Université de Montréal

THE EXILED INTELLIGENCE: DELMORE SCHWARTZ AND THE POETRY OF KNOWING

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

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Abstract

Wishing to escape the magnetic fields in Schwartz criticism of biography, precocity, and the New York intellectual context, I propose that the body of Delmore Schwartz's poetry is underwritten by a more compelling force: his consistent devotion to the epistemological capabilities of the poem. Amid the endless wrangles about the autotelicist and formalist, versus the mimetic and social, responsibilities of the poem which presented themselves in the thirties and forties, amid the confusing babel of critical tongues, Schwartz's voice is lively, simple and clear: a poem is "an effort at perception" (LC 336), "an act of knowing" (PI 4). I propose to test how these trenchant formulas are realized in the poetry.

Among the questions which recur with insistence is the one posed forthrightly in the dialogue "Father and Son": "What is there to be known?" (SK 31). Here Schwartz issued a career-long challenge to which he was committed to respond. I seek to address this very question, along with the closely cognate issues of perception, awareness and sentience. My effort to trace a working epistemology in the body of Schwartz's work is openly problematized, if not indeed challenged and subverted, specifically, by Schwartz's concessions to the difficulty of knowledge and, more generally, by his cultivation of a protean literary sensibility.

In elucidating the epistemological dimension of Schwartz's poetry, I propose a fresh set of critical alignments. In the debate about the cognitive and philosophical assertions of the poem, Schwartz remains a curiously neglected figure. Yet statements about the difference between philosophical discourse and poetic presentation, and how they treat separate orders of existence, abound in Schwartz's writings. Reading a philosophical poet in a post-philosophical age is not

without its challenges. The question of whether poetry is philosophical has been replaced with the declaration of literature's ascendancy over an atrophic philosophy. Schwartz would have been disheartened by the frontal attack epistemology has sustained in recent times. There is, as he writes in his correspondence, a "causal nexus between perception and poetry" (L 38). It is in the light of this statement that Schwartz's poetry can be most fruitfully examined. This pivotal "nexus" defines Schwartz's central artistic problem, as it furnishes a framework within which I pursue my central thesis, that is, that Schwartz's poetry registers, in phenomenological notation, the apprehended world.

The plaintive note struck by Eliot's Fisher King, "Shall I at least set my lands in order?" set the tone for a whole generation as it sounded a serious challenge for Schwartz's poetry. The first half of the thesis addresses the access to knowledge for which clarity and order are rhetorical desiderata. While the referential signposts are his own, Schwartz makes prodigious use of traditional markers of order, that is, musical symmetry and rhyme's iteration. These, embedded often in a turbulent subject matter, create their own fiction of concord to which the reader provisionally assents. The enumerative catalogue is Schwartz's most pervasive ordering device. The list imparts a method to his dogged stock-taking of the phenomenal world. Lists of substantives show onomastic function, while adjectival inventories betray a descriptive typology. Schwartz is, I maintain, a revisionary heir to the American Transcendentalist catalogue tradition.

In his early meditative piece, Having Snow, a series of exercises on the "difficulty of knowledge" as "something perceived," Schwartz sounds the opening phenomenological chord, and the dominant one, of his career. Standing at the confluence of many intellectual currents, Schwartz chooses Husserl's methodological programme as the one most unusually suited to his

own habits of perception and presentation. In the second half of the thesis, I look at how Schwartz registers the "privilege" of phenomenological discourse (Dufrenne, "The Phenomenological Approach to Poetry" 8) by celebrating in his poetry the textures and concealed essences of the lived world.

I do not apply a phenomenological criticism to a reading of the poems, which would, after the Geneva critics, give me direct access to Schwartz's own consciousness. I want to show, rather, how aspects of Husserl's methodology work themselves out thematically and stylistically in Schwartz's verse: pure intentionality or the self-reflexive inquiry into the objects of our consciousness, the poem's ensuing metapoetical engagement with its own artifice, the expedient bracketing of, and putting in abeyance, all naturalistic and existential presuppositions. Reflecting the inward turn of the epistemological paradigm, the literary work is for Schwartz both made object and form of generative consciousness; the poet both constitutes and contemplates his landscape. Schwartz's interest in the knowledge available in poetry raises a polemic against the purely lyric assertions of the poetic ego. Yet poetry is meant to record "not the world," but "one's sense of the world," as Husserl has it in his entry, "Phenomenology" in the 1927 edition of the Britannica.

Even as Schwartz participates in its redefinition, the concrete universal is a valuable informing paradigm for his epistemology: essence demands local habitation and investiture in the sensuous. Schwartz answers enthusiastically, and with a great deal of local colour, Husserl's landmark clarion call, "To the things themselves" ("Philosophy as Rigorous Science"). Schwartz's signature confrontation with the world typically includes a heuristic inventory of empirical events: "Study daily things" is his version of Husserl's methodological battle cry.

This dissertation is guided by my sense that most of the poems in Schwartz's canon, in one way or another, openly or implicitly, measure the accessibility or attainability of both the lived and essential knowledge demanded by phenomenology. I will consider Schwartz's themes -- the uses of the past, urban estrangement, modernist exile, Old Testament moralism, the wages of Capitalism, existential freedom -- in the context of the "philosophic mind" in which they were conceived. I apply rhetorical and textual analysis when attending to the formal aspects of his verse; a study of ideational significance calls for a closer look at the environing philosophical context. I defend the notion that Schwartz combines modernist pratice and, in his terms, "revery over the essences" (L 25) in a manner peculiarly his own. I undertake to demonstrate here that we are enjoined by Schwartz's poetry itself to reflect on the epistemological commitment of his images, themes and tropes. "Having snow" is his most enduring metaphor: although snow can be perceived and apperceived, it can never be "had."

Résumé de synthèse

Désirant échapper aux champs magnétiques que représentent, au sein de la critique schwartzienne, la biographie, la précocité et le contexte intellectuel new-yorkais, j'avance que l'oeuvre poétique de Delmore Schwartz est sous-tendue par une force plus puissante : le dévouement soutenu qu'il a manifesté aux capacités épistémologiques du poème. Parmi les interminables querelles des années trente et quarante sur les obligations autotélicistes et formalistes — ou, à l'inverse, mimétiques et sociales — du poème, dans le babel confus des paroles critiques, la voix de Schwartz s'élève simple, claire et vivante : le poème est un « effort de perception » (LC 336), un « acte de connaissance » (PI 4). Je me propose d'examiner la façon dont ces formules incisives se réalisent dans l'oeuvre du poète.

« Qu'y a-t-il à connaître ? » (SK 31) Cette question sans détours formulée dans le dialogue « Father and Son » est réitérée avec insistance tout au long de la carrière de Schwartz, représentant un défi qu'il n'a cessé de vouloir relever. Je me pencherai sur cette question et sur celles, apparentées, de la perception, de la conscience et de la faculté de sentir. Mon projet, consistant à tracer une épistémologie active au sein de l'oeuvre schwartzienne, est ouvertement remis en question — voire contesté ou expressément subverti — par les concessions de Schwartz au chapitre de la difficulté de la connaissance et, encore davantage, par son choix de cultiver une sensibilité littéraire protéenne.

En élucidant la dimension épistémologique de la poésie de Schwartz, je propose un nouvel ensemble d'alignements critiques. Schwartz est une figure curieusement négligée dans le débat

observations sur la différence entre le discours philosophique et la démarche poétique et la façon dont ceux-ci présentent les différents ordres de l'existence. La lecture d'un poète philosophique n'est pas sans problème à l'époque post-philosophique. Ayant cessé de demander si la poésie est ou non philosophique, on affirme désormais l'ascendant de la littérature sur une philosophie étiolée. Schwartz aurait été affligé par le rude assaut lancé contre l'épistémologie au cours des dernières années. Il existe, comme il le dit dans sa correspondance, « une liaison causale entre la perception et la poésie » (L 38), et c'est à la lumière de cet énoncé de programme que l'on peut réaliser l'examen le plus fructueux de sa poésie. Cette « liaison » cruciale définit le problème artistique central de Schwartz et fournit également le cadre au sein duquel je poursuis mon argument central, soit la notion que l'oeuvre poétique de Schwartz représente la transcription, en notation phénoménologique, du monde perçu et appréhendé.

La note plaintive perceptible dans le propos du roi pêcheur d'Eliot : « *Shall I at least set my lands in order?* » (« Mettrai-je au moins de l'ordre dans mes terres ? ») a donné le ton pour une génération entière et a représenté un défi profond pour l'oeuvre poétique de Schwartz. La première moitié de la présente thèse porte sur l'accès à la connaissance, pour lequel la clarté et l'ordre représentent des desiderata rhétoriques; les préférences cognitives déterminent les choix stylistiques. Tout en fournissant ses propres jalons référentiels, Schwartz fait un emploi important des marqueurs conventionnels de l'ordre que sont la symétrie musicale et l'itération de la rime. Souvent insérés dans une matière turbulente, ces marqueurs établissent une concorde fictive qui obtient l'assentiment provisoire du lecteur. Le catalogue énumératif est le procédé auquel Schwartz a recours le plus souvent pour créer l'ordre; la liste est un procédé qui lui permet de poursuivre son inventaire tenace du monde phénoménal. Les données sensorielles font l'objet

d'une notation poétique et sont étiquetées et comptées. Les listes de substantifs révèlent une fonction onomastique, tandis que les inventaires d'adjectifs trahissent une typologie descriptive. Je cherche à démontrer que Schwartz est l'héritier révisionniste de la tradition du catalogue léguée par les transcendentalistes américains.

Dans un texte de jeunesse méditatif — *Having Snow*, série d'exercices portant sur la « difficulté de la connaissance », correspondant à « quelque chose de perçu » dans « la tentative de connaître » — Schwartz fait entendre pour la première fois la note phénoménologique qui dominera son oeuvre. Au confluent de nombreux courants intellectuels, le poète choisit le programme méthodologique de Husserl qui reflète, de façon surprenante, ses propres habitudes de perception et de présentation. Dans la seconde partie de la thèse, j'analyse la façon dont Schwartz transcrit le « privilège » du discours phénoménologique (Dufrenne, « The Phenomenological Approach to Poetry » 8) en célébrant, dans ses poèmes, les trames et les essences cachées du monde vécu.

Je ne cherche pas à appliquer la méthode critique phénoménologique à la lecture des poèmes, méthode qui permettrait, d'après les critiques de Genève, d'accéder directement à la conscience même de Schwartz. Je souhaite plutôt faire valoir que certains aspects de la méthodologie de Husserl se manifestent sur le plan thématique et stylistique dans l'oeuvre poétique de Schwartz : l'intentionnalité pure ou l'enquête autoréflexive sur les objets de notre conscience, l'engagement métapoétique qui en découle et qui lie le poème à son propre artifice, la mise entre parenthèses opportune, ou la suspension, de tous les présupposés naturalistes ou existentialistes. Traduisant la perspective intérieure du paradigme épistémologique, l'oeuvre littéraire représente pour Schwartz à la fois un objet fabriqué et une forme de conscience

générative : le poète constitue et contemple tout à la fois son paysage. L'intérêt de Schwartz pour la connaissance disponsible dans la poésie vient contester les affirmations purement lyriques de l'ego poétique. La poésie doit cependant transcrire « non pas le monde » mais « le sens que l'on a du monde », comme l'écrit Husserl en 1927 dans l'article « Phenomenology » de la *Encyclopedia Britannica*.

L'universel concret que Schwartz contribue à redéfinir est un paradigme de grande valeur qui informe son épistémologie; en effet, l'essence exige l'habitation locale et l'investiture dans le sensuel. Schwartz répond avec enthousiasme (et beaucoup de couleur locale) à l'appel de clairon lancé par Husserl : « Aux choses mêmes » (*La Philosophie comme science rigoureuse*). Le mouvement typique par lequel Schwartz affronte le monde comprend un inventaire heuristique des événements empiriques; « étudier les choses quotidiennes » constitue sa version du cri de guerre méthodologique de Husserl.

La présente dissertation est guidée par ma conviction que la plupart des poèmes formant l'oeuvre canonique de Schwartz mesurent d'une manière ou d'une autre, de façon ouverte ou implicite, le caractère accessible ou atteignable de la connaissance à la fois vécue et essentielle exigée par la phénoménologie. Les thèmes de Schwartz — utilisation du passé, aliénation urbaine, exil moderniste, moralisme de l'Ancien Testament, salaire du capitalisme, liberté existentielle — sont examinés dans le contexte de « l'esprit philosophique » qui les a conçus. Mon approche est déterminée par le sujet : j'utilise l'analyse rhétorique et textuelle lorsque je porte attention aux aspects formels des vers de Schwartz; par contre, l'étude de la signification idéationnelle exige que l'on regarde de plus près le contexte philosophique. Je fais valoir la notion que Schwartz associe une pratique moderniste et ce qu'il appelle la « rêverie sur les

essences » (L 25) d'une manière qui lui appartient en propre, et je cherche à démontrer que l'oeuvre poétique de Schwartz nous enjoint de réfléchir à l'engagement phénoménologique exprimé par ses images, thèmes et figures de style. « *Having snow* », « avoir la neige », constitue sa métaphore la plus durable : certes la neige peut être objet de perception ou d'aperception, mais on ne peut jamais « l'avoir ».

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Abbreviations

DBB	Doctor Bergen's Belief
G	Genesis: Book One
IDBR	In Dreams Begin Responsibilities (Poems)
IDBROS	In Dreams Begin Responsibilities and Other Stories
J	Portrait of Delmore (Journals)
LLP	Last and Lost Poems
L	Letters
LLV	"The Apprenticeship of Delmore Schwartz," Lila Lee Valenti
PI	"Poetry as Imitation"
SE	Selected Essays
S	Shenandoah
SK	Summer Knowledge
VP	Vaudeville for a Princess

As Schwartz's earliest collection, In Dreams Begin Responsibilities, is out of print, I will refer to its poems as they are reprinted in SK, the centerpiece of my study. The verse play Doctor Bergen's Belief has not been reprinted. All references to it will be to the original IDBR. I refer to his uncollected, for the most part, unpublished, manuscripts and typescripts which are in the American Literature Collection at the Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library at Yale University. My source for the early unpublished sonnets and songs is Lila Lee Valenti's article, "The Apprenticeship of Delmore Schwartz."

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I sincerely thank Professor William Kinsley for his many acts of kindness. My gratitude to him for seeking me out in the library and helping me hunt down sources. His "thumbs up" and promptings of "Courage!" cheered my heart no end. Convinced that "everything by nature's law / Tends to the worse, slips ever backward, backward," I came to see the joy in discovering "what makes the corncrops glad" (Virgil, Georgics Bk 1 ll. 200-01; l. 1) under Professor Kinsley's tutelage.

I am indebted to Professor Robert K. Martin for his magnanimity, administrative help and for sending me the Ashbery lecture on Schwartz.

My gratitude to the professors with whom I studied, especially the teachers of American modernism -- Jay Bochner, John O'Neill and Richard Robillard. They are dedicated to giving the lie to this family saga: "My father who owned the wagon-shop / And grew rich shoeing horses / Sent me to the University of Montreal. / I learnt nothing and returned home . . . / Hunting quail and snipe" (Edgar Lee Masters, Spoon River Anthology, 35).

My appreciation to Gloria and Naomi and their families for their love and support.

I thank Malkaleh who has taught me the wisdom in Schwartz's title, "The Child is the Meaning of this Life" (IDBROS 140-86).

Dedication

To the memory of my beloved parents, Molly and Harry Lipsky

A likhtikn Gan-Eden.

And to dearest Ed, in appreciation of what he has endured.

Gadol ha-metsuveh ve-oseh

mi-she-aino metsuveh ve-oseh

Commandment, more than our will, confers greatness.

Now Joseph is, as I was: in Egypt's pit,
In that accustomed depth and isolated height
The solitude of eminence, the exiled intelligence,
Which separated me even as it created me. . . .

Delmore Schwartz, "Jacob"
Summer Knowledge 234

. . . there is a poet indulging
his rage for order --
or not as the case may be; for his
is a dying art,
an eddy of semantic scruples
in an unstructurable sea.
.....
. . . Watch as I tear down
to build up with a desperate love,
knowing it cannot be
long now till I have need of his
desperate ironies.

Derek Mahon, "Rage for Order"
qtd. in James Mc Elroy, "Derek Mahon's 'Rage for Order'"
Northwest Review 24 (1986), 100-01.

. . . Hang up philosophy!
Unless philosophy can make a Juliet. . . .

William Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet III, ii, ll. 57-58
Complete Works 398

. . . The bear,
The ponderous cinammon, snarls in his mountain

At summer thunder, and sleeps through winter snow,
But you, ephebe, look from your attic window,
Your mansard with a rented piano. . . .

Wallace Stevens, "It Must Be Abstract"
Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction, Collected Poems 384

Introduction

READING A PHILOSOPHICAL POET IN A POST-PHILOSOPHICAL AGE

> . . . the main source of "the poetic" is not the cognitive content but rather the poetizing process as such, the process, that is, of metaphoring experience. The process itself is a poetic one, for the creative movement of carrying a meaning forward and completing its melodic phrase in the formation of a new integrity, a newly emergent personal whole, is the most fundamental determinant of poetizing. . . .
>
> David Levin, "The Poetic Function in Phenomenological Discourse" 230.

a) Clearing the Ground: Scope and Method

A couple of years ago, in equal stride with countless other students of literature, I ran to purchase a copy of Harold Bloom's tome, The Western Canon: The Books and School of the Ages, seeking for my subject of study legitimacy and approbation where they are so grudgingly given. With his de-canonization of Eliot, rehabilitation of Yeats and Stevens, quarrel with the academic pieties and rules of canonicity, his shufflings and reshufflings of the orders of prominence within the canon, Bloom, I felt sure, must have made room for Delmore Schwartz. A quick perusal proved me wrong: he was not in the table of contents, not in the index, not even consigned to a footnote or given a scholarly nod. As I read the introduction, however, I was heartened to find Schwartz's implicit presence in Bloom's criteria for "aesthetic strength" by dint of which one breaks into the canon: "mastery of figurative language, originality, cognitive power, knowledge, exuberance of diction" (29).[1]

It is just this cognitive power, or, to waive the evaluative function, cognitive interest, of his work which sustains Schwartz's own poetic canon. It both lends Schwartz's text its vertebrate quality and governs my principles of selection. In this dissertation I will advance the thesis that Schwartz's self-declared subject matter -- consciousness, perception, apperception, sentience, the limits of knowledge -- is evidence of an abiding and programmatic epistemology

which pervades his entire poetic corpus. I take my lead from Schwartz's own critical practice which rests on his "strong sense that literature is a mode of knowledge and must be judged for what it knows" (Dike, "A Case for Judgment" 499). In his unpublished essay, "Poetry as Imitation,"[2] Schwartz draws on Aristotle's Poetics as well as the De Anima to define poetry as a "form of cognition" (McDougall 19) and perception, "an act of knowing":

> Aristotle describes the mind's act, when it knows, in such a way that a kind of identity seems to exist between the act of knowledge and the act of imitation. . . . The mind when it knows "becomes" the object which it knows. . . . As an example . . . the intellect, when it knows the triangularity of a triangle, becomes at the moment merely the meaning, triangularity. . . . If the artist also imitates, is not knowledge of some variety also the product? The act of writing a poem is an act of knowing. (3-4)

This essay served as his personal charter of literary rights throughout his career, as it set the scene for his poetic project. Schwartz anticipates W.K. Wimsatt's cognitive criticism which defends literature as a "form of knowledge" (Verbal Icon xii), Allen Tate's tenet, expounded in his essay "Literature as Knowledge," that the sufficient knowledge offered by the poem is coterminous with the poem itself and William Carlos Williams' conviction that poetry, as the "embodiment of knowledge" must be defined as "epistemology in a certain form" ("Philosophy, Science and Poetry" 74).

Schwartz has a lexical preoccupation with knowledge. In a concordance of Schwartz verse, "to know," along with its cognates -- "knowing," "knowledge," "known" -- would have many entries. "A Dream of Knowledge" is the subtitle of his verse play Coriolanus, as well as a heading in his collection Summer Knowledge. Each poem is prodigal of new musings on how it is a way of knowing, perceiving and understanding the world. I will try to determine "his sense of the world," which is the poet's sole subject, according to Wallace Stevens (Necessary

Angel 121). As we shall see in the second half of this thesis, Husserl gives this phrase a phenomenological reading -- "Not the world or any part of it appears, but the 'sense' of the world" ("Phenomenology") -- a reading which resonates through Schwartz's writing. Schwartz brings to articulation, in the personal, and even idiosyncratic, terms to which Levin refers in the above epigraph, the "experiential process" (230) of poetry. In my study of the poetic conventions and heresies of Schwartz's verse, I will attempt to define, as Conrad Aiken notes in his study of Schwartz's poetry, the "essentially lyric nature of his relation to his own world and moment" ("Back to Poetry" 219). Aiken's own lyric poem, "Knowing," defines the "effort" of Schwartz's poetry:

> . . . To comprehend
> And to be comprehended,
> To know the other
> And to be known. (The Art of Knowing, xiii)

If indeed Schwartz, as I contend, fashioned for himself a prescriptive epistemology, a normative hermeneutic, I will attempt to define those laws with reference to how he perceives, orders and interprets his perceptual field. It is knowledge as perception, the "self-conscious encounter with the object," as Eliot has it in his thesis on F.H. Bradley, to which I will attend in this study: "It is perhaps epistemology . . . that has given us the fine arts; for what was at first expression and behaviour may have developed under the complications of self-consciousness, as we became aware of ourselves as reaching aesthetically to the object" (qtd. in Duffey 1091). I will explore, as no one has before me, Schwartz's self-declared "causal nexus between . . . poetry and perception" (L 38). In my reading of Schwartz's personal poetic epistemology, I offer but the fourteenth way of looking at a blackbird, as Eugene F. Kaelin has it:

> [Stevens'] poem is thus "epistemological," showing how, within human experience, something comes to be known for the particular significance it has to the perceiver. . . . The fourteenth way of looking at Stevens' blackbird is already contained in our experience of the other thirteen; . . . new critical autonomists, intentionalists, semioticians, structuralists, poststructuralists, new psychocritics, reader-response critics, critics of consciousness -- tend overall to forget that their own modus operandi amounts to nothing more than still another way of looking at a blackbird -- a poem -- whose value is neither summative nor definitive, but which can only be as valid as it appears to convey a clear description of at least one aspect of what interests us. . . . (191-92)

To show how individual acts of knowing can serve as an organizing principle for Schwartz's work, I call on Roman Jakobson's lecture, "The Dominant," a clarification of Juri Tynjanov's theories: "The dominant may be defined as the focusing component of a work of art: it rules, determines and transforms the remaining components. It is the dominant which guarantees the integrity of the structure" (qtd. in McHale 55). In Schwartz's poetry it is the epistemological effort which ensures the integrity of the "concrete poetic canon" while it fixes the temporal poetic norms" (56). The dominant, then, works at the level of the specific text; it also functions at the level of the system, a "regularly ordered hierarchical set of artistic devices" (56). It is this latter definition which Brian McHale uses to distinguish the Modernist from the Postmodernist episteme. While the dominant of the Postmodern is an ontological one, the Modernist enacts a "poetics of the epistemological dominant":

> The dominant of Modernist writing is epistemological. That is, Modernist writing is designed to raise such questions as: what is there to be known? who knows it? how do they know it, and with what degree of certainty? how is knowledge transmitted from one knower to another, and with what degree of reliability? how does the object of knowledge change as it passes from knower to knower? what are the limits of knowledge? and so on. (58)

I hope to show how Schwartz stands squarely within this Modernist tradition. Whatever the perceptual and conceptual schemata proposed for the study of a poetry of knowing, among the

questions which recur with insistence is the one posed simply by the son to his father in the dialogue, "Father and Son": "What is there to be known?" (SK 31), one of McHale's key queries. With this question, Schwartz issued a career-long challenge to which his own poetry was committed to respond. I argue that this question is Schwartz's central artistic problem.

Schwartz contributed to, and was poetry editor of, the Partisan Review; he was literary consultant to his publisher, New Directions. Yet his vision was not markedly partisan, his direction not new. A "fellow traveller" in politics, a Laodicean in matters of religion, a straddler of conflicting historicist and formalist imperatives in literary criticism, Schwartz evinces an unambiguous and consistent devotion to the epistemological capabilities of the poem. Schwartz's voice is lively, simple and clear: a poem is an "effort at perception" ("Primitivism and Decadence by Yvor Winters" SE 336); it is also an "instrument of perception" (334). The effort to reconstitute the world in words, to parse and transcribe its parts, is the continuo against which all other melodic lines and themes are played. While political passions came and went with newsflashes from Russia, while allegiance to mass and ethical cultures followed the winds of the local Zeitgeist, Schwartz's engagement with philosophical, specifically epistemological, questions was constant throughout his career. I hope to show that his poetry is the point of juncture of modernist tropes and, what Schwartz termed, "revery over the essences" (L 25). His poetry reflects the speculative range and critical rigour which his avocation as a philosopher afforded him. Tutored reflection and classical instruction belie the casual erudition of his occasional criticism. The putative cognitive claims of poetry is a topic that endlessly engaged Schwartz, as it had other poets since Kant performed the historically-indispensable task of liberating aesthetic taste from its heteronomous bondage to scientific discourse.

My critical effort to trace a working epistemology in Schwartz's work is an enterprise which seems hopelessly old-fashioned in an age when philosophy, indeed epistemology, is described in atrophic terms: it is obsolete, played out, defunct and has retired from the scene. For purposes of this thesis, I will haul the Mastodon out of extinction. The question of whether poetry is philosophical has been replaced, with the widening of the notion of text as écriture, with the declaration of literature's ascendancy over philosophy. Richard Rorty's friendly suggestion that we, in the name of Neo-Pragmatism, drop our concern with philosophical preoccupations, and simply "change the subject" would have challenged a philosophical poet such as Schwartz. Schwartz, as poet, treads on philosophy's open preserve, not without first marking the distinction, as Coleridge did before him in the Biographia Literaria, between poetic thoughts and philosophical thoughts "translated" into the language of poetry (Engell and Bate 19). This distinction, along with the one Eliot made between "philosophical belief and poetic assent" ("Dante" 257), is dissolved by Paul de Man's contention, brought home in his essay "The Epistemology of Metaphor," that cognition and metaphor exist in blissful symbiosis, "illustrating" and "shaping" each other (16).

Although Schwartz steals across their borders, the boundaries between philosophy and poetry, he feels, must be preserved. In a passage which elucidates my choice of the word "knowing" in the title of this thesis, Schwartz writes passionately on the conviction that poetry is more than a registrar of one's philosophical and sensual impressions:

> But poetry is not philosophy, nor is poetry sense experience. How then is poetry knowledge? Let me at least begin by deciding that whatever knowledge is the product of poetry will be called, knowing, while the word knowledge itself reserved for what is known by means of philosophy and science. Now if poetry is neither philosophy nor sense experience, but is knowing of some sort, the next question clearly is, "What is known in a poem?" (PI 4-5)

This is precisely the question I seek to address. I will make the point that these terms of exclusion are compromised: Schwartz's poetry may indeed be "neither philosophy nor sense experience," yet these separate modes of discourse meet time and time again in the poem's imagistic concreta and their metaphysical referents. In a letter to Paul Goodman, Schwartz clarifies his knowing/knowledge dichotomy, while the terms strain to accommodate each other:

> You said that my analogy, art as knowing, was poor, because knowing always involves the universals. I used the word "knowing" as a contrast to "knowledge" to mark the analogy and signify the difference. My point is of course the likeness. Well, your objection falls down precisely because universals are involved in apprehending an object of art just as they are involved in knowing a person or knowing a neighborhood. Knowing is not "scientific" . . . that is, it is not knowledge: but it is more like knowledge than "like" anything else, because in each instance we have a kind of conscious contact with the object. . . . (L 29)

Schwartz's poetic knowing, then, accords with Bloom's personal stipulative definition of Gnosis, which is "not rational knowledge, but like poetic knowledge (I suspect 'like' to be my evasion). Gnosis is more-than-rational knowledge. . . . Gnosis alters both knower and known" ("A Prelude to Gnosis" 4-5). I will, then, study Schwartz's Gnosis or poetic cognition. In the debate about the cognitive, perceptual and philosophical assertions of poetry, Schwartz remains a curiously neglected figure. This stretch of Schwartz territory is untilled ground, except for a few critical treatments which are limited and unsustained. They single out touchstones and affiliations in his work, without determining the centrality of poetic knowing to the work itself. While there has been no full study of Schwartz's poetic epistemology, a few critics cite aspects of his aesthetic philosophy in his work. Richard McDougall, in his book-length study of Schwartz's poetry, aptly assesses PI as an "exuberantly ambitious attempt to define poetry as a form of cognition" (19), but does not apply this discovery more narrowly to the poems

themselves. Donald Dike, in "The Poetics and the Criticism of Delmore Schwartz," looks at various "extrapolations from Aristotle" in Schwartz's criticism, particularly his essay on Dos Passos. Discussing Schwartz's essay "Poetry as Imitation," Dike claims:

> The theory of poetry ambitiously assayed not only develops from an interpretation of Aristotle's; it even mimics some of the Poetics' procedural features, devoting for example a section to answering hypothetical objections. . . . as Aristotle might have put it if Schwartz's interpretation is correct: poetry imitates a universal, a reality of nature but the universal is discoverable only from the imitation, just as a form or type inheres only in a particular instance. (Item 27)

Valuable to my study are Dike's more general remarks, ". . . one measure of a poem [is] its capacity to realize the knowability, meaning, truth or universal of its subject matter . . . poetry brings to consciousness its own indigenous way and has its own special field of knowledge" (Item 27). Alas, this study is an all-too-brief "note" in the canon of Schwartz criticism. In his essay, "Delmore Schwartz's Felt Abstractions," Jay Halio draws a chronological line between Schwartz's early tactile and kinaesthetic imagery and his later poetry of abstraction. The essay, "The Passion for Plato in Delmore Schwartz," notes the strains of intuitive and intellectual knowledge in Schwartz's work. Here Jo Brans broadly vilifies and praises Schwartz, with little reference to specific poems: "The poems which contain the burden of desperate mysticism are generally flaccid and uninteresting in contrast with the more intellectually rigorous poetry . . ." (508). Platonic parallels are drawn with little care for text or metaphor: "The superficial influence of Plato is easily apparent in the cave, the horses. . . . But the deeper impact of the philosopher shows here ... in the courageous rational intelligence" (527). Schwartz has never been cited as a systematic theoretician, cogent polemicist or consistent philosopher. Yet critical opinion has more than acknowledged his poetic contemplation of eternal truths. Reviewing Schwartz's first collection of verses, In Dreams Begin Responsibilities, Wallace

Stevens commends Schwartz's philosophical prowess, citing F.H. Bradley's dictum, "what the imagination loved as poetry, reason might love as philosophy" (qtd. in Atlas 122).

