Now showing items 1-3 of 3

  • Cooperative VS. Non-cooperative Truels: Little Agreement, but Does that Matter? 

    Bossert, Walter; BRAMS, Steven J.; KILGOUR, D. Marc (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2000)
    It is well-known that non-cooperative and cooperative game theory may yield different solutions to games. These differences are particularly dramatic in the case of truels, or three-person duels, in which the players may fire sequentially or simultaneously, ...
  • Core Retionalizability in Two-Agent Exchange Economies 

    Bossert, Walter; Sprumont, Yves (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2000)
    We provide a characterization of selection correspondences in two-person exchange economies that can be core rationalized in the sense that there exists a preference profile with some standard properties that generates the observed choices as the set ...
  • Semi-Parametric Weak Instrument Regressions with an Application to the Risk-Return Trade-off 

    Perron, Benoit (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 1999)
    Recent work shows that a low correlation between the instruments and the included variables leads to serious inference problems. We extend the local-to-zero analysis of models with weak instruments to models with estimated instruments and regressors ...