Qu’est-ce qu’une “analogie” de l’expérience?

Abstract

In this paper I propose a new interpretation of the word “analogy” used by Kant to designate the principles of relation. After a brief presentation of three Kant-scholars (Guyer, Kemp Smith and Walsh) who remain doubtful about Kant’s intention with the use of that word, I discuss and criticize two proposals aiming at an understanding of the meaning of the term analogy: the empirical reading of F. Marty and the logical approach of A. Pieper. My own thesis is the following: Kant’s use is sound as long as the point of reference in the Analogies of Experience, the primum analogatum, is the pure form of time. In fact the categories of relation acquire their meaning only through this reference to time. My demonstration of the presence of analogies here is based on four grammatical conjunctions used by Kant in his chapter on causality: “Wenn…so ist es auch”, “eben dieselbe…als”, “so wie…”, and “ebenso wie…” In all these cases the point of reference of these syntactic structures introducing an analogy is the form of time, which is indispensible if the categories are to transpose on to the appearances a necessary order: The order of the appearances is analog to order of the places in pure time.