Richard Wilbur calls the volume Last and Lost Poems of Delmore Schwartz "rhapsodic yet philosophic" (qtd. in Dana 116), while F.O. Matthiessen recognizes Schwartz's "final capacity for combining lyric immediacy and philosophic reflection" (293). Phillip Rahv believes that Schwartz's poetry is informed by acts of pristine intellection, the "mind's long reflection on itself, a true inspectio mentis" (21). Irving Howe locates Schwartz's contemplative poems in a much larger "New York sensibility" which necessarily excludes a wide readership:

> The slyly clever stories ... as well as his rueful, contemplative poems, can leave some readers cold. The stories and poems are associated with the span of influence enjoyed by the "New York Intellectuals" from 1937 to say, 1960, an influence deriving from a special blend of opinion and sensibility: anti-Stalinist left, aggressively modernist, brashly high brow, freeswinging cosmopolitan, uneasily Jewish. All in all, this adds up to a pretty stiff dose for certain kinds of American literary people. ("Purity and Craftiness" 458)

While Atlas ably hunts down some of Schwartz's sources and notes his early interest in phenomenology (69), R.K. Meiners allows that consciousness is Schwartz's most enduring subject.

Other studies have vaguely defined fields of force by pointing to a cognitive or philosophic strain. According to Babette Deutsch, Schwartz is "concerned with the problem of . . . knowledge and belief, haunted by the time noise makes" ("Useful Entertainment" 21). Helen Vendler sees diabolical repercussions for his art in Schwartz's interest in philosophy: "The local and particular self . . . [was] invaded by the demon of philosophy . . . passages summing up ultimate meaning regularly killed off the dramatic force of Schwartz's particulars" (8). Morton Sieff intones, "concepts borrowed from philosophy dominate Schwartz's writings

. . ." (312) and proceeds to make a tenuous connection with Rankian theory. Others see his interest in philosophy as enhancing his lyric, so that it inspires lyricism in their own critical assessments: "Schwartz, in his precociousness, was one of those who taught us that knowledge and thought are the armatures of instinct, the muscle that controls the wings" (Dana 117).

That I have divided the thesis into two parts reflects a natural progression in my critical effort. I insist on the word progression because both parts are interdependent and drawn along a continuum. Part II needs the prior elucidation of Part I. A discussion of process in Part I is propaedeutic to a discussion of the structures and acts of knowledge in Part II. One must order the perceived world and clear its obfuscating underbrush before one can admit it into one's field of understanding. By addressing matters of obscurity and order first, I am following Schwartz's own demands for the heuristic function of metaphor. My approach is "subject-appropriate": a discussion of the formal aspects of his poetry, for instance, music's symmetry and catalogue in Part I, calls for rhetorical analysis and a more closely textual approach than does my look at the ideational significance of his system of universals in Part II. Before I begin my study proper, I air the theoretical currents and crosscurrents of an epistemology of poetry. In this introduction I address matters to which I will not return in the body of the thesis, but which nonetheless present an environing context for a study of Schwartz's poetic epistemology: a review of literature, his political and intellectual milieu, the theoretical subtexts and filiations.

The title of the first part of the thesis derives, with a prepositional adjustment, from R.P. Blackmur's criteria for judgment, as cited by Schwartz in his essay, "The Critical Method of R.P. Blackmur." Tropes must be presented so that they afford "an access of knowledge" (SE 352). All else is the poet's compelling, but closed, private and forbidding universe. In tune

with Schwartz's belief that the poem should offer a compliant surface, I have ordered my discussion with increasing specificity, so that a general discussion of obscurity in Chapter 1 opens up to a look at how he orders his universe in Chapter 2 and finally, and illustratively, how that order is variously and proliferatively enacted in the list in Chapter 3. A general discussion of Schwartz's interest in phenomenology in Chapter 4 is succeeded by a closer look at how that phenomenology is enacted in his poems in Chapters 5 and 6. As I note in Chapter 1, while the modernist stakes claims for expressive freedom by creating works that assert their autonomy, Schwartz insists that creative latitude must never be purchased at the cost of intelligibility.

In Chapter 2, I turn my study to Schwartz's articulated poetic systems with which he orders his experiential matrix. While the referential markers are clearly his own, iteration, symmetry and musicality are but a few rather traditional ways Schwartz seeks to record order in a disorderly universe. I will try to show how Schwartz's poetry is an enclosed system, as Robert Gibb puts it into perspective:

> It is the nature of formal systems . . . to be both recursive and paradoxical. . . . [They] limit both what we know and what we can know. . . . How we order meaning out of chaos without falsifying the world, how we determine insight from delusion, metaphor from monstrosity, are problems confronting all system-makers whether they are mathematicians or merely citizens of the phenomenological world. (97)

The small orders of each poem are charted on a trajectory of Schwartz's larger odyssey toward epistemological order. But again Schwartz's ordering efforts fail: his natural universe cannot be tamed, his horses of experience cannot be bridled, and ultimately chaos makes its own legitimate claim. One of the most pervasive ordering devices in the Schwartz canon is the enumerative catalogue, which is inherited and revised from the vast ledger sheets of the American Transcendentalists. In Chapter 3 I will attend to the Adamic habit of naming, which

is linked to Schwartz's substantives, as well as his adjectival and participial designations which are part of a descriptive typology. Schwartz's catalogue is a controlling device: all the sensual effects in one's epistemological field can be tagged and recorded. But this Linnaean habit of classifying and stock-taking of the phenomenal world is subverted by its own good intentions: what begins in a spirit of taxonomy, ends in dissolute prolixity and accumulation. Whitehead's concepts, particularly his belief that metaphysics requires the "evidence" of poetry, lent necessity and legitimacy to Schwartz's poetic undertaking.

It is Whitehead, with whom Schwartz studied at Harvard,[3] who supplied the title to the second half of this dissertation: "Acts of Cognition." Whitehead defined the "objectivist position" in his landmark work Science and the Modern World:

> This creed is that the actual elements perceived by our senses are in themselves the elements of a common world; and that this world is a complex of things, including indeed our acts of cognition, but transcending them. . . . The objectivist holds that the things experienced and the cognizant subject matter enter into the common world on equal terms. (84-85)

Although Schwartz exhibited a vigorous subjectivism both in the demands of his capacious poetic ego and in his defences of the Husserlian intending consciousness, Whitehead's term "acts of cognition" is applicable because it is broad enough to include the perceiver's activism. The phenomenologist shares with the objectivist the above-stated belief that "things experienced and the cognizant subject matter" are complicit: Schwartz, as I hope to show in the second part of the thesis, both constitutes and contemplates his poetic landscape.

Hence the term, "acts of cognition" was chosen to include Schwartz's characteristic poetic activities and the subject of Part II: consciousness and its intentional objects, concept and percept, reflexivity, the universal and its particular emanations. The "concrete universal," which

has descended through Bernard Bosanquet and Wimsatt from Hegel, with its pairing of absolute generality and its phenomenal particularity, essence and its reification, is a valuable informing paradigm and might suggest the nature of Schwartz's poetic world. In reading about the essential moment Husserl so valued, one can begin to understand something of Schwartz's epistemology. Schwartz's poetological effort to disclose "What a Poem Knows" (title of Section II, LLP) is a supremely phenomenological enterprise. In Chapter 4 I will claim that some of Schwartz's poetic practices are most fruitfully examined in the light of Husserl's phenomenological programme. Even as phenomenology offers a seductive framework of coherence for a study of Schwartz's epistemology, I will indicate affinity rather than influence. It is not my task to ascribe indebtedness or trace intellectual lineage: Schwartz's influences were not strict sources as Kant was for Coleridge, Duns Scotus was for Hopkins or Aquinas was for Joyce. Rather they broadly informed his literary sensibility. I share Sanford Schwartz's idea, expounded in his interdisciplinary study, The Matrix of Modernism, that certain "developments" available "to philosopher and poet alike" are "'in the air'" (3). Schwartz stood at the confluence of various intellectual currents; his poetry registers this positionality.

In an early epistemological piece, Having Snow (1931), Schwartz calls himself Spinozist, Aristotelian. As we shall see, Sidney Hook terms him Aquinate in belief; Atlas cites his early reading of Husserl. The common feature of these sympathies is immanence: God and the Absolute must be realized empirically by their effects in the sensible world. Schwartz takes care to locate himself somewhere on the spectrum from philosophical Realism to Nominalism, challenging the exclusions of the positivists. The phenomenological tendency to ground essential

knowledge in the evidence of the senses gets full and prodigious play in Schwartz's poetry. These issues will be addressed in Chapter 6.

Husserlian phenomenology is both a preparatory method and a philosophy of knowledge. I do not boast a thorough understanding of Husserl's epistemology, told in a dense and difficult language. I will advance the claim that the broad aspects of Husserl's essentialist method and special vocabulary accord with Schwartz's world view: the self-reflexive inquiry into the objects of our consciousness and the poem's ensuing engagement with its own invention, the positing of a transcendental intersubjectivity, the expedient "bracketing" of existential and naturalistic issues. Because the phenomenologist puts all presuppositions in abeyance, what is left him is the descriptive relationship to his universe. I do not apply a phenomenological methodology to a reading of the poems themselves, which would give me, after the Geneva critics, direct access to Schwartz's own consciousness. I want to show, rather, how Husserl's methodology works itself out thematically in Schwartz's verse. It is, after all, a mode of heuristic inquiry: Schwartz applies the phenomenological reduction to suspend the movement of the world and, in the process, better understand it.

The mind's self-reflexive labour is thematized in the figure of Narcissus and the mirror, as it is in the marginalizations and self-imposed exiles of the Jewish artistic imagination (Chapter 5). With Schwartz, poetry demands, and is accorded, the privilege of autonomy and self reference. This has less to do with the exigencies of Schwartz's artistic ego than it does with Husserl's having established categories of reflection in a theory of intentionality. Hence the inward turn of Schwartz's epistemological paradigm. In the conclusion I concede the hesitations

and admit the limitations of Schwartz's epistemology, finding in contemporary theories of indeterminacy an analogue for Schwartz's doubt.

My methodological declaration admits here a circle of exclusions as well as a circle of commitments. While I will attend to the poem's philosophic and aesthetic entailments, I will, for the most part, overlook matters of political, historical and cultural context and situation to discover meaning as immanent in the text. These matters -- Taine's race, milieu, moment -- are important to one so prominent in the canon of New York intellectual history and will be addressed briefly in the last section of the introduction. In close alignment with Schwartz's Aristotelian belief that the poem is a made object, I do not throw in with the phenomenological critics' reduction of the poem to the structures of consciousness. Georges Poulet's idea that "there is nothing formal about literature. It is the reality of a thought which is always particular, always anterior and posterior to every object" (qtd. in Miller, "The Geneva School" 280) is anathema to my assumption of the objective integrity and autonomy of the poem. Nor do I believe, with Marcel Raymond, that criticism is a "sort of ascesis" which has the critic "enter into a state of profound receptivity" (qtd. in Miller, "The Geneva School" 281).

However, one tenet of the Geneva school has guided me in my selection of, and approach to, the texts. The belief in the consistency and uniqueness of the imaginary universe as it is projected throughout an author's total body of work, including journals, letters, marginalia, has influenced my decision to range across Schwartz's entire poetic career. Schwartz's remark further legitimates this approach, as it serves as a trenchant formula for his own critical choices:

> But to place all the emphasis of judgment upon particular poems is the distortion of the anthologist. Not only are all the books of a poet one book, as Tate has said, but in this one book the inferior poems provide the best writing with a

> definition and a background they would otherwise lack. What we get from any poet, if we get anything, is a vision. ("The Poetry of Allen Tate" SE 164)

Hence I will look at the following volumes: Shenandoah (1941); Genesis: Book One (1943); Vaudeville for a Princess and Other Poems (1950); Summer Knowledge: New and Selected Poems, 1938-1958 (1959) for which Schwartz won the Bollingen Prize for Poetry; and Last and Lost Poems of Delmore Schwartz (1979). I will use the paperback reprint of Summer Knowledge, entitled Selected Poems (1938-1958): Summer Knowledge (1967). I will also cite poetry from his journals, Portrait of Delmore (1986), and refer to his Letters (1984) and Selected Essays (1975) for textual support.

My order of discussion is not chronological; as my task is not evaluative, I do not make any claims for development in his works. Hence a citation of a late poem will be juxtaposed to a discussion of verse from mid-career, for instance. I dispense with a linear discussion to track, what Schwartz called, his "obsessed trope[s]" (G 149). Certain lines demand recurrent attention as they relate to diverse aspects of my discussion. A literary image, as I will have occasion to point out in Chapter 1, gains by accretion (Arnheim, Visual Thinking 249). As I look for tactics and themes, with little thought to sequentiality and periodicity, and as the body of his canonical works is quite slim, I will cite a poem or parts of a poem many times. Whether or not the poem in question is a successful testament to its own iterability is not my mandate to determine.

I proceed from a reading of the poems themselves, seeking to avoid the tendentiousness which was for Schwartz a cardinal critical sin. He presents an elaborate fable which is worth quoting at length here, as it served as a cautionary tale throughout his career:

> It is most often true that the literary critic and the theorist of aesthetics resemble one or another of the blind men of the elephant fable in singling out one trait of their subject -- the tusk of the elephant, for example, and then declaring that

> tuskness is the nature of the elephant: when Croce asserts that all art is expression or when R.P. Blackmur reduces language to gesture, this process of mind is at work; and when the critic or theorist is too wary or too sophisticated to give himself to this natural and often valuable, illuminating, however one-sided tendency, he is likely to embrace one of two alternatives . . .: he may embrace the alternative of making a concensus of the various one-sided views of the nature of literature and art supposing quite rightly very often that each view possesses a partial truth, but making the wrong assumption that the sum of partial truths is the whole truth: here again, it is convenient to refer to the elephant of the fable as a way of pointing to the fallacy involved. ("Hegel's White Elephant" Beinecke)

I will steer clear of the danger of "tuskness" in my reading of Schwartz's poems by abjuring tendentiousness for an explicative holism as expounded in his essay, "John Dos Passos and the Whole Truth": here both Georg Lukács' dialectical materialism and Yvor Winters' critical distaste for the "error of naturalism" as it appears in the "fallacy of imitative form," are seen as but partial truths (SE 240).

The question of how best to defend poetry against this sort of reductionism is one that dogs me throughout the writing of this dissertation. That one might pick and choose a congenial interpretive scheme from among the proliferating criticisms provides cold comfort. Critical theory which has taken us to Yale formalism and jetisoned us aggressively to where criticism is "inside literature," but "beyond formalism" (Hartman) and with equal force, to the "actuality" of texts "beyond beyond formalism" which has us see "art as . . . some large intellectual endeavor . . . connected to . . . ideas, values and world pictures" (Said, "Reflections on American 'Left' Literary Criticism" 170). My effort to define Schwartz's poetic epistemology may be seen as aligned with the "swerve" that is taking place today, "a reassertion of the . . . ideological coordinates of literature . . . . attempts to repress the referent [which] only produced a . . . return of the repressed" (Peter Brooks 509).

While for some, the defeat of logocentrism and the subsequent deconstruction of its speech-over-writing hierarchy has merely replaced one absolute for another,[4] for others catachresis defines the poetic act itself.[5] Schwartz was proleptically reception-oriented in his admission of multiple readings. In his unpublished book, or series of essays on Eliot, Schwartz notes that "Sainte-Beuve . . . said that the purpose of the literary critic was to show the reader how to read more and more. This plain statement assumes that there are many ways in which to read the same book" (Eliot ts, Beinecke). As Schwartz's poetry presents the seemingly inexhaustible way we can know the world, "the whole scale of imaginative possibilities" ("John Dos Passos and the Whole Truth" SE 240), and tests the theme of knowability in countless variations, so does he allow, indeed insist on, infinite readings of that poetry. I will seek to avoid the fallacy of "tuskness" at all costs, calling on speech act theory, textualism, phenomenological criticism, among others, where appropriate: they make up the whole elephant. Ours is an age of post-facto assessments and diagnostic aftermaths, a "post-critical . . . overkill," as Claude Rawson calls the roll: "post-realist, post-humanist, post-modernist, post-fiction, post-structuralist, post-Marxist, post-Freudian, post-romantic, post-holocaust, post-atomic, post-cultural . . ." (941). Leslie Fiedler writes of a "defunct radicalism" which has left us "post-male, post-white, post-heroic . . . post-Jewish" ("New Mutants" 513, 517). This critical tag -- which I use in the subtitle to this introduction -- according to Matei Calinescu "should be seen as an (over) compensation for the poverty . . . of historical reference in the mainstream critical idioms of our century" (252).

This age has seen the institutionalization of schools of criticism which are alogical and absurd such as the New New Criticism, or "uncanny school," as J. Hillis Miller labels it.[6] I will

enact certain practices of textuality while upholding the "ideological co-ordinates" of Schwartz's literature, toward the end of answering the simple questions, "what and how does the poem mean?" That is, I will try, in accordance with Peter Brooks's above-mentioned plea for the reinstatement of poetics in the field of criticism, "to work from specific textual instances to the general conditions and project of literature that they apply . . ." (511). Embedded in other aesthetic, cultural and sign-making issues, the question of meaning has created its own polemic since C.K. Ogden and I.A. Richards first located the meaning of meaning somewhere along the emotive-referential spectrum, since Trilling found the meaning of a literary idea in the liberal imagination, and since E.D. Hirsch Jr. discovered that the reader, having no compelling normative principle of validating his interpretation, must look to authorial intention as a prime determiner of meaning.

Since I ask "how" the poem means, I do not subsume formal meaning under the rubric of context. To get at what Edward Said names, "the solitary crystalline perdurability we feel and know in a poem, the condition of its exile from the communal sea of its linguicity" (Beginnings 339) is to locate Schwartz's personal idiolect in the matrix of convention. Structuralism alone cannot effect this job, as Said suggests. I will try to determine what is known and what is communicated as known in the poem. Harry Levin adds his sober voice to the lament over critical pluralism, which serves as an instructive disclaimer in my study:

> Some of the recent theories . . . overcomplicate matters by abstracting structures and reifying percepts and multiplying categories to the point of interpretive chaos. Occam's razor needs to be resharpened now and then. If every reading is equally valid, if none is determinate, how can we ever grope our way back through the anarchy of disintegration to the meaning of meaning? ("Implication of Explication" 108)

Schwartz thematizes aspects of cognition; to read for an epistemology of poetry is necessarily to engage its themes. Somewhat fortified by Werner Sollors' recent collection which heralds the return of thematic criticism, I will refer to the common topoi of Schwartz's poetic life, with an eye to their larger epistemological assertions. If Schwartz's themes refer to a philosophical commonplace, they are uncommonly revealed, and revealed in reiterated figures. Snow is snow, certainly, chosen for its pristine beauty, its evanescence. But snow brings with it both memory and archive to signal transcendence of sublunary realities. In Aristotle's Poetics, dianoia is translated as understanding, theme and thought; thus the reflective identity of theme is established. Hence, while Boris Tomashevsky distinguishes free from bound motifs, story from plot in his essay "Thematics"[7] and while Riffaterre in our day has located theme semiotically in the presence of a "hypogram underneath the text" from which it "draws its significance" ("Hermeneutic Models" 13), any cognitive discussion of poetic theme harks back to its Aristotelian source (dianoia).

To track Schwartz's epistemological obsessions is to dispense with a diachronic approach, as I state above. According to Wellek and Warren, it is also to dispense with intelligent procedures of analysis: thematic criticism, in the Theory of Literature is termed, the "least literary of histories" (qtd. in Ziolkowski 219). Called variously Stoffgeshichte and Motivforshung, thematology was much maligned by literary scholars committed to werkimmanent forms of criticism (ix). Murray Krieger went a long way in rehabilitating the discipline to its broader post-formalist meanings. His idea of thematics, or, the "existential reflection of that work's aesthetic complexity," rests on the belief that "literary theory must be adequate to the literary experiences [life out there] for which it is to account" (The Tragic Vision 242, 4).

Schwartz's thematic "life out there" is one which is felt acutely. Krieger's definition of theme as the "philosophy" of a work (241) is expansive enough to include Schwartz's own practice.

In his more recent essay, "From Theory to Thematics: The Ideological Underside of Recent Theory," Krieger makes even more radical claims for the propositional nature of thematics. He contends that even the verbal theories of the deconstructionist strain of American poststructuralism end by thematizing themselves (43, 53). Schwartz's thematics does not favour proposition and ideology over "loosening our grip on our world's heavy furniture" (51). The heavy furniture -- the perceptual solidities of Schwartz's world -- is poetically implicated in any undergirding aesthetic, so that immanence and reference, text and a cognitive teleology, work together.[8] If, according to Sollors, "the antithematic affect seems so deeply ingrained that one might think of it as an episteme of contemporary criticism, a lingering by-product of the antirepresentational side of modernism in a postmodern age" (xiii), then Schwartz's thematic poetry offers a variety of an epistemological break, if you will. For George Steiner, theme is identical with literature:

> "Roncevaux" says one man to another, casually, in passing, in Hemingway's The Sun Also Rises. No explanation offered. But a brusque modulation into themes of betrayal. . . . Literature is by essence thematic. It can only operate in an echo chamber of motifs. The point about major literature is this: it echoes "before the sound. . . ." This genius for echo prior to sound or for sound that is already echo secures the element of intemporality in the poetic. . . . Canonic texts wobble absurdly above stilts of more and more basic footnotes. Try "Roncevaux." The very word "thematology" tells of mandarin dust. . . . Thematic presences are, as in music, the instrument of economy. They "shorthand" the wealth and depth of adduced meaning. . . . ("Roncevaux" 300)

Schwartz "shorthands" snow for epistemological evanescence, sensorium for the perceiver's eye and mirror for the phenomenological self. Schwartz's persistent themes are the uses of the past, the limits of knowledge, urban estrangement, modernist exile, Old Testament moralism, the

wages of Capitalism, existential freedom. I will consider them in the context of the "philosophic mind" in which they were conceived.

b) Literature and Knowledge, Poetry and Philosophy

In this apologia pro methodologica mea, two recent theorists -- Michel Pierssens and Jerome J. McGann -- merit attention for their work on the coincidence of literature and philosophy or knowledge, as they help me make sense of Schwartz's sundry acts of knowing. While McGann's volume Towards a Literature of Knowledge is tentatively and hesitantly entitled, an earlier and preliminary work rather more boldly champions an "interested" poetics: A Critique of Modern Textual Criticism. As the New Criticism was no longer new, and orthodoxy was traded for orthodoxy, iconoclasm for iconoclasm, Schwartz was able to challenge some of the hard-won assumptions of the exegetes of the intrinsic school. While Schwartz did battle with the New Critics for their dismissal of context, his essay on Yeats, "The Poet as Poet" (SE 72-80), demands of his reader "the literary study of literature," the New Critical methodological battle cry. In ever new variations, Schwartz celebrates the objective solidity of the poem, which has a discrete existence and special ontology. The poem as self-sufficient, yet meaning-generating object is, according to David A. White, a Husserlian idea:

> Poems are not things in the cabbages-and-kings sense but rather are things in Husserl's sense of objects as connections of consciousness. It follows that the self-evidence of poetry will be found in its meaning, but meaning understood not only in terms of the public referents of the language used, but also in the "englobing" effect of consciousness that makes poetic language perform as it does. (417)

I will travel the two roads to metaphor which Jonathan Culler has termed the via philosophica and the via rhetorica and judge if they run parallel or converge ("Commentary" 219).

Yet no reference to philosophical context alone can adequately sum up the creative vision of his poetry. While Schwartz quotes a stanza from Yeats's "Among School Children" "for close reading," pure attention to text is despoiled by Schwartz's reference to Greek myth, a contemptus mundi motif and Heracleitan philosophy ("The Cunning and the Craft of the Unconscious and the Preconscious" SE 198-99). Because of Schwartz's commitment to the inseparability of "craft and belief" (L 41-42), any preponderance of one approach results in grave misreading, a poetic category-mistake. Schwartz makes the point that both Blackmur's "interest in . . . epistemological subjects and the isolation of the individual sensibility" and "Johnson's condemnation of Lycidas because . . . grief 'runs not' to remote allusions" are equally "classic mistake[s] in the history of literature" ("The Critical Method of R.P. Blackmur" SE 356). Beliefs are only "a means, a framework to help the poet represent the ragged, unwieldy facts of experience." "Form and substance," Schwartz finally determines, are the "Scylla and Charybdis" of poetic criticism (357, 358), as he cites Richards' Practical Criticism in support: "so much mystery has been raised about the . . . extirpation of the matter in the form, that we are in danger of forgetting how natural and inevitable their cooperation must be" (qtd. in L103). The peril of "forgetting form" breeds "biographical, social and doctrinal distortion": "The poet is explained away in terms of his eventful life, rejected because of the vague political or social effects of his poetry. . . . Meanwhile the poem itself remains untouched" (SE 358).

For Schwartz the poem is both expression and autotelic artifact; the poet is correspondingly both sayer and maker, as Wimsatt declares in the Verbal Icon (xvii-xviii). However, Schwartz was too seriously schooled in the Aristotelian idea of the poem as a made object to localize the poem either intrinsically in consciousness or extrinsically in a life outside

the text. Attention must be paid to the linguistic fact of the poem as it is described and estimated in its own indigenous and autonomous categories:

> The act of contemplation is concentrated upon the thing itself and for itself; that is to say, for what it is, apart from the beholder. . . . The high degree of order in any kind of art . . . functions to enforce a concentration upon the object as itself: the meter of a poem heightens the quality of attention given to words as words . . . and the frame of a picture, whatever their origin, work to banish all but the object as itself from the beholder's consciousness. (Eliot ts, Beinecke)

Schwartz defends the poem's autonomy against those who would see in it authorial intention and didactic telos; yet he does not extricate it completely from external causes and ulterior ends. Try as he does to draw a firm and excluding line around literature, Schwartz is not always successful or consistent in that effort. He often admits a host of subsidiary values to intrude on the poem: epistemological and deontological concerns are uninvited, but inevitable, visitors to the life of the poem. Hence Schwartz's notion of form, which is both referential and self-contained, recalls A.C. Bradley's plea for unification of form and substance in his phrase, "significant form" from his celebrated lecture "Poetry for Poetry's Sake," where he determined that all form is expression.

Schwartz's programme is conciliatory and unequivocal: "I repeat this dogma: form and content are inseparable. . . . We ought never, in specific analysis of given poems to permit either technique or substance to preoccupy our attention apart from one another" ("The Critical Method of R.P. Blackmur" SE 354). This brings me to McGann's idea that it is impossible to "transcend the historical exigencies to which all texts are subject" (Critique 93), as it sanctions my own cross-disciplinary study. His subsequent book, Toward a Literature of Knowledge, rescues the poem from the positivist's claim that knowledge is the sole preserve of science. He shares Schwartz's prevailing concern for relating poetry's sensuous shape to broad intellectual

speculation about the nature of literature. Kant's Critique of Judgement describes the work of art as an object of knowledge sui generis and hence a heterocosm whose claim to truth and principles of order are self-bounded. McGann traces the tradition from Kant and received by Gadamer and raises a polemic against their programme. Poetry, he claims, which has been "beating against those programmatic restrictions" since Kant, has "larger resources than may be dreamt of in philosophy" (viii). He quotes Arnold's poem, "Shakespeare" to show how poetic acts, as criticism of life, are not "'free . . . still / Out-topping knowledge.' On the contrary, to the degree that they are at all involved with truth and knowledge, to that extent are they open to error, mistake, and the disconfirmations that follow from those conditions" (3). Schwartz similarly advises Tate that his claim to "literature as knowledge" should not give him free reign to interpret science poetically or too loosely. The literary outlook creates its own misapprehensions: Schwartz discredits Tate's identification of positivism and naturalism as well as his insight that "the world of positivism is a world without minds to know the world" (L 113, 112).

My claim, in the second part of my thesis, that Husserlian methodology has been thematically assimilated into Schwartz's poetic practices is legitimized by McGann's idea of literary knowledge as activity:

> In poetry . . . knowledge will appear as a form of activity rather than as content, a possession or an idea. To the degree that poetry is read thematically, to that extent it skirts what Blake called "the wastes of Moral Law". . . . one of the chief activities of poetry is to read itself, to assume ideological positions with regard to its own activities. . . . (7)

Finally, because of his emphasis on the transcription of experience, McGann's reflections on the cognitive dimension of poetic discourse illuminate Schwartz's poetic programme:

> The cognitive dynamic played out through poetic discourse. . . involves real, objective knowledge because the poetic field remains, finally, under the dominion of experience. . . . We acknowledge that experiential dominion when we make our factive explorations through the literary archive -- a depository which like the Nature of the scientist, draws our desire and exhausts our cognition. Poetry and the meanings of poetry are never equal to themselves, even conceptually, because their histories are open-ended. . . . (133)

The trick is in how to read the cognitive interests of the poem while maintaining that critical "disinterestedness" called for by Arnold in his essay "The Function of Criticism at the Present Time."

Schwartz's talk of the "particular datum of the poem" ("Poetry and Belief in Thomas Hardy" SE 69) points to the approach defined by Pierssens as "épistémocritique," enunciated in his book, Savoir à l'oeuvre: essais d'épistémocritique. It accords a place for ideological context within the interpretive scheme: the "attitude épistémocritique" helps us to apply "unexpected concepts and tools to literature, through the rewriting of the traditional historiography" ("Introduction," Special Issue: Epistémocritique 5); "What can be called 'epistemocriticism' aims to describe the ways in which knowledge, sometimes 'straight' and sometimes 'deviant,' provides tools for fiction-making" ("Novation Astray" 157). Literature and knowledge inhabit the same articulated space: ". . . literature can be construed as one of the essential modes at our disposal to understand our surrounding world, on a par with science and philosophy: knowledge has a stake in fiction and the novel does fulfil a cognitive function" ("What Does Fiction Know?" 3). While the subject is the novel for Pierssens, the same applies, mutatis mutandis, to the poem. While Pierssens asks "que sait un texte?" (Savoirs 14) -- "What Does Fiction Know?" as he puts it in an essay of the same title -- Schwartz more declaratively presents "What The Poem Knows" as a chapter of verses in LLP (35-55).

