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dc.contributor.authorCastro, Rui
dc.contributor.authorKoumtingué, Nelnan
dc.publisherUniversité de Montréal. Département de sciences é
dc.subjectIncomplete marketsfr
dc.subjectEndogenous borrowing constraintsfr
dc.subjectRisk sharingfr
dc.subjectEconomic integrationfr
dc.titleOn the individual optimality of economic integrationfr
dc.contributor.affiliationUniversité de Montréal. Faculté des arts et des sciences. Département de sciences économiques
dcterms.abstractWhich countries find it optimal to form an economic union? We emphasize the risk-sharing benefits of economic integration. Consider an endowment world economy model, where international financial markets are incomplete and contracts not enforceable. A union solves both frictions among member countries. We uncover conditions on initial incomes and net foreign assets of potential union members such that forming a union is welfare-improving over standing alone in the world economy. Consistently with evidence on economic integration, unions in our model occur (i) relatively infrequently, and (ii) emerge more likely among homogeneous countries, and (iii) rich
dcterms.descriptionCe document est une version mise-à-jour du document "On the individual optimality of economic integration", mars 2011 :
UdeM.VersionRioxxVersion publiée / Version of Record
oaire.citationTitleCahier de recherche

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