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Moral Hazard and Marshallian Inefficiency: Evidence from Tunisia
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 1996)
In the presence of moral hazard, received agency theory predicts the Marshallian inefficiency of agricultural tenancy contracts, meaning that inputs per hectare on sharecropped land will differ from that on owned land. in ...
Arbitrage-Based Pricing when Volatility is Stochastic
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 1996)
The paper investigates the pricing of derivative securities with calendar-time maturities.
Investment Under Demand Uncertainty: the Newsboy Problem Revisited
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 1996)
In this article we study the effect of uncertainty on an entrepreneur who must choose the capacity of his business before knowing the demand for his product. The unit profit of operation is known with certainty but there ...
Cognition in Seemingly Riskless Choices and Judgments
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 1996)
We instillate rational cognition and learning in seemingly riskless choices and judgments. Preferences and possibilities are given in a stochastic sense and based on revisable expectations. the theory predicts experimental ...
Investment Under Demand Uncertainty: the Newsboy Problem Revisited
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 1996)
In this article we study the effect of uncertainty on an entrepreneur who must choose the capacity of his business before knowing the demand for his product. The unit profit of operation is known with certainty but there ...