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Belief-weighted Nash aggregation of Savage preferences
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2018-09)
The 'belief-weighted Nash social welfare functions' are methods for aggregating Savage preferences defined over a set of acts. Each such method works as follows. Fix a 0-normalized subjective expected utility representation ...
Strategy-proof choice under monotonic additive preferences
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2020-05)
We describe the class of strategy-proof mechanisms for choosing sets of objects when preferences are additive and monotonic.
Two-stage majoritarian choice
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2020-05)
We propose a class of decisive collective choice rules that rely on an exogenous linear ordering to partition the majority relation into two acyclic relations. The first relation is used to obtain a shortlist of the feasible ...
Infinite-Horizon Choice Functions
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2006)
We analyze infinite-horizon choice functions within the setting of a simple linear technology. Time consistency and efficiency are characterized by stationary consumption and inheritance functions, as well as a transversality ...
Sharing the Cost of a Public Good: an Incentive-Constrained Axiomatic Approach
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2006-07)
We study the problem of provision and cost-sharing of a public good in large economies where exclusion, complete or partial, is possible. We search for incentive-constrained efficient allocation rules that display fairness ...
Resource egalitarianism with a dash of efficiency
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2007-05)
Strategy-proof preference aggregation
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2012-08)
An aggregation rule maps each profile of individual strict preference orderings
over a set of alternatives into a social ordering over that set. We call such a rule strategyproof if misreporting one’s preference never ...
Every Choice Function is Backwards-Induction Rationalizable
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2013-01)
A choice function is backwards-induction rationalizable if there exists a finite perfect-information extensive-form game such that, for each subset of alternatives, the
backwards-induction outcome of the restriction of ...
Sharing the Cost of a Public Good without Subsidies
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2006-07)
We study the construction of a social ordering function for the case of a public good financed by contributions from the population, and we extend the analysis of Maniquet and Sprumont (2004) to the case when contributions ...
Relative Egalitarianism and Related Criteria
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2009-02)
We reconsider the problem of aggregating individual preference orderings into a single social ordering when alternatives are lotteries and individual preferences are of the von Neumann-Morgenstern type. Relative egalitarianism ...