What’s wrong with Charles Taylor’s moral pluralism
Article [Version of Record]
Is part ofIthaque ; 17
Publisher(s)Société philosophique Ithaque
In political philosophy one often encounters claims on behalf of pluralism, yet there is anything but a consensus over the meaning of this fundamental concept. It is true that there is no single pluralist tradition; rather, there are different pluralist traditions within different domains of practical reason. No one would object, however, to the notion that Isaiah Berlin’s “value pluralism” is a genuine form of meta-ethical pluralism. Charles Taylor is another philosopher who is often called a pluralist, but I shall argue that this is a mistake. One of the central goals of his philosophy is that of reconciling competing aims and ends and this is incompatible with pluralism.
Zúñiga, D. (2015). "What’s wrong with Charles Taylor’s moral pluralism". Ithaque, 17, p.21-43.