Parcourir Faculté des arts et des sciences – Département de sciences économiques par sujet "strategy-proofness"
Voici les éléments 1-5 de 5
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Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance under Responsive Priorities
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2009-12)In many economic environments - such as college admissions, student placements at public schools, and university housing allocation - indivisible objects with capacity constraints are assigned to a set of agents when each agent receives at most one ... -
Consistent House Allocation
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2005)In practice we often face the problem of assigning indivisible objects (e.g., schools, housing, jobs, offices) to agents (e.g., students, homeless, workers, professors) when monetary compensations are not possible. We show that a rule that satisfies ... -
Efficient Strategy-Proof Allocation Functions in Linear Production Economies
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 1998)In a linear production model, we characterize the class of efficient and strategy-proof allocation functions, and the class of efficient and coalition strategy-proof allocation functions. In the former class, requiring equal treatment of equals allows ... -
Public Decisions: Solidarity and the Status Quo
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2006)A public decision model specifies a fixed set of alternatives A, a variable population, and a fixed set of admissible preferences over A, common to all agents. We study the implications, for any social choice function, of the principle of solidarity, ... -
Strategy-proof tie-breaking
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2011)We study a general class of priority-based allocation problems with weak priority orders and identify conditions under which there exists a strategy-proof mechanism which always chooses an agent-optimal stable, or constrained efficient, matching. A ...
