Welfare criteria from choice: the sequential solution
dc.contributor.author | Horan, Sean | |
dc.contributor.author | Sprumont, Yves | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2015-01-14T20:11:03Z | |
dc.date.available | 2015-01-14T20:11:03Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2015-01 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1866/11346 | |
dc.publisher | Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques. | fr |
dc.subject | Choice-based welfare analysis, bounded rationality | fr |
dc.title | Welfare criteria from choice: the sequential solution | fr |
dc.type | Article | fr |
dc.contributor.affiliation | Université de Montréal. Faculté des arts et des sciences. Département de sciences économiques | |
dcterms.abstract | We study the problem of deriving a complete welfare ordering from a choice function. Under the sequential solution, the best alternative is the alternative chosen from the universal set; the second best is the one chosen when the best alternative is removed; and so on. We show that this is the only completion of Bernheim and Rangel's (2009) welfare relation that satisfies two natural axioms: neutrality, which ensures that the names of the alternatives are welfare-irrelevant; and persistence, which stipulates that every choice function between two welfare-identical choice functions must exhibit the same welfare ordering. | fr |
dcterms.isPartOf | urn:ISSN:0709-9231 | |
dcterms.language | eng | fr |
UdeM.VersionRioxx | Version publiée / Version of Record | |
oaire.citationTitle | Cahier de recherche | |
oaire.citationIssue | 2015-01 |
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