For Schwartz knowledge and nature are methodized through the formal presumptions of the poem. Pierssens works, inversely and heuristically, from epistemological models: ". . . in order to understand many of the major aspects of modern literature one needs to construct models drawing on sometimes not too familiar ideas first put forward in a non-literary context by scientists and epistemologists" ("What Does Fiction Know?" 3). Schwartz cites Darwin, Huxley, Schopenhauer, Hartmann and Nietzsche as evidence of the modernity of Hardy's poetry. What is more, "they should also suggest how variously the scientific view may enter" into the poetry ("Poetry and Belief in Thomas Hardy" SE 62-63). Pierssens' discovery of the "traces of cognition" in narrative "cells" rather than in the whole "organism" is not unlike my atomistic enterprise of finding a bit of Husserl in this poetic line or a soupçon of Whitehead in that turn of phrase, a suggestion of Kant in a poem's title. I am not exploring, with Pierssens, the evidence of scientific theories in the text. I am, however, claiming that Schwartz draws heavily on epistemological trends which both informed his poetry and delimited his field of vision. This is the "champ épistémique" to which Pierssens refers in Savoirs, "caractérisé d'abord par ses objects, et que ces objets (concrets ou non) sont eux-mêmes d'abord tirés de l'expérience commune. . ." (8). While I do not attempt to answer Pierssens' question, "What is the relationship between the paradigm changes in science and the figural changes in [literature]?" ("What Does Fiction Know?" 15), I agree with his more general proposition: questions of literary interpretation are "the same as one encounters in epistemology -- with the same paucity of assured answers" (16).

Though much of his book is a technical discussion of the epistemic cognates of poetry and its coding devices, Reuven Tsur's determination that, "modern poetry is no less about cognitive

processes than about its subject matter" (35), sheds light on my discussion of Schwartz's perceptual structures. In his discussion of literature as a "storehouse of knowledge," Walter Moser cites Foucault's archaeology of knowledge as a "reminder of the non-coincidence of knowledge and science, and further, of the non-dissociation of knowledge and discursive practice": "Knowledge is defined by the possibilities of use and appropriation offered by discourse. . . . there is no knowledge without a particular discursive practice; and any discursive practice may be defined by the knowledge that it forms" (128). In his discussion of "The Two Cognitive Dimensions of the Humanities," Morton W. Bloomfield refers to its scholastic source: "We can know things, Thomas Aquinas says, per cognitionem or per connaturalitatem. The humanities[9] know in this dual way -- from the outside or from the inside" (75). Schwartz's poetic "knowing" is knowledge from the inside, apart from epistemological tests of objective or empirical accuracy. Bloomfield further supports the reflexiveness of Schwartz's type of project, as he argues that the "essence of the humanities . . . is a cognitive matter -- a knowing about another knowing" (88). In pondering the various discourses of literature and knowledge, one would do well to remember Hesiod's description of the Muses in his Theogony, as being "of one mind." The speculative gift of knowledge, along with its artistic performance, is a single and collective purpose of the Muses (Trimpi ix-x). Hesiod suggests that the varied offices of the poet include all the functions -- speculative, prudential and creative -- of the Muses. Schwartz throws in with Plato, who traces the genealogy of "muse" to learned thought and inquiry (Cratylus 406a). In the Republic, commerce with the muse is shown to be the "practice of . . . philosophy" (548b).

This unifying tension between, and integrative energy of, poetry and philosophy animate my study. Schwartz himself notes a coincidence, reciprocity and order of ascendancy between aesthetics and epistemology: "That a consequence of knowing is aesthetic pleasure must not obscure the fact that the knowing comes first and is a necessary condition of pleasure" (PI 26). Eliseo Vivas contrarily maintains that literature, in giving us an "aesthetically ordered picture" of which we must not demand correspondence, is "prior in the order of logic to all knowledge since it is constitutive of culture, which is one of the conditions of knowledge" (197). It is not my purpose here to determine what is proprietary to each discourse, rather to suggest their points of intersection and shared structures of support. Nor will I address the issue of the putative truth claims of poetry, so controversially raised by I.A. Richards. Schwartz humorously remarks on another aspect of Ricardian theory, in PI: "I.A. Richards . . . believes . . . that a poem is the co-ordination of impulses and interests: a theory which can only be true if it is true that the greatest poets are the happiest men" (25).

What is more, a paradigm shift from early modernist moral associations of truth, to its late modernist phenomenal definition, applies its "aesthetic retrenchments" to Schwartz as I will point out in my discussion of Schwartz and visual perception in Chapter 6: "The early modernist tendency to connect truth with depth, and at times to sacrifice the phenomenal for the reality that is presumed to underlie it, gives way to a counterassertion that truth inheres in the visible" (Wilde 211). Largely, Schwartz defends a poetry per se, as demanded by Poe in his essay "The Poetic Principle" (893), which was itself inspired by the Kantian model of purposiveness without purpose, and jealously guarded by notions of the separateness of poetic discourse. "Such

paradigms" [a poetry of statement] "are false," Schwartz warns in the poem "Boy Wonders and Precocities Are Wrong" (VP 88).

I will try to show how stylistic practices reflect cognitive preferences, as Ohman believes (Hagenbuchle 8). Schwartz's poetry makes a claim, unpropositionally, about how we know ourselves and our world. This sort of epistemological poetry has had a strong Romantic identification, ever since Shelley defined its geometry, boundedness and infinity in an image of the circle in his essay, "A Defense of Poetry": "[Poetry] is at once the centre and circumference of knowledge" (508). In this abstract schema, Shelley confounds wisdom, experience and science. Relating both forms of knowledge to pleasure, Wordsworth holds that "poetry is the breath and finer spirit of all knowledge . . ." ("Preface to Lyrical Ballads" 60). The eternal world is glimpsed only occasionally in the spots of time available to us through poetry.

Allen Tate's ruminations about the limits of knowledge and the experiential nature of poetic utterance are interesting in an assessment of Schwartz's poetry. While dressing down the semiotician's positivism which has it that there is no cognition, only responses, no knowledge, only signs (26), he insists that poetry's completeness is of the experiential order (47): "We must never leave the poem itself. Its 'interest' value is a cognitive one. . . . in the poem, we get knowledge of the whole object" (48). Drawing on the Romantic distinction between "informing form" and "informed substance" (157), Eliseo Vivas proposes the "intransitivity" of poetry, or its ability to create new knowledge. Like Schwartz, Vivas aligns poetic knowledge with our objects of perception (195) and their "discovery."

Schwartz's phenomenological collapse of the distinction between subject and object as it is revealed in the second part of this thesis, challenges Dorothy Walsh's assertion in her book

Literature and Knowledge: "Knowledge always involves some distinction between the knower and what is known" (86). Walsh states that literature offers a direct knowledge, not a mediated knowledge, as when someone says that he knows what it is like to be poor in Paris in the thirties. Laurence Lerner's division of his study The Truest Poetry into two sections, "Literature is Knowledge" and "Literature is Not Knowledge," corresponds to the dialectic which has presented itself historically around the issue. I am also guided in my study by Eco's belief that the poem may offer an "epistemological metaphor" (87) for its vast "fields of possibility" and "indefinite reserve of meaning" (10). The parallelism of form and epistemological situation Eco terms "structural homologies" (18). Hence my determination that catalogue betokens the Schwartzian desire for epistemological order.

Ellman Crasnow warns, "in referring to modes of knowledge, we may remind ourselves of how poetics hankers after epistemology. An imputed Platonic guilt may affect the text, a recurrent desire to raise its status from doxa to episteme" (59). Schwartz, with Poe, defends poetry against the abuses of the didactic heresy: "Art abhors didacticism. But Art also abhors mere journalism and mere history . . ." ("To the Reader" G vii-viii). In the "Acknowledgement" to IDBR Schwartz replaces Horace's move-teach-delight triad with the monolithic insistence of, what is the subject of this study, perception: "The use of ideas and the didactic in certain passages ought not to be misunderstood. Both are present . . . to represent perceptions. The intention, so far as it is known, is not to instruct or persuade, but merely present what has been seen" [emphases mine] (unnumbered). The kind of intelligence Schwartz's poem aspires to is neither Plato's doxa nor his episteme, but is of a sensual, perceptual or experienced order: Aristotle's nous poietikos. It is the ordering and presentation of these perceptions which

Schwartz's poetry addresses, and to which I will attend in this thesis. Experience is translated into poetry with some difficulty: "Experience . . . is not itself interpretive. . . . it is the seminal moment of the act of knowing, the nodal point of language, but it can grow to its own fullness only in the transformation which renders it articulate as knowledge" (Hagenbuchle 3). Because he poetically enacts both the process and the objects of perception, Schwartz engages issues of epistemology with a polyvalency of expression: "The subject of poetry is experience, not truths. . . . The functioning of his sensibility guarantees his asserted beliefs; it guarantees them as aspects of experience, though not as statements of truth" ("Poetry and Belief in Thomas Hardy" SE 71). Schwartz further insists that the "philosophical poet" must all the more "meet this test."

Such tautologies -- ". . . it is the knowledge before and after knowledge"; ". . . knowledge knows / Motive and joy. . . ." -- are permissible because they refer to subjective sensibility and not to verifiable sententiae ("Summer Knowledge" ; "The World Was Warm and White When I Was Born" SK 158; 199). Since Plato rejected poetry on moral grounds, and with it its cognitive possibilities, no other question has been more persistently argued than the epistemological claims of art. Approaches are historically schismatic as is Paul Ricoeur's "split reference of the cognitive and the imaginative function of poetic discourse" as he presents it in his essay "The Metaphorical Process as Cognition" (155) or conciliatory as is T.S. Eliot's designation, "felt thought," based on an isomorphic relation between intellection and expression ("The Metaphysical Poets").

While Plato wanted to banish poets from his republic because, as mere copyists, they are thrice removed from truth, and because the irrational nature of literature can only undermine the

social and moral order, Aristotle rehabilitated poetry with his claim in The Poetics that it has a higher and more philosophical purpose than history in that it expresses the universal. Aristotle was addressing here the "difference" of poetic discourse, setting aside a special faculty, an active intellect, "to abstract from sense experience the forms of reality" (Swann 91). In PI Schwartz extends the distinction between poetic knowing and scientific knowledge, mentioned above, to this simple statement: "It is important to insist that the essential knowledge contained in a work of art must be knowledge not to be found elsewhere or in any other way" (22-23). John Crowe Ransom elaborates on the great divide:

> . . . the language of poetry is the language of feeling, not the language of epistemology. This can be said without prejudice to the rights of epistemology, and of philosophy at large. Perhaps the wisdom which chaste Philosophia loves is always epistemology, that is the universal grammar or logic of knowledge, describing serially its various and interlacing forms, itself devoid of any feeling except a rare and strange passion for widest perspective, the epistemological passion. ("The Concrete Universal I" 277-78)

For Schwartz, as well as for Ransom, science and poetry treat different orders of existence: scientific discourse provides reduced versions of the world, while poetry wants to recover the denser world which we know through our perceptions and memories. This difference between the discourses, Ransom maintains, is radical or ontological ("Wanted: An Ontological Critic" 148). Charles Altieri claims that a discussion of literature as sharpening one's perceptual skills is "vapid" unless "tied to the fundamental question of literature as a form of knowledge" (Act and Quality 270).

In his introduction to the published papers of the Wuppertal symposium on poetic knowledge, Roland Hagenbuchle speaks in Schwartzian terms, of a poetry of "knowing":

> The expression is not new to criticism. . . . "Literatur ist Erkenntnis" ("literature is knowing") . . . . The sense in which we use the term here is linked to an

> understanding of the poem as heuristic process and of the act of language which takes place in literature as an act of knowing. . . . it is the realization in language of that moment when man first faces the world in wonder and the world first opens to him in meaning. (1-2)

Others have spoken less lyrically of the process, to suggest an "epistemology of metaphor," as Paul de Man entitles an essay on this matter. Here he insists that philosophical discourse need not give up its "constitutive claim to rigor in order to come to terms with the figurality" of poetic language (11). De Man uses Locke as a negative point of departure since Locke believed that metaphor's deceptions defeat cognition; with catachresis the texture of reality is dismembered and reassembled capriciously. Figuration, de Man holds, is really disfiguration. De Man's general maxims, that rhetoric can never be "isolated from its epistemological function" and that tropological patterns suffuse our way of looking at the world (27) are very much at the heart of my study.

Ricoeur holds that a semantic function be assigned to the "informative kernel of metaphor" (141-42)[10]. After having mapped the change in metaphor "from sense to reference" (150), he sums up his epistemological project, by suggesting that "there is a structural analogy between the cognitive, the imaginative and the emotional components of the complete metaphorical act . . . (157). In a seminal essay, "Metaphor," Max Black argues for the cognitive status of this trope of transference. He opens with characteristic humour: "To draw attention to a philosopher's metaphors is to belittle him -- like praising a logician for his beautiful handwriting" (25). Schwartz's poetic canon stands proleptically within the parameters first enunciated by Black and later updated in the paper "More About Metaphor." Here Black chooses the "unpretentious formula," "Can a Metaphorical Statement Ever Reveal 'How Things Are'?" to confront poetry's truth claims (74). He defends the idea that poetry representationally

presents "how things are" without being assimilated to "statements of fact": "This is the clue we need in order to do justice to the cognitive, informative, and ontologically illuminating aspects of strong metaphors" (76).[11] Wittgenstein's suggestion that to think in similes is to think cognitively (Jessup 483) cleared the path that Black and others have travelled for the rapprochement between expressive and referential discourses.

The poetic knowledge proffered by Schwartz's poetry is often that of life's cruel lessons: ". . . they know all, / Know time's exhaustion and spirit's cost" ("Sonnet: The Ghosts of James and Peirce in Harvard Yard" SK 51); "Birthday knowledge, knowledge of the eve of holidays, Sunday knowledge, knowledge that is gained in pain, in joy, through love, through loss, knowledge of morning exaltation . . ." (J 221). But most often, it is knowledge learned upon the pulses; it is the "wind which is chill and warm, wet, soft, in every influence" ("Will You Perhaps Consent To Be" SK 64); it is the "phoenix knowledge of the vine and grape near / summer's end, when the grape swells and the apple reddens" ("Summer Knowledge" SK 158); it is the "sunlight bright on the green window shade" ("Sonnet: O City, City" SK 52). The above are instances of what has been called "strong epistemic claims" (Kasprisin 17), or literature's special structure through which we can know the world in some unique way. Schwartz asks, implicitly, with Kasprisin, "What would it mean to talk about literature as a cognitive mode of awareness -- as a way of knowing?" (17).

I now turn, briefly, to poetry's quarrel with philosophy and its rapprochement. The subsequent ascendancy of literature in the wake of philosophy's demise is a topic which tangentially touched Schwartz's philosophical poetry. Poetry, which since Arnold's prophecy that it would replace, and by implication redeem, philosophy and theology, has done its job too

well. Literature was no longer seen as a handmaiden to philosophy ever since philosophy took a "linguistic turn" in the early philosophy of Wittgenstein. A proper transition from a discussion of the epistemic claims of poetry to a consideration of the death of philosophy is Paisley Livingston's book, Literary Knowledge, whose early chapter, "In Defense of Epistemology," suggests the frontal attack epistemology has undergone in recent times. Not the least of these assaults is Jean-François Lyotard's assessment of a crisis of "legitimation" which the cognitive practices of modernist literature such as Schwartz's leaves in its wake. I will refer briefly to The Postmodern Condition and its thesis of radical epistemological doubt, in the closing pages of this dissertation.

Livingston is critical of what he calls "framework relativism" which "contends that there exist radically divergent frameworks, so that beliefs that are true in one are false in another" (23). Because Western civilization has offered a "discontinuous succession of frameworks or worldviews," or in popular parlance, "paradigms," all readings and interpretations are fundamentally relative and arbitrary (23, 24). Livingston counterposes the absolute and centering idea that a "literary form of knowledge [is] a form of knowledge manifested in part by what critics do" (16). He consequently proposes an "epistemological definition of [literary] theory itself" (17). Hence, "those who know what a poem knows" ("What Curious Dresses All Men Wear" LLP 40) are also, abidingly, epistemologists.

Husserl's insight, cited by Livingston, that theory has always been present, is "already always" there (schon immer) (9), is helpful in discerning the critical mechanisms that were in place either to endorse the mutual fecundation of philosophy and literature or to condemn it. Indeed when Plato recorded his denunciation of poetry in the tenth book of the Republic, he

noted the already-extant "ancient enmity," and "ancient quarrel between philosophy and poetry" which was found among the pre-Socratic Ionian cosmogonists, or "first philosophers" (595a). Considering whether poetry represents theoretical or practical knowledge, skill or truth, Plato finally determined that poetry is not circumscribed by epistemic constraints. The road from here to Rorty's efforts to realign philosophy with literature, or more broadly with "literary culture," has been well documented and will not be rehearsed here. Instances of philosophical poetry from Lucretius' De Rerum Natura, to Pope's Essay on Man (Selected Poetry 191-232), from Dante's Divine Comedy to Shelley's "Queen Mab: A Philosophical Poem" (Poetical Works 762-835) are chiefly pieces of moral philosophy and have little to do with Schwartz's brand of poetry. Schwartz's relationship to the entire question was an ambivalent one; he desired philosophy's authority and speculative reach, but suspected its analytic energies. Eliot's distinction between philosophic belief and poetic assent served as a valuable rule of thumb ("Dante").

Schwartz read well the various theoretical divergences and convergences of philosophy and poetry, from Sidney's tenet in his treatise, "An Apology for Poetry," that as "the right popular philosopher," "the poet nothing affirmeth" (168), to Arnold's observation on Wordsworth, freighted with the responsibility that poetry be a criticism of life: "Poetry is the reality, philosophy the illusion" (qtd. in McFarland 28); from Wordsworth's own insistence that the "philosophical mind" be pervasive ("Ode: Intimations of Immortality" Oxford Authors 302), to Coleridge's appreciation of that mind: he allowed that the poet is implicitly, if not explicitly, a profound metaphysician. Wordsworth's "Elegiac Stanzas" Coleridge held to be the "First Genuine Philosophic Poem" (Biographia Literaria, Woodring 121). Yet Schwartz acknowledges the position of disadvantage which philosophy has in Coleridge's scheme: "And now I think of

Coleridge, the friend / Whom I must most delight in, among the dead, / He knew the perils of philosophy" (J 36).

The line of descent to the English Romantics and the German transcendental philosophers, including Kant, the Schlegels and Schelling, is from Aristotle's idea that poetry is expressive of a natura naturans as distinguished from a natura naturata, from the creative impulse rather than the finished product (Preminger 616). Arthur Danto, in his essay, "Philosophy as/and/of Literature" has his own squint on the meeting place of poetry and philosophy, and hence on the entire problematical dialectic:

> My own view is that philosophy wants to be more than universal; it wants necessity as well: truth for all the worlds that are possible. . . . Semantical theory does the best it can in striving to connect literature to the world through what after all are the only kinds of connections it understands: reference, truth, instantiation. . . . If this means distorting the universe in order that it can receive literary representations, this has never been reckoned a high price for philosophy to pay but a creative opportunity. (17, 10)[12]

Schwartz is opposed to literature that is nakedly ideational, "the dogma beneath the skin," as he calls it (J 98). He upholds the lyric and presentational uses of poetry over their propositional and representational misuses.[13]

Morris Weitz defends the position that what is required of a defensible "philosophical exegesis" of a literary work is an interpretation of the "philosophical theme . . . in relation to the other structural elements" (91, 92). Indeed, no standard account of the relation of poetry and philosophy can fail to note that historically this issue has been subsumed under a discussion of poetry's philosophic themes, as Stein Haugom Olsen trots them out in his essay, "Thematic Concepts: Where Philosophy Meets Literature": "freedom, determinism, responsibility, weakness of will . . . divine order . . . charity, reconciliation" (180). To these topics in the

domain of the "great philosophers" -- Rorty adds "subject and object, mind and matter, utilitarian and deontological ethics . . . language and thought, God and the world, universals and particulars, meaning and reference, etc., etc." He asks us to simply "set [them] aside" ("Keeping Philosophy Pure" 29-30). To limn the philosophical contours of Schwartz's poetry, is to name their themes. One undertakes such a venture today, when both philosophy and epistemology have retired from the scene, at one's own peril.

Before we get to Rorty, epistemology's chief mortician, it would be well to mention previous obituaries and eschatologies. Aristotle, in the Protrepticus, issued a defence of a discipline that was already under siege:

> If one must philosophize, then one must philosophize; and if one must not philosophize, then one must philosophize; in any case, therefore, one must philosophize. For if one must, then, given that Philosophy exists, we are in every way obliged to philosophize. And if one must not, in this case too we are obliged to inquire how it is possible for there to be no Philosophy; and in inquiring we philosophize, for inquiry is the cause of Philosophy. (qtd. in Nehamas 395-96)

Alexander Nehamas labels this the "Protreptic Dilemma," which is a "venerable way of responding to attacks on the sense and value of philosophy. . . . The argument [takes] philosophy to be flexible enough to include as its own proper parts even attempts to show that it is an impossible or a worthless endeavour" (396). Hegel is traditionally seen as the first "modern" self-immolating philosopher. Heidegger expounds the view that Hegel's metaphysics of absolute knowledge sounded the first death knell for philosophy. Indeed, Heidegger reflects on philosophy's end as achèvement: "We understand the end of something all too easily in the negative sense as a mere stopping, as the lack of continuation, perhaps even as decline and impotence. In contrast, what we say about the end of philosophy means the completion of metaphysics" ("The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking" 374); thinking is not

foundational but preparatory. Bernd Magnus finds traces of philosophy "completing itself," in surprising and prior places: "Aristotle's correction of Plato, Descartes' search for indubitable foundations, Kant's attempt to circumscribe the boundaries of intelligible discourse," among others (2-3). For Heidegger, "the end of philosophy" is just the beginning of the "task of thinking": a hermeneutic whose object of meditation is Being:

> Martin Heidegger's phenomenological destruction (Destruktion) of the Western onto-theo-logical tradition has shown that modern philosophy . . . in completing the imperatives of a metaphysical or "logocentric" (and representational) concept of truth, constitutes the "end of philosophy." Simultaneously . . . his destruction of the tradition points to a hermeneutics of being which is capable of "surpassing of metaphysics," a post-modern hermeneutics of dis-covery. . . . (Spanos 422)

For some theorists these developments have literary repercussions. Fredric Jameson has announced the "end of style," with the postmodern decentering of the subject ("Postmodernism" 65). This refers obliquely to Hegel's prophecy of philosophy's overcoming of art and the subsequent deferral of one discourse to the discourse that it attempts to appropriate. Stephen W. Melville names Hegel as having provided a context for Derrida (Ch. 2) as he placed philosophy beside itself, metaphilosophically speculating on its own survival. Literature is also, metapoetically, beside itself, as I hope to show in my fifth chapter. Betraying a more adversarial positionality, it is, as Graff has it, "against itself." Culler has called for "scrapping the term metaphor" altogether, as it is a "positive hindrance to our understanding" ("Commentary" 228-29).

Derrida, in his essay, "The Retrait of Metaphor," presents a similar polemic in this study of Heidegger's denunciation of the metaphysical concept of metaphor, as he admits that Heidegger's text cannot escape its own "metaphoricity" (8). Derrida's grammatology of metaphor is more finely enunciated in his volume, Margins of Philosophy, particularly in the

essays "Tympan" and "White Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy." Derrida sets out the project of considering philosophy "a particularly literary genre." He opens the first essay with a statement of intention: "To tympanize philosophy" (x). "Tympaniser," the translator Bass tells us, is archaic French meaning to "criticize," hence Derrida's self-appointed task of deconstructing philosophy. The other sense of tympanum, or the "internal vestibule of the ear . . . whose orifices may always remain unfindable, and whose entry and exit may be barely passable" (xi) is also intended. Hence, to tympanize philosophy is to situate oneself within its ear, and overhear its conversation with itself and its resonances. Philosophy is hence an aural/oral affair, with broad literary possibilities.

The section title "Plus de métaphore" of "White Mythology" is untranslated as it means both "more metaphor" and "no more metaphor." Derrida sets the margins for reading poetry in the text of philosophy: ". . . metaphor remains . . . a classical philosopheme, a metaphysical concept. It is therefore enveloped in the field that a general metaphorology of philosophy would seek to dominate" (219). Characteristically playful, Derrida renders metaphysics as the relève of metaphor. This is his ambiguous gloss on the Hegelian process of Aufhebung, or "lifting up," negating and conserving: dialectics negates and lifts up concepts to a higher sphere where they are conserved. Stanley Cavell, in whose work philosophy and literature confront each other as they confront epistemological scepticism, writes lucidly of the "new significance of philosophical repudiation":

> Hegel, I am told, said that he was the last professor of philosophy. I think I know what he would have meant -- that he was the last man to feel that he could speak evenly about every way in which the philosophical impulse has found expression, the last with the natural conviction that his own work was the living present of philosophy's history, able to take that history for granted. And that would mean that philosophy, as it has been known, is past. (Must xxiv)

Rorty's appropriation of Heidegger's critique of metaphysics has a "common denominator" with other end of philosophy movements, that is, according to Thomas M. Seebohm, the accusation that each "foregoing position [is] still metaphysical," based on the "unearthing [of] forgotten metaphysical presuppositions" (11). While Heidegger's critique of metaphysics rests on the giving up of propositional claims and Rorty insists on the abjuring of ontological claims (Caputo 252-53), Schwartz's poetic scheme often requires a metaphysical justification: his "sky's illimitable blue" is wrought with something far more deeply interfused. According to Rorty, peripheral "edifying philosophers" -- among whom he numbers Dewey, Wittgenstein and Heidegger -- are the great thinkers (and the "great destroyers") of our day, as they "make fun of the classic picture of man, the picture which contains systematic philosophy, the search for universal commensuration in a final vocabulary" (Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature 370). Rorty assumes the task of "dissolving" the standard "mind-body problem" which has dogged systematic philosophers since Plato, and cracking the mirror of nature and "our glassy essence" whose historical task it has been to represent and hypostatize reality. Rorty, like the triumvirate mentioned above as "edifying philosophers," "make[s] the reader question his own motives for philosophizing rather than . . . supply[ing] him with a new philosophical program" (5). He defends, "there will be something called 'philosophy' on the other side of the transition" (394) as long as there are university professors who have read "the great dead philosophers" (393).

Rorty does not recommend a new knowledge to replace the old one, rather, he suggests that a dismantling of the epistemological project be succeeded by an entrenchment of hermeneutics. In a world radically bereft of secure metaphysical touchtones, we must replace

the old epistemological quest for foundations and essences with a hermeneutical and dialogical model of critical inquiry. There is no more interesting work to be done in the definition of the True and the Good, so the Neo-Pragmatists simply change the subject. The eternal verities are a subject which will not go away for Schwartz. If philosophy is, as the textualists defend, a literary genre ("Nineteenth Century Idealism" 141), and if post-philosophical culture understands itself as an interpretation, integration and aggregation of many disciplines, then poetical exegesis instead of philosophical dialectics, is a new paradigm for the age. As Schwartz understands interpretation and integration, "the true philosophical poet is characterized by an understanding of ideas and an interest in them which absorbs his whole being" ("Poetry and Belief in Thomas Hardy" SE 66). Hence Schwartz acquired his own voice and forum for his own loquacity, within the conversation of literary culture. Michael Fischer sums up the situation:

> . . . as philosophy falls in Rorty's argument, literary culture rises. (Rorty takes the label "literary culture" from C.P. Snow's well-known Two Cultures). More exactly, literature only seems marginal, frivolous and inexact when contrasted to the putative centrality, seriousness and exactitude of philosophy. Debunking the authority of philosophy accordingly rehabilitates literary culture: the philosopher-king dethroned, the poet-exiles can return to their rightful place at the center of culture. (313)

However, Schwartz never included an adversarial relationship to philosophy as part of the terms of his exile. Long after philosophy, as Harold Bloom had it, had retired from the "Primal Scene of Instruction" (Map of Misreading 41-62), Schwartz found himself under the tutelage of Sidney Hook, Alfred North Whitehead, Phillip Wheelwright and David Prall as a student of philosophy at New York University and Harvard. Sidney Hook, to whose short-lived Marxist Quarterly Schwartz contributed, remembers him this way:

> Delmore Schwartz was a student of mine at New York University before he won fame as a poet and critic. . . . I got to know him best, not in the classroom, but

> in walks to the subway or the restaurant or publishers offices. He would wait for me to emerge from the north exit of the Main building at Washington Square three or four days each week. Sometimes I would prolong my walk with him if my appointment was not urgent and our conversation interesting. . . . I was impressed by the catholicity of his interests. What I remember most vividly was his deep concern with the Aquinate proofs of the existence of God. (408)

Schwartz was peripatetic not merely in his penchant for walking discussion, but also in his discipleship to Aristotle, ambler about the Lyceum. The Stagyrite, as Schwartz often calls him, is his most frequently-summoned philosopher.

