Bandits in the Lab
| dc.contributor.author | Hoelzemann, Johannes | |
| dc.contributor.author | Klein, Nicolas | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2018-09-24T18:32:54Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2018-09-24T18:32:54Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2018-08 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1866/20921 | |
| dc.publisher | Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques. | fr |
| dc.subject | Strategic experimentation | fr |
| dc.subject | Exponential bandits | fr |
| dc.subject | Learning | fr |
| dc.subject | Dynamic games | fr |
| dc.subject | Markov perfect equilibirum | fr |
| dc.subject | Continuous time | fr |
| dc.subject | Laboratory experiments | fr |
| dc.subject | Eye tracking | fr |
| dc.title | Bandits in the Lab | fr |
| dc.type | Article | fr |
| dc.contributor.affiliation | Université de Montréal. Faculté des arts et des sciences. Département de sciences économiques | |
| dcterms.abstract | We test Keller, Rady, Cripps’ (2005) game of strategic experimentation with exponential bandits in the laboratory. We find strong support for the prediction of free-riding because of strategic concerns. We also find strong evidence for behavior that is characteristic of Markov perfect equilibrium: non-cutoff behavior, lonely pioneers and frequent switches of action. | fr |
| dcterms.isPartOf | urn:ISSN:0709-9231 | |
| dcterms.language | eng | fr |
| UdeM.VersionRioxx | Version publiée / Version of Record | fr |
| oaire.citationTitle | Cahier de recherche | |
| oaire.citationIssue | 2018-09 |
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