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Resource-Monotonicity for House Allocation Problems
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2003)
We study a simple model of assigning indivisible objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offices, etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We completely describe all rules ...
Efficient Priority Rules
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2003)
We study the assignment of indivisible objects with quotas (houses, jobs, or offices) to a set of agents (students, job applicants, or professors). Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not ...
Consistent House Allocation
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2005)
In practice we often face the problem of assigning indivisible objects (e.g., schools, housing, jobs, offices) to agents (e.g., students, homeless, workers, professors) when monetary compensations are not possible. We show ...