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**Determinants of public support for European Enlargement:  
A Comparative analysis of public attitudes toward the accession  
of Turkey and Poland**


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en vue de l'obtention du grade de  
Maître ès sciences (M.Sc) en science politique**



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**Université de Montréal**  
**Faculté des études supérieures**

Ce mémoire intitulé:

**Determinants of public support for European Enlargement:  
A Comparative analysis of public attitudes toward the accession  
of Turkey and Poland**

présenté par:  
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## ABSTRACT

This study examines the individual-level determinants of public support for European enlargement. Previous research on European public attitudes mainly concentrates on public support for the integration process and offers a variety of explanations. In the current literature, three prominent theoretical explanations of public support highlight the role of economic/rational calculations, domestic politics and national identity as the main determinants of public attitudes toward integration. In this study, we first test the validity of these propositions within the context of support for European enlargement. Additionally, we suggest that public support for enlargement is influenced by an individual's preferred adaptation strategies for minority groups. Simply put, we argue that the views of the members of the majority groups in terms of the integration of "others", either multicultural or assimilationist, are important predictors of public support for enlargement. In order to test these propositions, we develop a series of logistic regression models of public support for the membership of Turkey and Poland, using data from a Eurobarometer survey (2000) conducted in 15 member states. The results show strong support for national identity hypotheses. Also, we find that democratic system satisfaction and positive economic evaluations increase the likelihood of support for the accession of Turkey and Poland. The findings reveal that education levels, income levels and occupational skills do not have a consistent effect on attitudes toward enlargement. Finally, the results confirm our hypotheses. While respondents with multicultural attitudes toward "others" are more supportive for the accession in both cases, respondents with assimilationist expectations are less enthusiastic about the membership of Turkey and Poland.

**Keywords:** *public support, European enlargement, European integration, national identity, economic calculations, symbolic threat, realistic threat, multiculturalism, assimilationist expectations*

## RÉSUMÉ

Cette étude examine les déterminants de l'opinion publique sur l'élargissement de l'Union européenne. La recherche sur l'opinion publique européenne se concentre particulièrement sur les attitudes envers l'intégration européenne. Ces études soulignent le rôle des calculs économiques/rationnels, de la politique domestique et de l'identité nationale comme les déterminants principaux des attitudes du public à l'égard de l'intégration. Dans ce mémoire, nous évaluons d'abord la validité de ces propositions dans le contexte du soutien à l'élargissement européen. De plus, nous estimons que l'appui du public à l'élargissement est influencé par les préférences individuelles au sujet des stratégies d'adaptation des minorités. Nous soutenons que les comportements des membres des groupes majoritaires en ce qui concerne l'intégration des « autres », qu'ils soient multiculturels ou assimilationnistes, sont des indicateurs importants de l'appui du public à l'élargissement. Pour évaluer ces propositions, nous développons une série de modèles de régression logistique de l'appui du public pour l'adhésion de la Turquie et la Pologne, utilisant des données d'un sondage Eurobaromètre (2000) mené dans 15 états membres. Les résultats montrent un puissant support pour les hypothèses d'identité nationale. Aussi, nous constatons que la satisfaction envers le système démocratique et des évaluations économiques positives augmentent la probabilité de l'appui à l'accession de la Turquie et de la Pologne. Les résultats révèlent que le niveau d'éducation, le revenu et les compétences professionnelles n'ont pas d'effet cohérent sur les attitudes envers l'élargissement. Finalement, les résultats confirment nos hypothèses. Tandis que les individus avec des attitudes multiculturelles envers les « autres » sont plus favorables pour l'accession dans les deux cas, les répondants avec des attentes *assimilationnistes* sont moins enthousiastes à propos de l'adhésion de la Turquie et la Pologne.

Mot-Clef: *opinion publique, élargissement de l'UE, intégration européenne, identité nationale, calculs économiques, menace symbolique, menace réaliste, multiculturalisme, attentes assimilationnistes*

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## **LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

- CEEC : Central and Eastern European Countries
- EC : European Community
- EMU : European Monetary Union
- EU : European Union
- EUP : European Union Parliament
- GDP : Gross Domestic Product
- PHARE : Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring their Economies
- SEA : Single European Act

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## **Introduction**

On October 3, 2005, the opening of negotiation talks between the EU and Turkey, which has been an associate member of the Community since 1963 and an official candidate since 1999, marked an historical step toward the integration of both parties. However, during the meetings, there were harsh discussions among the leaders of the member states concerning the future membership of Turkey. Austria explicitly opposed Turkey's full membership and insisted on the addition of the alternative prospects to the negotiations excluding full membership. During the discussions, a statement made by Ursula Plassnik, Austria's Foreign Minister, was remarkable. According to the Foreign Minister, her country was "listening to the people" by questioning the full membership for Turkey (BBC News 4/11/2005). Indeed, a recent survey on further EU enlargement indicates that more than half of all European citizens are against the membership of Turkey (Eurobarometer 63: 154).

It is commonly argued that European integration is an elite-driven process. In the early periods of integrative efforts, the role of public opinion in the integration process was neglected in practice as well as in academic research. However, from the mid 1980s, during the years of transition from an economic community toward a political union, the political elites introduced new actions to increase the participation of the masses in European affairs. Additionally, with the increasing salience of European policies, the public has been more reactive toward EU politics and has shown more opposition through referendums, national and supranational elections, and interest groups.

A growing literature examines public support for European integration. In one of the first attempts to explain public attitudes toward integration, Inglehart

(1970a) underlines the effects of cognitive mobilization on public support. The cognitive mobilization theory indicates that strong political communication skills and high political awareness tend to favor the support for integration policies by making the EU institutions more familiar and less threatening. In the subsequent periods, the increasing interests of scholars resulted in additional research on the issue and a variety of approaches to understanding public opinion on integration. These approaches can be classified under three main categories. The first category is composed of economic/rational calculation explanations which contend that, depending on socioeconomic status, the European integration process (or to be strictly accurate, the liberalization of the EU market) creates different costs and benefits in citizens' lives which affect their attitudes toward European integration (Gabel and Palmer 1995, Gabel 1998a, 1998b, 1998c, Anderson and Reichert 1996). These studies bring out education levels, occupational skills and income levels as the main determinants of public support. Another line of argumentation indicates that the perceptions of the economic situation and positive economic self-evaluations are influential on the formation of attitudes toward integration (Gabel 1997, Eichenberg and Dalton 1993). The second category of theoretical perspectives consists of studies which examine the role of domestic political factors. This approach stresses the impact of domestic political dynamics on mass attitudes. In this perspective, it has been argued that individuals rely on cues from domestic politics with which they are more familiar; for instance the performance of national governments can affect their attitudes toward EU integration (Franklin, Marsh and McLaren 1994, Franklin, Van der Eijk and Marsh 1995, Van der Eijk and Franklin 1996, Ray 2003a). Similarly, Anderson concentrates on the role of domestic politics and offers the

notion that people use domestic political proxies such as system and establishment party support to evaluate European integration (Anderson 1998, Kritzenger 2003). Finally, the third category of approach highlights the role of feelings toward national identity. The main argument in this category is that European unification diminishes national power over economic and political issues, which gives rise to opposition from individuals with a strong national identity and attachment (Carey 2002, Taggart 1998, Hooghe and Marks 2004). Furthermore, it has been disputed that the weakening influences of nation-states over European issues increase the level of concern over the integrity of the nation (De Master and Le Roy 2000) and the level of perceived threat on cultural and economic resources (McLaren 2002, 2006, de Vreese and Boomgaarden 2005), which has a negative effect on the level of support for integration. These different approaches that explain the determinants of public support for integration will be discussed in detail in the following sections.

Despite the growing literature on public support for integration, studies that focus on public attitudes toward enlargement have been mostly neglected. The literature on European enlargement mostly concentrates on the economic, social, political and institutional implications of the accession for candidate and member states. Political and economic reforms taking place in the candidate states as well as the democracy promotion effect of the EU are among the highly discussed issues. Concerning the public support for enlargement, there are studies which examine public attitudes in candidate states (Grabbe and Hughes 1999, Ehin 2001). However, there are only a few studies that concentrate on the public views about enlargement in member states. These studies emphasize the role of the transaction between countries, geographic proximity (Jones and Van

der Bijl 2005), democracy promotion (Hazama 2007), and anti-immigration sentiments (De Vreese and Boomgaarden 2005) as the main predictors of the support or opposition for enlargement. Nevertheless, none of these studies have observed the effects of explanations offered in the integration literature on enlargement. This study's objective is to fill the gap in that area.

In this study, we also propose a novel explanation. We argue that the position taken by the majority group members on the incorporation of different ethnic and cultural groups plays a crucial role in the formation of their attitudes. The studies conducted on intercultural relations show that in a society the majority and minority groups might have different preferences about the adaptation strategies to the host society (Van Oudenhoven, Prins and Buunk 1998, Van Oudenhoven and Eisses 1998, Horenczyck 1996). While some members of majority groups are in favor of multiculturalism as the adaptation strategy, some display assimilationist expectations. In this study, we argue that their views on that subject are essential parts of their attitudes toward the EU membership of new countries. In other words, we suggest that the views of the members of the majority groups in terms of the integration of "others," either multicultural or assimilationist, are an important determinant of public opinion on the enlargement process. In this context, this research seeks to contribute to the literature on the one hand by analyzing individual level determinants of public attitudes proposed in the European integration literature within the context of enlargement. On the other hand, we examine the effects of assimilationist expectations and multicultural approaches on support for the enlargement process.

In the study, the focus will essentially be on the Turkish case; although, it will be conducted by comparing Turkey and Poland in order to better understand and interpret the determinants of public opinion. Using Eurobarometer surveys conducted in member states in 2000, we realized logistic regression analyses to test the alternative theories of public support for enlargement. We believe that in the case of Turkey's accession, the attitudes of the European citizens should be explored in detail for two main reasons. First, the integration of Turkey into the European structure, with its 70 million Muslims, cultural differences and economic weaknesses, is one of the major challenges of European integration. Second, some countries such as France and Austria declared that the membership of Turkey will be presented in referendums at the end of the negotiation talks. In other words, the final decision on the accession will be given by the European public. Consequently, mass attitudes toward enlargement should be taken into serious consideration.

This study consists of two parts. In the first chapter, we discuss briefly the increasing role of public attitudes in the European integration process, and the channels of popular influence in the policy-making process. In this chapter, we also analyze in detail the main theories which try to explain the fundamental determinants of public support for the European integration process. In the second part of the study, we demonstrate the statistical relationships between public attitudes toward Turkey's and Poland's accession to the EU and test the major hypotheses put forward in the literature that examine public support for European integration.

## **Chapter I- European Public Opinion**

In this first chapter, we try to answer two important questions. The first question is “Why study public attitudes toward European integration?”. In order to provide a consistent answer to that question, we discuss in the first section of the chapter the place of public opinion in the early phases of European integration, and the increasing significance of public opinion in European politics. The second question that we attempt to answer is “What are the main determinants of public attitudes toward European affairs?” For that aspect, we will review the research conducted to understand the basics of public attitudes toward European integration as well as toward European enlargement.