While Schwartz was opposed to discursiveness in poetry, a consummation of the relationship of philosophy and literature was devoutly to be wished:

> I am upset daily by the effort of choice between my reading in philosophy and the writing of poetry. But I can make some unity of both is the well-known pious hope. . . . Still I do find that the things I want to think and write about do deserve some kind of name in philosophy: revery over the essences might [describe] the activity of considering the tomato sauce on the veal cutlet . . . as both a problem and a moment. (L 25)

This habit pervaded not only his poetry and belletristic writing, but also his journal, letters and whimsical verse. His volume of poetry, which is "suggested by Princess Elizabeth's admiration of Danny Kaye," contains the heading, "The True, the Good and the Beautiful," as well as a dedication from the Symposium. The triad of Platonic essences, along with Socratic erotic theory, by means of which one proceeds from earthly to divine love, coexists with a master of popular entertainment. For Schwartz, philosophy and poetry have a mutually necessary, if at times parasitic, relationship in art's ecosystem. Dialectics fascinated Schwartz methodologically as an intellectual discipline. In his later poetry, dialectics is replaced by monologue: as the editors of the Norton Anthology of Modern Poetry state, "the poet now hopes --- prays, even, . . . that he can settle his argument with himself substituting for the warfare of philosophical

concepts the healing rhythms of nature" (qtd. in Robert Phillips, "Foreword," LLP xv). Poetic dialectic, paradigmatically seen in the poem "Father and Son" (SK 29-33), owes as much to Yeatsian dialogue as it does to the claims and counterclaims of philosophical disputation.

Romantic idealism, which had retreated in the wake of the positivist philosophy of the early part of this century, survived in Schwartz, but was anchored in a radical empiricism. According to Howe,

> our appetites for transcendence had been secularized and our messianic hungers brought into the noisy streets, so that often we found it hard to respond to, even hear, the vocabulary of philosophical idealism which dominates American literature. Sometimes this earth boundedness of ours was a source of strength, the strength of a Delmore Schwartz. ("Strangers" 16)

This dual allegiance derived from a more fundamental ambivalence. In an essay on Wallace Stevens, Schwartz writes:

> The primary philosophical motive leads to a major limitation -- the meditative mode is a solitude which excludes the dramatic and narrative poet's human character and personality. But it also leads to great access: Stevens [was] the first poet to be influenced, very often in the same poem, by Shakespeare, Cubism, the Symbolist movement, and modern philosophy since Kant. (SE 195)

Although the philosophical mode is the conduit to "great access," it does not follow axiomatically from his engagement with metaphysics that poetry be a vehicle for philosophical ideas; indeed Schwartz warned against blurring the distinction between poetic and speculative discourse. Schwartz reminds Ransom in a letter that Mallarmé admonished Dégas for writing with ideas instead of words (L 330). Some of his poems, notably, "Philology Recapitulates Ontology, Poetry is Ontology" (LLP 38) and "Concerning the Synthetic Unity of Apperception" (SK40), admit the very discursiveness his criticism disallows.

In his essay, "Poetry and Belief in Thomas Hardy," Schwartz takes Hardy to task for a "direct statement of his beliefs" (SE 66). Recalling Eliot, Schwartz claims that sensibility "works only when the objects proper to it are in view" (SE 66). Schwartz opens this essay with a stipulative definition of three kinds of philosophical poetry, on Santayana's model, citing two of his Three Philosophical Poets:

> The purpose of versification is to make the doctrine plain. Lucretius is the obvious and much-used example, and Dante . . . another. The first kind is generally marked by the forms of direct statement, the second kind by a narrative or dramatic context. And when there is a shift in purpose, when the dramatic poet begins to use his characters merely as mouthpieces to state beliefs, the shift shows immediately in the surface of the poetry. . . . It is commonplace . . . to . . . conclude by modifying belief and observation to suit the necessities of versification, the suggestion of a rhyme or the implication of a metaphor. (SE 58-59)

In the spirit of definition of the natural boundaries of poetic study, he chastens Winters and Blackmur for "philosophy mongering." He condemns the use, in literary criticism, of terminology proper to philosophical inquiry: "[John Crowe Ransom] has taken the name of Plato in vain and forced a metaphysical interpretation of the nature of meter" ("Primitivism and Decadence by Yvor Winters" SE 337). It is a grave error, according to Schwartz, to mistake pedantry for philosophical insight. Blackmur also incurs Schwartz's critical wrath for a loose and inexact application of terms:

> There are sometimes errors of a logical-philosophical sort which seem to come from uneven reading in those fields. . . . The statement that a poem is a "tautology" on the plane of dramatic entelechy . . . mixes a logical term with one from ancient biology . . . inexact remarks about Aristotle's poetics, the nature of epistemology and the psychological basis of a doctrine of I.A. Richards. ("The Critical Method of R.P. Blackmur" SE 359)

Schwartz was a harsh taskmaster in his advocacy of the separateness of philosophy and poetry in criticism. Philip Rahv writes,

> . . . he was sufficiently well-educated in philosophy to spot with ease the metaphysical presuppositions that some critics unknowingly let slip into their work, because of a simple misunderstanding of philosophical terms or sheer ignorance of the rules of the game. . . . Too much at home with conceptual matters to turn himself into an exponent of any given exclusive "method," he also understood the pitfalls to which critical discourse is exposed when it oversteps its limits to indulge in philosophical or sociological divagations. (22)

Finally, because of the difference between intellective and poetic discourses, because of poetry's "untranslatableness" (Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, Woodring 199), Schwartz issues an unspoken plea that they inform and enlighten each other by working out their themes together. Heidegger's brand of "poetic thinking," expounded in his essay "What is Called Thinking?" approximates Schwartz's own: "It is precisely because thinking is not poetry but a primordial saying and speaking of language, that it must stay near the poetic" (qtd. in Halliburton, Poetic Thinking 147).

c) Literary Career, Reception, Uses of the Past

Schwartz burst upon the literary scene with the publication, in 1937, of his short story "In Dreams Begin Responsibilities,"[14] which was the first item of the inaugural issue of the over-hauled Partisan Review, once the organ of the John Reed Club.[15] This story of a boy watching his life unfold on the screen of a movie house was hailed for its modernist invention,[16] adherence to the Aristotelian unities, its surreal poetry: "'Dreams' became the centerpiece of a rather significant moment in intellectual history which might have caught Yeats's attention" (Wilson 368). This was quickly followed by the publication in 1938 of the widely-acclaimed

collection, In Dreams Begin Responsibilities, which included the title story, a group of lyrics, a play and a long poem. Conrad Aiken noted Schwartz's achievement as a movement "back to Poetry."

George Marion O'Donnell hails the book enthusiastically: "IDBR is one of those rare first books that oblige an immediate recognition. . . . Indeed no first book of this decade in American poetry has been more authoritative and more significant than this one" (105). He singles out Schwartz's strategy, "characteristic of the thirties," as a "tension between the physical image and philosophical concept" which mirrors the "modern conflict between values and perception" (107). Dudley Fitts, bringing his knowledge of classical techne to bear on his reading, cites Schwartz's rhetorical mastery and "sensitivity of perception": "Almost without exception the short poems achieve the equilibrium between Thing Said and Way of Saying that is the mark of the finest poetry" (29). Fitts notes the volume IDBR is as technically compelling as Williams' Collected Poems. Mark Van Doren holds that Schwartz "restores a rich wide world of reference which latterly has been lacking to the art" (209). Schwartz prized most Allen Tate's accolade: "Schwartz's poetic style is the only genuine innovation we've had since Pound and Eliot . . ." (qtd. in L 64). These encomia inspired Stevens to dub Schwartz "the hope for modern poetry" (qtd. in Bauer, "Figure of the Film Critic" 111). Because of the positive critical attention Schwartz's poetry garnered, he became the youngest poet ever (Atlas, "The Mind of God" 3) to win the Bollingen Prize.

There is a critical legacy of defamation, as well. Among his detractors -- who are more vociferous than his apologists -- is Hayden Carruth:

> [Summer Knowledge] contains a great deal of bad poetry; yet never merely bad or merely uninteresting; Schwartz's genius is on every page, twisted, fouled, and

> set against itself. It is an excruciating record; redeemed . . . by perfect poems that rise here and there from the tangle, strong, lucid, eloquent . . . like wild roses in a bank of weeds. (426)

Praise is damning because faint: ". . . Schwartz's talent is . . . minor Elizabethan. . . . He is Samuel Daniel of sorts or a Sir Edward Dyer" (O'Connor 55). Babette Deutsch is offended by his "failure of concentration . . . his diffuseness" ("Useful Entertainment" 21). Further stylistic considerations raise Helen Vendler's critical ire, as she charges that his prose "chokes on its own Latinity, and reads like badly digested Eliot" (8). Hugh Kenner is almost defeated by the "unbelievable badness of Vaudeville for a Princess. . . . These are the objective correlatives of the poetic real and earnest; Laforguian or Eliotic exacerbations without a trace of the appropriate irony" (50). Robert Dana contests Dwight Macdonald's "dust jacket assertion that the publication of such scarred and raw work was . . . 'necessary.' Necessary to whom, one asks" (119).

In Auden's eloquent and moving ode, "In Memory of W.B. Yeats," he writes of Yeats's "gift" which is oracular, simply, "a way of happening, a mouth" (Selected Poems 82). In his poem, "Jacob," Schwartz writes: "The gift was mind ... / The solitude of eminence, the exiled intelligence" (SK 234). Critics and literary historians have endlessly discussed Schwartz's deferred gift, tarnished and disused as it had become in later years. I will avoid the well-debated matters of the precocity of its radical inception, cited by Phillip Rahv, and the psychopathology of its early and failed promise, noted by Allen Tate (qtd. in Atlas 243). Horace Gregory complained that Schwartz's "promise was more in evidence than [his] achievement" (qtd. in Atlas 243), while M.L. Rosenthal states that Schwartz offers his reader nothing of Crane's "inviolate curve" because "he has rarely been able to sustain the whole poem at the level of its beginning"

("Deep" 515). Hence disappointments in his career parallel the fallings off of the poem from its opening to its conclusion. Schwartz never matched the critical success he achieved with his first volume of verse as well as his first published story when he was in his early twenties. This is the animating idea of Rahv's essay, "Delmore Schwartz: The Paradox of Precocity": ". . . it might be claimed that it is this very precocity which lifted him to such high ground when he was relatively very young and which began to fail him rather rapidly precisely when others reach their creative maturity" (19). Critical assessments are most valuable when the critic ignores both traditions of adulation and vituperation to arrive at a sober textual appreciation of Schwartz's achievement, which Blackmur locates in the "exile and immediacy of symbol" (468) and Howe in a "prose of uneasiness, an anti-rhetoric" ("Delmore Schwartz: An Appreciation" 187).

His erratic but loyal friendship inspired a novel, many memoirs and poems of tribute. John Berryman's Dream Songs 146-158 both celebrate and mourn him: "'I am the Brooklyn poet Delmore Schwartz / Harms and the child I sing'.../ when he was young and gift-strong"; "I'd bleed to say his lovely work improved/but it is not so" (168, 169).[17] In Robert Lowell's Life Studies, Schwartz is sandwiched aptly between homages to Santayana, the aesthetic philosopher, and Hart Crane, neo-Romantic mythographer of the American mind: "Underseas fellows, nobly mad / we talked away our friends. 'Let Joyce and Freud, . . . / the Masters of Joy, / be our guests here', you said" (53, 54). John Ashbery -- whose published lecture, The Heavy Bear: Delmore Schwartz's Life Versus His Poetry came to my attention too late for consideration in this thesis -- offers a poet's appreciation of the correspondence between biography and poetic art. Anecdotes about his life are legion: the close relationships with Blackmur, Stevens, Agee, Rahv, Kazin, Levin, Tate which he ended in paranoid recriminations; his inspired teaching, his selfless

assistance to young writers, his holding court, once reportedly for eight hours straight, at the White Horse Tavern in Greenwich Village. Saul Bellow, in his fictive portrait of Schwartz as Von Humboldt Fleisher, indicates the syncretistic veerings and derailings of his conversation which included reference to de Tocqueville, Marilyn Monroe, George Halas, Orpheus, Dante and Henry Adams, among others.

A review of literature reveals that biography obscures achievement; legend obtrudes on a sober reading of the text. Gossip, rumour, insights born of laundry lists, amateur Freudian speculations on his manic depression, and defamatory and mean-spirited "revelations" --- such as those in an essay by Maurice Zolotow, "I Brake for Delmore Schwartz,"[18] wherein he discloses Schwartz's jealousy of S.I. Hayakawa, fistfights with his colleagues and his careerism are dispensable to a critical appraisal of Schwartz's poetry. Schwartz seems to inspire his critic's self-disclosure, as we have in Jay Cantor's quirky essay, "On Giving Birth to One's Own Mother": "We melancholiacs are the creatures that suffer the ache of perpetual mourning" (80). Vendler surprises her reader with her myopic exclusions: "The central fact of Schwartz's life . . . was his manic depressive illness . . . [which] caught him up in a nightmarish rhythm of promises broken, expectations dashed, projects unfinished, advances unearned . . ." ("Dear Delmore" 7). This thesis gives credence to those critics -- such as Atlas and Valenti -- who hold that the central fact of his life was his poetry.

While one might long for the neo-classical distinction between life and art -- Johnson wrote biography and criticism, not biographical criticism -- still, one must allow that Schwartz himself proved to be the most persistent obstacle to such a disinterested reading: he cultivated a very public and protean literary identity which invited critical excursions into paraliterary

realms. Atlas published his biography in a powerful climate of resurgence of interest and restoration of reputation. Mark Shechner noted, in 1987, in the context of regretting the publication of Schwartz's "undigested journal":

> It is possible to feel overwhelmed by Delmore Schwartz in death as it was in life. Twenty years after his death on July 11, 1966, the movement to resurrect Schwartz has taken an aggressive turn. The publication of his journals is just a ripple in the tide of Schwartziana that has been swelling since 1975, when Saul Bellow's Humboldt's Gift brought Schwartz back into public consciousness as the kibbitzer maudit and insomniac laureate of his age. . . . Schwartz has now been brought back to life [in]. . . a small but vigorous cottage industry. ("More on Delmore" 497)

When the Laughlin-Schwartz correspondence was published but a couple of years ago, critical interest had receded, and with it, the speculative curiosity about the lurid details of his private life.

Much has been written about the anti-Stalinist sympathies of Schwartz's intellectual milieu, the New York Intellectuals.[19] Much has been written about their "critical crossings" from prophetic partisanship to unaffiliated pragmatism (Jumonville xii); about their transition from an age of enormity of the forties (Rosenfeld) to an age of conformity of the fifties (Howe) to the age of criticism (Jarrell and O'Connor) which spanned the thirties and the fifties. In his fiction Schwartz recorded their conversation: "[They] heard a voice that seemed their own, though it had never really existed until Schwartz invented it" (Howe, "Foreword" IDBROS vii-ix). Schwartz joined in the condemnation of the Moscow Show Trials as he shared a "prestige for having been 'right' about Stalinism before the Nazi-Soviet pact" (Cooney 226-27). If, as Ruth R. Wisse animatedly states in her study of the recent books on the topic, "they were a literate street gang, using whatever tactics they had in defense of their shifting territory" (29), then their combative wit was their chief arsenal in their internecine ideological battles.

Schwartz, for the most part, remained aloof from political contention and factionalism, preferring to volley his shots against the "leveling influence of mass culture" (Wisse 35). Proletarian solidarity was informed by his broadly radical humanism rather than by a close reading of Engels and Marx. Though a would-be "Trotskyite," he was content to be a "fellow traveller." It is for this reason that Mark Shechner writes of Schwartz that he was the only poet of the Partisan Review inner circle "in whom the waters of modernism ran clear. . . . He had no politics to speak of, no inherited cultural baggage he would not gladly jettison . . ." (After the Revolution 49). The literary program advanced by Schwartz was an epistemological, not a political, one. As Douglas Dunn has it, the "Marxism he shared with the New York intellectuals of the 1930's survived as a notion of responsibility which his temperament, whatever its inclinations, was disposed to honour" (xiv). "Good will," William Barrett offers, "is the chief inspiration in the American encounter with Marxism" (Truants 215).

In Coriolanus, a poem set in five acts, Schwartz writes of dialectics (SK 92), of Trotsky's belief that the "individual is an abstraction" (93) and of Marx, who appears as a nervous dramatis persona, biting his nails while surveying the historically-determined scene (85). Atlas claims that Marx's appeal was "as a determinist who had fashioned one of the great intellectual systems" (47). Schwartz explains the subtleties of his allegiance in a letter: "I am not, by the way, a Marxist, though Marx seems to me to have discovered all the connections -- what is wrong is the causal direction, first productive relation, then value . . ." (L 65). Hence critical appraisals which accommodate Marxist programmatic vocabulary fall wide of the mark: "Just as Schwartz adapts Plato's idealist allegory to express a materialist idea, so in . . . ['The winter sky's pure capital'] he takes Marx's 'Capital' and makes it stand for an ideal transcendence" (Breslin 647).

Paul Bauer cites the same poem to more credibly point to Schwartz's "complex political sensibility": "Schwartz articulates change in specifically economic terms. . . . The winds of capitalist modernity bring trouble, interrupt the poet's dreams" ("Politics of Reality" 212).

Any attempt to read figuration and reflectionism in Schwartz's works -- justified by what Mosquera calls "epistemologism" in his article on Meyer Schapiro's Marxist aesthetics (76) -- in Marxist terms of sanction is to raise the issue of tendentiousness again, as such a programme was not enunciated by Schwartz himself. As we shall see in Chapter 6, Schwartz answers Schapiro's Marxist polemic by insisting on the "critical-evaluating focus which the artist directs upon his perceptions" ("A Note on the Nature of Art" 309). Schwartz found "the poetry of passion" in Marx and in Hook's reading of Marx in From Hegel to Marx (Atlas 46-47). Yet Schwartz's spiritual loyalty was to Trotsky whose Literature and Revolution was a vade mecum in his politically-formative years. In an unpublished poem, "Poem for Jacques Maritain and Leon Trotzky" [sic], he juxtaposes Trotsky's sane socialist vision to that of the wildly prophetic Marxist, "drunk at the teats of Tiresias" (Robert Phillips, "Two Lost Poems" 49).

Schwartz sounded the alarm in 1952 for the "intellectual will to conformism . . . a forced and false affirmation of stability" ("Our Country and Our Culture" SE 400) on which Howe would elaborate in "This Age of Conformity," an essay about the complacencies and pieties of the intellectuals, about the "disintegration of bohemia . . . and the . . . damp dispirited isolation which undercut the ideology of liberal optimism" (10). Hence Schwartz took the political pulse of his "charmed circle" (so named by William Phillips 103) whose manners he chronicled in his short stories. Neither its most central nor its most typical voice, Schwartz understood that "critical nonconformism" would not survive the fifties, when radical and experimental incursions

had already been launched. It is important to note here William Phillips' comment in his history, A Partisan View, which was written in a spirit of "retrenchment": "Essentially our aim was to reconcile the modernist spirit, which was often conservative and antihistorical, with a political consciousness that emphasized the historical dimensions of art" (16). As contributor to both the Partisan Review and the Kenyon Review --- his collection Summer Knowledge is dedicated to representatives of both editorial boards, Dwight Macdonald and John Crowe Ransom --- Schwartz straddled the poles of political engagement and formalist disinterest. In his book, After the Revolution, Mark Shechner notes the "remoteness of the intellectuals' argosy from the values of traditional Judaism" (8), and names a hyphenate animal, "postwar Jewish modernism,"

> in whose earliest guises the new stringencies of form are obeyed, [it] had a consistent aesthetic character at the very outset, it was the self-conscious exhibition of Prufrockian diffidence: it did not dare to eat a peach. . . . Jewish modernism first comes into view in . . . [inter alia] the stories and poems of Delmore Schwartz. (43)

It is not my task in this thesis to locate Schwartz amid the proliferating "modernisms" which have surfaced since Harry Levin asked the question "What Was Modernism?" in 1960 and Trilling answered in Arnoldian strains in his essay, "On the Teaching of Modern Literature," where he determined that the modern element consists in the "disenchantment of our culture with culture itself" (539). Suffice it to say here that Schwartz made his own inroads into the topic with his influential essay, "The Isolation of Modern Poetry" and "The Vocation of the Poet in the Modern World" (SE 3-13; 14-23). A couple of incidents have become part of Modernist folklore: Schwartz "disowned" Pound in a letter "of resignation" decrying his anti-Semitism (L 68); according to Valenti, "when Schwartz suggested that the assumptions of New Criticism be made explicit, John Crowe Ransom complied by adding the [landmark] chapter 'Wanted: An

Ontological Critic' to his book, The New Criticism" (Poetic Achievement 211). By Trilling's estimation, Schwartz and others were writing in the literary context of "adversary culture." Howe, on the other hand, insists in his essay, "Strangers," that the forms of dissent had already been institutionalized:

> Modernism had come to America a decade earlier, in the twenties, with Hemingway and Faulkner, Eliot and Stevens, Crane and Williams. By the thirties when the generation of Schwartz and Bellow began to write, experimentalism no longer seemed so very experimental; it was something one rushed to defend but also, perhaps, with some inner uneasiness. To the revolution of modernism we were latecomers. (23)

The spirit of poetic experimentation had long subsided, along with the spirit of insurgence that seized the American imagination, as national interest was focused on reform. Poundian injunctions to expressive freedom had already "made it new." Schwartz does not so much break the pentameter ("Canto 81" Cantos 96), as exploit its proximity to speech.

Howe holds that there are "few things . . . more dogmatic . . . than the anti-dogmatism of the liberal intellectual, few things more closed than the famous open mind" (qtd. in Alexander Bloom 287). This applies with equal force to Schwartz's critical office. With counterrevolutionary zeal, Schwartz crusaded against some of the dogmas and prescriptions of modernism, while remaining a modernist himself, in his exertion of formal criteria over expressive ones. According to Jerome Rothenberg, "what Schwartz was defending, anyway, was a middle-ground strategy: a rear-guard response (by Eliot, Tate and others) to the 'anarchistic' thrust of modern poetry and art . . ." (521). Schwartz assumed the daunting task of explaining, and not altogether incidentally, lamenting, the modernist tendency toward isolation in the text. Tutored by the critical musings of Van Wyck Brooks, as they appear in his volume, The Writer in America, and convinced that they had "come of age," the writers of the twenties and thirties

had come to strike a series of confident and elaborate postures about their work. Matching confidence for confidence, Schwartz dressed them down. As an original topographer of the modernist imagination,

> it is clear why he was held in such respect, for reading through Delmore Schwartz's essays is like touring the monuments of literary modernism in the company of a wise and entertaining guide. . . . If Schwartz's account of modernism gives the reader a feeling of déjà vu, as of a skillful military historian recounting past literary battles, it never smells of musty archives. (Leibowitz 3)

While Howe holds that modernism "must be defined in terms of what it is not, the embodiment of a tacit polemic, an inclusive negative" ("The Idea of the Modern" 13), Schwartz sought to define it positively, and at times, prescriptively. I will point to Schwartz's discursive practices which are both modern -- spatial, formal, teleological, closural -- and postmodern -- self-reflexive, performative, dispersive, anti-closural -- and hence defy periodization.

While Lukács contends, in his discussion of the ideology of modernism, that the modernist despairs of systems of causation and defies historical consequence, Schwartz takes care to locate his poems historically. Whether defining a local ("Cambridge, Spring 1937" SK 57) or general ("At This Moment of Time" SK 26) temporality, Schwartz's poetry is finely attuned to the winds of the Zeitgeist. In fact, according to Howe, he defined the Zeitgeist: Schwartz was the "poet of the historical moment quite as Auden was in England" (qtd. in Tapping 391). Atlas sums up Howe's identification of Schwartz and his times: "It was [Schwartz's] misfortune to be metonymous, the very embodiment of an entire generation. . . . What lends resonance to his attitudes, what gives them a sort of historical authority, is how many others shared them . . ." (x). In his essay on Yeats, Schwartz defines Zeitgeist more broadly as Yeats's Anima Mundi, and uses it as a yardstick with which to measure the terms of literary and cultural

exchange ("An Unwritten Book" SE 85). But these things cannot be forced: "Thus a poet who sits down at his table to write a long poem in which he intends to 'express' the 'Spririt of America' will [fail]" (PI 17). Elsewhere, participation in the "Age itself" means, simply, "a sense of happy interest" (J 50). Schwartz was often distracted by culture's "hum and buzz of implication" (Trilling, "Manners, Morals and the Novel" 206): Trilling was referring here to gesture, rhythm, and value. Schwartz similarly names the "richness of implication" in Hardy's poetic diction, that is, its unuttered contextual rules ("Poetry and Belief in Thomas Hardy" SE 68).

David Zucker, in his essay, "Self and History in Delmore Schwartz's Poetry and Criticism," finds the line, "while History is unforgiven" of the poem "In the Naked Bed, in Plato's Cave" (SK 25) to be the "key to understanding" Schwartz's work. What is more, Schwartz is "constantly dissolving the distinction between universal and personal history" (98). This is perhaps why Schwartz takes Trilling to task for charging that The Scarlett Letter lacks "social texture" because it expresses an individual life ("The Duchess' Red Shoes" SE 206). Hence Schwartz has an acute sense of the complex historical moment and its bearing on poetry, so that his literary sense is always deeply implicated in a sociology of literature and a process of acculturation. This is what Eliot calls the "historical sense . . . so indispensable to anyone who would continue to be a poet beyond his twenty-fifth year" ("Tradition and the Individual Talent" 14). One might locate this "historical orientation" within the "functional dynamics of [a most tenacious] Jewish memory" (Yerushalmi xiv). Elisa New's comment is noteworthy here: Schwartz's early correspondence reveals

> an acute, even punitive awareness of this relation of personal life to certain social forms. . . . Schwartz's attention to mass culture puts him in intellectual

> relationship with thinkers like Benjamin Adorno and Bloch whose writings of the 1930's show an identical, if of course clearly more disciplined and comprehensive, preoccupation with detecting the right relation to "reality" and with locating the place of mass culture in that "reality." (251)

I will not pause to consider this likeness to the Frankfurt School, except to concur with New that for Schwartz, "[there is] an indexing of the personal to the social and the social to the personal . . ." (251). Yet Schwartz rejects strict historical determinism which has it that a work of art is reduced to a symptom of an age or a class situation. Historicism denies poets an appropriate freedom of invention. Although he admits that the writer is committed by the resources of language and knowledge prevailing at a certain time -- the intellectual is a "prisoner and creature of the Zeitgeist" ("Our Country and Culture" SE 399) -- this is not necessarily desirable. Schwartz breaks out of the formalist paradigm to situate the poem, first within the enunciative act itself, and then within the culturally-bound context. His standards of aesthetic judgment are absolute: he demands that the relativity of the historical consciousness not subvert the absolute autonomy of the poem. Hence, in what Rorty calls the "big battle" of the twentieth century between those like Husserl who want philosophy and literature to be "autonomous ahistorical discipline[s] that discuss ineluctable formal structures of reality, experience or language" and the historicists and anti-formalists ("Killing Time" 32), Schwartz is often caught in the crossfire. In James Longenbach's study of modernism and the poetics of history, he cites Hans-Georg Gadamer's exclusivity which necessarily discounts Schwartz as a serious historicist by virtue of his self-absorption: "To be historical . . . means that one is not absorbed into self-knowledge" (10).

Yet Clifford Geertz's new historicist anthropology will have much to offer in a reading of Schwartz. The "ineluctably local shapes of knowledge" (4) can be valuably applied. Geertz

throws poetry and ethnography together as "crafts of place," working "by the light of local knowledge" (168). Schwartz recommends in G, in the voice of Hershey Green, one of his alter egos, that one lift one's mind from the local colour to a contemplation of universals; yet the local colour, he equally defends, has a value all its own. The diachronic will to track historical movement and change is, for Schwartz, often underwritten by a type of synchrony (Geertz 121): the historical simultaneity described in the poem, "The Ballad of the Children of the Czar" -- the speaker in Brooklyn, 1916, ate a potato, when Roosevelt "was an Arrow Collar ad," while his grandfather hid in a wine barrel in Bucharest (SK 21-22) -- evinces an interdisciplinarity and periodization which Stephen Greenblatt has called, a "poetics of culture." It defends the power of poetic discourse to shape cultural history.

Schwartz's pervasive relationship with his literary past is illuminated by Fredric Jameson's claim that historicism refers to "our possibility of understanding the [past's] monuments, artifacts, and traces" (qtd. in Thomas 4). A literary recuperation of the past is effected through its monuments, as it signals Schwartz's desire to participate in its redefinition:

> The mind is ...
> .....
> Marked by the monuments which no one
> Now remembers....
> .....
> The mind possesses and is possessed by all the ruins
> Of every haunted, hunted generation's celebration.
> ("Overture" Narcissus LLP 60)

Foucault's archaeology of knowledge is at play here, as is his sense that rupture and discontinuity challenge the humanist assumptions of the narrative unity of history.

Schwartz does not refuse the literary "uses" of the past, that is, modernity's celebrated encounter with history and the persistence of memory. These uses include for Schwartz both rupture and filiation. According to De Man,

> the continuous appeal of modernity, the desire to break out of literature towards the reality of the moment, prevails, and, in its turn, folding back upon itself, engenders the repetition and the continuation of literature. Thus modernity, which is fundamentally a falling away from literature and a rejection of history, also acts as the principle that gives literature duration and historical existence. (qtd. in Beebe 1067-68)

Schwartz's poetry is informed by Eliot's "historical sense," as it is defined in his essay, "Tradition and the Individual Talent," which "involves a perception, not only of the pastness of the past, but of its presence" (14). This Schwartz echoes in Coriolanus and His Mother: "The past is always present, present as past, /It grasps us like Athena by the hair" (SK 99). The quarrel between the "Ancients and Moderns," the ostensive topic of Swift's A Tale of a Tub, is resolved in the dialectical discourse of Schwartz's poetry. Historicist theories of modern literature have stressed the need to address a received tradition, attending to either the uses of the past (Van Wyck Brooks), the sense of the past (Henry James) or the burden of the past (W. Jackson Bate). The eponymous heroes of Coriolanus and his Mother and The Studies of Narcissus, dressed up, Joseph Papp-like, in local colours and contemporary costume, enact dramas of proven narrative and moral interest. Schwartz draws on a wide range of literary commonplaces and topoi, updating them and stamping them with his personal signature. The words of the Dramatist in his verse play "Paris and Helen: an Entertainment" reflect his modification of the existing canon in a very (Harold) Bloomian moment:

> What else is there to do but live again
> All the old stories, asking what they mean, . . .
> . . . only through the old we gain the new.

> Originality creates itself
> From imitation as the past creates
> The future by inherited traditions. . . . (LLP 107)

He plunders the past only to rehabilitate it to a wider readership.

