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Infinite-Horizon Choice Functions
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2006)
We analyze infinite-horizon choice functions within the setting of a simple linear technology. Time consistency and efficiency are characterized by stationary consumption and inheritance functions, as well as a transversality ...
Strategy-proof preference aggregation
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2012-08)
An aggregation rule maps each profile of individual strict preference orderings
over a set of alternatives into a social ordering over that set. We call such a rule strategyproof if misreporting one’s preference never ...
Every Choice Function is Backwards-Induction Rationalizable
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2013-01)
A choice function is backwards-induction rationalizable if there exists a finite perfect-information extensive-form game such that, for each subset of alternatives, the
backwards-induction outcome of the restriction of ...