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Strategy-proof choice under monotonic additive preferences
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2020-05)
We describe the class of strategy-proof mechanisms for choosing sets of objects when preferences are additive and monotonic.
Two-stage majoritarian choice
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2020-05)
We propose a class of decisive collective choice rules that rely on an exogenous linear ordering to partition the majority relation into two acyclic relations. The first relation is used to obtain a shortlist of the feasible ...
Estimating COVID-19 prevalence in the United States: A sample selection model approach
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2020-04)
Robust minimal instability of the top trading cycles mechanism
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2020-03)
In the context of priority-based resource allocation, we formulate methods to compare assignments in terms of their stability as binary relations (on the set of possible assignments) that depend on the preference and the ...
Spouses, children and entrepreneurship
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2020-04)
We develop a model of endogenous entrepreneurship and marriage. Spouses influence entrepreneurship via three channels: they reduce benefits by working less the more profitable the business is, they reduce costs by working ...
Blocking pairs versus blocking students: Stability comparisons in school choice
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2020-04)
It is known that there are school choice problems without an efficient and stable assignment. We consider comparing assignments in terms of their stability by comparing their sets of blocking (student-school) pairs or ...
Fiscal rules with discretion for an economic union
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques, 2022-03-11)
The design of a fiscal rule involves a trade-off between committing governments to
a fiscally responsible budget and giving governments the discretion to respond to
shocks. What is the optimal degree of discretion for ...
Strategy-proof and envyfree random assignment
(Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, 2020-12-22)
We study the random assignment of indivisible objects among a set of agents with strict
preferences. We show that there exists no mechanism which is strategy-proof, envyfree
and unanimous. Then we weaken the latter ...
Normative properties for object allocation problems : characterizations and trade-offs
(Université de Lausanne. École des hautes études commerciales. Département d'économie, 2021-03)
We consider the allocation of indivisible objects among agents when monetary transfers are not allowed. Agents have strict preferences over the objects (possibly about not getting any object) and are assigned at most one ...
Non-manipulable house exchangeunder (minimum) equilibrium prices
(Lund University. Department of economics, 2020)
We consider a market with indivisible objects, called houses, and money. On this market,
each house is initially owned (or rented) by some agent and each agent demands precisely
one house. The problem is to identify the ...