Recherche
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Matching Markets under (In)complete Information
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2007-02-01)
We are the first to introduce incomplete information to centralized many-to-one matching markets such as those to entry-level labor markets or college admissions. This is important because in real life markets (i) any agent ...
Free Triples, Large Indifference Classes and the Majority Rule
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2007-03)
Oligarchies in Spatial Environments
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2007)
In spatial environments we consider social welfare functions satisfying Arrow’s requirements, i.e. weak Pareto and independence of irrelevant alternatives. Individual preferences measure distances between alternatives ...