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Robust design in monotonic matching markets : a case for firm-proposing deferred-acceptance
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2018-05)
We study two-sided matching markets among workers and firms. Workers seek one position at a firm but firms may employ several workers. In many applications those markets are monotonic: leaving positions unfilled is costly ...
Matching Markets under (In)complete Information
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2007-02-01)
We are the first to introduce incomplete information to centralized many-to-one matching markets such as those to entry-level labor markets or college admissions. This is important because in real life markets (i) any agent ...
Manipulation via Capacities Revisited
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2009-03)
This paper revisits manipulation via capacities in centralized two-sided matching markets. Sönmez (1997) showed that no stable mechanism is nonmanipulable via capacities. We show that non-manipulability via capacities can ...
Student-optimal interdistrict school choice : district-based versus school-based admissions
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques, 2022)
Hafalir, Kojima and Yenmez (2022) introduce a model of interdistrict school choice:
each district consists of a set of schools and the district’s admission rule places applicants to the schools in the district. We show ...