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dc.contributor.authorEhlers, Lars
dc.contributor.authorMajumdar, Dipjyoti
dc.contributor.authorMishra, Debasis
dc.contributor.authorSen, Arunava
dc.date.accessioned2016-03-22T18:01:09Z
dc.date.available2016-03-22T18:01:09Z
dc.date.issued2016-03
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1866/13352
dc.publisherUniversité de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques.fr
dc.subjectIncentive compabilityfr
dc.subjectCardinal utilitiesfr
dc.subjectOrdinalfr
dc.titleContinuity and Incentive Compatibility in Cardinal Voting Mechanismsfr
dc.typeArticlefr
dc.contributor.affiliationUniversité de Montréal. Faculté des arts et des sciences. Département de sciences économiques
dcterms.abstractWe show that every cardinal incentive compatible voting mechanism satisfying a continuity condition, must be ordinal. Our results apply to many standard models in mechanism design without transfers, including the standard voting models with any domain restrictions.fr
dcterms.isPartOfurn:ISSN:0709-9231
dcterms.languageengfr
UdeM.VersionRioxxVersion publiée / Version of Record
oaire.citationTitleCahier de recherche
oaire.citationIssue2016-04


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