Recherche
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Choosing Wisely: The Natural Multi-Bidding Mechanism
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2005)
Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2002) propose a multi-bidding mechanism to determine a winner from a set of possible projects. The winning project is implemented and its surplus is shared among the agents. In the multi-bidding ...
Top-Cycle Rationalizability
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2005)
We identify necessary and sufficient conditions for the choice set from every subset A of a (finite) universal set X to coincide with the top cycle in A of some fixed tournament on X.
Consistent House Allocation
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2005)
In practice we often face the problem of assigning indivisible objects (e.g., schools, housing, jobs, offices) to agents (e.g., students, homeless, workers, professors) when monetary compensations are not possible. We show ...
Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Sets in Matching Problems
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2005)
The following properties of the core of a one well-known: (i) the core is non-empty; (ii) the core is a lattice; and (iii) the set of unmatched agents is identical for any two matchings belonging to the core. The literature ...