Epistemic deontologism and the voluntarist strategy against doxastic involuntarism
According to the deontological conception of epistemic justification, a belief is justified when it is our obligation or duty as rational creatures to believe it. However, this view faces an important objection according to which we cannot have such epistemic obligations since our beliefs are never under our voluntary control. One possible strategy against this argument is to show that we do have voluntary control over some of our beliefs, and that we therefore have epistemic obligations. This is what I call the voluntarist strategy. I examine it and argue that it is not promising. I show how the voluntarist attempts of Carl Ginet and Brian Weatherson fail, and conclude that it would be more fruitful for deontologists to look for a different strategy.
Côté-Bouchard, C. (2011). "Epistemic deontologism and the voluntarist strategy against doxastic involuntarism". Ithaque, 8, p.1-16.
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