As poetic archaeologist, Schwartz sifts through the rubble of Biblical, mythical, literary and personal genealogical sites to reconstruct a temple amid the "cut glass" palaces of contemporary Kulchur. Schwartz's poems proceed from an invocation, not to the Muse, but to selected spirits who people his intellectual history. His poems were penned under anxious influence of, and in belatedness to, his cultural and literary forebears: "Sonnet: the Ghosts of James and Peirce in Harvard Yard"; "Sonnet Suggested by Homer, Chaucer, Shakespeare, Edgar Allan Poe, Paul Valéry, James Joyce et al."; " A Dream of Whitman Paraphrased, Recognized and Made Vivid by Renoir" (SK 51; LLP 41, 47). Here comes everybody. The recent proliferation of theories of influence and confluence challenges Schwartz's reader: Ihab Hassan rejects a study of influence which presupposes some manner of causality, traceable to a social and historical matrix and further recommends throwing out the absolute terms of "source" and "parallel" for more relativistic terms, "affinity" and "development" ("The Problem of Influence"). Schwartz's own standards of precise detective work, evident in his essay "Rimbaud in Our Time" (SE 53-57), where he traces influence to Blake, is violated by Hassan's studied indeterminacies.

Reminiscent of the trend in literary taxonomy which had Mark Twain reverse the tag and call himself "the American Sholem Aleichem," Schwartz, early in his career, earned many such labels. To James Laughlin, who had included some of Schwartz's shorter poems in his New Directions in Prose and Poetry anthology of 1937, Schwartz was "the American Auden"[20];

Dwight Macdonald of the Partisan Review introduced Schwartz as "the new Hart Crane" (Atlas 97, 96). Encouraged, in part, by Schwartz's chapter, "Poems of Experiment and Imitation" in his first volume, many critics denied Schwartz a central American tradition, for which Vernon Parrington so fiercely lobbied in his Main Currents in American Thought. R.K. Meiners posits that Schwartz's "myth of the tormented soul" is culled from Coleridge, Holderlin, Nietzsche, Freud, Rimbaud (315); Jay Halio, in a discussion of the prosody of the later poems, claims, "the influences here, apart from Whitman, are obviously the sprung rhythm of Hopkins and the sonorous verse of Dylan Thomas" (815-16); Carol Becker, in a cross-application of the arts, notes a Rilke tradition, that is, his transcription into poetry, of Rodin's gestural technique (128).

In R.H. Deutsch's discussion of the poem, "The Winter Twilight Glowing Black and Gold," Schwartz, crowded out by his influences, does not find his own voice until the end:

> The reader begins the poem hearing overtones of Shakespeare and Eliot, moves on to a second line reminiscent of Allen Tate's "Sonnet at Christmas," touches in the fifth line, a chord from Hart Crane . . . moves out to a note from Auden in the second stanza . . . and ends finally with a Schwartzian emphasis. (2, 25)

In metrical matters, Harvey Gross posits, "behind Schwartz's lines stand the practice of Eliot and ultimately Browning and the Jacobean dramatists" (98). I have already remarked that source study is not my task; I hope most emphatically to avoid the above impressionistic roll call. Indeed Schwartz himself warns against source study:

> . . . The more inclusive the myth . . . the less attention one gives to the concreteness and particularity of . . . literary works. . . . Of this fact I was reminded recently while reading an essay by a Swiss critic on F. Scott Fitzgerald, in which the doctrines of Kant, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, St. Augustine and Pascal were all made to apply to Fitzgerald. . . . The only thing wrong was that Fitzgerald might have lived all his life in Bulgaria, and it would not have made any difference or interfered with the Swiss critic's disquisitions. ("The Duchess' Red Shoes" SE 203-04)

"He called on old codes or new apperceptions," as Berryman remembers Schwartz in "Dream Song 148" (167). Indeed Schwartz rifled the past for inspiration and method, availed himself of the Whitmanian long line and syntactic repetition in his later poetry, and indulged in the Homeric catalogue. This point must be made: if Schwartz draws on, for example, Auden's poetic habits, semantic markers, illocutionary acts and shares with him his broad humanism, early radicalism and socio-historical referents, Schwartz more than returns the favour by offering as a model for The Sea and the Mirror, a rewriting of The Tempest, the play Coriolanus and His Mother, an updating of Shakespeare, who himself remade Plutarch. Schwartz indeed owes a "heavy lexical debt to Shakespeare" (LLV 203). However, the sonnet line, "Love is not love which alters when it alteration finds" itself is altered to the prosaic "Love is not love, it is a child sucking his thumb and biting his lip" ("Socrates' Ghost Must Haunt Me Now" SK 58). The sonnet suggested by Homer et al., cited above, contains its own transformations: "Let me not, ever, to the marriage in Cana of Galilee admit the slightest sentiment . . ." (LLP 41). Schwartz, although producing poems neither new nor experimental in form, remade literary history in a spirit of artistic truancy. The poetic mind, Schwartz posits in a passage of hubristic revisionism, can "correct the sea" ("Ode on the Study of Philosophy" Robert Phillips, ed., Letters to Laughlin 38). Eliot's meditation on ecclesiastical reprobation, "After such knowledge, what forgiveness" ("Gerontion" Collected Poems 38), is rendered "correctively" by Schwartz, with characteristic emphasis on knowledge: "After utter forgiveness, what knowledge / Can be possessed in consciousness?" (Narcissus LLP 64).

Hence, Schwartz's "fables of transformation" might be fruitfully read as an instance of Harold Bloom's "poetics of anxiety [and] the process of misprision by which a late comer strong

poet attempts to clear imaginative space for himself" ("Coleridge" 1). In his essay, "The Sorrows of American Jewish Poetry," Bloom singles Schwartz out as a "principal name" in his generation while denying him a position of strength, or "achieved solipsism":

> Schwartz's "Abraham" is impressive work, except that the irrelevance of the precursor who found Schwartz makes again . . . for a disturbing incongruity between style and imaginative attitude. With Isaac restored to him, Abraham sums up his life in the accents of the late T.S. Eliot: "It has never been otherwise: / Exiled, wandering, dumbfounded by riches, / Estranged among strangers, dismayed by the infinite sky, / An alien to myself at last, the caste of the last alienation." (71)

Schwartz would have approved of Bloom's theory which derives from a language of patriarchy, based on the Lurianic/Kabbalistic tradition of scriptural revision. Schwartz's allusiveness is founded on a ratiocinative process of response and active derivation. Hence Bloom's designation of the ephebe as a "new Phoebus," fits this Apollonian strain in Schwartz. And Bloom's corollary idea that the late poet "influences," by retrospective anticipation, the earlier one, is easily demonstrated: certainly, Schwartz's heavy bear lends imagistic specification to Whitehead's phrase, "the withness of the body," which serves as an epigraph to the poem (SK 74). The reader is aware of the enabling presence of Schwartz's forebears --- Aristotle, Shakespeare, Whitehead, Eliot --- even as he recognizes Schwartz's posteriority. Schwartz's ethics of appropriation assumes the integrity and privilege of the prior text.

Bloom, like so many critics both before and after him, writes of Schwartz, "the inherited idiom is Eliot's" ("Sorrows" 71). Indeed Eliot figured widely in Schwartz's career: many acknowledge his essays, "T.S. Eliot as International Hero" and "T.S. Eliot's Voice and His Voices" (SE 120-28; 129-42) as having gone far in popularizing and demystifying Eliot. Most relevant to my study are Eliot's practice of intertextual quoting and alluding and his theory of

literary tradition, expounded for the most part, in "Tradition and the Individual Talent." Schwartz's poetic text is often a palimpsest on which the first text is quite visible. His adjectival enumerations exemplified in "Sonnet 7" -- "The self is ignorant of what / Is safe, blue, bright, cold, blind, soft, real and hot" (LLV 208) -- is borrowed from Eliot's "Animula" which is itself indebted to Dante's sixteenth Canto of the Purgatorio, thus extending the chain of allusiveness: "'Issues from the hand of God, the simple soul' / To a flat world of changing lights and noise, / To light, dark, dry or damp, chilly or warm . . ." (Collected Poems 111). David Zucker maintains that Schwartz's philosophers are "evoked throughout his work to bear witness to events and moods. . . . They are appealed to, in effect, to impose an intellectual order on a patchwork and exhausted self" (98). While emphasis in recent theories of influence is intratextual, that is, a poem speaking to other poems, Schwartz, in his use of embedded sources and "generating" fragments, makes his reader confront the poem's intertextual allusions, transpositions and interlineal suggestions.

"Tradition and the Individual Talent," cited here before, is essential to the workings of influence in Schwartz's text. The relevant passage is the exposition of the simultaneity of all European literature:

> The whole of literature of Europe from Homer and within it the whole of literature of his own country has a simultaneous existence and composes a simultaneous order . . . what happens when a new work of art is created is something that happens simultaneously to all works of art which preceded it. The existing monuments form an ideal order among themselves. The existing order is complete before the new work arrives; for order to persist after the supervention of novelty, the whole existing order must be, if ever so slightly, altered. (14)

Schwartz offers a similar observation in a letter to Allen Tate: "Naturally everyone is minor next to Shakespeare, but there is an obvious sense in which Auden ... extends the whole

organism of English poetry (as Eliot would say), augments and modifies our fund of sensibility" (L 52). The relationship between text and its precursive source, between legacy and its present appropriations, is one of mutual constitution.

One of the poems I will be studying is "Ballad of the Children of the Czar." Here Schwartz writes of Aeneas, who lovingly carried his father Anchises, too old to walk. Characteristically, Schwartz rewrites Virgil, adding burden to filial piety:

> In history's pity and terror
> The child is Aeneas again . . .
> Child labour.
> The child must carry
> His fathers on his back. (SK 22)

Tradition, poetically conceived, is history's bequest and its obligation. Bloom's definition, as it is proposed in the chapter, "The Dialectics of Poetic Tradition" (Map of Misreading 27-40), corresponds to Schwartz's exactly. A consideration of tradition begins in etymology --

> Tradition, the latin traditio, is etymologically a handing-over or a giving over, a delivery, a giving up, and so even a surrender and betrayal. Traditio in our sense is Latin only in language. The conception deeply derives from the Hebraic Mishnah, an oral handing over or transmission of oral precedents. . . , of what has been instructed successfully. (32)

-- and ends in sacrifice. The past, in Schwartz's own temporal logic, is "inevitable" (SK 23). It is chiefly as tradition, "the carriage of [one's] father on [one's] back" ("I Am to My Own Heart Merely a Serf" SK 71), filial descent and inevitable pastness that Schwartz senses his Jewishness, which is to him both exile and return. Deracination, dispossession, alienation, marginalization -- Schwartz turns these clichéd descriptors of the American Jewish experience to literary advantage. While he was schooled in Jewish antecedent literary culture, he had a more abiding sense of the complex historical and philosophical moment.

The title of Ruth R. Wisse's article, "The New York (Jewish) Intellectuals" is a particularly apt paradigm for Schwartz's poetic corpus: he brackets his Jewishness both in the ordinary sense of assigning it parenthetical status in his intellectual project and in the phenomenological sense of effecting a reduction of that experience which is not immediately available to him. Schwartz remained the prototype of Isaac Deutscher's "Non-Jewish Jew," as it is expounded in his essay of the same name. Here Deutscher extends the example of a "Jewish heretic who transcends Jewry [and who] belongs to a Jewish tradition" (26) to Spinoza, Heine, Marx and Trotsky. If Schwartz felt "the pulse of Jewish history course through his veins" ("What is a Jew?" 51) its beat is most strongly sensed in his Biblical triptych and personal Midrash -- "Abraham," "Sarah" and "Jacob" (SK 230-31; 232; 233-35) -- and as it is presented in G. While it is outside the parameters of this thesis to examine, with David Zucker, Schwartz's "Americanness and secularism [which] were complicated by his awareness of himself as Jew" ("Alien to Myself" 151), it is important to note here Schwartz's contribution to the symposium entitled, "Under Forty: American Literature and the Younger Generation of American Jews," published in 1944 in Commentary's forerunner, Contemporary Jewish Record: ". . . the fact of Jewishness has been nothing but an ever-growing good to me, and nothing but an inexhaustible inheritance" (363). Hence Howe's understanding that "alienation was a badge we carried with pride" ("Strangers" 22) seems more congenial to Schwartz's vision than does Leslie Fiedler's harsh critical pronouncement, informed, no doubt, by his charge of the "Judaization of American culture:" "Jewish writers have discovered their Jewishness to be an eminently marketable commodity, their much vaunted alienation to be their passport into the heart of Gentile American culture" (405).

With his emphasis on a private epistemology, Schwartz contests both the binding imperatives and the absolute values of a normative and prescriptive Judaism. Yet I will show how Jewish practice, in the form of the Mishnaic list, informs his habit of taxonomic catalogue, for example. For Schwartz, as much as for John Hollander, haggadah is more important than halakha, fable more important than law ("The Question of American Jewish Poetry" 112). Atlas notes the poem's capacity for disclosure: "[Schwartz] relied on literature to explicate existence, much in the manner of a Talmudic scholar poring over some obscure text" ("The Mind of God" 5). Jewish lore and Talmudic disputation were matters for which Schwartz had much enthusiasm but little formal instruction.[21] By contrast, Schwartz confronts his second generation Jewishness head-on in his short stories with varying degrees of engagement and disaffection. While Schwartz's poems, except for G and S, are bereft of reference to "Jewish realia," they can still evince the persistence of a Jewish modality of imagination (Alter, "Jewish Dreams and Nightmares" 18), if that modality can accommodate broader epistemological issues. As I hope to show in my chapter on self-consciousness, the Jewish-artist-as-doubly-exiled is a valuable informing paradigm for Schwartz's isolating epistemological quest.

As I opened this dissertation with a reference to Harold Bloom, so will his remarks close this introductory chapter:

> For all our mutual deep skepticisms, the increasing enterprise of American-Jewish poetry is what it must be: persistence in seeking to recover what once our ancestors had. The motto for that poetry's future can be taken from Rabbi Tarphon: "You are not required to complete the work, but neither are you free to desist from it." ("Sorrows" 74)

In his memories of his friendship with Schwartz in The Truants, William Barrett writes, "history does not record what Damon and Pythias became to each other in later life" (229).

Unfortunately, history did record Schwartz's fate, "tired and unhappy" (SK 38) as he had become in later years: his death was variously reported to have happened in the corridor or the elevator of a run-down hotel in Times Square. Until that time, Schwartz, in his secularization of the Ethics of the Fathers referred to above, neither completed, nor desisted from, the task of discovering "what a poem knows."

Endnotes to Introduction

[1] Accused of elitist assumptions by the proponents of mass culture, defenders of the very notion of a canon have taken some hard knocks lately. For a full discussion of the vagaries and legitimacy of canonicity see von Hallberg's collection, Canons, which includes questions of ideology and canon formation, the making of a modernist canon as well as canonic variations. John Guillory's career is devoted to the question of poetic authority. For his latest excursion into the topic see Cultural Capital. Barbara Herrnstein Smith, in her consideration of the "Contigencies of Value," also considers cognitive issues to be paramount: ". . . while professors of literature have sought to claim for their activities the rigor, objectivity, cognitive substantiality, and progress associated with science and the empirical disciplines, they have also attempted to remain faithful to the essential conservative and didactic mission of humanistic studies: to honor and preserve the culture's traditionally esteemed objects . . ." (2).

[2] Harvard University Archives. Harvard awarded Schwartz the Bowdoin Prize in 1936 for this exposition of Aristotle's mimetic theory.

[3] In a letter to Paul Goodman, Schwartz comments on his own involvement in Whitehead's lecture on the Timaeus:

> "Plato preferred the timeless, you know . . .
> An utter mistake . . . absolute nonsense. . . ."
> And when the lecture was over, went up, asked Whitehead,
> Shy and uneasy, "but I think Plato
> Thought that which is in time moves,
> That which moves moves to an end.
> But that which moves to an end is imperfect
> Therefore the timeless is more perfect. . . ."
> ". . . aaa . . . who are you?" And when my turn
> To stammer: "aaa . . . Schwartz. . . ." "You've
> Given me the proper answer, the proper
> Answer: I'll take it up next time.
> Remind me." (L 26)

[4] M.H. Abrams wonders in his landmark essay, "if all interpretation is misinterpretation, and if all criticism . . . can engage only with a critic's own misconstruction, why bother to carry on the activities of interpretation, and criticism?" ("The Deconstructive Angel" 434).

[5] J. Hillis Miller holds that, since all language is based on catachresis, all literature is one word ("Stevens' Rock and Criticism as Cure I" 29).

[6] "'Uncanny criticism' represents a labyrinthine attempt to escape from the logic of words . . . the moment when logic fails in their work is the moment of deepest penetration into the actual nature of literary language. . . . It is also the place where Socratic procedures will ultimately lead, if they are carried far enough" ("Steven's Rock, II" 337-38).

[7] In his essay, "Thematics and Criticism," Harry Levin reflects on the term thematics: "If ever a word was set up to be knocked down, it is that forbidding expression, which no dictionary has yet been broad-minded enough to admit" (128).

[8] Theodor Wolpers' study on motif and theme ends with this compromise which has resonance for Schwartz's own subject, as we will see in the last chapter: "Every motif can be turned into a theme . . . if emphasized and generalized appropriately. And each abstract theme can be made a motif if adequately particularized. Motifs, like themes . . . have the potential of operating as "concrete universals" (91).

[9] The effort to distinguish the cognitive element in the humanities from that in the natural sciences has a predominantly German history. William Dilthey explored the discipline of Geisteswissenschaften in his volume, Introduction to the Humane Sciences in 1883 (E.D. Hirsch Jr., "Value and Knowledge in the Humanities" 62). Hirsch rails against the tendency to conflate valuation and knowledge in the humanities, particularly literature. For a discussion of Hirsch's interest in Husserl, see Magliola 97-106.

[10] With supportive illustration by Richards, Black and Beardsley, among others. His conjoining of image and meaning "runs against" both Frege's article "Sinn and Bedeutung" and Husserl's Logical Investigations where there is a separation between Sinn, or "sense," and Vorstellung, or "representation" (142).

[11] Many theoreticians refer to John Middleton Murry's essay "Metaphor" as pivotal in a historiography of metaphor. It is, I believe "prone to inflation" [as Black suggests most discussions on the subject have been ("More About Metaphor" 48)], as we see in this bland statement: "Metaphor is as ultimate as speech itself, and speech as ultimate as thought" (27).

[12] Danto makes the larger claim in his book The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art that philosophy has traditionally attempted to undermine all the arts by treating art as no more than "philosophy in an alienated form" (xv). The article I cite in the text which I read in the Cascardi volume, is also anthologized here.

[13] As Gerald Graff maps the distinction between philosophy and poetry in his book Poetic Statement and Critical Dogma. He decries the contemporary "separation of poetry and ideas [which] tends to destroy the unity of humanistic knowledge, intensifying the fragmentation which the theory originally sets out to repair. . . . The view that poetry 'presents' a kind of immediate, non-discursive meaning seems to me to do considerable violence to the nature of language. For language, I would argue, cannot achieve significance of any kind without the mediation of abstract concepts that are separable from the experiences and objects they intend" (24-25).

[14] "In dreams begin responsibility" is the epigraph to Yeats's 1914 collection, Responsibilities, reprinted in The Collected Poems (113-43).

[15] In 1934 Philip Rahv and William Phillips launched the Partisan Review to champion the issues of proletarian writing while reconciling modernism and political interest. Dissatisfied with the "crude literary positions and corrupt politics" (Barrett, The Truants 34) of the John Reed Club, the editors suspended publication, to regroup in 1937, free of the claims of Stalinist apologetics. Their more moderate cultural position was outlined in an editorial statement: ". . . the tradition of aestheticism has given way to a literature which, for its origin and final justification, looks beyond itself and deep into the historic process. Any magazine, we believe, that aspires to a place in the vanguard of literature today, will be revolutionary in tendency; but we are also convinced that any such magazine will be unequivocally independent. . . . Partisan Review aspires to represent a new and dissident generation in American letters. . . . For our editorial accent falls chiefly on culture and its broader social determinants. . ." (Dupee, MacDonald, McCarthy et al. 3-4).

[16] Indeed, Irving Howe, noting the frisson aesthétique which the story inspired, singled out Schwartz's artful originality. His comment, if only for the light it sheds on the receptive audience Schwartz found among the intellectuals, bears repeating at length: "Those of us who read it at the time really did experience a shock of recognition. The intellectual heavyweights of the PR group had been mobilized for this opening issue and they performed in high style. Young readers like myself who looked forward to the magazine as a spokesman for "our" views on culture and politics -- that is the views of the anti-Stalinist left -- were probably more interested in the polemics than the fiction. Still, we did read Schwartz's story, if only because the editors had put it at the top of their table of contents; and we were stunned. Many people I know have remembered the story after forgetting everything else in that first issues.

We were charmed by the story's invention, though this could hardly explain the intensity of our response, since you didn't have to be a New Yorker, you could as well live in London or Singapore, in order to admire Schwartz's technical bravura. Still, it was the cleverness of it -- that one first notived first. A movie theatre becomes the site of dreams . . ." ("Delmore Schwartz: An Appreciation" 183-84).

[17] Berryman's poem, "At Chinese Checkers," not part of the Dream Song cycle, has this sad portrait of Schwartz: "Slack the large frame, he sprawls upon the bed / Useless, the eloquent mouth relaxed and dumb" (Short Poems 40).

[18] Zolotow aims to set the record straight, yet succeeds, in this invidious article, in calling into question his own good name: "Ronald Reagan admires [Don] Rickles and I suspect, he would have adored Delmore Schwartz" (2). His main point is that Schwartz exaggerated his own authority and influence.

[19] See works by Aaron, Abel, Barrett, Bender, Alexander Bloom, Cooney, Gilbert, Hook, Howe ("The New York Intellectuals"), Jacoby, Jumonville, Kriegel, William Phillips and Wisse, among others.

[20] A journal entry bears this self-portrait: "America's Auden / Quickly faded. . . . / This year has seen fame spreading like a stain" (61). See Haffenden.

[21] The Yiddish author Meyer Shtiker notes a curious anecdote. Glantz-Leyeles, Yiddish poet and "fiery Yiddishist," tried to elicit Schwartz's interest in an unnamed Yiddish newspaper. He details the ensuing meeting: Schwartz peppered his talk with Yiddish words from childhood, displaying enthusiasm, but, alas, little commitment to this mission (24-25).

Part I

ACCESS TO KNOWLEDGE

Chapter 1

OBSCURITY AND POETRY

> Be subtle, various, ornamental, clever,
> And do not listen to those critics ever,
> Whose crude provincial gullets crave in books
> Plain cooking made still plainer by plain cooks.
>
> W.H. Auden, "The Truest Poetry is the Most Feigning"
> (Collected Shorter Poems 315)

a) The Critical Debate

Far from advocating plain cookery, Schwartz threw himself into the forefront of the critical debate on modernist obscurity which was being conducted with a vertiginous degree of complexity on the pages of the literary and "little" magazines. In his essay, "Views of a Second Violinist: Some Answers to Questions About Writing Poetry," Schwartz laments the "well-known difficulty of modern poetry," while entering a plea to "write the way the old boys did" (SE 26, 29). In a contrived dialogue between Orpheus and Agathon, Schwartz laments the impenetrable lyric style of Orphic poetry which confounds the "common reader": "This is not what the public wants" (29). One remembers here the fate of Orpheus: dismemberment at the hands of the Maenads. Before discussing the poems, I will map Schwartz's critical position, as it is both supported by, and overturns, his own poetic activity.

Schwartz remained aloof from the internecine warfare waged between various literary camps: he refused to speak the cabbalistic language of the structuralists, resisted periphrastics in his criticism and renounced catachresis in his poetry. "Modernist literature . . . stress[es] vision as a privileged mode of perception . . . while at the same time cultivating opacity" (Sitney 2). Schwartz upholds, rather than subverts, this privilege by recommending transparency. It is this which gives his own work its epistemological rigour, its heuristic purposiveness.

Eccentricities of style must never disguise the process of knowledge underlying and inspiring the poem, which he so assiduously worked to disclose. Schwartz's discussion of one of Blackmur's criteria for criticism is a trenchant formulation of his own poetic mission:

> Does the combining of these words result in "an access of knowledge"? Knowledge in the full sense, one must add, for something must be made known "publicly" "objectively," in terms of which any intelligent reader, with the proper effort, can grasp, as distinct from terms and language used "privately" "personally," "subjectively."
> ("The Critical Method of R.P. Blackmur" SE 352).

Schwartz took up the fight against what Max Eastman called, in 1931, "the cult of unintelligibility"(2)[1] with enough vigour for Alex Preminger to accord him a central reference in the Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics entry, "Obscurity," alongside John Crowe Ransom and R.P. Blackmur, among others:

> There was a general suspicion of language used for emotional and imaginative purposes -- for myths. Science and applied science made tremendous strides. . . . An unfortunate consequence of this, Schwartz says, is that there was little or no room left for the cultivated man. Poetry . . . became more and more self-regarding and specialized, the poets writing for themselves or for small coteries. (583)

The essay Preminger cites, "The Isolation of Modern Poetry" (SE 3-13), fired the popular imagination, while it provided an explicit catechism on the issue. Adherents of perspicuity in literature henceforth claimed Schwartz as an ally and spokesman for their enthusiasms. In this commanding commentary, Schwartz laments, even as he explains, that the modern poet is isolated by virtue of his art. Self-reflexive literature, what he called the "grasping one's sensibility as a subject," breeds solipsism, and its concomitant literary sin, obscurity:

> The trouble has been that the idiom of poetic style and the normal thought and speech of the community have been moving in opposite directions [since the mercantile and industrial revolutions] and have had little or no relationship to each other. The normal state of affairs occurs when poetry is continually digesting the

> prose of its time, and folk art and speech are providing sustenance for major literary efforts. . . .
> From this isolation of poetic sensibility the obscurity of modern poetry also arises. The poet is engaged in following the minutest movements, tones and distinctions of his own being as a poetic man. Because this private life of his sensibility is the chief subject available to him, it becomes increasingly necessary to have recourse to new and special uses of language. . . . The common language of daily life, its syntax, habitual sequences and processes of association are precisely the opposite of what he needs. . . . (SE 10-11)

While Schwartz avoids the obscurity inherent in ornate stylizations, he often violates, in his poetry, his own critical strictures: art's reflexive energies and the workings of his own consciousness as subject are very much Schwartz's own poetic idiom. However, the communicative ability of poetry is a desideratum he never abandons. As a most articulate contemporary elucidator of textual difficulties, George Steiner sheds light on Schwartz's ideas. In his essay "On Difficulty," he categorizes the broad and variegated spectrum of obscurities, while positing four varieties: contingent difficulties which are related to surface problems and can be cleared up by what Pound called "homework"; modal difficulties which arise when a reader is cut off from an entire area of knowledge of what has become, through time, a remote sensibility; tactical difficulties which are deliberate challenges to the reader; and ontological difficulties where difficulty is a partially-unconscious expression of the breakdown of certain post-Romantic cultural norms. It is this last category which bears citing here, as there are clear reverberations, with obvious Marxist elaborations, of "The Isolation of Modern Poetry":

> This contract [of preponderant intelligibility between poet and reader] is itself wholly or in part broken. . . . this type of difficulty implicates the functions of language and of the poem as a communicative performance . . . .
> . . . The aetiologies of this inspired movement towards darkness are as various as the individual talents and social circumstances involved. . . .
> Severed from concrete revolutionary possibilities, later romanticism cultivated the posture of inward exile, of the poet's isolation in a prosaic society. . . . Now it was language as a whole that was being cheapened, brutalized, emptied of

> numinous and exact force by mass usage. This view is implicit in . . . Mallarmé's resolve to cleanse the vocabulary and syntax of foreign speech, to carve out and preserve for poetry an arcane realm of uncompromising significance. (40-42, 45)

For Schwartz, as well, personal expression, the shaping of one's own private poetic idiolect, must never be purchased at the price of clarity. Schwartz sought to emulate Wordsworth's plain style and re-definition of poetry as a unique way of knowing the world and discovering significance within it.

In 1945 The American Scholar published a special issue, a forum on "Obscurity in Modern Literature." Herein are many matters which were either indirectly fuelled by Schwartz's essays or directly addressed by his poetry. Marc Friedlaender, in his contribution, "Poetry and the Common Store," contends that obscurities of yore -- the allegories of Dante or Spenser, the encyclopedism of Burton or Milton -- are the kind that demand footnoting and hence are different from modern incomprehensibility. In 1945 the author was forced to choose identity or communication:

> It is necessitated only when the artist has ceased to feel that he is within himself creator and audience. . . . The artist is not able to identify himself with his audience . . . by the loss of the common body of reference, of the myths that constitute the tradition of the group. . . . the loss of a frame of traditional values in which the artist and the audience move easily and with confidence. (362-63)

Friedlaender echoes, with a greater degree of specificity, Schwartz's ideas on the dispensibility of common points of reference and his repudiation of an adequate and definitive body of modern belief:

> The development of modern culture from Darwin and Huxley to Freud, Marx and the author of The Golden Bough has merely extended, hastened and intensified this process of removing the picture of the world which the poet took for granted as the arena of his imagination, and putting in its place another world picture which he could not use. . . . Now this is only one aspect of the poet's isolation;

> it is the aspect in which the sensibility of the poet has been separated from the theoretical knowledge of his time.
> ("The Isolation of Modern Poetry" SE 6-7)

Poems do not so much inform us, as they are informed by a set of values and a store of knowledge themselves.

Earlier in "The Isolation of Modern Poetry" Schwartz deems Wordsworth's Lockean enjoinder to the reader in his "Preface to Lyrical Ballads" to "gratify certain known habits of association" an insufficient "defence of modern poetry" (SE 3). Hence, according to Schwartz, the common store had run dry more than a century ago. Schwartz does not assume an interpretive community of scholars, an informed reader, a set of community assumptions as later defined by Stanley Fish's "affective stylistics" as it is presented in various essays in the collection Is There a Text in this Class? In a bid for straight talk, Schwartz intones: "No author can assume a community of ideas and values between himself and his audience. Hence he must bring his ideas and values openly and clearly" (G viii). In W.Y. Tindall's contribution to the American Scholar forum, "Exiles: Rimbaud to Joyce," he, like Schwartz, traces the obscurity of Joyce and Eliot to the French Symbolist tradition, the interior monologue of Edouard Dujardin, the grammatical improvisations of Mallarmé and the hallucinations of Rimbaud. Referring to a manifesto published by Eugène Jolas, Stuart Gilbert and Elliot Paul in the June 1929 issue of transition, Tindall submits, "proclaiming the end of grammar and communication, the autonomy of the imagination in search of a fabulous world, the litany and hallucination of the word, . . . they stated what the tradition of exile has always implied: 'The plain reader be damned'" (355).