### **A- The end of “permissive consensus”**

European integration has often been referred to as an elite-driven process. During the early periods of the integration movement, the role of mass attitudes on the integration process has been mostly neglected. As the community has been perceived as an international economic organization, the emphasis has been put mainly on the efficiency of the institutions (Majone 2000, 1994, Dahl 1994), and on the role of elites and intergovernmental cooperation (Moravcsik 1991, Follesdal and Hix 2005). In his seminal work, Haas maintains that “it is as impracticable as it is unnecessary to have recourse to general public opinion surveys or even to surveys of specifically interested groups” (Haas 1958: 17). According to Haas, “it suffices to single out and define the political elites in the participating countries, to study their reactions to integration and to assess changes in attitude on their part” (*ibid*). This period has been characterized by a



“permissive consensus,” a notion introduced by Lindberg and Scheingold, between masses and elites which allowed political elites to take necessary steps in the integration project without public pressure (Anderson 2005: 5). During this period, as the union has been perceived as an international economic organization, citizens had very little interest in politics on the European sphere; they either “had no opinion about the actions pursued by their governments or they supported their governments actions toward further integration” (Hix 2005: 149). In this perspective, during the early phases of the integration process, it may be accurate to describe public opinion as irrelevant to the process which paved the way for the discussions concerning the legitimacy of the EU and the democratic deficit. Democratic deficit can be simply defined as the “lack of popular control over the institutions of European Union” (Gibson and Caldeira 1998: 69) and, according to Geddes, the strong power of national ministers, European officials and technocrats on EU level decision-making pose a threat to the EU’s democratic accountability (Geddes, 2000: 4).

In this perspective, can we assume that public opinion was insignificant in the European integration process? Public opinion is a dynamic phenomenon which involves variation over time (Anderson 2005: 2). It is commonly accepted that, beginning in the mid 1980s, public preferences gained a more significant role in the integration progress. The Single European Act (SEA), signed in 1986, which aimed to eliminate all the direct and indirect trade barriers between member states, was an important step in creating a single European market. In the following period, the coming into force of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993 has been a crucial step toward the creation of the political union (Franklin, Marsh and McLaren 1994: 455). One of the main objectives of the Maastricht Treaty, as

stated in the first article of the treaty, was to establish “an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe, in which decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen” (1992). It should be emphasized that both the SEA and the Maastricht treaty were leading up to a stronger influential role for the public in the integration process. However, during this period, the Danish rejection of the treaty in a referendum in June 1992 and the French approval of the treaty with a tiny margin became a surprising indicator of the increasing popular opposition among the European public (Franklin *et al.* 1994: 456). As the European Union has become more salient in citizens’ lives on the way toward political union, there has been increasing public involvement into the integration process (Eichenberg and Dalton 1993: 507), which has brought the end of “permissive consensus.” As argued by Anderson, the reaction shown during the referendums of the Maastricht treaty has indicated that “the European masses have the ability and willingness to constrain and possibly forestall further progress toward a unified Europe” (Anderson 1998: 570). Simply put, the opposition of the masses during the referendums made clear to the European elites that public opinion should be more seriously taken into consideration in the European project.

In the same manner, the recent French and Dutch rejections of the EU Constitutional Treaty during the 2005 referendums became another important example of how public opinion affects the integration process<sup>1</sup> and highlighted the referendums as an important channel of popular influence in the European policy-making process. Yet, it should be noted that the channels of popular influence on integrative policies are not limited to the referendums. The national elections are also important instruments of public influence on European politics.

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<sup>1</sup> For details on the referendums, see Whitman 2005.

No doubt, the relationship between decision makers and the “voters” is different in the EU than in a typical representative democracy (Gabel and Anderson 2004: 13). However, the national ministers in the Council of Ministers who make decisions concerning the EU policies and the national parliaments that ratify these decisions are responsible to their citizens (Gabel 1998a: 5). The positive or negative evaluations of the policies at the EU level would affect the choices of voters in national elections (De Vreese 2004: 2-3), which in turn convince the political elites to take into account public preferences in the policy-making process.

Besides the referendums and national elections, another important channel of public influence in the EU sphere is the European Parliament (EUP). The first direct elections for the European parliament took place in 1979, but in the early phases of the integration process, the European Parliament had limited power on EU policy-making. The first important change in the power of the EUP appeared with the coming into force of the cooperation procedure established by the SEA. According to this procedure, if the Parliament takes a position for a proposal forwarded by the Commission, the Council of Ministers could amend the position taken by the Parliament by a unanimous vote. Simply put, with the implementation of the cooperation procedure, for the council of ministers, the acceptance of a Parliament proposal supported by the commission was easier than modifying it. This power has been called a “conditional agenda setter” (Tsebelis 1994: 128, 1996 see also Moser 1996). In the following period, the co-decision procedure introduced by the Maastricht treaty and reformed later by the Amsterdam and Nice treaties, has been an important step in increasing the legislative power of the European Parliament. With the new procedure, EUP had

the power to prevent the implementation of new policies by rejecting a proposal in the economic and social issues where the co-decision procedure applies. According to Tsebelis *et al.*, during this period, the European Parliament “evolved from an almost insignificant and purely consultative assembly to a potentially powerful player in the legislative process with significant independent powers and resources” (Tsebelis, Jensen, Kalandrakis and Kreppel 2001: 573).

The improvement of the legislative powers of the European parliament is crucial for an increase in public participation and to make public attitudes a determinant of the integration process (Gabel 1998a: 6). Early studies on the European Parliament and the voting behavior in elections contend that the EUP elections have the characteristics of the “second order elections” (Reif 1984, Reif and Schmitt 1980, Marsh and Franklin 1996, see also Marsh 1998). In comparison to the first order elections, which are national parliamentary or presidential elections, the second order elections are perceived as less important as “there is less at stake” (Reif and Schmitt 1980: 8). Local, regional, and provincial elections, as well as European Parliament elections, can be considered in this category. The second order characteristic of EUP elections has implications on the level of participation as well as in the representation of interests in the Parliament. This characteristic, on the one hand, results in a lower turnout level in the elections (Reif 1984, Reif and Schmitt 1980, Marsh 1998, Schmitt 2005) and, on the other hand, paves the way for the reflection of national partisan concerns instead of the supranational political issues (Gabel 1998a: 6). However, an increase in the power of influence and a role in the policy-making process are critical for the public support of the EU Parliament (Rohrschneider

2002: 463-464) as well as for the higher level of participation of the European parliamentarian in the EU related policy-making process (Scully 1997: 245). Although the level of turnout in the election is not quite as high as expected (Schmitt 2005), the increasing role of the Parliament in the legislation makes the EUP an important channel of public influence on integration through their representatives in the Parliament.

In the early periods of the European integration process, public opinion was mostly underestimated. On the road of transition from an international economic organization toward a political union, the significance of public opinion and preferences gained substantial salience. Today, referendums, national elections, European Parliament as well as interest groups (Aspinwall 1998) and the European Court of Justice (Alter 2000) are the main channels of public influence. As stated by Anderson, the progress in the European integration process shows that “European integration, originally pushed forward at the elite level, cannot progress without public support” (2005: 6). Up until now, we have tried to point to the increasing role of public opinion in the integration process and to the main channels of public participation and influences. In the following section, we will present the main theories proposed in the literature which examines the determinants of public opinion toward integration.

## **B- Understanding European public opinion**

Before concentrating on the explanations and arguments put forward to explain public attitudes toward integration, an important point should be noted. In the public opinion literature, there is a variety of approaches which differ in the level of analysis. While some studies focus on individual level measures, others conduct their research by using national level analysis. In the literature, national level analyses mainly put forward national economic performance of the member states as the main determinant of variation in public opinion. However, individual level analysis takes into consideration the socioeconomic, ideological as well as cultural factors as the determinants of public opinion on European integration. Even though we will also discuss in this study the explanations on the national level, we will mainly concentrate on the explanations on the individual level.

In the literature, scholars offered a variety of explanations for understanding public opinion toward integration. One of the early and most influential propositions in the literature has been developed by Roland Inglehart. In his cognitive mobilization theory, he argues that people with high cognitive mobilization tend to be more supportive toward European institutions and consequently, toward European integration (Inglehart 1970a). According to this perspective, the cognitive mobilization is characterized by strong skills in political communication and high levels of political awareness (Gabel 1998a: 95, Gabel 1998b: 335). These factors make the European institutions more familiar and therefore less threatening, which leads to an increase in support (Inglehart 1970a: 47, Inglehart 1977: 338). According to the author, cognitive mobilization is a necessary but not sufficient condition of support for European integration,

but he also asserts that political awareness does not necessarily result in a favorable opinion toward European institutions and integrative policies. However, he claims that “for those with a high level of political awareness and skills in political communication, there is at least good chance that one will come to identify with a supranational political community” (*ibid* 1977: 338).

In another study, Inglehart points to the role of value orientation in explaining public attitudes toward European integration (Inglehart 1970b, 1977, for a detailed analysis see Janssen 1991). Inglehart argues that the political orientations of individuals are formed during early life, and proposes that the socioeconomic environment of these years is influential in their political attitudes (1970b: 767-768). In Europe, since the end of World War II, there have been significant changes in the socioeconomic surroundings as well as in the value orientations of generations (1970b: 768, Inglehart, Rabier and Reif 1991). Young generations growing up during the strong economic development era have different value orientations than the generations that grew up during the high scarcity days of WWII. Inglehart distinguishes two value orientations: materialist and post-materialist. Individuals with materialist orientations prioritize the economic and physical security, while individuals with post-materialist orientations prioritize the intellectual needs, need for belonging, and need for independence and self-actualization (Janssen 1991: 445). In this framework, the main argument in the value orientation theory is that, post-materialists have more favorable attitudes toward European integration than materialists because, on the one hand, post-materialists are less preoccupied with the economic and safety needs, which facilitates the emergence of a cosmopolitan political identity (Inglehart 1977: 334) and, on the other hand, as

the EU enforces the reforms toward less nationalistic and more egalitarian society, it is more attractive for the individuals with post-materialist values (Gabel 1998a: 97).

Both cognitive mobilization and value orientations theories have been cited in various studies. However, recent studies show that both theories have limited explanatory power for public attitudes toward European integration. Janssen, in his study, tested both theories and found that although individuals with high political skills and awareness understand the European institution better and are more supportive of integration, the change in value orientations provides no impact on public attitudes toward integration (1991). Similarly, in the studies conducted by Gabel (1998a, 1998b) which analyze public support for European integration in member states, both theories are not supported by the data. In another analysis, Anderson and Reichert found that materialists in the new member states are more supportive than post-materialists, which is exactly the opposite of the main value orientation argument (Anderson and Reichert 1995: 246).

Starting from the beginning of the 1990s, an increasing number of researches have been conducted by scholars in the domain of public support for integration, and various approaches have been proposed in the literature. These approaches can be categorized under three main strands, which constitute the base of our research: economic/rational calculations, domestic politics, and national identity.



*a-) Economic/rational calculations:*

In the literature on public opinion on European integration, the studies stressing the role of economic factors are at the center. Considering the main thrust of European integration which paved the way for the elimination of barriers against free movement of good, capital and labor and for the creation of the Monetary Union, the majority of the studies which explain variation in public opinion by economic calculations is not unexpected (Hooghe and Marks 2004: 415). In the rational calculations strand, the analysis has been conducted both at the national level and the individual level.

