Implementing Revisionism: Assessing a Revisionist Theory of Moral Responsibility
Article [Version of Record]
Is part ofIthaque ; 10
Publisher(s)Société philosophique Ithaque
The aim of this paper is to examine a particular substantive theory among others in the set of “revisionist” theories of moral responsibility, namely, Manuel Vargas’ version of the moral influence account of the justification of responsibility- specific practices. Moderate revisionism, which Vargas (2005) endorses, advocates a clear distinction between descriptive and normative questions, which enables a naturalistically plausible account of responsibility that does not jeopardize the normative aspect. However, while Vargas provides a useful framework for thinking about revisionism, I argue that despite its initial appeal, an actual revisionist theory does not seem to track as closely as we would like what I call the “meta-theory” of revisionism, viz. what Vargas defines as the features of moderate revisionism. Outlining these differences enables the formulation of observations about 1) the role of revisionist approaches for theorizing about moral responsibility and 2) how revisionism can be integrated with scientifically informed approaches.
Banville, F.-I. (2012). "Implementing Revisionism: Assessing a Revisionist Theory of Moral Responsibility". Ithaque, 10, p.115-135.