RSS 1.0Faculté des arts et des sciences – Département de sciences économiques - Travaux et publications
Cette collection accueille les publications savantes et d’autres types de travaux d’auteur.e.s associé.e.s à cette unité. Voir aussi les collections Thèses et mémoires et Production étudiante de l'unité.
Recent Submissions
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Accident-Induced absence from work and wage growth
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques, 2024-01-14)How do short absences from work affect workers’ labor trajectory? We use linked employer-employee administrative data from Hungary, with rich administrative health records, and use unexpected and mild accidents with no permanent labor productivity ... -
Nonparametric estimation of the density of a change-point
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques, 2024-01)The paper considers a panel model where the regression coe¢ cients undergo changes at an unknown time point, di§erentfor each series. The timings of changes are assumed to be independent, identically distributed, and drawn from some com-mon distribution, ... -
How are wages determined? : a quasi-experimental test of wage determination theories
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques, 2023-01-02)We use novel quasi-experimental variation to (i) test whether firm-specific demand shocks impact wages, and (ii) to disentangle predictions coming from wage bargaining and firm upward sloping labor supply curve (wage posting). We use a unique ... -
Fiscal rules with discretion for an economic union
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques, 2022-03-11)The design of a fiscal rule involves a trade-off between committing governments to a fiscally responsible budget and giving governments the discretion to respond to shocks. What is the optimal degree of discretion for deficit-biased governments ... -
Respecting improvement in markets with indivisible goods
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques, 2023-09-17)We study markets with indivisible goods where monetary compensations are fixed (or are not possible). Each individual is endowed with an object and a preference relation over all objects. Respect for improvement means that when the ranking of an agent’s ... -
On the constrained efficiency of strategy-proof random assignment
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2023-04-25)We study random assignment of indivisible objects among a set of agents with strict preferences. Random Serial Dictatorship is known to be only ex-post efficient and there exist mechanisms which Pareto-dominate it ex-ante. However, we show that there ... -
Student-optimal interdistrict school choice : district-based versus school-based admissions
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques, 2022)Hafalir, Kojima and Yenmez (2022) introduce a model of interdistrict school choice: each district consists of a set of schools and the district’s admission rule places applicants to the schools in the district. We show that any district’s admission ... -
Normative properties for object allocation problems : characterizations and trade-offs
(Université de Lausanne. École des hautes études commerciales. Département d'économie, 2021-03)We consider the allocation of indivisible objects among agents when monetary transfers are not allowed. Agents have strict preferences over the objects (possibly about not getting any object) and are assigned at most one object. How should one allocate ... -
Three public goods and lexicographic preferences : replacement principle
(Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, 2021-03)We study the problem of locating multiple public goods for a group of agents with single-peaked preferences over an interval. An alternative specifies for each public good a location. In Miyagawa (1998) each agent consumes only his most preferred ... -
Strategy-proof and envyfree random assignment
(Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, 2020-12-22)We study the random assignment of indivisible objects among a set of agents with strict preferences. We show that there exists no mechanism which is strategy-proof, envyfree and unanimous. Then we weaken the latter requirement to q-unanimity: when ...