In the national level or aggregate level explanations, Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) examine the relationship between macroeconomic conditions and aggregate level support for EU integration. According to the authors, “if the EC has promised anything, it has promised the enhancement of member states’ national economic welfare” (Eichenberg 1993: 510). In this perspective, they examine the national economic performance and the relative economic position within the EU to understand the variation in the level of support for European integration (Brinegar and Jolly 2005: 156). Following the work of Lewis-Beck (1988) on economic voting which stresses the relationship between economic conditions and evaluation of the national government, Eichenberg and Dalton focus on inflation rates, unemployment rates and gross domestic product (GDP) to determine their influences on public opinion (1993: 512), based on data spanning from 1973 to 1988. They maintain that these three variables consist of “the essential, cross nationally comparable elements of the economy that are the basis for the public evaluations” (1993:513). According to the authors, GDP is the essential indicator of overall living standard in a country, in other words it is

one of the key measures of economic well-being. In addition, the inflation rates and unemployment rates provide strong signs about the economic stress (ibid). As stated earlier, Eichenberg and Dalton emphasize the role of economic performance in public evaluations and in this context, they expect that increase in GDP would have positive effect on public support while higher levels of inflation and unemployment rate would result by decreasing public support toward European integration. The result of their analysis put forward strong support for the effect of inflation rates on public opinion while GDP and unemployment rates show weaker support. In another study which is testing the findings of the Eichenberg and Dalton's analysis using data from 1973 to 1993, Anderson and Kalthenhaler find that GDP, unemployment rates and inflation have significant effects on integration support (1996).

Another argument proposed at the national level emphasizes the effect of the losses and benefits received from the union membership on public attitudes toward membership (Eichenberg and Dalton 1993, Anderson and Reichert 1996). Anderson and Reichert point out two kinds of benefits from EU membership: *direct benefits* constitute the funds received from the EU budget, while *indirect benefits* refer to the increasing amount of trade with other member states and some other opportunities such as professional mobility (1996: 233). Simply put, it has been suggested that a higher level of returns from the EU budget as well as an increasing amount of positive trade balance with other member states leads to the higher level of citizen support toward the integration process.

A recent approach that focuses on the effects of cost/benefit calculations on public attitudes emphasizes the influence of political-economic institutions (Brinegar, Jolly and Kitschelt 2004). According to the authors, "the mechanism

linking institutions and citizens' assessment of EU integration is the perception of costs and benefits accruing from integration in light of domestic capitalist institutions" (2004: 64). One of the propositions in the study underlines the role of wage-bargaining regimes on the socio-tropic calculations of cost and benefits of EU integration. Brinegar *et al.* argue that centralized wage bargaining provides mechanisms to keep the macroeconomic stability in terms of low inflation, low unemployment and high growth (*ibid*). According to the authors, the *median national voter* prioritizes the collective good of the country. They reason that the opposition to integrative policy may be more powerful in the countries with coordinated wage bargaining regimes than fragmented bargaining systems (*ibid*: 65). The study also stresses the types of welfare states. Referring to Esping-Andersen (1990, 1999), Brinegar *et al.* distinguish three types of welfare states: liberal, conservative-Christian and social-democratic welfare states. Two main ideas in the argumentation are that, first, *median voters* calculate the costs and benefits of the integration by comparing their social policy practices with predominant European states' - especially with France and Germany- social policy practices and, second, *median voters* favor the status quo in their country as they see the change from existing social policy to another as a big cost imposed on them (*ibid*: 67). Given that conservative-Christian model of welfare state is more widespread among EU members (*ibid*), the authors argue that citizens from conservative welfare states will be more favorable of integration process. On the contrary, citizens in liberal and social-democratic welfare states should be more skeptical about the integration process compared to those in conservative welfare states as they may confront high national

adjustment costs as a result of conforming with European social policy norms (*ibid*: 67-68, see also Hooghe 2004).

The individual level hypothesis examining the effects of economic/rational calculations on public attitudes toward European integration has been introduced by Gabel and Palmer (1995). The main argument is that “the economic consequences of the European integration differentially influence citizen’s welfare depending on their economic and political interests” (Gabel 1998a: 100) which, in turn, influence citizens’ attitudes toward the integration process. In other words, in this line of explanation, it has been argued that the liberalization of the European Union market has different costs and benefits for citizens from different socioeconomic statuses which shape their attitudes toward integration (Gabel and Palmer 1995, Gabel 1998a, 1998b, 1998c, Anderson and Reichert 1996). According to Gabel, the education level, occupational skills and income levels are primary factors in the public support for European integration.

Regarding the *education level* and *occupational skills*, Gabel argues that in the advanced industrial economies of Europe, a high level of education and experience in skilled occupations—in other words, a high level of “human capital”—are more valuable and transferable (Gabel 1998:43, 1995:7). Given the EU-wide competition for jobs, which allows companies to hire workers from different member countries, high levels of education and occupational skills may provide a more advantageous environment for employment. In opposition, for less educated individuals and unskilled workers, the employment opportunities are more pessimistic because as the labor supply has spread to the entire European union, labor supply differences between states will decrease, which affects wages (1998a: 61). Also, the free movement of capital and labor will

foster the flowing of capital to cheaper labor by making it “less costly for capital to move rather than accede to labor demands” (Gabel 1998b: 337, see also 1998c). In this perspective, Gabel claims that high education and strong occupational skills are positively related to cost/benefit calculations, which are consequently related to the support for integration.

Concerning *income level*, Gabel posits that the level of income is an important factor in their cost benefit evaluations and consequently in their attitudes toward integration (Gabel 1998a, 1995, Anderson and Reichert 1996). The main proposition is that the liberalization of capital markets and the creation of the economic and monetary union will create costs for the low income citizens while high income citizens will benefit from it (Gabel 1998a: 46). The low-inflation and new investment opportunities resulting from the market liberalization and EMU increase the support of the high income citizens. On the contrary, the low income citizens who are more dependent on the social welfare programs are more likely to oppose the European integration process (Gabel 97: 7, Gabel 1998a: 46). In sum, this perspective underlines the roles of income, education and occupational skills as the main determinants of public attitudes toward integration.

**Proposition 1a:** Lower levels of socioeconomic status are related to lower support for EU integration.

Another line of argumentation on the determinants of individual level support for EU integration takes into consideration the role of perceptions of economic conditions. As stated earlier, Eichenberg and Dalton investigated the role of evaluations of the economic losses and benefits on public attitudes toward integration (1993). Similarly, Gabel and Whitten also give weight to the role of

economic *perceptions* in understanding public opinion about the integration; however, they differ in the level of analysis (1997). According to the authors, instead of aggregate level analysis, the relationship between economic evaluations and public attitudes should be investigated at the individual level because “objective measures of national economy may be poor proxies for citizens’ economic sensitivities” (1997: 82). They ground their views first to the insufficiency of objective national conditions to reflect the sub-national economic variations and second to the inconsistency between objective economic conditions and individual’s economic perceptions (*ibid*).

**Proposition 1b:** Positive evaluations of economic conditions are related to higher support for EU integration.

As the studies in the rational calculation strand assume that citizens are economically rational, have high levels of awareness of European issues and have the capability to make rational calculations about the cost and benefits of the integration process, it has been subject to strong critics (Anderson 1998, see also, McLaren 2006). Still, it can be said that this model of explanations is commonly referred to in the literature on public opinion toward integration.

**b-) *Domestic politics:***

In this set of explanations, the studies highlight the role of domestic politics and national cues on the formation of public attitudes toward European integration. The main argument is that considering citizens' low levels of knowledge on the integration issues, when determining their attitudes toward European politics with which they are less familiar, they use information from the national government and domestic cues which they know well (McLaren 2002: 553). In this section, we will try to discuss in detail the main approaches of this perspective.

In a study conducted by Franklin *et al.*, the authors investigate the main reasons for the “surprising” results of the 1992 EC referendums which resulted in the Danish rejection and the French approval with a tiny margin (Franklin, Marsh and McLaren 1994). Analyzing the voting behaviors of the citizens from Denmark, France and Ireland during the Maastricht referendums, the authors claim that the main factor in the Danish refusal was the unpopularity of the government and the behaviors of political parties, rather than their views about the integration policies (Franklin *et al.* 1994, Franklin, Van der Eijk and Marsh 1995, Van der Eijk and Franklin 1996). Consistent with Reif and Schmitts' views about the categorization of the European elections as second order elections mentioned earlier, the authors reason that the European elections are “treated as opportunities to discuss national political differences and to register support for, or opposition to, political parties on the basis of these differences” (Van der Eijk and Franklin 1996: 367). On issues concerning European politics, the national parties refrain from mobilizing their supporters against or in favor of the issues and leave the responsibility to government. Consequently, the

performance of the government becomes crucial (Franklin *et al.* 1994: 470). Besides, the incumbent government plays a very significant role on voters' behavior because it has an institutional advantage as the agenda-setter and can manipulate the voters with limited information (Schneider and Weitsman 1996: 586). The low salience of European issues and the limited knowledge of the masses in terms of European politics, according to Franklin *et al.*, "attempts to consult the voters about European matters being essentially hijacked for partisan and national ends...In country after country, European elections are fought not on European but national issues" (Franklin *et al.* 1994: 469-70).

A study conducted by Ray gives support to this perspective and highlights the relationship between the support for the incumbent government and the level of support for European integration (Ray 2003a). However, he points to a very important distinction: in terms of the referendum or European elections, he finds a positive relationship between incumbent support and attitudes toward European policies, but adds that on general support for European integration or on support for EU membership, this relationship diminishes (*ibid.*). Hug and Sciarini, in their detailed study which examines 14 referendums held on European integration since the 1970s, highlight the role of partisanship and argue that the effect of the incumbent government on attitudes depends on the intentions and signals sent to the voters by the government. According to the authors, if the government reflects the referendum as a "vote of confidence", it leads to stronger support for the government's position (2000, see also Ray 2003b). In other words, the reaction of the public depends on the context in which the situation has been presented.



**Proposition 2a:** Positive evaluations of the incumbent government are related to higher support for EU integration.

No doubt, this strand of explanation generated many critics. For instance, Siune *et al.* reject the role of political parties and performance of government as the main and only factor. They also see the European elections and referendums as a mechanism used by the public to support or to punish their government parties and domestic parties and indicate that the Danish refusal of the Maastricht treaty was a result of public views on European issues (Siune and Svensson 1993, Siune, Svensson and Tonsgaard 1994). Similarly, Garry *et al.*, analyzing the Nice referendum claim that the satisfaction with the incumbent government played a limited role on public attitudes. According to the authors, in the Nice treaty referendum, the response to the key issue—European enlargement— was the main determinant of public attitudes (Garry, Marsh and Sinnott 2005: 215).

