Sentiment moral et contrainte légale Kant lecteur de Hutcheson
dc.contributor | Grapotte, Sophie | |
dc.contributor | Lequan, Mai | |
dc.contributor | Sosoe, Lukas K. | |
dc.contributor.author | Piché, Claude | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-01-27T17:03:46Z | |
dc.date.available | NO_RESTRICTION | fr |
dc.date.available | 2021-01-27T17:03:46Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2017 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1866/24564 | |
dc.publisher | Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin | fr |
dc.subject | Kant | fr |
dc.subject | Hutcheson | fr |
dc.subject | Baumgarten | fr |
dc.subject | Crusius | fr |
dc.subject | Obligation | fr |
dc.subject | Sentiment moral | fr |
dc.subject | Moral feeling | fr |
dc.title | Sentiment moral et contrainte légale Kant lecteur de Hutcheson | fr |
dc.type | Chapitre de livre / Book chapter | fr |
dc.contributor.affiliation | Université de Montréal. Faculté des arts et des sciences. Département de philosophie | fr |
dcterms.abstract | Dans cet article, nous retraçons l’évolution du rôle du sentiment moral dans la philosophie de Kant depuis la Recherche sur l’évidence (1762) jusqu’à la Doctrine de la vertu (1797). En 1762, l’obligation morale (Verbindlichkeit) se répartit entre un volet formel purement rationnel inspiré de Baumgarten et de Crusius, et un volet matériel fondé sur le sentiment moral, explicitement emprunté à Hutcheson. Or en adoptant plus tard le modèle légal (Cruisus) d’une loi morale à titre de principe rationnel sur lequel se fonde désormais exclusivement l’obligation morale, Kant est amené à rétrograder le sentiment moral au statut d’un simple effet de la loi sur la sensibilité. À travers lui, la nécessitation (Nötigung) inhérente à l’obligation est littéralement ressentie. Ainsi le sentiment de respect ne sera-t-il pas le critère du bien, mais plutôt le ressort (Triebfeder) de l’action bonne. | fr |
dcterms.abstract | In this article, I would like to examine the evolution of the role of moral feeling in Kant’s philosophy from the Inquiry Concerning the Distinctness (1762) to the Doctrine of Virtue (1797). In 1762, moral obligation (Verbindlichkeit) is grounded both on a purely formal-rational component, inspired by Baumgarten and Crusius, and on a material component based on a moral feeling explicitly borrowed from Hutcheson. But by later adopting the legal model (Crusius) of a moral law conceived as a rational principle on which, from then on, the moral obligation is exclusively grounded, Kant is led to downplay the status of moral feeling by seeing in it a simple effect of the law on sensibility. Through this feeling the necessitation (Nötigung) implicit in moral obligation is literally felt. Accordingly, the feeling of respect will not be considered as the criterion of the good, but rather as the incentive (Triebfeder) of the moral action. | fr |
dcterms.description | Il s'agit d'une pré-publication (version de travail). | fr |
dcterms.isPartOf | urn:ISBN:9782711627561 | fr |
dcterms.language | fra | fr |
UdeM.ReferenceFournieParDeposant | ISBN 978-2-7116-2756-1 | fr |
oaire.citationTitle | Kant et les penseurs de langue anglaise : mélanges en l'honneur de Jean Ferrari | fr |
oaire.citationStartPage | 237 | fr |
oaire.citationEndPage | 253 | fr |
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