William Van O'Connor obliquely implicates Schwartz, both vindicating and vilifying his brand of criticism in his essay, submitted to the forum, "This Alexandrian Criticism." Here O'Connor cites Jacques Maritain's recognition in Poetry's Dark Night of modern poetry's efforts "to make poetry an instrument of knowledge, an instrument of passionate perception" (357). This artistic credo sustained Schwartz through some of his darkest nights, later in his career. Schwartz's attention to textual difficulties is often riveted to a grammatical lapse: "The difficulty in Crane is . . . a result of omission of connection: that is, the relation of one statement to the next one is not mediated by transitional phrases" (L 37). F.W. Dupee's essay, "Difficulty as Style," answers many of Schwartz's critical queries. The reader must take for granted an assertively obscure style: "I wonder, indeed, if a high degree of difficulty is not an aspect of the modern poetic style, just as a peculiarly brilliant and aggressive clarity was a stylistic feature of the school of Pope" (356). Schwartz and Dupee both cite, inevitably, T.S. Eliot's defense of obscurity as a "principled" [Dupee's term] element of modern verse from his essay, "The Metaphysical Poets":

> It is not a permanent necessity that poets should be interested in philosophy, or in any other subject. We can only say that poets in our civilization as it exists at present, must be difficult. Our civilization comprehends great variety and complexity, and this variety and complexity, playing upon a refined sensibility, must produce various and complex results. The poet must become more and more comprehensive, more allusive more indirect, in order to force, to dislocate if necessary, language into his meaning. (289)

Their conclusions, however, are drawn quite variously: Dupee wonders whether Eliot's pronouncements are less descriptive than judgmental, while Schwartz condemns Eliot for his facile assessment, based as it is, in rhetorical terms, on unexamined analogy and false causality:

> There is a defense of the modern poet which seems utterly insufficient to me. . . . Mr. Eliot's explanation seems to me not so much wrong as superficial. . . . I

> think he is identifying the surface of our civilization with the surface of our poetry. But the complexity of modern life, the disorder of the traffic on a business street or the variety of reference in the daily newspaper is far from being the same thing as the difficulties of syntax, tone, diction, metaphor and allusion which face the reader in the modern poem. . . . [This] merely. . . engender[s] misunderstanding by over-simplification.
> ("The Isolation of Modern Poetry" SE 3-4)

Schwartz's participation in the polemics about the issue of obscurity would not be complete without his taking on the neo-humanist and moralist scourge of modernist experimentation, Yvor Winters. Winters claims in his 1937 essay, "Primitivism and Decadence," that the generation of Laforgue, Eliot, Crane and Pound has raised obscurity to high art, or "obscurantism."[2] Here Winters defines imitative form as "the attempt to express a state of uncertainty by uncertainty of expression; whereas the sound procedure would be to make a lucid and controlled statement regarding the condition of uncertainty" (87). Schwartz does not share this faith in the normative and stabilizing function of poetry. He decries Winters' insistence on rational motive, the coincidence of the moral and literary views, the "qualitative progression," borrowed from Kenneth Burke, "whereby unity of mood fallaciously proceeds from image to image through a coherence of feeling" (57), the fallacy of pseudo-reference or "grammatical coherence in excess of, or in absence of rational coherence" (40). The fallacy of imitative form [or the "error of naturalism for which art is merely a mirror of the disorder and incompleteness of life itself" as Schwartz calls it in his essay "John Dos Passos and the Whole Truth" (SE 240)] garners most of Schwartz's attention. Schwartz relentlessly takes Winters to task:

> From the meter of the poem [Winters] infers the spiritual or moral character of the poem. There is . . . the statement that "the limp versification of Mr. Eliot is inseparable from the spiritual limpness that one feels behind the poems." What

> spiritual limpness is, one can only guess. . . . meter turns out to be the same thing as spiritual awareness.
> ("Primitivism and Decadence by Yvor Winters" SE 337-38)

In Schwartz's practice form both follows function and resists it: in "May's Truth and May's Falsehood" Schwartz deploys the long line with neither the expansive sweep and Biblical rhythms of Whitman, nor the elegant grace of James Dickey. However, the long line does replicate the organic growth whose process cannot be contained. Sylvan overgrowth, the uncut hedges of the natural landscape, the uncharted river, make the poetic line spill over in spontaneous celebration:

> . . . And the dark statues of the trees on the blue and green ground, flowing.
> And every solid thing
> Moved as in bloom, leafing, opening wing upon wing to the sun's overwhelming lightning!
> And every solid sight was a great green drum, throbbing and pulsing in the growing vividness of the greenness darkening
> So that the litter and ripple of the river was excited by the advent and descent of light upon its slow-flowing:
> The river was opulence, radiance, sparkle, and shine, a rippling radiance dancing light's dances;. . . . (SK 213)

In the poem "Look in the Labyrinth of Memory," whose subject matter is dead desire, age, sleeplessness, the cruel passage of time, the inadequacy of memory, the form is anything but labyrinthine, the progression from thought to thought anything but a daedalian contrivance. It is a Petrarchan sonnet with the predictable burden, or reflection, of the octave followed by the "turn" in the sestet which is not so much a resolution as a further meditation. The rhyme scheme abab acac dedeff is of a hybrid sonnet variety, but a rhymed pattern nonetheless. In the last two lines the speaker despairs of any redemption, yet these same lines are endowed with the regulation and formal blessing of a couplet. Fussell's view that "our age seems to have lost the [Renaissance] sense that rhyme betokens 'accord'" (112) seems appropriate here:

> Regard, O reader how it is with me:
> This year am I five thousand years of age,
> Secure in Pharaoh's great society,
> Like uncle Joseph, or a lesser mage.
> This year will be the thirtieth eternity
> The thirtieth time around the solar fire,
> But if I count night watches, obviously
> How I am aged in hope and dead desire!
>
> For I am fifty years by sleepless toll:
> And more than that! for every fresh event
> Flashes upon the waiting wakeful soul
> New light on what the past time might have meant:
> And as we think of years, thinking like this,
> Look, reader, how we stare at an abyss! (VP 103)

Indeed modernist culture cultivates, according to Thomas Mann, "a sympathy for the abyss" (qtd. in Howe, "The Idea of the Modern" 14).

Schwartz concedes that some mimicking of the subject matter is inevitable, that is, experience is not so much captured or transfigured by the poetic medium, as merely reproduced. Moreover, the whole issue calls attention to its own obsolescence, as today's subversion becomes tomorrow's convention, as the forms of dissent, as noted in the introduction, according to Howe, have been institutionalized. Lionel Trilling also notes in his essay "On the Teaching of Modern Literature," there is a "socialization of the anti-social or the acculturation of the anti-cultural or the legitimization of the subversive" (554-55). Schwartz echoes this sentiment:

> Since these writers [the documentary novelist and the transition group] are struggling to express the complexities of modern life and their discontinuous values, their efforts tend to exert a pressure on the normal modes of syntax and arrangement: there is an omission of transition and explanation. In time, of course, the new method of presentation becomes as familiar as the old. It is difficult in 1937 to understand why Ulysses seemed obscure in 1921 [sic]; and the obscurity of Keats is almost inconceivable.
> ("Primitivism and Decadence" SE 344-45)[3]

In this spirit, John Press writes: "Now with T.S. Eliot grown respectable, W.H. Auden enthroned in the Chair of poetry at Oxford and Dylan Thomas canonized, it is time to look for a new scapegoat who can be denounced for his obscurity and driven into the wilderness" (74). Still, both Eliot and Joyce had to append their works with a guide for the perplexed: The Waste Land, whether or not by the exigencies of publication to lengthen Eliot's folio, is followed by explanatory footnotes to allusions and references esoteric to even his most tutored reader. "Imagine," Schwartz marvels, "The Waste Land sans notes" (J 24). Joyce mapped out schematic correspondences of the chapters of Ulysses to its Homeric model, later published and made accessible by Stuart Gilbert. Schwartz created his best poetry, without programme notes, in the mid- to late-thirties, little more than a decade after this annus mirabilis, 1922.

b) Obscurity Defied

Tenor and vehicle mutually require each other: "The aesthetic structure absolutely requires the cognitive structure in order to realize itself" (Wesling 76). For Schwartz, understanding of the poetic object is inextricably bound to clarity of style. He quotes Bossuet in his epistemological exercise, Having Snow: "Mais ce qui est plus nécessaire pour former un style c'est de bien comprendre la chose, de pénétrer le fond et la fin de tout et d'en savoir beaucoup" (Beinecke). For Schwartz, clarity is both a creed and a style, schooled as he was in Aristotelian poetics and rhetoric. For Aristotle, metaphor is a mode of perception, not an ornament: "appropriate" metaphors lend "clearness, charm and distinction" (Rhetoric 1405A). Metaphors should conform to a mean and be neither too obvious nor too far fetched (1412A). Yet he admits that "it is well to give the ordinary idiom an air of remoteness" (1404B), as he

condemns the "common place" which "does not impress." In the course of cataloguing various defects which end in a "frigid" style, Aristotle specifies the use of "strange words (1406A), and obscure metaphors": "if they are far-fetched, they are obscure" (1406B). Schwartz's implicit choice is for the older, easier "textes de plaisir" over the modern, playfully challenging "textes de jouissance" as defined by Barthes in his volume, Le Plaisir du texte. Schwartz is a devotee of "The Early Morning Light," as he entitles Section 3 of VP. This series of meditations on clarity and luminosity partake of the chiaroscuro of the aubade: a celebration of the dawn to come while one is still in a state of darkness. Allon White cites Isaiah 59:9 -- "We wait for light, but behold obscurity" -- to support this paradox: "Strange that the metaphor of light should simultaneously organize the axes of morality, knowledge and discourse. . . . It thus becomes impossible to separate the degree of intelligibility in a text from epistemological considerations" (13).

In De Doctrina Christiana, St. Augustine located the aesthetic pleasure of reading Christian literature as a difficulty overcome, a cracking of the shell, or letter, to get at the kernel, or sentence. Since then has obscurity, dressed up in tropes and figures, entered our secular literature, and become a term of approbation. This typological difficulty was propagated with secular piety and brought into the modern age through the hermetic or "closed" composition of the troubadors of the trobar clus tradition, the grotesque neologisms of Gongor, Lyly's euphuistic turns of phrase, the tortures of the "far-fetched" metaphysical conceit, the elusive vatic intent of the Romantic visionary, the obscure object of Symbolist desire as it manifested itself through suggestiveness, association, impressionism and correspondences.

Howe holds that difficulty is the defining quality of the modern: "To the established guardians of culture, the modern writer seems wilfully inaccessible" ("The Idea of the Modern" 13). The modernist incarnation of textual recalcitrance ranged over the refractory spectrum: James's use of "muddlement" and delight in securing a complicated effect, Eliot's collage, Pound's montage, panmythological references, capricious typography, the employment of found material from different genres and languages, cento or patchwork quotations, aleatory and automatic composition, asyntactic and paratactic leaps, disregard for causal sequence and narrative logic, additive and syncopated rhythms, abstract stylizations (Worringer) and spatialization of poetic form (Joseph Frank). Schwartz, too, avails himself of certain practices of Symbolist evocation, the neo-Metaphysical conceit, suppression of predication and euphuistic latinisms. If his is an age of anxiety, as Auden diagnoses it, Schwartz seeks to decipher its nervous jottings.

His sometime engagement with the nebulous, the obscure and the contingent has epistemological consequences, as we shall see in the conclusion:

> Some who are uncertain compel me. . . .
> . . . They fear
> Love offered suddenly, turning from the mantlepiece . . .
> Tentative, hesitant, doubtful.
> ("At This Moment of Time" SK 26)

While he sought to deny obscurity the ascendancy and privilege accorded it by his colleagues, Schwartz reveals himself to be both attracted to, and repelled by, it. He tenders this dreary assessment in mid-career:

> We who are poets . . .
> .....
> As if we struggled with a puzzle's parts,
> [Make] the huge assumption that there is

> A lucid picture which these fragments fit,
> Disheveled in our clumsy pious hands,
> A picture true, good, and appropriate. . . .
> ("Disorder Overtakes Us All Day Long" VP 60)

Schwartz's critical voice, however, is clear. According to Herbert Leibowitz,

> A lucid explainer of texts and difficult ideas -- it comes as no surprise that Schwartz was a great teacher -- he sets to right what he believes are confusions of method or lapses of sensibility. . . . His polemics indeed might serve as a model of the witty correction of error. He seeks to augment knowledge, not overpower us by glittering acrobatics on the dialectical highwire. (3)

The earnest statement which opens his review of Trilling serves as the unspoken wish for all his writing: "Let me try to make myself as plain and clear as possible" ("The Duchess' Red Shoes" SE 221). Fidelity to the observed world, and not a studied perplexity, is the route Schwartz chooses to confound and expose the certainties by which we think we live. Although Schwartz wants to believe that a higher order animates his world, obscurity remains a persistent lexical preoccupation: "I wish I had a pony or a trot / To read the obscure Latin of your heart" ("I Wish I Had Great Knowledge or Great Art" VP 73). Here obscurity is the foil to the courtly lover's yearning for the elusive princesse lointaine. In the poem, "How Each Bell Rings and Rings Forever More," obscurity takes on a religious cast: "Thus we are tossed! by powers from afar, / By puns on rocks in Christ's most obscure word . . ." (VP 96). The epistemologically nebulous is thematically pervasive:

> Fog in stony December; it is well
> The season's character being clear,
> That every shape of error veil
> Building and transient street-car. . . . ("Song 18" LLV 212)

This early-found solace (1933-34) is pursued in late-career (1958):

> What blooms after the lisping lipping dimnesses
> What night in all its formless vagueness is over all

> The beauty of the body of the river?
> The roses are pink because of the weight of fragrance.
> ("The Studies of Narcissus" LLP 74)

Clarity is accomplished by various structural and stylistic strategies, the first among them the often prose-like assertions of the poetic text. Here we have Eliot's acute observation of quotidian activity in his demotic English:

> In the bad cold of sorrow much too weak
> To drink some coffee, light a cigarette
> And think of summer beaches, blue and gay.
> I climb the sides of buildings just to get
> Merely a glob of gum. . . .
> ("I Am to My Own Heart Merely a Serf" SK 71)

Eliot's urbanity is overturned by Schwartz's earnestness. Among the bare props of the everyday, one's existential identity stares one, simply, in the face:

> So once in the drugstore,
> Amid all the poppy, salve and ointment,
> I suddenly saw estranged there,
> Beyond all disappointment,
> My own face in the mirror. ("By Circumstances Fed" SK 42)

This poem was written in the period Robert Phillips, in his preface to LLP, calls Schwartz's early Yeatsian "stripped bare" style (xv). As with Stevens, "the poem of the mind [is engaged] in the act of finding / What will suffice" ("Of Modern Poetry" Collected Poems 239), and not much more.

Schwartz, in just this brand of bald poetic utterance quoted above, sought the "constative" possibilities of poetry. In a prefatory apologia Schwartz writes: "I should . . .like to think that I am one more of the poets who seek to regain for Poetry the width of reference of prose without losing what the Symbolists discovered" (G ix). However, the stark poignancy of this simple statement -- "I'll kiss you wherever you think you are poor / Wherever you shudder, feeling

striped or barred . . ." ("Two Lyrics from Kilroy's Carnival: a Masque" LLP 7) -- can break down into the prosaic flat planes of syntactical predictibility:

> She has a noble attitude marked by pride and candor
> She takes a noble pride in the female nature and torso
> She articulates her pride with directness and exuberance
> She is honest in her delight in womanhood and manhood.
> ("Love and Marilyn Monroe" LLP 23)

Cleanth Brooks's heresy of paraphrase is vitiated: translation is unnecessary. The poetic phrase yields its meaning immediately. Many of Schwartz's simple poetic statements defeat John Press's critical cliché: ". . . judged by normal standards of prose clarity, there will always remain an element of obscurity in poetry. That poetry, in obeying the very laws of its nature, must preserve the right to be obscure" (191). Schwartz attempts to rob poetry of this birthright.

There are another few tactics with which Schwartz makes the poem offer up its precise intention. He often uses performative utterances, as J.L. Austin names them in How To Do Things With Words. A sentence is performative if it can be shown that "to utter the sentence . . . is not to . . . state that I am doing it. . . . the issuing of an utterance is the performing of an action"(6). These lines from "Song 6" do not merely perform the illocutionary act of naming -- "And if I call your will a waiting bird / As if a natural thing" -- they further clarify by granting motive: "I mean to show / The hideous balances which wait for it / Flying with anguished breath the cliffs of air" (LLV 207). Nomenclature, the Adamic task, is a further stipulative aid to reflection, as we shall see in the chapter on lists.

Another illocutionary device is the imperative mood, used in its regulative capacity, according to John Searle's philosophy of language: "regulative rules regulate antecedently or

independently of existing forms of behaviour" (33). Because life is inscrutable, the imperative is one way to inject speech with assurance, and give oneself location:

> Absurd and precarious my presence there
> Looped by the spotlight in assured discourse
> Harangue, imperative, prayer and wish . . .
> With much relief myself I see retire . . .
> Regain my sense of place, sharpened, anew.
> (Coriolanus SK 96)

Although an exercitive (Austin 155)[4] is not used, exertion of influence or exercise of powers or advocacy of course of action is implied. Directives and commands abound in Schwartz's poetry; they compel attention and a sense of purpose in an indifferent, goalless and equivocal poetic environment: "Decide to take a trip, read books of travel. . . . / Mention the name of happiness: . . . . / Choose love, for love is full of children" ("All Clowns Are Masked and All Personae" SK 65). In "Prothalamion" the speaker, in a dream, alerts his audience to the good life, to the vegetative and appetitive life, in a series of urgent invitations:

> Summon the children eating ice cream
> To speak the chill thrill of immediacy.
> Call for the acrobats who tumble
> The ecstasy of the somersault.
> .....
> Bring the poised impeccable diver.
> Summon the skater, precise in figure.
> He knows the peril of circumstance
> The risk of movement and the hard ground.
> Summon the florist! And the tobacconist!
> All who have known a plant-like beauty
> Summon the charming bird for ignorant song. (SK 46-47)

In the same imperative spirit the appeals of life's empirical testing ground are named: "Regard the child, regard the animal, / Welcome strangers, but study daily things" ("Dogs are

Shakespearean, Children are Strangers" SK 68). "Time's Dedication" has the urgency of a carpe diem hortation, with Schwartz's characteristic qualifications:

> Abide with me: do not go away
> But not as the dead who do not walk,
> And not as the statue in the park
> And not as the rock which meets the wave
> .....
> Quit the dance from which is flowing
> Your blood and beauty: stand still with me. (SK 77)

From "seize the day," to the bellicose political strains of

> seize the enemy, O grasp his throat.
> Demand your right to live, your right to eat. . . .
> Deny the rich!. . . .
> Shout in their perfumed ears
> That you refuse to die while they are rich! (Coriolanus SK 82)

The triple imperative "Imagine, summon, idolize" of "Sterne" (SK 180) dimly echoes Eliot's triad "Datta Dayadhvam Damyata", "Give, sympathize, control" of The Waste Land (Collected Poems 77). "Song 25" is written in the imperative mood, as an answer to the opening question, "What ought one to do?" The last stanza bears, not the sneer of cold command, but a practical lesson in how to live, with its final dark corollary:

> Take wife, get child, and show
> That love's wet fruits stay south
> Though every brother go
> To break his brother's mouth,
> And show that time is frozen
> In the house's warmth:
> Then, a governor in reason,
> And learned in all breath
> Go north to study death. (LLV 213)

Related to the imperatives is the aphorism with which Schwartz often centers an ironic sidelong glance, bridles queer shifts of mood and tames vagaries of thought. Schwartz's gnomic

utterances, so foreign to "high" modernist imagism, revolve around a syntax of assertion. In "Love is unjust: justice is loveless" of the poem "Jacob" (SK 235), parallel structure emphatically compounds the moral advocacy. This aphorism defines love and courage in sententious and reciprocal terms: "Love is the most difficult and dangerous form of courage / Courage is the most desperate, admirable and noble kind of love" ("The Choir and Music of Solitude and Silence" LLP 16). A clichéd metaphor is transmuted by more specific terms of definition, echoing Blake: "Existence is a rose; the worm i' the rose. . . . / Existence is a rose but it is unwell" ("Song 7" LLV 209). Clarity is achieved elsewhere by a similar progression of greater degrees of specificity: "Drums: white drums: the white round drums" (Narcissus LLP 82). Each colon, in the service of descriptive literalism, opens up to a new and added detail.

"Song 7," quoted above, bears the refrain, "We who are in love know this." The refrain, along with conspicuous repetition, is a convention not abandoned by the modernists, as Yeats's early poems attest. Schwartz makes full heuristic use of the iterated phrase, the simplest closural device in strophic verse. The burden of the poem, "Calmly We Walk through This April's Day," is "(This is the school in which we learn . . .) / (. . . that time is the fire in which we burn) (SK 66-67). The refrain adds order, however grim, to the "Metropolitan poetry here and there / In the park sit pauper and rentier, / The screaming children, the motor-car . . . ." Its expression varies or develops from one recurrence to the next: in the final stanza the parentheses are discarded altogether: "Time is the school in which we learn, / Time is the fire in which we burn." According to Barbara Herrnstein Smith, such modification of a repetend only serves to strengthen the sense of closure in a final stanza (Poetic Closure 60). The perceptual and

epistemological possibilities inherent in a device such as variation of the refrain is pointed to by Edward Said in his essay "On Repetition":

> . . . the facts of nature are dissolved and then reassembled polemically [in the museum and the library]. A parallel affiliative process takes place in philology, in fiction, in psychology, where repetition turns into an aspect of analytic structural technique. Probably repetition is bound to move from immediate regrouping of experience to a more and more mediated reshaping and redisposition of it, in which the disparity between one version and its repetition increases, since repetition cannot long escape, the ironies it bears within it. (124-25)

Indeed the permutation in refrains -- in this case from "This is the school" to "Time is the school" -- has the reader dissolving and reassembling a perceived fixity into a more elastic and open structure.

Narrative is an historical and diachronic device in an ahistorical and synchronic modernist age. Schwartz often makes philosophical concept more palatable through the reversals of plot. Hayden White's essay, "The Value of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality," stresses the narrative's contribution to the reader's assimilation of a transcultural episteme:

> . . . Narrative might well be considered a solution to a problem of how to translate knowing into telling, the problem of fashioning human experience into a form assimilable to structures of meaning that are generally human rather than culture-specific. . . . As Barthes says, "narrative is translatable without fundamental damage" in a way that a lyric poem or a philosophical discourse is not. (1-2)

What is more, "narrate" and "knowing" are etymologically linked, according to Victor Turner:

> "Narrate" is from the Latin gnarus ("knowing," . . .) both derivatives from the Indo-European root ngâ ("to know") whence the vast family of words deriving from the Latin cognoscere, including "cognition" itself. . . . Narrative is, it would seem, rather an appropriate term of reflective activity which seeks to "know" . . . antecedent events and the meaning of those events. (qtd. in Perloff, Dance of Intellect 156)

Schwartz numbers the loss of narrative poetry among the wages of obscurantist sin: "Almost without exception there is a failure or absence of narrative or dramatic writing in verse" ("The Isolation of Modern Poetry" SE 46). The phenomenological task of the consciousness of consciousness is recommended in the poetic prose of Dr. Bergen's doctrines. However, it is the drama which unfolds, that is, the real reason for Eleanor Bergen's suicide, which assumes centre stage.

Schwartz's fascination with sequential poetry is cognate to his interest in narrative verse. Schwartz's poetic career was well under way when Brooks's well-wrought urn and Wimsatt's verbal icon had become standard watchwords in the New Critical vocabulary. The point at which Frank addresses simultaneity, citing Pound's noted definition from the essay, "A Retrospect," of an image as "that which presents an intellectual and emotional complex in an instant of time" (qtd. in Perloff, Dance of Intellect 13) highlights the difference between Schwartz's brand of simultaneity and modernist dislocation:

> The implication of this definition should be noted: an image is defined not as a pictorial reproduction but as a unification of disparate ideas and emotions into a complex presented spatially in an instant of time. Such a complex does not proceed discursively, in unison with the laws of language, but strikes the reader's sensibility with an instantaneous impact. (Frank 9)

Schwartz's poems are rarely out of step with the norms of language. While his sequences point to the simultaneity of perceived sense data, the all-at-onceness of the rush of events, his images sustain discernible patterns rather than blur them, as do Pound's juxtaposed fragments. Simultaneity is conceived with the fluidity inherent in nature's inevitable process:

> Tired and unhappy, you think of houses
> Soft-carpeted and warm in the December evening
> While snow's white pieces fall past the window
> And the orange firelight leaps.

A young girl sings
That song of Gluck where Orpheus pleads with Death;
Her elders watch, nodding their happiness.
("Tired and Unhappy, You Think of Houses" SK 38)

The meditation on the houses, the falling of the snow, the leap of the firelight, the song of the girl, the elders' vigil, happen at the same time, as they give succour to the speaker, lost in reverie, away from "the weight of the lean buildings" and the "subway rush."

Schwartz's sense of the poem as an integral configuration is unlike Eliot's "montage which serves to heighten and intensify the play of images, or to permit ironic and anagogic association between symbols or images without the confining effect of clear grammatical transition between them" (Clearfield 11).[5] Schwartz is careful not to obscure the ordering of events. His retention of predication and conjunctions helps signal time shifts:

The children of the Czar
Played with a bouncing ball
.....
While I ate a baked potato
Six thousand miles apart,

In Brooklyn, in 1916,
Aged two, irrational.

When Franklin D. Roosevelt
Was an Arrow Collar ad.
("The Ballad of the Children of the Czar" SK 21)

Clearfield sees as essential the ability to acknowledge, as Schwartz does, both diachronicity and synchronicity:

> Linguists speak of an "axis of successiveness," an "axis of simultaneity" treating the two as if they were independent variables on a Cartesian graph. The problem of course is that they are independent only theoretically -- in practice, the linear structure governs the range of choices at each step of the way and the combined (and presumably intended) meaning of the chosen words creates and influences the ongoing linear structure. (6)

Often the narrative assures the psychological continuity of the poem underlying any caprices of poetic diction and detail.

Another device Schwartz employs to defeat obscurity in the text is the frequent use of parentheses between which he provides the poem's own exegesis. He also brackets any distracting or diversionary information: "Beware of all your desires. You are deceived / (As they are deceived and deceptive, urgent and passing!) / (Or knew we had been as we saw all that was lost!) ("The Fulfillment" SK 150); "I sat amid flickering shadows of the war, / Sad about being sad (in this capital / Where thought and art arose once, beautiful)" ("Cartoons of Coming Shows Unseen Before" VP 97). Sometimes the parenthetical insertions are in the manner of the dramatic aside, a form revived by O'Neill in Strange Interlude: "Is any imagination more infamous? / (After so many years to come to this!) / As if the famous past could be denied" ("I Wish I Had Great Knowledge or Great Art" VP 73). Schwartz allows his reader to be privy to his speaker's unarticulated thoughts. In Part II we will see how this bracketing has phenomenological significance.

One more weapon in his arsenal against obfuscation: Schwartz battles gratuitous displays of erudition. An unfamiliar word is accompanied by an apologia: "Now he is phthisic, and he is, poor Keats / (Pardon, O Father, unknowable Dear, this word, / Only the cartoon is lucid, only the curse is heard)" ("Someone Is Harshly Coughing as Before" SK 37). "Aseity," or the self-creating will, is defined both in the body of Coriolanus: "(Aseity such as is God's alone)" (SK 98), and in the subtitle to Act Five: "As If a Man Were Author of Himself" (134). In the same play a definition precedes the term: "'This is the turning-point," 'This is the peripety'" (126). In DBB, the dramatis personae are referred to, characteristically, as "Persons of the Play"

(IDBR 141). Hence Schwartz eradicates most of the lexical difficulties in his text, difficulties which, according to Steiner, can be "looked up." These "contingent" or "epiphenomenal" difficulties "stick like burrs to the fabric of the text":

> Homework: mountainous and becoming more so as our twentieth century brands of literacy recede from the vocabulary, from the grammars, from the grid of classical and biblical reference which have mapped the contours of Western poetry from Caxton and Chaucer to the archival gathering or museum-catalogue in The Waste Land and the Cantos. . . . (The issue is philosophically vital: a language act is inexhaustible to interpretation precisely because its context is the world). . . . Conceivably, the distance between a culture and certain texts can grow so drastic that everything has to be looked up. . . . In practice this may make the given text inaccessible; it slips over the horizon of pragmatic perception as do the retreating galaxies. ("On Difficulty" 26-27)

Schwartz does the homework for his reader.

Pound quoted foreign terms in their original alphabet, a noted example of which is found in "Hugh Selwyn Mauberly": "O bright Apollo / tin andra, tin heroa, tina theon [transliteration] / What god, man or hero /Shall I place a tin wreath upon!" (Personae 189). The untutored reader will miss the fact that the third line is a scrambled translation of the second, miss the source -- Pindar -- the rhyme "theon" and "upon" and the pun on "tin." Schwartz, on the other hand, takes pains to translate the polyglot texture of the poem into something the reader can understand. Schwartz's poems include many subtextual strata, before the vogue in criticism to handle them. Quotation marks around the intertext make its recuperation easy. His sources appear often in the titles: "A Dream of Whitman, Paraphrased, Recognized and Made More Vivid by Renoir" (LLP 47-48); or in the subtitles: "To Helen" "(after Valéry)"; "The Spring" "(after Rilke)" (LLP 30, 32). The poem which begins "'True eloquence mocks eloquence'" is entitled, programmatically, "On a Sentence By Pascal" (VP 3). The epigraph to VP appears in English, in Roman characters which curiously resemble the Greek alphabet. The source is

unacknowledged, but even the least discerning reader, familiar with the Socratic dialogues, would recognize the subject matter as that of The Symposium:

> I think that now we who are together this evening cannot find anything better to do than to praise love.
>
> I propose that each of us, speaking in turn, going from left to right, make a speech in praise and celebration of Love. . . .