In another study which focuses on the role of domestic factors, Anderson first criticizes the proposition that the economic rational explanations play an essential role on attitudes formation toward integration, given the low level of information on European issues and on the effects of European integration, and claims that economic calculations have an indirect role (Anderson 1998: 573). According to Anderson, the lack of information on European matters pushes citizens to refer to proxies in evaluating integration and these proxies are based on perceptions of domestic politics (Anderson 1998):

Because citizens lack crucial information about the integration process, they resort to proxies derived from domestic political reality to comprehend and form opinions about it. This does not mean that opinions about Europe are irrational or lack coherence. Instead of seeking out information about the minutiae of the EU when they have more pressing demands on their time, citizens view the integration process through

the lens of how they feel about their own political system, political parties and to a lesser extent, their government (Anderson 1998: 591)

In this context, the author puts forward government support as one of the main proxies in which the citizen relies and additionally suggests the system support proxy and the establishment party support proxy. Regarding system support, Anderson argues that, as the EU is a set of institutions, attitudes toward European integration may reflect attitudes toward national political systems (Anderson 1998: 576). In that approach, the main point of focus is the tension in the relationship between the national level legitimacy and supranational political integration (Hoffman 1966, quoted in Martinotti et Stefanizzi 1995: 164). Although, in an early study, no straightforward relationship between satisfaction with democracy and support for integration has been found (ibid) and, according to Anderson, satisfaction with the performance of national democratic institutions is positively correlated with the level of support for European integration (1998). Another study which concentrates on the role of the democratic performance of the institutions on mass attitudes has been put forward by Rohrshneider (2002). Different from Anderson's national proxies' approach, the focus has been on the performance of the EU institutions. According to this approach, the citizens who live in countries with "high quality institutions" and good democratic performance, the democratic deficit of the EU and the feeling of not being represented in the EU leads to the dissatisfaction and lower level of support for European integration. Surely, the performance evaluation is not just limited to the democratic institutions. According to Sanchez Cuenca, trust in national institutions and problems such as corruption, high structural unemployment and poor performance of the state is also

influential in the attitudes toward supranational institutions and European integration (Sanchez Cuenca 2000).

**Proposition 2b:** Positive levels of system satisfaction are related to higher support for EU integration.

In terms of establishment party support proxy, Anderson first discusses the role of partisanship in classical left/right cleavages and suggests that European integration is not an issue that can be represented on a left/right axis, but rather between establishment and anti-establishment parties (1998: 578-9). According to the author, by opposing European integration, the new and anti-establishment parties prove that they are “real parties” and present themselves as an alternative to the “cartel” establishment parties (ibid: 579). From this perspective, the support for establishment or anti-establishment parties provides cues for the public in their attitudes toward European issues. Supporters of the anti-establishment parties are expected to be less supportive of European integration. The effects of left/right positioning on public attitudes toward European issues have been widely discussed in the literature (Wessels 1995, Hix 2005, Van der Eijk, Franklin and Oppenhuis 1996). These studies fail to provide strong explanations regarding the relationship between left/right self-positioning and support for European integration (Anderson 1998). However, recent studies on the issue point out that, while the left/right ideological positioning has been significant on the national parties’ reaction to European issues (Gabel and Hix 2004, Hooghe and Marks 2004, Ray 2003b, Van der Eijk and Franklin 2004), the response of these party supporters varied according to the issue’s importance of the party and individual’s attachment to the party (Ray 2003b). Additionally, it has been argued that depending on the political-economic institutions of the

state, the left/right positioning can have implications for public opinion (Brinegar *et al.* 2004, Marks 2004).

**c-) *National identity:***

According to Tajfel's definition, the social identity is "part of an individual's self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership to a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership" (Tajfel, 1981: 255). Following this definition, Herman and Brewer propose that identification with a group "impels attachment loyalty and a sense of obligation to the group and group welfare" which in turn makes the social identification a potential resource for collective action (2004: 6). In this context, the European and national identities emerge as important factors in the preferences of individuals (Hooghe and Marks 2004).

The research on the identity literature focuses mainly on the role of the national identity in the opposition toward further integration (see Jones and Van der Bijl 2004, Hooghe and Marks 2004). In the national identity strand, one of the main arguments emphasizes the effects of the national attachment on attitudes toward integration (Carey 2002, Taggart 1998). The study conducted by Carey shows that strong identity leads to lower levels of support for integration (2002). Carey defines the national identity as the "the intensity and the type of the relationship toward the nation" (Carey 2002: 391). The author relates the national identity to the individual's attachment to his/her nation and maintains that "the stronger the bond that an individual feels towards the nation, the less likely that individual will approve of measures that decrease national influence

over economics and politics” resulting from the European integration (ibid). In other words, the conflicts over sovereignty and the fear from different identities and cultures influencing the national culture triggers an opposition to integration (2002:388). The studies conducted by Hooghe and Marks support the national identity propositions (Hooghe and Marks 2004, 2005). They find that individuals having *exclusive national identity*, i.e. individuals who see their national identity as “exclusive of other territorial identities,” are more suspicious of European integration (Hooghe 2005: 424). Similarly, another study investigating attitudes toward immigration policy harmonization at the EU level shows that national identity has a significant role in attitudes and suggests that those who are more strongly attached to the national identity are less likely to support harmonization policies at the European Union level (Luedtke 2005).

**Proposition 3:** Higher levels of exclusive nationality are related to lower support for EU integration.

Another set of explanations implies that the perceived threat from other cultures is an essential determinant of public support for the European Union (McLaren 2002, De Master and Le Roy 2000). Both studies criticize the main assumption of *self-interest* in the rational calculation models of explaining public attitudes and emphasize the role of societal needs in attitude formation.<sup>2</sup> According to De Master and Le Roy, who study the issue in the context of xenophobia, the fear of foreigners triggers opposition toward integration (2000). They argue that, as a result of the integration process, “the flow of peoples across national borders and the influence of foreign policymakers on domestic politics, the perception of foreigners will likely have a greater effect on support” (2000:

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<sup>2</sup> For a detailed analysis of self interest and societal interest see Funk 2000.

425). According to the authors, as the perceived threat on the integrity of the nation and fear of foreigners increase, citizens will be less likely to support the integration process (ibid: 421). From a different point of view, Hooghe and Marks claim that individuals with positive feelings toward cultural diversity are more supportive of integration (Hooghe and Marks 2004, Marks and Hooghe 2003).

Similarly, McLaren argues that attitudes toward the European Union are mainly based on general hostility toward other cultures (2002, 2003, 2006). She contends that “the people are concerned about the problems related to the degradation of the nation state” (2002: 554) and the protection of the in-group (the nation). She also claims that the level of antipathy toward other cultures resulting from nationalistic attachments is a principal factor which determines public attitudes toward European integration (ibid: 551). McLaren refers to the literature on symbolic politics and realistic group conflicts and argues that as the level of perceived threat increases, the level of support for integration decreases (2002, 2006). In symbolic politics theory, the main assumption is that long standing predispositions based on early childhood influence the perceptions and attitudes, as well as the responses to certain symbols (Sears, Hensler and Speer 1979: 371, Sears, Citrin, Cheleden and van Laar 1999). Symbolic threat, also called cultural threat, has been mainly referred to immigrant/majority intergroup relations and emphasizes the perceived threat on distinct morals, norms and values posed by immigrants and the negative feelings emerging in the host community (Stephan, Ybarra, Martinez, Schwarzwald and Tur Kaspas 1998). In the European case, McLaren suggests that the European public reacts to integration in a symbolic way and it is likely to resist integrative policies which

pose a threat to a very important symbol, to the power and sovereignty of the nation state and cultural integrity (2002: 555, 2006: 73).

Another strand in the political science literature on which McLaren bases her argumentation is the realistic group conflict theory. According to Blumer, the main argument of the theory is that “perceptions of members of groups other than one’s own receiving benefits at a cost to one’s own group” leads to hostility between groups (Blumer quoted in McLaren 2006: 50). McLaren underlines the realistic group conflict theory as a factor in explaining public attitudes toward European integration and finds that perceived threat concerning redistribution of national resources and benefits to non nationals—especially to immigrant groups—by the mechanisms of EU institutions triggers the opposition toward integration (2006:68). In other words, the perceived threat or fear for the loss of national resources is presented as a significant—maybe not principal—determinant of reluctance toward the integrative process. Similarly, research conducted among Swiss citizens examining public attitudes toward European membership shows that the stronger the national identity and the perception of threat to national interests, the less likely they are to be favorable to a European Union membership (Christin and Trechsel 2002). Also, De Vreese and Boomgaarden argue that concerns about the national identity are associated with perceptions of immigration as a threat to culture and they put forward the anti-immigration sentiments as the main factor of support for European Union integration (2005).

**Proposition 4:** Higher levels of perceived threat from other cultures are related to lower support of EU integration.

### **C- Determinants of public support for European enlargement**

European integration is a process which progresses by both geographical widening and institutional deepening. Most of the studies focusing on public attitudes in the European Union mainly concentrate on the deepening side of progress, while the widening, or in other words the enlargement of the EU, has been neglected. The vast majority of studies dealing with public opinion concerning the enlargement process has been conducted on candidate countries and focused on the attitudes toward the prospective membership to the EU (Grabbe and Hughes 1999, Ehin 2001). Recently, several studies have been published which assess the determinants of public support on European enlargement in member states.

In one of these studies, Jones and Van der Bijl, in their national level analysis, examine the impacts on aggregate support for enlargement of factors such as level of transaction between countries, geographic proximity, as well as the share of employment in the member and candidate states (2005). The authors find that while there is a positive correlation between the level of support and the trade amount between member and candidate states, the distance between capitals correlates negatively. Another important proposition in the study considers the relation between the size of agriculture in a candidate state and the public attitudes toward their accession in member states. The authors state that countries with large agricultural sector and with high employment in agriculture receive substantial financial subventions which are provided from relatively rich countries (page 345). In this context, they suggest that public support toward enlargement decreases in member states when the importance of agriculture in domestic employment increases in candidate states.



In a recent study, Hazama puts forward a constructive approach and claims that individuals who believe that enlargement would promote democratization of the acceding countries and the reunification of Europe tend to be more favorable toward the enlargement process (2007). De Vreese and Boomgaarden also consider the dynamics of public support for enlargement (2006). According to the authors, the media stand out as a strong power on the formation of public opinion among European citizens, especially on issues concerning the enlargement process. Also, in another study which extends the propositions of McLaren regarding the hostility toward other cultures as a determinant of public support, they contend that anti-immigration sentiments play a significant role in the attitudes toward enlargement as well as in attitudes towards integration (2005).

Nevertheless, research on support for EU enlargement remains few and limited. None of these studies provide a collective examination of all of the different theoretical perspectives presented in extensive integration literature. In other words, in the contemporary literature on public opinion what is frequently explored is support for European integration. We believe that the alternative theoretical perspectives proposed to understand support for the entire European integration project should be explored also in the case of the enlargement process, which is an essential part of the integration project. In order to do so, we will perform a more systematic examination of the determinants of support for EU enlargement. First, we will test all the propositions that emerge from the literature on public support for integration presented above within the context of support for European enlargement. Second, we will present and test a novel

explanation. Both of these contributions are outlined in the two following subsections.

**a-) Applying the factors of integration support to enlargement support:**

As stated in the previous sections, rational/economic calculation explanations play an important part in understanding public support for integration. The main argument in that perspective is that integrative policies pursued at the European level creates different costs and benefits to individuals depending on their socio- economic situation. Simply put, the effects of market liberalization for capital, goods and labor create different costs and benefits for individuals from different education backgrounds, occupational skills and income levels. This proposition applies also to the enlargement process because the elimination of barriers “alters the balance of labor and capital across national markets” (Gabel 1998c: 938). The capital transfers to the low-wage countries, on one hand, and the migration from less developed member states, on the other hand, increase the competitiveness for unskilled jobs (*ibid*). Besides the socioeconomic factors, positive evaluation of the economic situations and positive future expectations may diminish the perception of threat from the accession of new countries. In that perspective, we will test the following hypotheses in the enlargement case.

