Pogge -vs- Sen on Global Poverty and Human Rights
Is part ofRevue Éthique et Économique / Ethics and Economics ; vol. 3, no 2
Publisher(s)Centre de recherche en éthique de l'UdeM (CRÉUM)
This Paper is part of a broader project examining the ways in which Amartya Sen’s “capability approach” provides a framework for thinking about global poverty as a denial or a violation of basic human rights. The Paper compares the “capability approach” as a basis for thinking about global poverty and human rights with the alternative framework developed by Thomas Pogge. Both the “capability approach” and Pogge’s theory of “severe poverty as a violation of negative duties” support the idea of “freedom from severe poverty as a basic human right”. However, there are important differences. The Paper examines the limitations of Pogge’s “apparent minimalism” and establishes the ways in which Sen’s treatment of the “capability approach” and human rights moves beyond a “minimalist normative position” whilst avoiding Pogge’s charge of “implausibility”.