Self-referentiality in Kant's transcendental philosophy
dc.contributor | Robinson, Hoke | |
dc.contributor.author | Piché, Claude | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2019-02-25T14:05:16Z | |
dc.date.available | NO_RESTRICTION | fr |
dc.date.available | 2019-02-25T14:05:16Z | |
dc.date.issued | 1995 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1866/21452 | |
dc.publisher | Marquette University Press | fr |
dc.subject | Kant | fr |
dc.subject | Bubner | fr |
dc.subject | Self-referentiality | fr |
dc.subject | Dynamic principles | fr |
dc.subject | Contingency | fr |
dc.subject | Transcendental | fr |
dc.title | Self-referentiality in Kant's transcendental philosophy | fr |
dc.type | Contribution à un congrès / Conference object | fr |
dc.contributor.affiliation | Université de Montréal. Faculté des arts et des sciences. Département de philosophie | fr |
dcterms.abstract | Inspired by the thesis of Rüdiger Bubner according to which Kant’s argumentation in the Transcendental Deduction is self-referential, I propose to extend the scope of this thesis to the transcendental Analytic as a whole. The question at stake is: What are the rules that guide transcendental critique if it is not to transgress the finiteness of its standpoint? I suggest that they are to be found in the dynamic Principles of the Analytic since these are also valid, mutatis mutandis, for the transcendental critique that describes them. In other words: these Principles are self-referential. For instance Kant claims that they are necessary for experience in general, but that their application is “contingent” (A 160/B 199). They are not necessary in themselves, no more than a necessary cause within experience is in itself necessary, but rather contingent, i.e.: dependent on another cause, as the principle of causality specifies. Now the dynamic principles are themselves contingent in their implementation, that is: dependent on the material conditions of experience in general. The transcendental conditions here are conditioned by the empirical conditions. | fr |
dcterms.isPartOf | urn:ISBN:0874624770 | fr |
dcterms.language | eng | fr |
UdeM.ReferenceFournieParDeposant | ISBN 0-87463-477-0 (Vol. II.1), p. 259-267. | fr |
oaire.citationTitle | Proceedings of the Eighth International Kant Congress | |
oaire.citationVolume | 1 | |
oaire.citationStartPage | 259 | |
oaire.citationEndPage | 267 | |
oaire.citationConferencePlace | Memphis (Tenn.) | |
oaire.citationConferenceDate | 1995 |
Fichier·s constituant ce document
Ce document figure dans la ou les collections suivantes
Ce document diffusé sur Papyrus est la propriété exclusive des titulaires des droits d'auteur et est protégé par la Loi sur le droit d'auteur (L.R.C. (1985), ch. C-42). Il peut être utilisé dans le cadre d'une utilisation équitable et non commerciale, à des fins d'étude privée ou de recherche, de critique ou de compte-rendu comme le prévoit la Loi. Pour toute autre utilisation, une autorisation écrite des titulaires des droits d'auteur sera nécessaire.