**Hypothesis I(a):** Lower levels of socioeconomic status are related to lower support for EU enlargement.

**Hypothesis I(b):** Positive evaluations of economic conditions are related to higher support for EU enlargement.

Regarding the propositions in the domestic politics theoretical perspective, the main argument is that, given the low level of knowledge about European affairs, the popularity of the incumbent government which is 'in charge' of the European integration process influences the attitudes of citizens toward EU integration. Of course, to apply this perspective to the enlargement process holds some problems. Concerning integration, it is the governments of the member states that participate in EU activities and decision making (Anderson 1998: 577); the governments do not oppose explicitly to the integration project. However, for enlargement, particularly about the accession of Turkey, the opposition is reflected more explicitly. Still, the relationship between government support and public attitudes should be taken into consideration because despite the explicit opposition, Turkey has been accepted as a candidate and the opening of negotiation talks has been approved by the government leaders. Simply put, in spite of the rhetoric, in practice, the governments seem to be in favor of Turkey's membership. The second domestic proposition that we will test in the case of enlargement is the system satisfaction proxy. In that perspective, the idea is that individuals with high level of trust for their domestic political institutions and high levels of satisfaction with the democratic system are more favorable to the integration process. As a result of enlargement, the representation of the new countries in European institutions and the changing balance in the decision-making processes certainly causes burdens on the working of European institutions. According to Anderson, the citizens of national states reflect their views about domestic institutions toward European institutions. In this framework, it can be expected that a higher level of trust for

the domestic system would provide a higher levels of trust for the EU institutions, which decreases the opposition to enlargement.

**Hypothesis II(a):** Positive evaluations of the incumbent government are related to higher support for EU enlargement.

**Hypothesis II(b):** Positive levels of system satisfaction are related to higher support for EU enlargement.

In the national identity strand, the role of national attachment and the feelings toward national identity and culture have been emphasized. The integration process indisputably results in the sharing of national sovereignty and the increasing interaction of different cultures. The enlargement process on one hand expands the number of states taking part in the EU decision-making processes and on the other hand, with the elimination of the borders within the EU, thereby it facilitates the movement of persons between borders. It would be accurate to expect that the individuals who are more attached to their national identity and more sensitive about national sovereignty are more suspicious about the enlargement process. Besides, the potential immigration from new member states affects the level of perceived threats to their culture and their economic resources. Departing from that point of view, we will examine the following hypotheses in the enlargement case.

**Hypothesis III:** Higher levels of exclusive nationality are related to lower support for EU enlargement.

**Hypothesis IV:** Higher levels of perceived threat from other cultures are related to lower support for EU enlargement.

Without a doubt, our approach shows important similarities between the views of McLaren and De Vreese *et al.*, especially by emphasizing the role of intercultural relations and perceiving “other” cultures as a threat to the main stream society. However, in our study, we build up a different perspective to early propositions. First of all, while the anti-immigration sentiments proposition takes into consideration not only cultural factors but also economic factors<sup>3</sup>, we develop an approach that mainly concentrates on inter-cultural factors. Concerning the “perceived threat” approach of McLaren, we extend this approach and develop a different standpoint by focusing on the role of assimilationist expectations and multiculturalism on the attitudes toward enlargement. The role of multiculturalism is assessed by Hooghe and Marks in earlier studies discussing its effects on the integration process (2004). In this study, we present assimilationist expectations of the host society or the fear from “failure to assimilate” (Paxton and Mughan 2006) to the mainstream culture and multiculturalism as a determinant of public opinion for the European enlargement. We now look at that proposition in detail.

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<sup>3</sup> The authors use a five-item index to measure anti-immigrant sentiment (1) immigration is good for the labor market; (2) immigrants cause problems in the schools that their children attend; (3) immigrants enrich Danish or Dutch culture; (4) members of immigration groups misuse Danish or Dutch social welfare; and (5) their religion is a threat to our way of living. (De Vreese and Boomgaarden 2005)

**b-) *A new perspective of identity:***

The attachment to national identity and attitudes toward “others” have emerged as a significant and developing approach in explaining European public attitudes toward integration. In this study, parallel with the views mentioned earlier on the national identity strand, we maintain that the attitudes of people toward “others” affect their opinion on enlargement. Simply put, we argue that multicultural or assimilationist expectations of majority group members from non-nationals are essential in understanding the level of their support for enlargement.

Most western European societies, as a result of increasing migration, are turning into multicultural societies. Accordingly, the incorporation of immigrants into the host society has been an important area of study in the social sciences. However, most of the studies in that area mainly concentrated on strategies and policies developed by the states (Massey 1999, Ireland 2004, Castles and Davidson 2000, Brubaker 2002, Kastoryano 2002). Nevertheless, recently, there is an increasing interest which focuses on the intercultural relations between minority groups and majority groups in the host societies and on diverse adaptation strategies. In other words, the behavior of minority members on how to incorporate into the main society and the views of the host society on that matter has gained significance in intergroup relations.

According to Berry who underlines the socio-psychological aspects of intercultural contact and acculturation processes, individuals and groups in multicultural societies face two important dimensions. The first dimension concerns the maintenance and development of the original culture of the immigrants. The second dimension concerns the desirability of contact with the

members of the host society (Berry 1984, 1990, 2001). The term *psychological acculturation*, first proposed by Graves, accounts for the psychological changes experienced by individuals who are members of cultures in contact (cited in Berry 2001) and Berry proposes four distinct acculturation strategies according to the combination of these dimensions of contact and culture maintenance. As stated in the following table, different responses to culture maintenance and contact result in different acculturation attitudes such as assimilation, integration, separation and marginalization.

**Table I.** Models of Possible Acculturation Strategies

		Maintaining the original culture	
		Yes	No
Positive relations with majority group members	Yes	Integration	Assimilation
	No	Separation	Marginalization

Source: Adapted from Berry 1984

According to Berry, if the individuals do not wish to maintain their original culture and give importance to interaction with other cultures, the resulting acculturation attitude is *assimilation*. We speak of *integration* if the individuals wish to contact without losing their original culture. *Separation* occurs when the individuals aim to maintain their culture but do not seek contact with other cultures. Finally, if there is no desire for interaction nor for protecting the original culture it results in *marginalization* (Berry 1984, 1990, 2001).

There are an increasing number of studies which take into consideration the preferences of the minority groups as well as of the majority groups concerning acculturation attitudes. The difference of opinion on that matter

affects mutual expectations as well as inter-cultural relations (Verkuyten and Thijs 2002, Taylor and Lambert 1996). Surely, this has been linked to an increasing number of studies which examine the expected acculturation strategies of the newcomers and the members of the host society (Zagefka and Brown 2002, Van Oudenhoven, Prins and Buunk 1998, Van Oudenhoven and Eisses 1998, Berry 1984, 1990, 2001, Horenczyck 1996, Bourhis Moise, Perreault and Senecal 1997). The studies show that while the newcomers mostly aim for integration as the preferred acculturation strategy, host society members are more inclined toward assimilationist strategies (Van Oudenhoven *et al.* 1998, Horenczyck 1996). It should be noted that the rhetoric of integration has been appropriated by many majority groups and they are trying to attribute to their assimilationist acculturation strategy a more “liberal flavor” (Horenczyck 1996: 248), the host society members are mostly protective in the maintenance of their culture and favor the assimilation as the acculturation strategy (Van Oudenhoven *et al.* 1998, Van Oudenhoven and Eisses 1998, Horenczyck 1996). In this perspective, we contend that the attitude in terms of acculturation strategies, in other words, whether the individuals possess an assimilationist or a multicultural approach toward others, is determinant on their attitudes formation in the case of European enlargement. The hypotheses can be stated this way:

**Hypothesis V(a):** Higher levels of multicultural approach are related to higher support for EU enlargement.

**Hypothesis V(b):** Higher levels of assimilationist approach are related to lower support for EU enlargement.



## **Conclusion**

This study aims to contribute to the literature in two areas. On the one hand, we test the main hypotheses put forward about public opinion concerning the integration process in the case of the enlargement process. On the other hand, we extend the propositions of the hostility toward other cultures as a determinant of public support by adding assimilationist expectations and multiculturalism as explanatory variables. In the next chapter, we will test these hypotheses regarding the determinants of European public support for EU enlargement in a comparative analysis of Turkey and Poland.

## **Chapter II- European Public Opinion on enlargement: A Comparative Analysis of Turkey and Poland**

In this chapter, we conduct a multivariate analysis to test the hypotheses presented in the first chapter. The first section of the chapter provides a brief history of European enlargement with a focus on the fifth enlargement of the EU toward Central and Eastern European Countries and Turkey's accession. In the following sections, we will present the data, the method and the results of the analysis examining the determinants of public support for the membership of Turkey and Poland to the European Union.

### **A-) A Brief History of European Enlargement**

The European Union was founded by six countries with the establishment of European Coal and Steel Community in 1951 and the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community in 1957. In less than fifty years, as a result of five successful enlargements, the number of member states has grown to 27. The fifth and last enlargement started with the accession of 10 new countries<sup>4</sup> in the European Union in 2004 and completed with the accession of Romania and Bulgaria in January 2007. This has been the largest enlargement of the European Union and, in a sense, it was a sign of the reunification of Europe divided by an Iron Curtain (EU Commission). Presently, Turkey, Croatia and Macedonia are the candidate countries for membership and western Balkan countries such as Albania, Serbia, Bosnia Herzegovina and

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<sup>4</sup> These 10 countries are: Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia

Montenegro can be counted among the potential candidate countries for membership.

Until the end of the 1980s, the relationship between the European Union and Poland has been limited. However, the initiation of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement in 1989 and the introduction of the PHARE program in the same year have been important steps in the development of closer relations between both parties. After the collapse of communist regimes in Europe in 1991, the Europe Agreements were signed with Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. The main purpose of the agreement was to create “a special type of relationship reflecting geographic proximity, shared values and increased interdependence” (European Commission 1992, quoted in Gower 1999). Following the introduction of the Copenhagen Criteria (1993), which set the rules for membership on April 1994, Poland formally applied for EU membership and accession negotiations started in 1997. At that time, although there were no major problems on meeting the political criteria, Poland, with its size and population, was a major challenge for the European Union. However, it is commonly argued that the success of Poland’s full integration was crucial for a successful eastern enlargement (Podraza 2005: 31). On May 2004, Poland joined the EU as a full member of the union.

The history of relations between Turkey and EU is longer and surely more complicated than all precedent candidate countries. Since the establishment of the Turkish republic, transformation from an Oriental Islamic empire to a secular nation state, in other words Westernization, became the principal objective of the Turkish state and its elite (Joseph 2006:1). The idea behind the reforms—mainly top-to-bottom—has been the westernization of the new

republic, a republic established at the end of a war against Western powers. Turkey first applied to the European Economic Community for an association agreement in 1959. In 1964, the Ankara Agreement was signed between Turkey and the six members of the community. The aim of the Ankara Agreement was to establish economic integration, free movement of workers and closer ties between both parties. However, during the following years, the occurrence of events such as human rights violations, coups d'état and a deteriorating economic situation in Turkey became big burdens on the development of relations (LaGro and Jorgensen 2007: 5). Application for full membership in 1987 was rejected, but still Turkey has been encouraged by the formation of the Custom Union which was approved in 1995. For Turkish officials, the creation of the Custom Union has been perceived as an important step toward membership in the short term (Arikan 2006: 89). However, the decision, made during the European council meeting of December 1997, not to accept Turkey as a candidate state paved the way for the interruption of relations between Turkey and the EU. At the Helsinki Summit of 1999, Turkey was finally accepted as a candidate state. The accession negotiation could start six years later in 2005, after a series of reforms enacted by the government in political, social and economic areas. Presently, the negotiations between Turkey and EU continue very slowly alongside the discussions concerning "the place" of Turkey in Europe.

