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Gale's fixed tax for exchanging houses
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2018-06)
We consider the taxation of exchanges among a set of agents where each agent owns one object. Agents may have different valuations for the objects and they need to pay taxes for exchanges. Using basic properties, we show ...
Non-manipulable house exchangeunder (minimum) equilibrium prices
(Lund University. Department of economics, 2020)
We consider a market with indivisible objects, called houses, and money. On this market,
each house is initially owned (or rented) by some agent and each agent demands precisely
one house. The problem is to identify the ...
Budget-Balance, Fairness and Minimal Manipulability
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2010-10-20)
A common real-life problem is to fairly allocate a number of indivisible objects and a fixed amount of money among a group of agents. Fairness requires that each agent weakly prefers his consumption bundle to any other ...
Transferring ownership of public housing to existing tenants: a mechanism design approach
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2014-08)
This paper explores situations where tenants in public houses, in a specific neighborhood, are given the legislated right to buy the houses they live in or can choose to remain in their houses and pay the regulated rent. ...
(Minimally) 'epsilon'-incentive compatible competitive equilibria in economies with indivisibilities
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2012-04)
We consider competitive and budget-balanced allocation rules for problems where a number
of indivisible objects and a fixed amount of money is allocated among a group of agents. In 'small' economies, we identify under ...