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dc.contributor.advisorLepage, François
dc.contributor.authorLippiatt, Ian
dc.date.accessioned2012-05-15T18:43:28Z
dc.date.availableNO_RESTRICTIONen
dc.date.available2012-05-15T18:43:28Z
dc.date.issued2012-05-03
dc.date.submitted2011-12
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1866/7078
dc.subjectConditionnelsen
dc.subjectContrefactuelsen
dc.subjectMondes Possibleen
dc.subjectSémantiqueen
dc.subjectLogiqueen
dc.subjectConditionalen
dc.subjectCounterfactualen
dc.subjectPossible Worldsen
dc.subjectSemanticsen
dc.subjectLogicen
dc.subject.otherPhilosophy / Philosophie (UMI : 0422)en
dc.titleLewis’ Theory of Counterfactuals and Essentialismen
dc.typeThèse ou mémoire / Thesis or Dissertation
etd.degree.disciplinePhilosophieen
etd.degree.grantorUniversité de Montréalfr
etd.degree.levelMaîtrise / Master'sen
etd.degree.nameM.A.en
dcterms.abstractLa logique contemporaine a connu de nombreux développements au cours de la seconde moitié du siècle dernier. Le plus sensationnel est celui de la logique modale et de sa sémantique des mondes possibles (SMP) dû à Saul Kripke dans les années soixante. Ces dans ce cadre que David Lewis exposera sa sémantique des contrefactuels (SCF). Celle-ci constitue une véritable excroissance de l’architecture kripkéenne. Mais sur quoi finalement repose l’architecture kripkéenne elle-même ? Il semble bien que la réponse soit celle d’une ontologie raffinée ultimement basée sur la notion de mondes possible. Ce mémoire comporte quatre objectifs. Dans un premier temps, nous allons étudier ce qui distingue les contrefactuels des autres conditionnels et faire un survol historique de la littérature concernant les contrefactuels et leur application dans différent champs du savoir comme la philosophie des sciences et l’informatique. Dans un deuxième temps, nous ferons un exposé systématique de la théorie de Lewis telle qu’elle est exposée dans son ouvrage Counterfactuals. Finalement, nous allons explorer la fondation métaphysique des mondes possible de David Lewis dans son conception de Réalisme Modal.en
dcterms.abstractModern logic since the end of the Second World War has undergone many developments. Two of the most interesting of these are the Kripkian Possible World Semantics and Lewis’ system of Counterfactuals. The first was developed by Saul Kripke in the 1960s and the second was developed by David Lewis in the 1970s. In some senses we can say that Lewis’ system of counterfactuals or Counter Factual Semantics (CFS) is built on top of the architecture which Kripke created with his Possible Worlds Semantics (PWS). But, what is the Kripkian Possible World Semantics itself built on? The answer it seems is very finely tuned ontology founded on the notion of possible worlds. This paper will attempt to do the following. First, attempt to draw a distinction between on the one hand conditionals and the other counterfactuals and at the same time attempt to look at some of the historical literature surrounding counterfactuals and their application in various fields like the philosophy of science. Second, recapitulate Lewis’ system of counterfactual semantics as developed primarily in Lewis’ book Counterfactuals. Finally this paper will attempt to explore the metaphysical foundations of the possible worlds account argued for by David Lewis in his conception of Modal Realism.en
dcterms.languageengen


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