In this study, we will test the hypotheses put forward in the cases of Poland and Turkey in a comparative perspective. Although our principal interest is on public opinion toward Turkey's accession, we will conduct a comparative analysis in order to observe alternative explanations and to reduce the magnitude

of measurement error (King, Keohane and Verba 1994: 210). In a comparative study, it is crucial to choose the cases that possess similarities in many important characteristics as well as dissimilarities (Lijphart 71: 687). Turkey and Poland hold significant similarities and differences which render a valid comparison. Referring to a study conducted by Onis (2004), these similarities can be summarized as follows: elites in both countries give importance to being a part of Europe; both countries are large in population size; both have a large and inefficient agricultural sector which creates a burden on European institutions like the Common Agricultural policy and on structural and regional funds; both countries experienced a long period of state domination in their economic and political systems; and finally, both countries are in a reform process to consolidate the “substantive” democracy in their society but nevertheless did not establish the western standards of democracy (Onis 2004: 482-483). Regarding the differences between these two countries, the main distinction lies in cultural aspects. Poland, with its geographical proximity and its cultural and historical relations was an expected candidate for the European Union (ibid: 484). The inclusion of CEE countries to the union would be an historical step toward the end of the division of the continent and the reunification of Europe, which has been sought by the very idea of European integration (Wallace, Wallace and Pollack 2005: 407). On the contrary, there have always been and still are doubts and reluctance toward future membership of Turkey among the state elites as well as among the public. Simply put, the accession process of Poland to the EU signified and was perceived as the reunification of Europe, while the history, culture and the geographical situation of Turkey led to discussions concerning its “European identity” and its place in Europe.

## **B-) Data**

In this study, we assess the determinants of public opinion toward the accession of Turkey and Poland to the European Union. In this context, we test the hypotheses put forward in literature about public support for European integration, and add assimilationist expectations and multiculturalism variables.

To operationalize these variables, we use data from a Eurobarometer survey which was conducted in April-May 2000.<sup>5</sup> There are two main reasons to choose this Eurobarometer survey. First, during the period the survey was being conducted, the negotiations between Poland and the EU were still continuing and Turkey was recently recognized as a candidate for membership. Although the negotiation talks were not started yet in the case of Turkey, both countries had the status of candidate for membership which provides the opportunity for a better comparison. The second reason to choose that survey was mainly practical. Eurobarometer 53 is a very comprehensive survey which provides the opportunity to examine various theories. The survey was carried out in 15 member states and a total of 16078 respondents were interviewed.

*The dependent variable*, the support for accession, is operationalized using the survey question: “For each of the following countries, would you be in favor of or against it becoming part of the European Union?” The answers of the respondents were coded for each candidate and potential candidate country as “in favor,” “against” and “DK.” For our study, the dependent variable is operationalized as a dichotomous variable, coded as 1 when the respondent is in favor of the accession and coded as 0 when the respondent is against or there is

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<sup>5</sup> Eurobarometer 53 is obtained from the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR), the study number is 3064.

no answer. Coding the answer as a binary variable provides a larger sample size and, additionally, it makes it possible to distinguish the characteristics of supporters not only from the opponent but from the rest of the sample (Ehin 2001: 43). The total number of respondents for the entire survey was 16078. Missing cases for Turkey were 17, while for Poland it was only 13. While only 31 percent of respondents are in favor of Turkey's European Union membership, 48 percent of the respondents are in favor of Poland's membership. The distribution of answers for both countries is shown in the following table.

**Table II.** Frequency Distribution: Support for European Union membership

		Support for Turkey's Membership				Support for Poland's Membership			
		Freq.	%	Valid %	Cum. %	Freq.	%	Valid %	Cum. %
Valid	<i>Against + DK</i>	11005	68,45	68,52	68,52	8466	52,66	52,70	52,70
	<i>In Favor</i>	5056	31,45	31,48	100,00	7599	47,26	47,30	100,00
	Total	16061	99,89	100,00		16065	99,92	100,00	
Missing	System	17	0,11			13	0,08		
Total		16078	100,00			16078	100,00		

*The independent variables* have been operationalized under three groups. In the construction of the independent variables, we used the same measures as the studies that have been referred. The first group of independent variables in the analysis concerns the economic/rational calculations and includes occupational skills, education levels, household income levels, and future economic expectations. For occupational skills, we created three dummy variables for manual workers, unemployed and professionals. The education variable is recoded under four categories according to the age that the respondents completed their education. It should be noted that European countries acquire a wide variety of educational structures. In the formation of

four education categories, we mainly referred to a report on education prepared by European Commission (2005) which provides data about the educational systems of each member state. The first category represent the respondents who stopped full time education at 15 years old which correspond to primary and lower secondary education. The respondents who had upper secondary education have been grouped under the second category. The respondents who participated in post secondary schools lasting 6 months to 2 years which prepares them for labor market and tertiary education (ibid. 63) listed in the third category. Finally, the fourth category corresponds to the 21 years old and more includes the university degree and more. In the analysis, the average age that respondents stopped full time education is 17.8 years (excludes still studying respondents) The respondents that are still studying were classified by their age. The income level variable is recoded in a four point scale regarding the respondents' self-evaluations.<sup>6</sup> And finally, the future economic expectations variable is operationalized using the question: "In the course of the next five years, do you expect your personal situation to improve, to stay about the same or to get worse?" The answers are coded as 0 (Get Worse), 0.5 (Stay about the same) or 1 (Improve). The "do not know" answers are recoded with the "stay about the same" answers

In the second group, the independent variables concern the domestic politics and they have been assessed as left/right self replacement, satisfaction with the incumbent government, and satisfaction with the system. Left right ideology is measured according the self-placement of the respondents, ranging from 1 (left) to 10 (right). In order to measure the satisfaction with the incumbent

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<sup>6</sup> The DK answers are recoded to the median.



government, the question “If there were a ‘General Election’ tomorrow which party would you vote for?” is used. Those who affirm that they would vote for the existing government party or parties are coded as 1 and all the others are coded 0. Finally, the responses for the question about whether respondents are satisfied with how the democracy works in their country, is coded as 0 (Not At all Satisfied), 0.33 (Not very Satisfied), 0.67 (Fairly Satisfied) or 1 (Very Satisfied). The “do not know” answers are placed at the median.

In the national identity strand, the independent variables have been identified as the exclusive national identity and the perceived threat from other cultures. The exclusive national identity variable is operationalized according to respondent’s answers to the question about whether they define themselves as nationality only, European only or both. The nationality only answer has been recoded as 1 and the rest has been recoded as 0. The perceived threat from other groups is explored under symbolic threat and realistic threat. The variables are measured by the responses to two statements: “People from these minority groups abuse the system of social benefits” and “The religious practices of people from these minority groups threaten our way of life.” Those who agree with those statements are recoded as 1 and those who disagree are recoded as 0. In the analysis, the “do not know” answers have been placed at the median category. This method has been chosen instead of list-wise deletion of cases in order to not lose these data.<sup>7</sup>

Finally, the assimilationist expectations have been operationalized using the following survey question: “In order to be fully accepted members of

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<sup>7</sup> Carey uses the same method to handle the ‘do not know’ missing values. She suggests that the results from two different analysis one with listwise-deleted “don’t knows” and one with all “don’t knows” recoded in the ‘neither good nor bad’ category, are both very similar. (2002: 394)

(NATIONALITY) society, people belonging to minority groups must give up their own culture.” The answers of this question provide a strong indication about the views of the respondents concerning assimilation. The possible answers in the codebook were “tend to agree,” “tend to disagree,” and “DK.” The answers have been recoded into a three point scale ranging from 0 to 1, where 0 signifies “tend to disagree,” and 1 “tend to agree”. The DK answers have been recoded at the median. In order to assess multicultural attitudes, we used this survey question: “It is a good thing for any society to be made up of people from different races, religions or cultures.” The answers of the respondents have been recoded the same way as the assimilationist expectations variable where 0 signifies “tend to disagree” and 1 signifies “tend to agree.” For details concerning the construction and descriptive statistics of the independent variables, see Appendix A.

### **C) - Method**

In the empirical analysis, we use logistic regression to test the hypotheses. Logistic regression models are mainly used when the dependent variable is binary or dichotomous (Hosmer and Lemeshow 2000). Independent variables can be both continuous and discrete. Logistic regression analysis observes the odds of occurrence of an event and the effects of independent variables on these odds (O’Connell 2006:11). Before running the logistic regression, the problem of multicollinearity should be taken into consideration. Unlike OLS regression, in a logistic regression there are no limitations for multivariate normality, homoscedasticity or linearity of the independent variables, still, the problem of multicollinearity should be controlled in a logistic

regression analysis (Spicer 2005: 135). The inter-correlated independent variables are called “multicollinear” and a problem of multicollinearity occurs in case these correlations have effects on the estimation of regression (von Eye and Schuster 1998:134). No doubt, in our study, there are relatively highly correlated variables such as education and income level ( $r= 0.22$ ) or perceived symbolic threat and assimilationist expectation ( $r=0.35$ ) which show moderate correlations. The variance inflation factor (VIF) is an indicator that assesses the multicollinearity and a VIF greater than 10 points to problems which may cause inflation in the magnitude of estimates and standard errors (DeMaris 2004: 267-268). The table in Appendix B shows that VIF values are low which confirms that there is not a multicollinearity problem.

To investigate the effects of independent variables on the attitudes toward accession of both countries, we ran five logistic models for each country. Table III shows the results of the logistic regression analysis for Turkey and Poland. In the first three models, we investigated the economic/rational, domestic politics and national identity variables separately. The fourth model includes all the independent variables put forward in the literature. Finally, the fifth model includes all the variables including assimilationist expectations and multicultural approaches. In the tables, we presented the logistic regression coefficient and odds ratio value for each variable. The odds ratio indicates the “*multiplicative impact on the odds of [occurrence of] an event for a unit increase*” in the independent variable (*ibid*: 264). The odds ratio is a useful and simple way to evaluate the strength of the effects of independent variables on dependent variables (Hosmer and Lemeshow 2000). In the interpretation of results, our

main focus will be on the odds ratios. The traditional significance level of 0.05 is adopted.

#### **D)- Analysis**

The three models presented in Table III study separately the major individual level hypotheses on public support for enlargement. Model 1 regresses the socio-economic variables on support for accession of Turkey and Poland. The results show that better economic evaluations and future expectations have strong effects on the odds of support for both countries. The odds ratio is higher for Turkey and the results demonstrate that respondents with better future expectations are 1.7 times more likely to support Turkey's accession (Poland 1.33). Regarding the effects of socioeconomic status on public support, only income level reveals a significant effect in both cases. For both Turkey and Poland, there is a positive relation between income level and support for accession (the odds ratios are 1.33 and 1.20, respectively). For the occupation skills, the results provide little evidence about their effects on public attitudes. In the Polish case, only the manual worker variable is significant, indicating that manual workers are less supportive of accession. When we take the education variable into account, the results yield mixed effects that differ by country. The proposition that a higher educational level is positively related to support for enlargement is validated in the Polish case. According to the results, respondents with a higher education level are 1.87 times more likely to support Poland's membership. In the Turkish case, the results for the education variable are not statically significant.