Where he does include foreign language in the text, translation follows, but a translation tempered by his characteristic self-consciousness: "Les extrêmes se touchent: these poles which meet / Define a circle of uneasiness" (G 192).

Schwartz's casual erudition, which informs most of his writing, is inspired by both good will and will to self-disclosure:

> And this I tender
> Until . . .
> The past has acted and the poem is said: By this ballet, of such humility,
> I show my learning and my charity. ("Sonnet 1" LLV 203).

While he longs for the "ideal reader" (Pl 18), the reality is that his readership is instructed neither by the sweetness and light of Hellenistic culture nor by Hebraistic moralism with its diligent regard for the letter. They are like his character Jacob Fish who has

> . . . not read Ecclesiastes
> or Sophocles. Yet he has lived for sixty years,
> He should know what long life avails,
> The best seats at the funeral of friends. (S 10)

Having no certain wisdom to impart, Schwartz's own "learned presence" recedes to allow the course of events to offer up its own lessons. There are occasional lapses. Generally cited for the broad range of his scholarship and the breadth of his reading, Schwartz incurs Elisa New's

wrath for his offhanded references to Hegel, Empedocles et al.: ". . . in such lines Schwartz is merely clearing his throat" (250).

Schwartz always considers his audience, addressing it directly: "Be then the active reader, active knower / Even in parts -- Bend down the page you want" (J 29) -- all this before reader-oriented theories would designate the reader an active agent in the making of meaning. His deference to his reader is suffused with ambivalence. In 1938 he writes for a select and privileged few:

> The bubble dancer, the deep-sea diver,
> The bureaucrat, the adulterer,
> Hide private parts which I disclose
> To those who know what a poem knows.
> ("What Curious Dresses All Men Wear" LLP 40)

Both privilege and responsibility attend such disclosure. Later in his career his readership sinks in his estimation, as it broadens: "A dunce will know exactly who I mean, / Lucky as Midas, or as pitiful" ("Passing Beyond the Straits of Guilt and Doubt" VP 82); "No one fools anyone except a fool: / Even the blind will know just what I mean" ("How Strange to Others, Natural to Me" VP 85).

c) Obscurity Assimilated, Poetic Object Defamiliarized

Groping toward clarity, demonstrability and comprehensibility, Schwartz occasionally becomes entangled in the thickets of obscurity himself. We "must earn through dull dim suffering. . . . / The early morning light we have deserved" ("True Recognition Often is Refused" VP 20). The exigencies of regular metrics aside, uncertainty and vagueness are the matrix in which he seeks certainty and definition. He therefore allows himself more creative

latitude than he allows others. This embrace of dull dim suffering and early morning light is Schwartz's variation on the Aeschylean theme, through suffering, knowledge (Agamemnon l. 177, p. 19). Schwartz rehearses this formula in his journal: "Through suffering . . . knowledge" (274). This kind of duality is ubiquitous in Schwartz's poetry. Indeed, it is the nature of the modernist beast. As Clement Greenberg sees it in his article "The Necessity of Formalism":

> Modernism as a whole distinguishes itself by its inclusiveness, its openness and also its indeterminateness. It embraces the conventional polarities . . . or rather it abandons them. . . . Modernism defines itself in the long run not as a "movement," much less a program; but rather as a kind of bias or tropism: toward esthetic value. . . . The specificity of modernism lies in its being so heightened a tropism in this regard. (106)

The subtitle of Kermode's chapter, "The Modern," that is, "Discrimination of Modernisms"[6] (Continuities 1-10) speaks for itself. Modernism brought with it anarchic consequences and solecistic temptations, temptations to which Schwartz himself yielded. These difficulties are not aberrant lapses; they are deliberately-impeded form, willed obscurities, in the manner of Williams, according to Winters, whose "vagueness is willed and controlled": "One has a definite measure of vagueness set against the definite intensity of the meter. To make these perceptions more precise would lessen the impact of the central lines. This mastery of emphasis is . . . the most important mark of the great stylist" ("Primitivism and Decadence" 80-81). Schwartz agrees that vagueness can be "fixed, deliberate, controlled" ("Primitivism and Decadence by Yvor Winters" SE 341). In a position which will be further elaborated in the conclusion, the phenomenologist demands an open and indeterminate work to replicate the human existential situation. Eco cites Merleau-Ponty to bolster the argument for the positive aesthetic function of vagueness and obscurity: ". . . ambiguousness . . . is [the] very definition of

[consciousness]. Consciousness is . . . the very region of indetermination. . . . It is therefore essential for an object and also for the world to present themselves to us as 'open' . . . and as always promising future perceptions" (The Open Work 17).

For the most part, Schwartz proffers recognizable gifts, the most obvious of which are his poetical forays into the appliances and articles of mass consumption:

> Come let us praise the life in which we live
> .....
> Have we not television and Broadway,
> Victrolas, coca-colas, powerful cars
> .....
> When Tin Pan Alley formulates the heart
> When Hollywood fulfills the laws of dreams,
> When the radio is poet laureate
> To Heinz, Palmolive, Swift and Chevrolet. . . .
> ("Some Present Things Are Causes of True Fear" VP 56-57)

He charges Tin Pan Alley with normative power and bestows on the radio poetry's highest prize. That Schwartz wrestles thematic recalcitrance into pacification is most easily seen in poems whose titles suggest weighty epistemological or linguistic issues. The poem "Philology Recapitulates Ontology, Poetry is Ontology" (LLP 38) does not answer in kind Haeckel's evolutionist law, "Ontogeny is the recapitulation of phylogeny" (see Chapter 5c, endnote 18) of which it is an obvious parody.

In his essay, "Familiarization and its Semiotic Matrix," Henrik Birnbaum defines his alternative to Shklovsky's ostranenie:

> In contrast to defamiliarization, the semiotic-aesthetic category of familiarization, while working in the opposite direction, also serves the purpose of increasing the aesthetic effect. Used more sparingly, its essence is to acquaint the reader with otherwise alien, previously unknown (even if superficially witnessed) circumstances, unassimilated or inconceivable experiences. (149-50)

This technique of bringing "alien and ambiguous subjects within the realm of what is previously known and therefore suggestive of intimacy and control" (157) is Schwartz's pervasive task. Coriolanus, the myth of Narcissus, Meyer Schapiro's lecture on Seurat, Aristotle's metaphysics -- all these subjects are rendered in a familiar manner. As Faust has abjured divinity, so does he, in Schwartz's conception, abjure the authority of philosophical tractates for the empirical proof of the lived experience, revealed in a simple simile:

> I knocked each nut to find the meat;
> A worm was there and not a mint
> Metaphysicians could have told me this,
> But each learns for himself, as in the kiss. ("Faust in Old Age" SK 49)

In the poem "Socrates' Ghost Must Haunt Me Now," idealist strivings after a noumenal realm, a world beyond "the mechanical whims of appetite," are not shrouded in philosophical jargon, rather they are delivered in the familiar tones of childlike aspiration: "Old Noumenon, come true, come true!" (SK 58).

Most of Schwartz's intentional obscurities can be most fruitfully examined in terms of Shklovsky's theory of defamiliarization as expounded in his essay "Art as Technique."[7] Shklovsky starts off by avowing that "poetry . . . is a special way of thinking and knowing," a thinking in images (5), both beliefs to which Schwartz wholeheartedly subscribed. Here he argues that because we cannot retain the novelty of our perceptions, it is the responsibility of literature to recreate and rediscover the world:

> Art exists that one may recover the sensation of life; it exists to make one feel things, to make the stone <u>stony</u>. The purpose of art is to impart the sensation of things as they are perceived and not as they are known. The technique of art is to make objects "unfamiliar," to make forms difficult, to increase the difficulty and length of perception because the process of perception is an aesthetic end in itself and must be prolonged. Art is a way of experiencing the artfulness of an

> object. . . . The language of poetry is, then, a difficult, roughened, impeded language. . . . we can define poetry as attenuated, tortuous speech. (12, 22)

As an intellectual and existential exile, Schwartz includes the word estrangement in his poetic lexicon: "This first estrangement is a gradual thing" ("A Young Child and His Pregnant Mother" SK 43); "Estranged among strangers . . . / An alien to myself until at last the caste of the last alienation" ("Abraham" SK 231). There are many devices which Schwartz employs to break the habituation, the automatization[8] of the poetic word, to restore conscious experience:

> I am the octopus in love with God,
> For this my desire inconclusible,
> Until my mind, deranged in swimming tubes
> Issues its own darkness, clutching seas. ("Prothalamion" SK 46)

The octopus leaps off the page and seizes the reader with all eight members, in an embrace of horror, novelty, surprise. In the first line the reader's complacency is jostled threefold: the speaker takes on a grotesque persona who, for all his extra limbs, cannot grasp its elusive object. Secondly, the attribution of human emotion -- love -- to an animal is an unconventional anthropomorphization at which the reader must doubtlessly balk; thirdly, God is an object of beastly desire, not faith. The next three lines heap obscurity upon obscurity. The subject of the participial phrase, "clutching seas," is ambiguous. Common sense would have the octopus as subject, endowed as it is with grasping apparatus. But there is too much syntactical distance between them to be the case; a host of subordinate clauses intervene. Is it the mind which clutches seas? The darkness? Bafflement, I believe, is intended, as the next line -- "O God of my perfect ignorance" -- confronts the reader with a paradigmatic Schwartzian paradox: he is an agnostic devotee of God.

The image of a mind "deranged in swimming tubes" is certainly not a formulaic one. Schwartz uses the language and suggestiveness of Rimbaud's creed of the "derangement" of all the senses: in a letter to Georges Izambard, May 13, 1871, he writes: "Il s'agit d'arriver à l'inconnu par le dérèglement de tous les sens" (qtd. in Clearfield 136). Rimbaud's influence on Schwartz can be traced from his translation in 1939 of Un Saison en Enfer,[9] to the correspondences of various sense modalities which Rimbaud inherited from Baudelaire. This may have influenced Schwartz's synaesthetic images, to which he gives a characteristically meditative twist: "The room's entirely pink before the Flood, / Save for the milky bed, the color of sleep" ("Sonnet 8" LLV 206). A phenomenology of colour will be proposed in Chapter 6. Although the reader is set up for their grotesque character early in the poem -- "The dream is warped or monstrously fulfilled" -- the images of the octopus and the mind in swimming tubes throw the reader into a state of cognitive dissonance. In his essay, "The Code of Modernism," D.W. Fokkema explains how the reader is "tempted to accept a cognitive content he normally may want to reject":

> In accordance with Lotman's view [as expounded in Analysis of the Poetic Text] we believe that twentieth century European literature is dominated by the aesthetics of opposition, rather than by the aesthetics of identity. In other words, although the aesthetic effect may comprise both recognition and surprise, it is the surprise, the new kind of seeing things, that strikes the recipient of Modern literature first and foremost. . . . The literary text first creates a distance between the fictional world described in the text and the world the reader lives in. (680)

The element of surprise figures very greatly in Schwartz's poetics. Schwartz's aesthetic laws are imminent in his system, a system which itself contains many asymmetries and instabilities. If some of his images jar us with their unanticipated adjacencies, it is because Schwartz respects the perceptual and idiosyncratic, rather than the mimetic and objective,

responsibilities of the text. In G, surprise is celebrated as the child's first discovery of "resemblance between different things":

> Surprises, Being's surprises everywhere,
> -- Cumuli clouds full of ontologies!
>
> We in our death enjoy this very much,
> Seeing how one thing is another thing
> In certain ways, a girl being a rose
> In certain ways, a poet being a train. (88)

Schwartz's poetry is replete with odd couplings, which owe much to the tradition of the metaphysical conceit -- a discordia concors, by which, according to Samuel Johnson, "the most heterogeneous ideas are yoked by violence together" (qtd. in Preminger 496). Familiar actions or phenomena are rendered unfamiliar in accordance with Shklovsky's idea that poetry exercises a controlled violence upon practical language, which is thereby deformed in order to compel our attention to its contrived nature.

In the following tropes, poetic device is "laid bare." The yoking is often substantive: "Love's metric seeks a rhyme more pure and sure" ("Prothalamion" SK 45); "The syntax of heaven, the grammar of night" ("Sonnet 1" LLV 203). The application of linguistic terms to abstractions transfixes the reader. In "Aubade," it is the predicate and participle which startle us by their invention: "The sun, fat first, / Punches the window / Nursing blue shadow" (LLV 214). In the poem, "In the Slight Ripple, the Mind Perceives the Heart," the defamiliarization is adjectival: ". . . the fishes dart / Like fingers, centrifugal, like wishes / Wanton," as it is in the poem, "At this Moment of Time": ". . . turning from the mantlepiece / Sweet with decision" (SK 39, 26). Although fingers do not move centrifugally, their morphology, like spokes on a wheel, suggests centrifugal motion. A contrast is set up against the centripetally

self-reflexive labour of the rest of the poem. Decision can be as sweet as success; however, it takes Schwartz's keen sensibility to note it and hence renew one's perception of one's state of mind as one is turning from the mantlepiece.

In the poem, "Father and Son," Schwartz ascribes unusual attributes to the poetic object: "The unction and falsetto of the sentiment / Which gratifies the facile mouth" (SK 29). The defamiliarization is compounded by the fact that "unction and falsetto" are not only incompatible with their partitive genitive noun ["sentiment"] but with each other as well. The "ignorant arm" of the poem "Metro Goldwyn Mayer" (LLP 22) may be an infelicitous metonymy or a truncated echo of Arnold's "Dover Beach": "And we are here as on a darkling plain / Swept with confused alarms of struggle and flight / Where ignorant armies clash by night" (Poetical Works 212). The diction in the poem "She Was the Girl Within the Picture Frame" corroborates the second alternative: "Darkling, I hardly know just what I mean" (VP 68).

According to Fredric Jameson, "only pre-existing things -- objects, institutions, units of some kind -- can be defamiliarized; just as only what has a name to begin with can lose its familiar name and suddenly appear before us in all its bewildering unfamiliarity" (Prison House 70). Steiner opens the parameters of this issue to embrace both epistemology and intentionality:

> No coherent answer [to the question what is difficulty] could be given outside a complete model such as we do not have, of the relations between "thought" and speech, and outside a total epistemology, which again we do not have, of the congruence or non-congruence of speech forms with a "precedent" body of intention, perception and vocative impulse. ("On Difficulty" 18)

The common store, as noted earlier, is an elusive thing. In his cycle of Biblical poems, Schwartz calls on his reader's presumed familiarity with Sarah's laughter at her annunciation:

> I did not laugh. It was
> A cough. I was coughing . . .

> It was the cold I caught nine minutes after
> Abraham married me . . .
> I was also
> Clearing my throat. ("Sarah" SK 232)

Schwartz indulges, somewhat playfully, in a bit of Biblical revisionism to introduce the cough of self-consciousness, a leitmotif in his work, as we shall see in Chapter 5. Schwartz seems to subvert his own hermeneutic project which is grounded in an understanding of poetic truth. He often confounds the patronage which he, at the same time, tries to enlighten. Once again, Steiner's taxonomy of the varieties and orders of difficulty is applicable. Schwartz effects "tactical" difficulties:

> The poet may choose to be obscure in order to achieve certain specific stylistic effects. He may find himself compelled toward obliquity and cloture. . . . The authentic poet cannot make do with the infinitely shop-worn inventory of speech, with the necessarily devalued or counterfeit, currency of the everyday. . . . The underlying manoeuvre is one of rallentando. We are not meant to understand easily and quickly. Immediate purchase is denied us. The text yields its force and singularity of being only gradually. . . . our understanding, however strenuously won, is to remain provisional. . . . There is a dialectical strangeness in the will of the poet to be understood only step by step and up to a point. . . . The retention of innermost meaning is, inevitably . . . ironized by the mere fact that the poet has chosen to make his text public. (33-35)

Many turns of phrase in Schwartz's poetry offer such resistance; the surface play of words belies a deeper impenetrability. The irregular cadence and harsh sputtering of lines such as ". . . the sunlight / Thrashes its wet shellac on brickwalk and doorstep" ("Cambridge, Spring 1937" SK 57) ensure that prosody and sound conspire to keep complete understanding at bay. The use of contrasted adjectives which are not parallel in meaning -- "Each is but each and clear to see, not steep [my emphasis]" -- creates the same obstacle, preserves the same mystery ("Out of the Watercolored Window, When You Look" SK 36). Despite a critical allegiance to clarity, the via dolorosa is often the road to artistic redemption. The road is uphill, arduous, and

suffused with the Augustinian delight in a difficulty overcome, both for Schwartz and his reader: "There, effort was like dancing's its own pleasure" ("The Fulfillment" SK 150). It is the effort expended in the struggle to attain knowledge which affords the text its energy and sinew: "Know the act and their enaction and another's and others' who suffer the struggling, / The effort of effort, as in the toil and ecstasy of dancing and climbing . . ." ("The First Morning of the Second World" SK 155). Meaning is not necessarily found on the path of least resistance. Note the characteristic title of one of Schwartz's essays: "Ezra Pound's Very Useful Labors" (SE 102-12). The "travail" of "early morning" embodied in the "fleet of trucks [which] strained uphill, grinding" ("In the Naked Bed, in Plato's Cave" SK 25) pervades the poetic act both in its creation and reception. Elisa New notes this trend in Schwartz's criticism: "Such phrases as . . . 'poetry in its travail' . . . are characteristic of Schwartz, phrases that seem drawn from the very bloodstream of a poet's praxis" (247).

Schwartz tests the mettle of his reader, with the concluding lines of "Poem" (LLP 39) which is more conundrum than poetic statement: "It is the belief that hope itself was not, from the beginning / before believing, the most important of all beliefs." These poetic utterances which, shell-like, turn in on themselves are reminiscent of Eliot's circuitous literary logic most notable in his Four Quartets: "Or say that the end precedes the beginning, / And the end and the beginning were always there / Before the beginning and after the end" ("Burnt Norton" V, Four Quartets 12). One has to read the lines several times before one can come to a satisfactory gloss. Schwartz's lines bring with them a further difficulty: hope and belief are ill-defined in the rest of the poem and are at opposite ends of the spectrum of human aspiration.

In his journal, Schwartz exposes the machinery and intellectual spadework upon which Milton's art rests: "To distinguish between overt (a poor word) form and the form or arrangement arrived at by means of working at the subject matter with overt form. Thus, in the sonnet the form Milton arrives at -- the mastered deliberate strain. . ." (177). Eliot likewise attests to the value of the self-corrective critical apparatus which has reason check intuition in his essay, "The Function of Criticism":

> . . . the larger part of the labour of an author in composing his work is critical labour; the labour of sifting, combining, constructing, expunging, correcting, testing. . . . There is a tendency, and I think it is a whiggery tendency, to decry this critical toil of the artist; to propound the thesis that the great artist is an unconscious artist, unconsciously inscribing on his banner the words Muddle Through. (28)

In the poem, "Being Unused to Joyous Consciousness," the abstraction, freedom, finds its emblematic incarnation in the labour and throes of childbirth:

> The more the promise grows, though difficult,
> As in the hours when the headfirst child
> Shudders amid his mother's mounting fit:
> Small pain before endless joy. (VP 80)

Although Schwartz did not want his reader to shrink from the exegetical labour of reading his poems, certain obscurities arise from the difficulties inherent in the trope itself: ". . . some obscure metaphor / Moved in the infant mind" (G 100). Rarely is the difficulty embedded, in transformational terms, in the poem's deep structure, that is, not in the lexical surface but in the syntactical elements which are intentionally elided. Earlier I referred to Schwartz's unswerving use of conjunctions to signal sequence. Schwartz takes Crane to task for a difficulty which is "a result of omission of connection: that is, the relation of one statement to the next one is not mediated by transitional phrases" (L 37).

Yet Schwartz avails himself of the Modernist habit of compression, a habit which has classical roots. In his Ars Poetica Horace writes: Brevis esse laboro: obscuro fio: "I labour to be brief and grow obscure" (qtd. in Dupee 356). Poetic phrases are deliberately foreshortened by elision of the verb: "What satisfaction, fruit? What transit, heaven" ("Far Rockaway" SK 34); "Fog forgotten, yesterday, conclusion, / Nostalgic, noising dim sorrow?" ("The Sin of Hamlet" SK 35); "Idle, denial; false, affirmation" ("My Mind to Me a Kingdom Is" VP 8). Predicates intrude upon the purely substantive and atttibutive descriptions Schwartz intends. In the passive construction of these lines: "Not the door opened and the stair descended / The voice answered, the choice announced" ("The Sin of Hamlet" SK 35), Schwartz removes the human agent to call attention to the action itself. Often economy, which reads as surface obscurity, facilitates understanding, as irrelevant semantic baggage is shed. In his early career Schwartz put into practice Pound's directive from ABC of Reading: Dichten=Condensare, "to write is to condense" (36). A journal entry reads, "all literature is an effort at the formal character of the epigram" (J 44) -- a truism he violated in later years.

For Shklovsky, repetition is not an emphatic tool, as one might imagine; rather it is yet another device of defamiliarization and "making difficult" (zatrudnenie). Repetition distorts and deforms the naturalistic material, making it artistically perceptible. Tautological pairs, synonyms, repetitions of prepositions or words are all manifestations of the "staircase construction" (stupenchatost). Shklovsky is addressing the question of narrative in the folk tale, but finds many parallels in poetry: "The work is truly 'perceived,' the process of perception being heightened by the 'retardation' (zamedlenie) which serves to extend and intensify the perceptive process" (qtd. in Sherwood 34, 36). It is with such design that a group of poems in

Summer Knowledge appears under the rubric, "The Repetitive Heart: Poems in Imitation of the Fugue." In his poem, "Father and Son," the line "Guilt, guilt of time, nameless guilt" (SK 31) specifies the brand of guilt, but it also slows down the movement of the poem, after Shklovsky's model.

The line "Hand and hand, glance and glance, care and care" ("Prothalamion" SK 45) does not specify at all; the retardation serves no greater end outside itself. The line proceeds, step-like to no real resolution. Shklovsky's account in his essay, "On the Connection Between Devices of Syuzhet Construction and General Stylistic Devices," sheds light on the aforementioned examples: ". . . it is obvious for all those who know how to look, how . . . near to fractation art is; it is not, of course, a march set to music, but rather a dance-walk . . . a movement constructed only so that it may be sensed" (54). The staircase unwinds with almost syllogistic movement:

> Withness is ripeness
> Ripeness is withness
> To be is to be in love
> Love is the fullness of being. ("The First Morning of the Second World" SK 154)

This retardation affects the perception of sequence, and slows down the reader's reception of the poem. Rudolf Arnheim's observation informs us of the visual and literary perception of Schwartz's brand of "gradual accretion":

> A pictorial image presents itself whole, in simultaneity. A successful literary image grows through what one might call accretion by amendment. Each word, each statement, is amended by the next into something closer to the intended total meaning. This build-up through the stepwise change of the image animates the literary medium. (Visual Thinking 249-50)

Hence the above devices are employed to call attention to the verbal medium, to make the familiar unfamiliar, to point to the literariness of the text. Schwartz is very conscious of

keeping the language fresh and renewed. Even his sense of literary "tradition" merely intensifies what Shklovsky calls the "palpability of newness," allowing that the transition from the old system to the new one is dynamic. Even strategically-placed anachronisms could be, in Russian Formalist terms, an extreme form of innovation. The appearance of Marx and Freud in his play Coriolanus makes us rethink our sense of historical sequence, all literary works comprising a "simultaneous order," as Eliot has it ("Tradition and the Individual Talent" 14). The syntax in the line, "Love love exhausts" ("Abraham and Orpheus, Be With Me Now" SK 73) calls attention to itself by its archaism. Steiner warns that innovation and archaism are not exclusive terms:

> Above all, meaningful art, music, literature are not new, as is . . . the news brought by journalism. Originality is antithetical to novelty. The etymology of the word alerts us. It tells of "inception". . . a return, in substance and in form to beginnings. In exact relation to their originality, to their spiritual-formal force of innovation, aesthetic inventions are "archaic." They carry in them the pulse of the distant source. (Real Presences 27-28)

Schwartz attempts, in ever new variations, to engage his reader in an enriched way of perceiving familiar objects and sensations. A sensory faculty is shockingly empowered with the hardness of a weapon: "like a gun is touch" ("What is to be Given" SK 53). History is defied to wrench us, violently, out of our indifference: "[The past] grasps us like Athena by the hair" (Coriolanus SK 99). Novelty itself is material for poetry: "Regain my sense of place, sharpened anew" (96). Adults must learn from a child's jubilation:

> "I am cherry, alive," the little girl sang,
> "Each morning I am something new: . . .
> I am tree, I am cat, I am blossom too:
> .....
> The pit has a pit the pit has a peach
> .....
> But I don't tell the grown ups: because it is sad

> And I want them to laugh just like I do
> Because they grew up and forgot what they knew
> . . . When I sang my song, I knew, I knew!
> .....
> I am red I am gold I am green I am blue,
> I will always be me, I will always be new!"
> ("I am Cherry Alive, the Little Girl Sang" SK 161)

Here "knew" and "new" join ranks homonymously to enforce Schwartz's belief that knowledge must ever be revitalized. The above examples of rhetorical novelty include, respectfully, reference to the past. According to René Girard, individual acts of "epistemological rupture" (12) need not be radical:

> The Latin word in-novare implies limited change, rather than total revolution; a combination of continuity and discontinuity. . . .
> Real change can only take root when it springs from the type of coherence that tradition alone provides. Tradition can only be successfully challenged from the inside. The main prerequisite for real innovation is a minimal respect for the past, and a mastery of its achievements. . . . (19)

If Schwartz pours old wine -- commonplace modernist themes -- into new bottles, that wine is tempered with his desire to use language freshly and present his perceptions in a novel way. His poems are instances of invention, classically conceived (Aristotle's heuresis or Cicero's inventio) as discovery or originality. Donald Dike establishes Schwartz's critical position:

> Criticism mediates between the literary work and its audience, concerned about the latter as well as the former . . .; it must therefore take pains to communicate, talk to its reader, eschewing obscurantist self indulgences of style . . . obscurities to which the modern poet's enforced isolation and his legitimate absorption in his own experience give a cultural sanction.
> ("The Literary Criticism of Delmore Schwartz" 494)

His hatred of obfuscation in criticism applies with equal force to his poetry. However, as we have seen, his espousal of lucidity includes larger commitments, that is, keeping the reader's interest with an arresting image, an unexpected turn of phrase, new ways of seeing the familiar.

While "stock" adjectives (rosy-fingered dawn), according to Riffaterre, "survive the death of the esthetics that begat them. . . . the reader is under a stronger compulsion to perceive them as poetic . . . the more remote they seem . . . from everyday speech" (Semiotics of Poetry 26). Schwartz's epithets, contrarily, have a decidedly "contemporary" ring. The Homeric formulaic epithet is discarded for the conceptual freshness of the "government of love's great polity" (SK 71), the sensual thrill of the "snowflakes as kisses" (SK 76).

Subject to ideational turbulence from within and polemical buffeting from without, all of Schwartz's theoretical terminologies and stylistic desiderata must be examined along with their praxis. Drawing a physiognomy of modernist obscurity, Schwartz gives it a new face. Finally, his poetry, in various acts of defamiliarization, challenges its own pieties. While Schwartz values lucidity in expression, his poem cannot but "enact or otherwise indicate the epistemological barriers that stand between us and the objective world" (Kenshur 231). The small epistemological orders of his poems are proposed, not always successfully, as a trope for the order of the universe, as we shall now see.

Endnotes to Chapter 1

[1] Schwartz makes direct reference to Eastman's "attack on difficult poetry" in a letter to Philip Horton (L 37). Schwartz did not address Eastman's Marxist condemnation of individual hermetic expression.

[2] Winters names other devices in the obscurantist's bag of pyrotechnical tricks: repetition, pseudo-reference, as "reference to a non-existent plot or symbolic value," "the double mood," which includes anti-climax and romantic irony. The following year, 1938, Winters further expatiates on the subject in Maule's Curse.

[3] Randall Jarrell, in his essay, "The Obscurity of the Poet," lightheartedly proposes that it is simplicity which becomes old hat: "How long it takes the world to catch up! Yet it never really 'catches up,' but is simply replaced by another world. . . . An old gentleman at a party . . . asked me what modern poet I like best. Rather cutting my coat, to his cloth, I answered: 'Robert Frost.' He looked at me with surprise and said with gentle but undisguised finality: 'I'm afraid he is a little after my time'. . .; surely in 1850 some old gentleman, fond of Gray and Cowper and Crabbe, must have uttered to the young Matthew Arnold the same words, but this time with reference to the poetry of William Wordsworth'"(8).

[4] An exercitive is the giving of a decision in favour of or against a certain course of action, or advocacy of it: "It is a decision that something is to be so . . .; it is a sentence as opposed to a verdict." Some examples are: recommend, direct, command, advise, entreat, urge (Austin 154-56).

[5] No discussion of simultaneity should ignore this historical fact: in 1913 Blaise Cendrars collaborated with painter Sonia Delaunay to produce the "Premier Livre Simultané." "The decorations by Delaunay are supposedly linked to the poem, which confers upon it the appellation 'simultanéiste.' The two were devised simultaneously, but any connection between Delaunay's abstract composition and the poem must remain hermetic or obscure" (Clearfield 75-76).

[6] After Lovejoy's "On the Discrimination of Romanticisms."

[7] Iskussto kak priem: this essay has been translated variously as "Art as Device."

[8] "Automatization" is a term used by the Czech Structuralists, Mukarovsky and Jakobson among them. "Habituation" is Shklovsky's term.

[9] His translation, A Season in Hell, was roundly criticized for its mistranslations and syntactical lapses. Stevens defended Schwartz, if faintly, against such attacks: "It [might] contain things that matter" (qtd. in McDougall 21).

