Parcourir Faculté des arts et des sciences – Département de sciences économiques - Travaux et publications par auteur·e "Poitevin, Michel"

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  • Contract Renegotiation: a Simple Framework and Implications for Organization Theory 

    Beaudry, Paul; Poitevin, Michel (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 1993)

  • Disclosure of Information in regulatory Proceedings 

    Lewis, Tracy; Poitevin, Michel (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 1994)

  • Environmental Risk: Should Banks Be Liable? 

    Gobert, Karine; Poitevin, Michel (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 1998)
    This paper studies the impact of banks' liability for environmental damages caused by their borrowers. Laws or court decisions that declare banks liable for environmental damages have two objectives : (1) finding someone to pay for the damages and (2) ...

  • Environmental Risks : Should Banks Be Liable? 

    Gobert, Karine; Poitevin, Michel (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 1998)
    This paper studies the impact of banks' liability for environmental damages caused by their borrowers. Laws or court decisions that declare banks liable for environmental damages have two objectives : (1) finding someone to pay for the damages and (2) ...

  • Innis Lecture: Can the Theory of Incentives Explain Decentralization? 

    Poitevin, Michel (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2000)
    This survey presents within a single model three theories of decentralization of decision-making within organizations based on private information and incentives. Renegotiation, collusion, and limits on communication are three sufficient conditions for ...

  • Non-Commitment and Savings in Dynamic Risk-Sharing Contracts 

    Gobert, Karine; Poitevin, Michel (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 1998)
    We characterize the solution to a model of consumption smoothing using financing under non-commitment and savings. We show that, under certain conditions, these two different instruments complement each other perfectly. If the rate of time preference ...

  • Organizational Design of R&D Activities 

    Ambec, Stefan; Poitevin, Michel (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2001)
    This paper addresses the question of whether R&D should be carried out by an independent research unit or be produced in-house by the firm marketing the innovation. We define two organizational structures. In an integrated structure, the firm that ...

  • The Progressivity of Equalization Payments in Federations 

    Gravel, Nicolas; Poitevin, Michel (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2004)
    We investigate the conditions under which an inequality averse and additively separable welfarist constitution maker would always choose to set up a progressive equalization payments scheme in a federation with local public goods. A progressive ...

  • Should a non-rival public good always be provided centrally? 

    Gravel, Nicolas; Poitevin, Michel (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2015-11-06)
    This paper discusses the problem of optimal design of a jurisdiction structure from the view point of a utilitarian social planner when individuals with identical utility functions for a non-rival public good and private consumption have private ...

  • Using Ex-ante Payments in Self-Enforcing Risk-Sharing Contracts 

    Gauthier, Céline; Poitevin, Michel (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 1994)