Model II reveals the effects of domestic politics variables on the support for accession. Consistent with the Hypothesis II(b), respondents who have a

**Table III.** Results from logistic regression analysis predicting support for accession

	Turkey									Poland								
	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3			Model 1			Model 2			Model 3		
	B	(S.E)	Exp(B)	B	(S.E)	Exp(B)	B	(S.E)	Exp(B)	B	(S.E)	Exp(B)	B	(S.E)	Exp(B)	B	(S.E)	Exp(B)
<i>Economic</i>																		
Education Level	0,042	(0,048)	1,043							0,625**	(0,045)	1,868						
Income Level	0,182**	(0,055)	1,200							0,285**	(0,052)	1,331						
Professional	0,019	(0,075)	1,019							0,099	(0,072)	1,105						
Manual worker	0,002	(0,040)	1,003							-0,093*	(0,038)	0,911						
Unemployed	0,041	(0,074)	1,042							-0,047	(0,069)	0,954						
Future Expectations	0,529**	(0,056)	1,698							0,282**	(0,052)	1,325						
<i>Domestic</i>																		
Ideology Left/Right				-0,350**	(0,087)	0,705							-0,206*	(0,081)	0,814			
System Satisfaction				0,735**	(0,069)	2,086							0,720**	(0,064)	2,054			
Incumbent Support				0,083*	(0,038)	1,087							0,007	(0,036)	1,007			
<i>National Identity</i>																		
Exclusive National Identity							-0,382**	(0,036)	0,682							-0,577**	(0,033)	0,562
Realistic Threat							-0,371**	(0,040)	0,690							-0,339**	(0,038)	0,712
Symbolic Threat							-0,364**	(0,043)	0,695							-0,299**	(0,039)	0,741
<i>N</i>	16045			16045			16045			16049			16048			16050		
-2 Log L	19876,691			19842,152			19578,403			21840,135			22060,051			21590,632		
chi-square	114,933			149,472			411,666			362,074			140,662			613,075		

\*\*  $p < 0,001$ ; \*  $p < 0,05$ . The results were obtained using SPSS

higher level of trust for their domestic institutions and who are satisfied with the performance of the democratic institutions are more likely to support the accession of Turkey and Poland. In both cases, one unit increase of system satisfaction increases the likelihood of being in favor of enlargement more than twice. Left/right ideology also appears to be a significant factor in the attitudes toward enlargement. The results suggest that respondents who find themselves closer to the right are more reluctant toward the accession of new countries. Finally, in terms of incumbent support, the findings are statistically significant in the Turkish case ( $p < 0.05$ ). The results point to a positive relationship between incumbent government support and support for accession as expected, however it does not show a strong effect. The supporters of government are only 9% more likely to be in favor of Turkey's membership.

The variables associated with national identity have been analyzed separately in Model III. The results display strong negative effects of national identity on public support. Consistent with Hypothesis III, having an exclusive national identity emerges as a strong predictor of attitudes toward accession, especially in the Polish case. Respondents defining themselves only with their nationality and having a strong attachment to their national identity are almost half less likely (0.56) to support the membership of Poland. Likewise, in the Turkish case, the results indicate that a one unit increase in exclusive national identity reduces the likelihood of supporting Turkey's membership by 32 percentage points ( $1 - 0.68 = 0.32$ ). The results for realistic and symbolic threat lend support to Hypothesis IV, which points to the negative effects of perceived threat on support for accession. The coefficient and odds ratio values have strong negative effects in both cases. Respondents who perceive threat on their

economic resources are less likely to support the accession of Poland and Turkey to the EU. A one unit increase on the level of perceived realistic threat reduces the likelihood to be in favor of the membership of Poland and Turkey by 30% (Poland  $(1-0.71) = 0.29$ ; Turkey  $(1-0.69) = 0.31$ ). For both cases, the perceived threat on culture was found to play an important role on attitudes. Perceiving threat on culture decreases the odds of support, but it should be noted that in the Turkish case perceived symbolic threat has a greater negative effect on support than in the Polish case. The magnitudes of regression coefficients are respectively -0,36 and -0,30 and both are significant at  $p < 0.001$ . Therefore, the increasing level of perceived threat on economic sources and on culture results in an increasing reluctance toward the EU membership of Turkey and Poland which confirms the Hypothesis IV in the separate model.

Table IV displays the logistic regression results for two different models. In Model 4, all economic/rational calculations, domestic politics and national identity variables are included simultaneously in the analysis. This model provides us with the possibility to test the main hypotheses put forward in integration literature. In the economic/rational calculation strand, the results for socio-economic variables show diverse results for both cases. In the Polish case, education and income are statistically significant and have positive effects on the likelihood of support for Poland's membership. Education appears to be an especially significant factor in attitudes toward the accession of Poland. Respondents with a one unit higher educational level are 1.58 times more supportive Poland's membership. Surprisingly, for Turkey, education reveals a negative effect for support. The results suggest that highly educated respondents are less favorable of Turkey's membership. In terms of occupational skills, being

unemployed or working as a professional or manual worker do not have any significant effect in either cases. The future expectations variable appears to be a significant variable for both cases. The results point to increasing public support when they are more optimistic about their economic future. Particularly in the Turkish case, the future expectations show a very strong effect. Respondents with better expectations are 43% more likely to be in favor of Turkish membership (11% for Poland).

For domestic politics variables, the system satisfaction variable has very strong effects and high odds ratio values for both cases. Higher system satisfaction increases the predicted probability of support for Turkey's

**Table IV.** Overall Models. Results from logistic regression estimates predicting support for accession.

	Turkey						Poland					
	Model 4			Model 5			Model 4			Model 5		
	B	(S.E)	Exp(B)	B	(S.E)	Exp(B)	B	(S.E)	Exp(B)	B	(S.E)	Exp(B)
<b>Economic</b>												
Education Level	-0,130*	(0,050)	0,878	-0,177**	(0,050)	0,838	0,459**	(0,046)	1,582	0,418**	(0,047)	1,519
Income Level	0,106	(0,056)	1,112	0,100	(0,056)	1,106	0,202**	(0,052)	1,224	0,197**	(0,053)	1,218
Professional	-0,007	(0,077)	0,993	-0,011	(0,077)	0,988	0,074	(0,073)	1,077	0,065	(0,074)	1,067
Manual worker	0,045	(0,042)	1,046	0,041	(0,042)	1,042	-0,051	(0,039)	0,950	-0,054	(0,039)	0,947
Unemployed	0,115	(0,075)	1,122	0,115	(0,076)	1,122	0,029	(0,070)	1,029	0,025	(0,071)	1,025
Future Expectations	0,360**	(0,058)	1,434	0,307**	(0,058)	1,359	0,107*	(0,053)	1,113	0,051*	(0,054)	1,052
<b>Domestic</b>												
Ideology Left/Right	-0,151	(0,089)	0,859	-0,061	(0,090)	0,940	-0,046	(0,083)	0,955	0,048	(0,084)	1,049
System Satisfaction	0,522**	(0,071)	1,686	0,472**	(0,072)	1,603	0,450**	(0,066)	1,569	0,397**	(0,067)	1,487
Incumbent Support	0,095*	(0,039)	1,100	0,098*	(0,039)	1,103	0,030	(0,036)	1,031	0,035	(0,037)	1,035
<b>National Identity</b>												
Exclusive National Identity	-0,343**	(0,037)	0,710	-0,272**	(0,037)	0,762	-0,473**	(0,033)	0,623	-0,404**	(0,034)	0,668
Realistic Threat	-0,339**	(0,040)	0,713	-0,257**	(0,041)	0,773	-0,280**	(0,038)	0,756	-0,196**	(0,039)	0,822
Symbolic Threat	-0,334**	(0,044)	0,716	-0,171**	(0,046)	0,842	-0,250**	(0,040)	0,779	-0,082*	(0,042)	0,921
Multiculturalism				0,550**	(0,048)	1,734				0,503**	(0,043)	1,655
Assimilationist Exp.				-0,172**	(0,048)	0,842				-0,205**	(0,043)	0,815
<i>N</i>	16014			16004			16018			16008		
-2 Log L	19417,577			19239,668			21333,250			21135,065		
chi-square	539,714			706,947			826,860			1011,367		

\*\*  $p < 0,001$ ; \*  $p < 0,05$ . The results were obtained using SPSS



membership by 69% (Poland: 57%). Concerning political ideology, though we find that moving from left to right ideologically furnishes a negative effect on the likelihood of support, the results are not statistically significant. Also, the incumbent government support variable is significant only in the Turkish case, but suggests a small effect on the likelihood of support. As in the separate model, the national identity variable shows significant results in the overall model. In both cases, respondents having strong feelings toward their national identity and higher levels of perceived realistic and symbolic threat are less enthusiastic for the European enlargement.

In the last model, Model 5, we added assimilationist expectations and multiculturalism variables to the analysis. First, in order to see if adding these variables to the equation contributes to the model or not, we are looking for the change in the -2 Log Likelihood values. The -2 Log Likelihood test which reflect the significance of the variance in the dependent variable is used for assessing the significance of the added variables (Romer 2006: 140). Compared with Model 4, the magnitude of the -2 Log likelihood significantly decreases which indicates that adding assimilationist expectations and multiculturalism variables contribute to the explanation in both cases (Spicer 2005: 129). Overall, the model performs well. The model is successful in predicting support for Turkey (68 % predicted correctly) and Poland (60% predicted correctly). Especially in the Polish case, the proposed model showed an improvement of 8 points over the model predictions.

The results of logistic regressions confirm the hypothesis that higher levels of pluralist approach toward “other” leads to increasing support for enlargement (Hypothesis V(a)). As shown in the table, respondents with

multicultural attitudes are 1.7 times more likely to support Turkey's membership to the European Union (1.65 for Poland). Overall, the multicultural approach variable appears to have the strongest effect on the public support for the accession of Turkey. In the analysis, we also find support for the assimilationist expectations hypothesis (Hypothesis V(b)). The results are statistically significant in both cases. Though it has a relatively weaker impact on public attitudes than the multiculturalism variable, still the findings indicate that assimilationist expectation is a significant predictor of reluctance toward enlargement. The results confirm our proposition which highlights the role attitudes towards minority groups as a determinant of public opinion on enlargement issues. An important point that should be stated is that the results for the assimilationist expectation variable show stronger effects on dependent variables than the symbolic threat variable which also emphasizes cultural concerns.

\* \* \*

To summarize, the regression analysis of all variables from different theoretical perspectives sheds light on important findings. First of all, the results present limited support for Hypothesis I(a), which underlines the role of individual competitiveness and socioeconomic situations on public attitudes. Highly educated respondents seem to be only more supportive of the accession of Poland. In the Turkish case, we obtain opposite findings. The results do not show any significant effect for occupational skills. Regarding future expectations, the results confirm Hypothesis I(b) in both cases, while the effect of the variable is stronger for Turkey. For the domestic politics hypotheses, we find strong support for Hypothesis II(b) which underlines the positive impact of

system satisfaction on public support. Finally, the variables in the national identity strand demonstrate strong effects on public support for the accession of Turkey and Poland. The results confirm Hypothesis III about the negative effects of having strong national identity and attachment. The logistic regression results also confirm Hypothesis IV suggesting that support for enlargement is negatively affected by the perceived threat on economic resources and on culture. Finally, the results display strong support for our own hypotheses. While respondents with multicultural attitudes are more enthusiastic for the accession of new countries to the EU, respondents with assimilationist expectations are less likely to support the enlargement.

