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dc.contributor.authorLarouche, Viateur
dc.contributor.authorAudet, Michel
dc.date.accessioned2007-11-07T20:38:22Z
dc.date.available2007-11-07T20:38:22Z
dc.date.issued1992
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1866/1749
dc.format.extent1310756 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.publisherUniversité de Montréal. École de relations industrielles.
dc.subjectthéories
dc.subjectrelations industrielles
dc.subject[JEL:C78] Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theoryen
dc.subject[JEL:C79] Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - Otheren
dc.subject[JEL:C78] Mathématiques et méthodes quantitatives - Théorie des jeux et négociation - Théorie de la négociation et du "matching"fr
dc.subject[JEL:C79] Mathématiques et méthodes quantitatives - Théorie des jeux et négociation - Diversfr
dc.titleTheorizing Industrial Relations: The Dominance of Logical Positivism and the Shift to Strategic Choice
dc.typeArticle
dc.contributor.affiliationUniversité de Montréal. Faculté des arts et des sciences. École de relations industriellesfr
dcterms.descriptionNuméro de référence interne originel : A1.328 WP 9207
dcterms.isPartOfurn:ISSN:0829-0121
UdeM.VersionRioxxVersion publiée / Version of Record
oaire.citationTitleDocument de recherche
oaire.citationIssue92-07


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