Recherche
Voici les éléments 1-9 de 9
Gale's fixed tax for exchanging houses
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2018-06)
We consider the taxation of exchanges among a set of agents where each agent owns one object. Agents may have different valuations for the objects and they need to pay taxes for exchanges. Using basic properties, we show ...
Organizing time banks: Lessons from matching markets
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2018-07)
A time bank is a group of people that set up a common platform to trade services among themselves. There are several well-known problems associated with this type of time banking, e.g., high overhead costs and difficulties ...
Dynamic refugee matching
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2018-10)
Asylum seekers are often assigned to localities upon arrival using uninformed matching systems, which lead to inefficient and unfair allocations. This paper proposes an informed dynamic mechanism as an intuitive and ...
An algorithm for identifying agent-k-linked allocations in economies with indivisibilities
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2013-11)
We consider envy-free (and budget-balanced) rules that are least manipulable with respect to agents counting or with respect to utility gains. Recently it has been shown that for any profile of quasi-linear preferences, ...
Non-manipulable house exchangeunder (minimum) equilibrium prices
(Lund University. Department of economics, 2020)
We consider a market with indivisible objects, called houses, and money. On this market,
each house is initially owned (or rented) by some agent and each agent demands precisely
one house. The problem is to identify the ...
Budget-Balance, Fairness and Minimal Manipulability
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2010-10-20)
A common real-life problem is to fairly allocate a number of indivisible objects and a fixed amount of money among a group of agents. Fairness requires that each agent weakly prefers his consumption bundle to any other ...
Assigning Refugees to Landlords in Sweden: Stable Maximum Matchings
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2016-12)
The member states of the European Union received 1.2 million first time asylum applications in 2015 (a doubling compared to 2014). Even if asylum will be granted for many of the refugees that made the journey to Europe, ...
Transferring ownership of public housing to existing tenants: a mechanism design approach
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2014-08)
This paper explores situations where tenants in public houses, in a specific neighborhood, are given the legislated right to buy the houses they live in or can choose to remain in their houses and pay the regulated rent. ...
(Minimally) 'epsilon'-incentive compatible competitive equilibria in economies with indivisibilities
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2012-04)
We consider competitive and budget-balanced allocation rules for problems where a number
of indivisible objects and a fixed amount of money is allocated among a group of agents. In 'small' economies, we identify under ...