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Now showing items 11-18 of 18
An Axiomatization of the Serial Cost-Sharing Method
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2009-12)
We o¤er an axiomatization of the serial cost-sharing method of Friedman and Moulin (1999). The key property in our axiom system is Group Demand Monotonicity, asking that when a group of agents raise their demands, not all ...
Size invariant measures of association: characterization and difficulties
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2014-08)
A measure of association is row-size invariant if it is unaffected by the multiplication of all entries in a row of a cross-classification table by a same positive number. It is class-size invariant if it is unaffected by ...
Ordinally consistent tournament solutions
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2016-03)
A set ranking method assigns to each tournament on a given set an ordering of the subsets of that set. Such a method is consistent if (i) the items in the set are ranked in the same order as the sets of items they beat and ...
Ranking by rating
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2016-02)
Each item in a given collection is characterized by a set of possible performances. A (ranking) method is a function that assigns an ordering of the items to every performance profile. Ranking by Rating consists in evaluating ...
Relative Nash welfarism
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2017-09)
Relative Nash welfarism is a solution to the problem of aggregating von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences over a set of lotteries. It ranks such lotteries according to the product of any collection of 0-normalized von ...
Strategyproof Choice of Acts : Beyond Dictatorship
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2017-05)
We model social choices as acts mapping states of nature to (public) outcomes. A social choice function (or SCF) assigns an act to every profile of subjective expected utility preferences over acts. A SCF is strategyproof ...
Welfare criteria from choice: the sequential solution
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2015-01)
We study the problem of deriving a complete welfare ordering from a choice function. Under the sequential solution, the best alternative is the alternative chosen from the universal set; the second best is the one chosen ...
Strategy-proof choice of acts : a preliminary study
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2016-06)
We model social choices as acts mapping states of the world to (social) outcomes. A (social choice) rule assigns an act to every profile of subjective expected utility preferences over acts. A rule is strategy-proof if no ...