An algorithm for identifying agent-k-linked allocations in economies with indivisibilities
| dc.contributor.author | Andersson, Tommy | |
| dc.contributor.author | Ehlers, Lars | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2014-02-07T16:35:47Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2014-02-07T16:35:47Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2013-11 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1866/10313 | |
| dc.publisher | Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques. | fr |
| dc.subject | Least manipulable envy-free rules | fr |
| dc.subject | Algorithm | fr |
| dc.title | An algorithm for identifying agent-k-linked allocations in economies with indivisibilities | fr |
| dc.type | Article | fr |
| dc.contributor.affiliation | Université de Montréal. Faculté des arts et des sciences. Département de sciences économiques | |
| dcterms.abstract | We consider envy-free (and budget-balanced) rules that are least manipulable with respect to agents counting or with respect to utility gains. Recently it has been shown that for any profile of quasi-linear preferences, the outcome of any such least manipulable envy-free rule can be obtained via agent-k-linked allocations. This note provides an algorithm for identifying agent-k-linked allocations. | fr |
| dcterms.isPartOf | urn:ISSN:0709-9231 | |
| dcterms.language | eng | fr |
| UdeM.VersionRioxx | Version publiée / Version of Record | |
| oaire.citationTitle | Cahier de recherche | |
| oaire.citationIssue | 2013-12 |
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