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Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance under Responsive Priorities
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2009-12)
In many economic environments - such as college admissions, student placements at public schools, and university housing allocation - indivisible objects with capacity constraints are assigned to a set of agents when each ...
Resource-Monotonicity for House Allocation Problems
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2003)
We study a simple model of assigning indivisible objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offices, etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We completely describe all rules ...
Efficient Priority Rules
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2003)
We study the assignment of indivisible objects with quotas (houses, jobs, or offices) to a set of agents (students, job applicants, or professors). Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not ...
Consistent House Allocation
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2005)
In practice we often face the problem of assigning indivisible objects (e.g., schools, housing, jobs, offices) to agents (e.g., students, homeless, workers, professors) when monetary compensations are not possible. We show ...
Probabilistic Assignments of Identical Indivisible Objects and Uniform Probabilistic Rules
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2001)
We consider a probabilistic approach to the problem of assigning k indivisible identical objects to a set of agents with single-peaked preferences. Using the ordinal extension of preferences, we characterize the class of ...