## Conclusion

The European integration is mostly referred to as an elite-driven process. However, with coming into force of the Single European Act, the European Union became more salient in citizens' lives, which paved the way to increasing public involvement in the integration process. There is a growing literature on public support for European integration which revolves around three main sets of explanations: economic/rational calculations, domestic politics and national identity. Nevertheless, these studies have mainly concentrated on support of the integration process; the enlargement issue is mostly neglected. In the case of Turkey, the data from member states' public surveys show strong reluctance toward the accession of Turkey. In front of increasing public opposition, some states such as France and Austria declared that the membership of Turkey will be taken to a referendum. From this perspective, we believe that it is important to investigate, in detail, the individual level determinants of public attitudes toward enlargement.

The findings from the logistic regression analysis provide partial evidence for the effects of the economic calculations on support for enlargement. Socioeconomic variables have mixed effects in both cases. In the Polish case, respondents with more education and a higher income level are more likely to be in favor of possible enlargement. As suggested by Gabel, this might be because they feel less threatened by the accession of new countries (1995, 1998a, 1998b, 1998c). However, the findings in the Turkish case are noteworthy. Surprisingly, we found opposite results which indicate that respondents with a higher education are less supportive of the accession of Turkey. The results show strong

negative effects that can't be neglected. A possible explanation of these negative effects can be found in non-economic factors. Although the educational level has positive effects on economic security, it also increases the level of political awareness (Inglehart 1970a, Bartle 2000) which, in turn, may result in questioning the membership of a country that has many conflicted issues such as human rights violations, the Cyprus issue, the Kurdish question and the Armenian genocide/massacre debates.

Income level shows a positive association with support for enlargement; however results are significant only in the Polish case which requires further examination. In separate model, income level appears as a significant factor which has a positive effect on the likelihood of support for accession for both countries. However, in overall models shown in Table IV, it is evident that income level variable loses its effect and significance in Turkish case when controlling for national identity and domestic politics variables. Considering the effects of national identity variables, examining the effects of symbolic and realistic threat variable would be useful. As stated in the first part of the study, realistic threat corresponds to the perception of threat on social welfare benefits which may occur by opening the borders to new member state citizens. However, to explain the change on the income variable by the effects of realistic threat seems inadequate because we would see similar changes on the effects of income level for both Turkey and Poland. In this perspective, the effects of cultural factors and the perceived threat on cultural symbols should be explored in more detail. Although Turkey and Poland have big similarities in their size of population, economic structure and democratization process, they possess big differences in their historical relation with Europe and their cultural identity. In

this context, it would be accurate to suggest that the respondents in the analysis perceive more threat in their way of life and their cultural symbols in Turkish case regardless of their income level.

One of the indisputable consequences of the enlargement process is the elimination of the barriers to the movement of capital and persons. The free movement of capital gives rise either to the transfer of capital to low-cost labor countries or to the migration of labor from relatively less developed economies to the developed economies which increase competition for jobs (Gabel 1998c). In such a context, it is expected that unskilled workers or unemployed persons be less supportive of the accession of new countries (Gabel 1995, 1998a, 1998b, 1998c). However, our results do not provide any evidence regarding the effects of occupational skills. When we take into account the effects of economic evaluations on support for European enlargement, we find significant results. Our findings offer strong evidence for the proposition, that rational calculations about the benefits of European integration and positive economic expectations do affect the level of support for enlargement.

In the domestic political factors, satisfaction with the system and with the performance of democratic institutions stands out as a very strong predictor of support for enlargement. As stated by Anderson, because of their limited knowledge of European institutions, citizens use proxies from domestic politics to evaluate the EU and if they are satisfied with the working of the domestic institutions, they are also satisfied with the European institution (1998). When we take system satisfaction into account in the enlargement case, it would be accurate to say that trust of the domestic politics increases the trust for European institutions, which diminishes concerns about enlarging the union. The results

provides evidence for that proposition. The results offer little evidence for the government support hypothesis, which illustrates the relationship between support for incumbent government and support for enlargement.

In one of their studies, Hooghe and Marks ask in the title if identity or economic rationality drive public opinion on European integration (2004). Asking the same question for the enlargement process, our findings provide a clear answer to that question. Our results confirm the significant role of national identity factors in determining public attitudes and show that this line of argumentation is more successful in explaining opinions toward enlargement. There is remarkably strong evidence for the negative effects of strong attachment to national identity. Concerning the national identity attachment, individuals who define themselves exclusively with their national identity instead of multiple identities are more protective about their identity. It can be said that the fear of losing the principal underpinnings of their identity in front of the European identity, which diversifies by the accession of new countries, increases opposition toward enlargement. Interestingly, the effects of exclusive national identity are stronger in the Polish case, which has closer historical ties with Europe. Regarding perceived realistic and symbolic threat, the findings concur with our expectations. The perception of threat leads to a lower level of support. However, the data on the perception of symbolic threat should be discussed in more detail. This variable has a stronger effect in the Turkish case than in the Polish case. This difference implies that in the Turkish case the respondents are more sensitive to the perceived threat to their culture.

This brings to mind the question of whether religious differences have an effect on the threat perception. Nelsen *et al.* examine the role of religion on the

public and suggest that religious affiliations and religious commitment affect attitudes toward European integration (Nelsen, Guth and Fraser 2001). For instance, according to the authors, Roman Catholics are more supportive of the integration project (ibid: 210). An important sentence from the study states that even if Turkey manages to overcome its economic problems, the membership of a Muslim country to the European Union will be met with a lack of enthusiasm (ibid: 211). Unfortunately, the discussions about the role of religion on public support point out a shortcoming of this study. As the Eurobarometer does not include a question concerning the beliefs of the respondent, it is not possible to observe individual level effects of religious affiliations on public support for enlargement. Considering the Muslim population living in European countries, the role of religious affiliations on public opinion is a very important issue that requires further research.

As stated in the previous sections, one of the objectives of this study is to test the propositions put forward in the literature on public support for integration in the enlargement case. Our findings reveal that national identity propositions are more successful in predicting public support. The second objective of the study is to assess the role of the multicultural approach and assimilationist expectations. For both cases, multiculturalism has the strongest effect on public support. It appears that positive feelings toward cultural diversity are critical for being in favor of the enlargement process. The individuals who perceive the existence of different cultures in their society as an opportunity to establish a culturally richer community support the accession of different countries to the EU.



In contrast, expectations from other cultures to give up their own culture to adapt to the society, in other words assimilationist expectations, create negative feelings towards enlargement. It is possible to read these results as a reaction to multiculturalism. For a long time, in Western European societies, to criticize multiculturalism and multicultural policies has been equated with racism, but today there are more criticism about the subject (Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007: 123). The main idea behind multiculturalism is to protect the distinctive culture and identity of minority groups and to institute a society in which both minority and majority groups are “equal in standing” (*ibid*: 124-125). However, there is an increase among the people who see multiculturalism as a threat to their cultural core and their way of life (Auster 1990, Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007). Our findings reveal that individuals who favor cultural assimilation to cultural diversity are less likely to support EU enlargement.

In conclusion, the European integration project is formed as a unity of states. However, it can be said that the European Union is evolving from a unity of states toward a unity of people. In this perspective, we believe that the protection of national identity and inter-cultural relations are important factors that should be taken into consideration to better understand European integration and enlargement. Our results provide strong evidence for that perspective.

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## Appendix A

**Table V.** Description of variables

Variables		Question	Coding
<i>Support for the Turkey/Poland's membership (DV)</i>		For each of the following countries, would you be in favor of or against it becoming part of the European Union? Turkey (Q37.15), Poland (Q37.3)	0=Against + DK 1=In Favor
<i>Economic Calculations</i>	Education level	How old were you when you stopped full-time education? (D.8)	0=0-15 Years 0.33=16-18 Years 0.67=19-20 Years 1=21> Years
	Occupational Skills	What is your current occupation? (D.15) Dummy variables for professionals, manual labors, unemployed (Gabel 1998b)	1=Professional/Manager 1=Manual Worker 1=Unemployed 0=Rest
	Income level	Household Income (D.29)	.00= -- .33= - .50=No Response (DK) .67= + 1.00=++
	Future Expectations	In the course of the next five years, do you expect your personal situation to improve, to stay about the same or to get worse? (Q.6)	.00=Get Worse .50=Stay about the same+ DK 1.00=Improve
<i>Domestic Politics</i>	Left/Right	In political matters people talk of "the left" and "the right". How would you place your views on this scale? (D.1)	.00=Left .50=DK 1.00=Right
	Evaluation of Incumbent	If there were a "General Election" tomorrow which party would you vote for? (D.4)	0=Rest 1=Vote for the party in government
	Satisfaction with the System	On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in (Our country)? (Q.17)	0=Not At all Satisfied .33=Not very Satisfied .50=DK .67=Fairly Satisfied 1=Very Satisfied
<i>National Identity</i>	Exclusive National Identity	In the near future do you see yourself as? (Q.28) Nationality only/ Nationality and European/ European and Nationality/European only	0=Else 1=Nationality only
<i>Perceived Threats</i>	Realistic threat	People from these minority groups abuse the system of social benefits (Q51.3)	.00=Disagree .50=DK 1.00=Agree
	Symbolic threat	The religious practices of people from these minority groups threaten our way of life (Q51.7) (McLauren 2002).	.00=Disagree .50=DK 1.00=Agree
	Assimilationist expectations	In order to be fully accepted members of the society, people belonging to minority groups must give up their own culture (Q59.4)	.00=Disagree .50=DK 1.00=Agree
	Multiculturalism	It is a good thing for any society to be made up of people from different races, religions or cultures (Q59.1)	.00=Disagree .50=DK 1.00=Agree

**Table VI.** Descriptive statistics for dependent and independent variables

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Support for Turkey's membership	16061,00	0,00	1,00	0,31	0,46
Support for Poland's membership	16065,00	0,00	1,00	0,47	0,50
Education level	16066,00	0,00	1,00	0,44	0,37
Income Level	16078,00	0,00	1,00	0,49	0,32
Professional	16078,00	0,00	1,00	0,06	0,23
Manual worker	16078,00	0,00	1,00	0,24	0,43
Unemployed	16078,00	0,00	1,00	0,06	0,23
Future Expectations	16074,00	0,00	1,00	0,67	0,31
Ideology Left/Right	16078,00	0,00	1,00	0,48	0,20
System Satisfaction	16060,00	0,00	1,00	0,54	0,25
Incumbent Support	16078,00	0,00	1,00	0,29	0,45
Exclusive National Identity	16078,00	0,00	1,00	0,44	0,50
Realistic Threat	16064,00	0,00	1,00	0,60	0,45
Symbolic Threat	16071,00	0,00	1,00	0,32	0,44
Multiculturalism	16070,00	0,00	1,00	0,69	0,43
Assimilationist Expectations	16067,00	0,00	1,00	0,29	0,42
Valid N (listwise)	16001,00				

## Appendix B

**Table VII-** Collinearity statistics

	Collinearity Statistics	
	Tolerance	VIF
Education level	0,870	1,150
Income Level	0,915	1,093
Professional	0,928	1,078
Manual worker	0,942	1,062
Unemployed	0,958	1,044
Future Expectations	0,936	1,069
Ideology Left/Right	0,940	1,064
System Satisfaction	0,937	1,067
Incumbent Support	0,951	1,051
Exclusive National Identity	0,892	1,121
Realistic Threat	0,852	1,174
Symbolic Threat	0,782	1,279
Multiculturalism	0,821	1,217
Assimilationist Expectations	0,803	1,246