Now showing items 352-371 of 564

  • Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: strategy-proofness and comparative statics 

    Ehlers, Lars; Klaus, Bettina (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2014-12)
    We study the problem of assigning indivisible and heterogenous objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offices, school or university admissions etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We consider ...
  • Oligarchies in Spatial Environments 

    Ehlers, Lars; Storcken, Ton (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2007)
    In spatial environments we consider social welfare functions satisfying Arrow’s requirements, i.e. weak Pareto and independence of irrelevant alternatives. Individual preferences measure distances between alternatives according to the Lp-norm (for a ...
  • On Complexity of Lobbying in Multiple Referenda 

    Christian, Robin; Slinko, Arkadii; ROSAMOND, Frances; FELLOWS, Mike (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2006-10)
    In this paper we show that lobbying in conditions of “direct democracy” is virtually impossible, even in conditions of complete information about voters preferences, since it would require solving a very computationally hard problem. We use the apparatus ...
  • On Fixed-Path Rationing Methods 

    Ehlers, Lars (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2001)
    Moulin (1999) characterizes the fixed-path rationing methods by efficiency, strategy-proofness, consistency, and resource-monotonicity. In this note, we give a straightforward proof of his result.
  • On Intertemporal General-Equilibrium Reallocation Effects of Europe's Move to a Single Market 

    Mercenier, Jean; Akitoby, Bernardin (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 1994)
  • On Limits to the Use of Linear Markov Strategies in Common Property Natural Resource Games 

    Gaudet, Gérard; Lohoues, Hervé (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2005)
    We derive conditions that must be satisfied by the primitives of the problem in order for an equilibrium in linear Markov strategies to exist in some common property natural resource differential games. These conditions impose restrictions on the ...
  • On Periodic Structures and Testing for Seasonal Unit Roots 

    Ghysels, Eric; Hall, A.; Lee, Hahn S. (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 1995)
  • On Periodic Time Series and Testing the Unit Root Hypothesis 

    Ghysels, Eric; Hall, A. (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 1993)
  • On Stable Factor Structurs in the Pricing of Risk 

    Ghysels, Eric (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 1995)
  • On Stackelberg Equilibria with Differentiated Products: the Critical Role of the Strategy Space 

    Boyer, Marcel; Moreaux, Michel (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 1985)
    Nous Considerons Dans Cet Article un Modele de Duopole Avec Produits Differencies; Nous Montrons Que le Caractere Substituts Vs Complements de Ces Produits Est un Facteur Important Dans la Determination du Mode de Concurrence Strategique (Cournot-Bertrand, ...
  • On the (Mis)Specification of Seasonality and Its Consequences: an Empirical Investigation with U.S. Data 

    Ghysels, Eric; Siklos, Pierre L.; Lee, Hahn S. (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 1992)
  • On the Analysis of Business Cycles Through the Spectrum of Chronologies 

    Ghysels, Eric; Sarlan, H. (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 1994)
  • On the constrained efficiency of strategy-proof random assignment 

    Basteck, Christian; Ehlers, Lars (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2023-04-25)
    We study random assignment of indivisible objects among a set of agents with strict preferences. Random Serial Dictatorship is known to be only ex-post efficient and there exist mechanisms which Pareto-dominate it ex-ante. However, we show that there ...
  • On the Dynamic Specification of International Asset Pricing Models 

    Kichian, Maral; Garcia, René; Ghysels, Eric (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 1995)
  • On the Effects of Mergers on Equilibrium Outcomes in a Common Property Renewable Asset Oligopoly 

    Benchekroun, Hassan; Gaudet, Gérard (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2013-11)
    This paper examines a dynamic game of exploitation of a common pool of some renewable asset by agents that sell the result of their exploitation on an oligopolistic market. A Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium of the game is used to analyze the effects ...
  • On the Game-Theoretic Structure of Public-Good Economies 

    Sprumont, Y. (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 1995)
  • On the Individual Optimality of Economic Integration 

    Castro, Rui; Koumtingué, Nelnan (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2011-03)
    Which countries find it optimal to form an economic union? We emphasize the risk-sharing benefits of economic integration. We consider an endowment world economy model, where international financial markets are incomplete and contracts not enforceable. ...
  • On the individual optimality of economic integration 

    Castro, Rui; Koumtingué, Nelnan (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2014-08)
    Which countries find it optimal to form an economic union? We emphasize the risk-sharing benefits of economic integration. Consider an endowment world economy model, where international financial markets are incomplete and contracts not enforceable. A ...
  • On the individual optimality of economic integration 

    Castro, Rui; Koumtingué, Nelnan (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2015-11)
    Which countries find it optimal to form an economic union? We emphasize the risk-sharing benefits of economic integration. Consider an endowment world economy model, where international financial markets are incomplete and contracts not enforceable. A ...
  • On the Manipulability of Proportional Representation 

    Slinko, Arkadii; WHITE, Shaun (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2006-07)
    This paper presents a new model of voter behaviour under methods of proportional representation (PR). We abstract away from rounding, and assume that a party securing k percent of the vote wins exactly k percent of the available seats. Under this ...