Kant et le problème de l'affection
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Abstract(s)
Starting with Vaihinger’s famous trilemma which presents the different possibilities for
explaining the origin of affection, I critically assess the classical theses of Jacobi, Aenesidemus-Schulze,
Adickes, Kemp Smith, Paton and Allison on this subject. I argue that Kant is entitled to claim that both the
empirical object and the thing in itself are the source of affection. It depends on the point of view one
adopts: empirical or transcendental. But in this last case we face the famous problem: How could Kant dare
to depict the thing in itself as the “cause” of affection? I claim that his description complies mutatis mutandis
with the conditions imposed upon the principle of causality. If this principle states that the cause and the
effect are “heterogeneous” and that the necessary cause may be a mere “indeterminate” something, then the
affecting thing in itself, at its own level, satisfies both conditions: The thing in itself and sensation are radically
heterogeneous and the essence of this thing remains for Kant totally “problematic”, although its existence is
declared certain. The Kantian use of the concept of causality is justified here by what must be called the selfreferentiality of transcendental philosophy.
Note(s)
Ce texte est inédit. Il s’agit de la traduction française intégrale d’un article rédigé en anglais qui est paru, amputé de sa dernière section, sous le titre “Kant and the problem of affection” dans la revue Symposium : Canadian journal of continental philosophy, vol. 8, no. 2, 2004, p. 275-297.This document disseminated on Papyrus is the exclusive property of the copyright holders and is protected by the Copyright Act (R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42). It may be used for fair dealing and non-commercial purposes, for private study or research, criticism and review as provided by law. For any other use, written authorization from the copyright holders is required.