Now showing items 1-12 of 12

  • A Characterization of Consistent Collective Choice Rules 

    Bossert, Walter; Suzumura, Kotaro (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2006-08)
    We characterize a class of collective choice rules such that collective preference relations are consistent. Consistency is a weakening of transitivity and a strengthening of acyclicity requiring that there be no cycles with at least one strict preference. ...
  • Decisive Coalitions and Coherence Properties 

    Bossert, Walter; Suzumura, Kotaro (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2009-03)
    In a seminal contribution, Hansson has demonstrated that the family of decisive coalitions associated with an Arrovian social welfare function forms an ultrafilter. If the population under consideration is infinite, his result implies the existence of ...
  • Infinite-Horizon Choice Functions 

    Bossert, Walter; Asheim, Geir B.; Sprumont, Yves; Suzumura, Kotaro (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2006)
    We analyze infinite-horizon choice functions within the setting of a simple linear technology. Time consistency and efficiency are characterized by stationary consumption and inheritance functions, as well as a transversality condition. In addition, ...
  • Multi-Profile Intergenerational Social Choice 

    Bossert, Walter; Suzumura, Kotaro (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2008-06)
    Ferejohn and Page transplanted a stationarity axiom from Koopmans’ theory of impatience into Arrow’s social choice theory with an infinite horizon and showed that the Arrow axioms and stationarity lead to a dictatorship by the first generation. We prove ...
  • Non-Deteriorating Choice without Full Transitivity 

    Bossert, Walter; Suzumura, Kotaro (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2006-08)
    Although the theory of greatest-element rationalizability and maximal-element rationalizability under general domains and without full transitivity of rationalizing relations is well-developed in the literature, these standard notions of rational choice ...
  • Priorities in the Location of Multiple Public Facilities 

    Bochet, Olivier; Gordon, Sidartha (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2008-07)
    A collective decision problem is described by a set of agents, a profile of single-peaked preferences over the real line and a number k of public facilities to be located. We consider public facilities that do not su¤er from congestion and are ...
  • Quasi-Transitive and Suzumura Consistent Relations 

    Bossert, Walter; Suzumura, Kotaro (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2009-03)
    We examine properties of binary relations that complement quasi-transitivity and Suzumura consistency in the sense that they, together with the original axiom(s), are equivalent to transitivity. In general, the conjunction of quasi-transitivity and ...
  • Rationality, External Norms and the Epistemic Value of Menus 

    Bossert, Walter; Suzumura, Kotaro (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2008-06)
    Ever since Sen’s (1993; 1997) criticism on the notion of internal consistency or menu independence of choice, there exists a widespread perception that the standard revealed preference approach to the theory of rational choice has difficulties in coping ...
  • Relative Egalitarianism and Related Criteria 

    Sprumont, Yves (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2009-02)
    We reconsider the problem of aggregating individual preference orderings into a single social ordering when alternatives are lotteries and individual preferences are of the von Neumann-Morgenstern type. Relative egalitarianism ranks alternatives by ...
  • Sharing the Cost of a Public Good without Subsidies 

    FLEURBAEY, Marc; Sprumont, Yves (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2006-07)
    We study the construction of a social ordering function for the case of a public good financed by contributions from the population, and we extend the analysis of Maniquet and Sprumont (2004) to the case when contributions cannot be negative, i.e. ...
  • Sharing the Cost of a Public Good: an Incentive-Constrained Axiomatic Approach 

    Sprumont, Yves; MANIQUET, François (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2006-07)
    We study the problem of provision and cost-sharing of a public good in large economies where exclusion, complete or partial, is possible. We search for incentive-constrained efficient allocation rules that display fairness properties. Population ...
  • Single-Peaked Choice 

    Bossert, Walter; Peters, Hans (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2006-09)
    Single-peaked preferences have played an important role in the literature ever since they were used by Black (1948) to formulate a domain restriction that is sufficient for the exclusion of cycles according to the majority rule. In this paper, we ...