Chapter 2

IDEAS OF ORDER

> Oh! Blessed rage for order, pale Ramon,
> The maker's rage to order words of the sea,
> Words of the fragrant portals, dimly-starred,
> And of ourselves and of our origins
> In ghostlier demarcations, keener sounds.
>
> Wallace Stevens, "The Idea of Order at Key West"
> (Collected Poems 130)

a) The Rage for Order

Dishevelled, clumsy, lumbering, perplexed ("The Heavy Bear Who Goes With Me" SK 74) in his personal life, rambling in conversation, lax in matters of moral probity, irascible in interpersonal relationships, Schwartz demanded order and order-making arguments in poetry. As Stevens contends here, the poet, derived etymologically from the Greek "to make" (poiein), is maker. This etymology does not escape Schwartz: ". . . to be a poet is to be a maker . . . to make something new by putting things and words together" ("The Vocation of the Poet in the Modern World" SE 15). The poetic order Schwartz seeks is both made or imposed, and discovered or recovered, from a matrix of chaos. Stevens, again, presages Schwartz's effort: ". . . to impose is not / To discover. To discover an order as of / A season, to discover summer and know it . . ." ("It Must Give Pleasure," Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction, Collected Poems 403). For Schwartz, the aspiration to order is the supreme, if necessary and corrective, fiction.

With Foucault's order of knowledge and its exclusions in mind, Ihab Hassan boldly states: "We are enjoined to reflect upon the order and disorder of knowledge in our time" ("Culture, Indeterminacy and Immanence" 47). With a more narrowly-circumscribed mandate, I come to reflect upon the order and disorder of knowledge in Schwartz's poetry and poetics. It is the organicity of the ordering process which Schwartz recognizes both as poet and critic: "R.P.

Blackmur was the first to remark . . . that Stevens' poems 'grow in the mind.' They do. The growing continues, astonishing and inexhaustible . . ." ("In the Orchards of the Imagination" SE 189). Although Schwartz defers to the rigours of classical form, it is this Romantic and organic definition of the shaping powers of the intellect, this unity in diversity traceable to Coleridge, which was passed on to Schwartz via Whitman and Stevens. It is a creative order, a natura naturans rather than a found order, natura naturata. If order is immanent in nature, as Eniko Bollobas insists, in a discussion of the "creative process as epistemological activity," then it is the modernist's task, as agent of that creativity, to uncover it (101). Pound's distinction between the "symptomatic," or reflective artist, and the "donative," or creative one, springs to mind: "Donative artists . . . project new forms for ordering sensations" (Sanford Schwartz 105).

Schwartz was engaged with order as an object of desire, and with how its constituents are apprehended. In his study of the aesthetics of the "open work," Umberto Eco declares that "art knows the world through its own formative structures." Art represents the world through the way it organizes its constituents (modo di formare) rather than through what the constituents themselves represent (xiv). By holding the mirror up to nature, poetry is a passive and mimetic reflection of order. By creating stanzaic patterns and aural symmetries, it is the active and effecting agency of order:

> Poetry says of reality that if it is magnificent,
> it is also stupid:
> For poetry is, in a way, omnipotent;
> For reality is various and rich, powerful and vivid,
> but it is not enough
> Because it is disorderly and stupid or only at
> times, and erratically, intelligent:
> For without poetry, reality is speechless or incoherent:
> It is inchoate, like the pomp and bombast of thunder. . . .
> ("The Kingdom of Poetry" SK 187)

What the thunder says to Schwartz mimics the third of its directives to Eliot in The Waste Land, that is, "control" (Collected Poems 77, 83). While taking Winters to task for the didactic function he ascribes poetry, Schwartz lets the ordering, as well as the controlling, functions stand: "the writing of a poem is a moral act because it is an attempt to order, control and understand one's experiences" ("Primitivism and Decadence by Yvor Winters" SE 332).

As determined in the poem "The Kingdom of Poetry," poetry's "perorations verge upon the ceaseless oration of the ocean" (SK 187). Stevens' parallel seaside musings include the "sudden mobs of men" who "requir[e] order beyond their speech" ("Sad Strains of a Gay Waltz" Collected Poems 122); require, that is, the poet's measure. Schwartz's poetry equally bears out Stevens' complementary definition of the poet as a "Connoisseur of Chaos" in the poem of the same title: "A. A Violent order is disorder; and / B. A great disorder is an order. These / Two things are one" (Collected Poems 215). As I will show later in this chapter, the city is the arena where chaos and order do battle. Schwartz finds precedence in a tradition of city poems from Juvenal's satires to Baudelaire's wonder at the "fourmillante cité, cité pleine de rêves" of "Les Sept Vieillards" (Les Fleurs du Mal 170) and to Eliot's Preludes (Collected Poems 21-23). Ilya Prigogine's "self-organizing systems," or the spontaneous emergence of order out of disorder, his "dissipative structures" (qtd. in Porush 56) have applicability to literature in general, and specifically to the ordering techniques of Schwartz's poetic vision: ". . . how chaos has been historically inscribed or suppressed lies in the complex dynamics that connect writer, reader and text within the culture" (Hayles, "Introduction: Complex" 30).

In an age which sifted phrases to their meaning of meaning, saw ambiguities in multiples of seven, qualified poems by their competing tensions, looked at a blackbird in thirteen different

ways, Schwartz sought to hammer his thoughts into unity. Hence he was engaged in a recognizably modernist enterprise: the text is made to yield meaning despite its own intransigence and opacity. Schwartz gives testimony to the heuristic function of poetry and its concomitant responsibilities: "If Art is an ordering of an experience, it can obviously fail either as an ordering or in the amount of experience grasped by the ordering" (J 24). His defence of Pound -- "When, then the interrelatedness, on all sides, of modern experience is recognized, it becomes simple to understand the way in which the Cantos are put together, and we can see what a lesson they afford for further acts of ordering [emphasis mine] ("Ezra Pound's Very Useful Labors" SE 108) -- is reminiscent of Eliot's refutation of the charge levelled against Joyce that he was a "prophet of chaos": ". . . in manipulating a . . . parallel between contemporaneity and antiquity, [myth] is simply a way of controlling, of ordering, of giving a shape and a significance to the . . . panorama . . . and anarchy which is contemporary history" ("Ulysses, Order, and Myth" 177).

Schwartz's own extended use of the Narcissus myth, his appeals to Orpheus, and Apollo Musagete, his phoenix choir of Psyche and Cupid, establish the eternal and constant truth of literary works, extracted from the historical accidents in which they are embedded. Although Schwartz's poems do not proceed from an invocation to the muse, knowledge is his who drinks at her fountain: "Hippocrene [the fountain of the Muses at Helicon], fuselage, annealed, echelon, querulous" (J 59). As shown above, the poet, as purveyor of expressive workmanship and not unpremeditated art, is something more than the Aeolian harp which the wind causes to vibrate. The poet does not sit on the muse's tripod. A poem is a "made" object, and not a daemonic given: "Nothing is given which is not taken" ("Apollo Musagete, Poetry and the

Leader of the Muses" LLP 52). It is in his aspect as the God of Reason that Apollo finds a place in Schwartz's pantheon: Schwartz demands conscious artistry over the giddy and self-forgetful mania conferred by the gods. Maurice Beebe, using the occasion of his essay, "Ulysses and the Age of Modernism," to enumerate the "four cardinal points of modernism," confirms both Eliot's definition and Schwartz's practice: ". . . Modernist literature makes use of myth not in the way myth was used earlier, as a discipline for belief or a subject of interpretation, but as an arbitrary means of ordering art" (qtd. in Beebe 1073).

b) Order from Confusion Sprung

Schwartz's poetry represents neither the unitary world of Parmenides nor the fragmented world of the pre-classical Atomists despite this bi-polar journal entry: "Behold how life is form, proportion, grace, / Matter by structure mastered, or the chaos" (61). His poetic view is more conciliatory than such reductions allow, so that absolute order and absolute chaos emerge as equally untenable interpretive categories. His poem "A Small Score" celebrates the cacophonous music of birds:

> "Bubble, little
> Whistle, pretty,
> Trickle, whittle . . ."
> .....
> Thus, thus, the little birds sang in charming disorder
> and full chorus. . . . (SK 167)

In the lines "Before dawn descended / And darkness surrendered" is Schwartz's awareness of the Chaos of Genesis. The world was primordially "without form and void," Tohu vavohu (Genesis 1:1), before God separated light from dark, day from night, earth from water. Nature's discordances are at once exhilarating and diabolical:

When, Citizens,
I placed a seashell to my ear, I heard
My heart roar PANDEMONIUM,
which was to say
Every devil from hell yells in your heart,
Or shuffles coarsely as coal rides down a chute.
("The Past's Great Power Overpowers Every Hour" VP 63)

Hence Schwartz lends voice to what George Steiner calls, "the raw material, the anarchic prodigalities of consciousness," as any "significant . . . poet" must (Real Presences 13).

James K. Feibleman highlights the pre-Socratic engagement with order: "Intuitively, order has always been understood in terms of law. . . . The clearest and earliest statement is that of Heraclitus, Law (or logos) is the element of arrangements common to all things. . . . The law 'steers all things' through all things and is why 'all things are one'" (3). Order is often for Schwartz, quite conventionally, this ability to predict arrangement, to discover the coherence which Foucault defines as, "given in things as their inner law" (Order of Things xx). Yet a collocation of parts is sent into disarray: "Each attitude reveals different possibilities in the object. . . . / The past arises, tossing and rocking day's neatest arrangements, doorway exchanges" (J 200). The journal entry continues:

Some fiend
Possesses me . . . at some crack
Of my mind's form . . .
slippery as shadows in day's foam,

to reveal the reflectiveness of his arrangements. The objects of placement are often "found," inspired perhaps by Eliot's passive sense of order: "Among the smoke and fog of a December afternoon / You have the scene arrange itself -- as it will seem to do" ("Portrait of a Lady" Collected Poems 116). Schwartz praises Dwight Macdonald's prose, claiming it met standards Schwartz himself hoped to emulate: ". . . you have developed a wonderful expository style with

more energy and clarity and what Eliot called ordinance (that is, arrangement and structure proportionate to the subject matter) than anyone I can think of since Bertrand Russell was an honest man" (L 110). "Ordinance" is heavily freighted with sacerdotal and patristic connotations; however, Schwartz disenfranchises the term from the idea of the framework of the universe through which God manifests His providence. Except for this lapse in an early letter -- "The beauty of the natural world is the order of God" (L 13) -- Schwartz gives "ordinance" a decidedly secular reading.

His own poetic practice admits of the dislocations and discontinuities of modernist discourse. Indeed the modernist tendency to create new literary codes is a formal effort to stay chaos (Fokkema, "The Code of Modernism" 681). Schwartz is adamant and consistent, if not always successful, in his desire to wrest an order out of the detritus and shards of contemporary poetic subject matter, which propel themselves dispersively, centrifugally, and, as Pound had it, "vortically." Sometimes the fragments, defying assimilation and integration, must simply be arranged, or presented: "We know our clumsiness, / Our weakness, our necessities, we cannot / Forget our pride, our faces, our common love" ("Do the Others Speak of Me Mockingly, Maliciously?" SK 70). The title "Disorder Overtakes Us All Day Long" compounds the hegemony that the "puzzle's parts" exercise over the poet who "make[s] the huge assumption that there is / A lucid picture which these fragments fit / Disheveled in [his] clumsy, pious hands . . ." (VP 60-61). Schwartz's text moves freely amid a multiplicity of perspectives. In G the mind must "rise ever from the flesh" to contemplate such variations: "Thin leaf, slim broken knife, knife and leaf rising . . . " (6). Thus Schwartz acknowledges that relations among

objects constitute local patterns and yield local meanings; chaos inheres in the imagistic caprices of poetry.

The process of apperception, as the mental process which raises subconscious or indistinct impressions to the level of attention and at the same time arranges them into a coherent intellectual order, figures greatly in Schwartz's harmonizing poetics. His poem "Concerning the Synthetic Unity of Apperception" (SK 40) does not treat directly the Kantian activity of the title (see Chapter 6a, endnote 5), but singles out, very concretely, the snatches of experience which according to Kant the transcendental unity of consciousness synthesizes. This is effected through a choppy and laconic dialogue between a king and his nephew, portending ghostlier demarcations, indeed:

> "All ghosts come back. They do not like it there,
> "No silky water and no big brown bear,
> "No beer and no siestas up above."
> "Uncle," I said, "I'm lonely. What is love?" (SK 40)

Pure reason or transcendental apperception precedes all data of perception and makes possible their inner order or meaning. A perception is reconstituted and assimilated to a mass of innate ideas already possessed in order to comprehend and interpret it. Schwartz defines the aesthetic experience in apperceptive terms:

> In experiencing works of art we become the music, the poem, and the admired building, the comely statue and the vivid painting. Our sensations are sensations which have already been experienced, discriminated, selected. Our ordinary sensations come upon us diffusely and in disorder, or at a lower degree of order, or an order determined by practical need. (J 587)

Schwartz notes the activity of cognition which orders the objects of perception progressively and incrementally: ". . . Now he must knit time with apperception, bit by tiny bit" (SK 40). The almost exclusively-monosyllabic nature of the last couplet suggests that knowledge is gained in

fits and starts. This perceptual gradation is present in his earliest poetry: "The hum about my head can but increase, / As time clouds floridly, blue piece by piece / The time's the sky's imponderable height" ("Sonnet 1" LLV 203). Time is here a mode of perceiving, after Kant, not an object of perception. Indeed in DBB, the eternal recurrence of time's portions -- here the night -- provides paradoxical continuity in the fractation of the rain: "Good and evil are merely expressions of pain / In the perpetual return of the blind night / And the bit by bit disorder of the rain" (IDBR 142).

Schwartz's poetry is a testament to variety, multiplicity and to the refractory nature of experience. The suggestion that "variety . . . / is sensuality's most fleeting hope" (G 11) is borne out in countless variations throughout his poetic career. His criticism reveals that poetic laws are immanent in each poem, each poem in turn a purveyor of countless asymmetries and surfaces. In his essay, "A Burden for Critics," Blackmur contends, "Omnis intellectus omniformis est: every mind is omniform, every mind has latent in it all possible forms of the mind, even one's own mind" (189). He further tenders the position that in pre-modern times the "artist's task was principally to express the continuity of his culture and the turbulence that underlay it. That is why perhaps we find the history of criticism so much concerned with matters of decorum" (191). Today, artists must forge an order out of chaos. As his essay on Blackmur shows, Schwartz has read this insight well, assuming "the whole job of culture" (192) which Blackmur feels is chiefly an ordering one. Schwartz poeticizes the above-quoted Renaissance adage: poetry is "an omnibus containing, bearing and begetting all the mind's animals" ("The Kingdom of Poetry" SK 188).

"Discovering and uncovering all colors and all kinds, all forms and all distances" ("A Little Morning Music" SK 169), Schwartz celebrates prolixity in long prosaic lines. Nature's bounty is paid homage with "unpruned" loquacity:

> The stars became the petals of the flowers
> Of powers hidden, infinite and generous,
> Flowing over, overflowing in boundless plenitude,
> Possessing and possessed blessing and blessed --
> All luxury, fulfilment and largesse.
> .....
> The river sang again of truth's variety
> Which is the light's plurality and ingenuity
> .....
> . . . how all things are magnified and multiplied
> .....
> The river is the hymn wherein
> The ultimate vineyards of variety
> Become the plums and grapes of dawn and dusk
> In a plenitude so multitudinous
> It must be infinite and infinitely generous
> It is the dance in which abundance falls and follows . . .
> Fed by an abundance so multitudinous
> I knew it must be infinite:
> .....
> By studying the marvels of my hope
> And all the variety and poverty of my face
> Within the supple marble where the leaves
> Of swirling waters were more numerous, as various
> As falsehood more fecund than fantasy. (Narcissus LLP 79, 75, 61)

There are examples of what James Atlas calls Schwartz's "haphazard, euphonious . . . effusions . . . empty symphonies of sound" (308). Robert Phillips takes issue with Atlas, defending Schwartz's energy and delight: "To dismiss such poems because of their euphony would be to dismiss Gerard Manley Hopkins, Dame Edith Sitwell and Dylan Thomas . . ." ("Foreword" LLP xiv-xv). The lines from Narcissus quoted above hardly arrive at Hopkins' carefully-crafted and determined sprung rhythm with its insistent first paeon, accentual trochee or dactyl. I find

myself in Atlas' camp: sadly, excrescence, tautology and gratuitous alliteration appear to be the price of Schwartz's lack of editorial acumen in his later poems. Still, in Narcissus, grammatical and prosodic lineation are closely related, creating semantic control and order in an unpredictable and disordered context. Enjambment ensures continuity and attention.

The fecundity of the above poem is contained in the poem "Summer Knowledge" in the anaphora of repetition and emphasis:

> It is not May knowledge . . .
> It is not the knowing . . .
> .....
> It is bird knowledge
> .....
> It is not the knowledge known from the mountain's height
> It is not the still vision in a gold frame. . . . (SK 157)

Phenomenal variety is but a gnomon, a reflection in miniature, of noumenal variety:

> "The little boy, like curious Socrates --"
>
> "O Nature is a view of Paradise:
> The snow, the lilacs, and the dripping fish
> Drawn from the sea by man's technique show what
> Profuse prolific inexhaustible
> Variety provides down here, below --
>
> And yet each tiny thing in Nature's vast
> Bouquet is but a minor tiny clouded
> Species and sample of Heaven's plenitude --" (G 130-31)

Variety is seen as both essential and accessory to the human condition:

> Confusion is variety, variety
> And confusion in everything. . . .
> Of all desire and opulence,
> All satisfaction and poverty. ("Phoenix Lyrics" LLP 9)

The legato of the sylvan "eloquent variety" (SK 173) gives way to the truncated and staccato prosody of its urban counterpart, the kaleidoscopic flux of city images. The oft-repeated word, "scrimmage," reminds Schwartz's reader of the confused throng:

> A team in miniature is running forth
> In loose array, as if involved in games,
> And as two football teams in scrimmage there
> Men mix and wrestle, grunt, leap forward, fall,
> The rush, the furor, pop! bang! whoa! . . .
> The cry, the anger, the chaos and the gong. (Coriolanus SK 87)

Educating the speaker to the demands of his own appetitive soul, the clumsy bear

> stumbles, flounders and strives to be fed
> Dragging me with him in his mouthing care
> Amid the hundred million of his kind,
> The scrimmage of appetite everywhere.
> ("The Heavy Bear Who Goes With Me" SK 75)

As the vegetation accumulates through self pollination, so does the crowd grow in the cities: ". . . the occasion / Engenders its own increase, applause / Engenders applause. . . ." Schwartz is the poetic demographer of Rome --

> . . . cook is dressed
> In Sunday's clothes, the old, the strange, the ill
> Who stay in private rooms the whole year long,
> Press against rich and poor, packed at the curb,
> Passionate to see him, hardly aware
> Of the tumult, the brass, the flashing heat,
> Their congregated act. . . . (Coriolanus SK 96, 97-98) --

and New York: "Now, midst the truths of silence, who believes / In noon, the city life, the thronging Square?" ("Demons and Angels Sing Even in the West" VP 95). Seurat's Parisians are celebrated in Keatsian strains: ". . . O happy, happy throng, / It is forever Sunday, summer, free" ("Seurat's Sunday Afternoon Along the Seine" SK 192).

The horde's descent on the beaches purveys a sense of disorder to the ocean's regular tide. While Stevens bemoans lost order outright --

> There is order in neither sea nor sun.
> The shapes have lost their glistening.
> There are these sudden mobs of men,
>
> These sudden clouds of faces and arms,
> An immense suppression, freed. . . .
> ("Sad Strains of a Gay Waltz" Collected Poems 122) --

Schwartz welcomes the loss of workaday discipline and its liberating, even therapeutic anarchy. "Far Rockaway" bears Henry James's tag, "the cure of souls" as epigraph, and continues,

> The radiant soda of the seashore fashions
> Fun, foam and freedom . . .
> .....
> The rigor of the weekday is cast aside with shoes,
> With business suits and traffic's motion . . .
> .....
> O glittering and rocking and bursting and blue
> -- Eternities of sea and sky shadow no pleasure. . . .
> (SK 34)

Schwartz's city dwellers are, at heart, "a summer people, all year long. / The seashore is the lyric of [their] lives" ("Lunas Are Tempting To Old Consciousness" VP 58). Details blur hidden patterns; the colourful heterogeneity of the "congregants" obscures inherent symmetries. In G, order springs from the loins of the artists and dancers and is, in the strictest sense, somatically-felt: "The dancers with their discipline destroyed / The chaos and the waste of Broadway crowds, / They with their limbs an inner order knew" (195).

Whitman's "million-footed Manhattan" of "A Broadway Pageant" (Leaves of Grass 242) is multiplied six-fold: ". . . six million souls, their breath / An empty song suppressed on every

side . . ." ("Sonnet: O City, City" SK 52). The crowd is peopled by characters drawn in anonymity rather than in their rich and varied humanity. Group acts are merely

> . . . evasions which so many don,
> To flee the guilt of time they become one,
> That is, the one number among masses,
> The one anonymous in the audience,
> The one expressionless in the subway. . . . ("Father and Son" SK 30)

Caught in the crush of the subway crowd, Schwartz's New Yorker does not express subtleties of intellectual choice nor does he define struggles of conscience. Blanche Gelfant's determinations about the city novel can, mutatis mutandis, apply to Schwartz's poetry: since the protagonist in the "synoptic"[1] novel is the city itself, characterization is minimal, or merely representative. The subway is paradigmatic of urban life: people are forced into a physical proximity that underscores their social isolation. Their lives, like the subway tracks, run parallel, and never converge.

The opening poem of Narcissus bears the sustained analogy of its subtitle, "The Mind is an Ancient and Famous Capital":

> The mind is a city like London,
> Smoky and populous: it is a capital
> Like Rome, ruined and eternal,
> Marked by the monuments which no one
> Now remembers. For the mind, like Rome, contains
> Catacombs, aqueducts, amphitheatres, palaces,
> Churches and equestrian statues. . . .
> The mind possesses and is possessed by all the ruins
> Of every haunted, hunted generation's celebration.
> (LLP 60)

Schwartz, ever mindful of Wittgenstein's directives on language as defining the boundaries of one's world, seems here to have conflated the master's idea, expounded in his Philosophical Investigations, that language can be seen as an ancient city, a maze of streets and squares and

his observation, "When you are philosophizing you have to descend into primeval chaos and feel at home there" (qtd. in Steiner, "Introduction," Real Presences unnumbered). Linguistic orders, according to Wittgenstein, are "suburbs" (Jessup 483) of our language; Schwartz's "suburbs' dripping sewers take / Used condoms and burnt matches. . . ." ("Song 8" LLV 211). In DBB, the city, in an idiom at once naturalistic and Eliotic, is a predatory animal stalking its inhabitants: ". . . the typical / Ticking of the clock repeats its dry sound, while outside the bedroom window the great city squats" (IDBR 151). After the prose interlude, "There Was a City," the city in Coriolanus is described as a "beast, / A many-headed beast" (SK 122). In G, the reader can follow the city's metamorphosis. Early in the epic poem, the city is "a box for souls . . . a tomb / An obvious tomb of lives!" Later, the city, taking on a life of its own, transcends mere funereal metaphor: "The city then becomes a thing in itself / Not living, but a deity because / It has laws of its own growth and strength . . ." (5, 200).

Schwartz's characters, defined by their civic setting, are addressed as "Dear Citizens" in five of the poems in the section "The True, the Good and the Beautiful" of VP. Schwartz is a self-appointed laureate of New York City. The poem "America! America!" recycles the city images of his earlier poetry in ever-shifting scenes and spatial alignments:

> I am a poet of the Hudson River and the heights above it,
> the lights, the stars and the bridges
> .....
> . . . I am a poet of the kindergarten (in the city)
> and the cemetery (in the city)
> And rapture and ragtime. . . .
> .....
> -- This is the city self, looking from window to lighted
> window
> When the squares and checks of faintly yellow light
> Shine at night, upon a huge dim board. . . .

The poem ends in a statement of surfeit and unfinishedness: "It is the city consciousness / Which sees and says: more: more and more: always more" (LLP 4). The abundance of the vegetative life offers the bucolic ideal of a natural, rather than an artful order, an Edenic rather than a post-lapsarian plenitude, the "moods and modes of fertility and fruitfulness," the "amplitude of abundance, dancing" (Narcissus LLP 75).

Variety and travel are brought together in the poem "The Journey of a Poem Compared to All the Sad Variety of Travel," where poetry's progress finds a familiar analogue:

> A poem moves forward
> Like the passages and percussions of trains in
> progress
> A pattern of recurrence, a hammer of repetitive
> occurence
> a slow less and less heard
> low thunder under all passengers
>
> Steel sounds tripping and tripled and
> Grinding, revolving, gripping, turning and returning. . . . (LLP 37)

In the tradition of Herbert, the shape of the poem imitates the image. Here the train's hesitations and lurchings at its departure are captured in the varied indentation and length of the poetic lines. The photographically-frozen frame distills scenes viewed from the moving train: ". . . the striped poles step fast past the train windows / Second after second takes snapshots, clicking . . . / Snapshots and selections, rejections, at angles, of shadows . . . " (LLP 37). In the city itself there is a cinematic rush of images: "Leafshadows on the wall, carflight's flashed sleeves . . ." ("Demons and Angels Sing Ever in the West" VP 95).

Schwartz variously acknowledges, celebrates and laments, the procession of mankind. There is a "coarse necessity" which animates and gives purpose to the random velocity of city life:

> I in the New York mountains slowly rose
> From fifth-floor windows looked at other floors,
> Moving in crowds moved by a nameless cause
> This formal beauty
> Permits the city
> The rage of cars
> And the quick taxi. . . . (J 112)

Pound stands Schwartz in good stead, as he cites Aristotle: "The apt use of metaphor [arises] . . . from a swift perception of relations . . ." (qtd. in Sanford Schwartz 73). Movement is itself, paradoxically, a constant. In his later poetry Schwartz typically preserves heroic rhymes while varying the line's syllabic length. He hence realizes Eliot's principle, "it is this contrast between fixity and flux, this unperceived evasion of monotony which is the very life of verse" ("Reflections on Vers Libre" 33). Schwartz offered his own, however misrepresented, reflections on free verse. In his contribution to the volume Mid Century American Poetry Schwartz laments: "One time I replied to a question about meter saying that there was no such thing as the verse, but only different kinds of rhythm. By the time this careless remark reached the printed page it turned out that I had denied the existence of poems which were called free verse" ("Two Problems in Writing of Poetry" 281).

The city and its wider extensions are a moveable feast of perpetual flux. Its people are successive centers of our episodic and fragmentary attention, "no more than an assemblage of surface contiguities" (Wilde 215). This headlong pace at which innumerable varieties of figure, dress, air, gait and expression are viewed is an ineluctable element of a peculiarly urban dynamic. According to Georg Simmel:

> The psychological basis of the metropolitan type of individuality consists in the intensification of nervous stimulation which results from the swift and uninterrupted change of outer and inner stimuli. . . . [Lasting impressions] use

> up . . . less consciousness than does the rapid crowding of changing images. . . .
> These are the psychological conditions which the metropolis creates. . . . (48)

From the speaker's window the cityscape unfolds inexorably:

> . . . Reflected headlights slowly slid the wall
> Carpenters hammered under the shaded window
> Wind troubled the window curtains all night long,
> A fleet of trucks strained uphill, grinding
> .....
> Hearing the milkman's chop,
> His striving up the stair, the bottle's chink,
> I rose from bed. . . .
> .....
> Shaking wagons, hooves' waterfalls,
> Sounded far off, increasing louder and nearer.
> A car coughed, starting. . . . ("In the Naked Bed, in Plato's Cave" SK 25)

Hence the polyphonic and sumptuous texture of the city's music where millions of melodic lines exist in counterpoint. Schwartz's agitated and vertiginous catalogue of sounds, smells and spectacles underlines the multiplicity of Simmel's metropolis with its "excess of psychic stimulation" as much as it testifies to William James's empiricist thesis as it is expounded in his essay, "The Stream of Consciousness": "No one ever had a simple sensation by itself. Consciousness, from our natal day is a teeming multiplicity of objects and relations and what we call simple sensations [Schwartz's 'simple door' ("Kilroy's Carnival" LLP 80)] are results of discriminative attention" (715).

In a positivistic spirit of detached and dispassionate observation, Schwartz views the city dwellers in the context of the architecturally-articulated space that defines them:

> Calmly we walk through this April's day,
> Metropolitan poetry here and there,
> In the park sit pauper and rentier,
> The screaming children, the motor car
> Fugitive about us. . . .
> ("Calmy We Walk through This April's Day" SK 66)

Metropolitan poetry is found in the distinctively urban iconography: the fire escape, the push cart, "building and transient street car" ("Song 18" LLV 212), the "monument, the factory stack, the tree / [which] Blacken against the sunset . . ." ("Song 6" LLV 208). Like Seurat, Schwartz "is at once poet and architect, / Seeking complete evocation in forms as strong as the Eiffel Tower" ("Seurat's Sunday Afternoon along the Seine" SK 194). In the poem, "Dusk Shows Us What We Are and Hardly Mean," the architectonic nature of the city is confirmed in the first line and sustained in the rest of the poem, with an eye to period identification:

> O evening like a frieze late light serene,
> The city fades beneath your passing poise,
> The heavy huddled buildings look like toys
> .....
> The Square -- Georgian façade, or that late French
> Baroque . . .
> Thins to a postcard's picayune decor,
> As the racked traffic lurches in a trench. . . . (VP 98)

Periodization, after all, is a modernist preoccupation. Modernist as well, is the angular discontinuity of the building's silhouette: "Le Paradis n'est pas artificiel / But is jagged" is Pound's curious pronouncement ("Canto 92" 620) which serves as the epigraph to Boundary 2, a journal devoted to postmodernist theory and practice. Schwartz's version is more earthbound: ". . . the city's grand and gross façade / The skyline's emptiness and broken chain" ("Hope Like the Phoenix Beast Rises Again" VP 99); "The building's heights [are] like broken teeth" ("Someone Is Harshly Coughing as Before" SK 37). His bleak panorama gives the urban edge to William James's ascription of the "broken edges of sentient life" over which "time gaps" are bridged (716).

In "Song 6" the weight of the obstruction is a natural one. The landscape rudely separates the spirit of desire (the bird) from its object or realization: "The blueness of the sky

is overhead / Seen or unseen, hiding from the birds / The generous theatre of the lovely will . . ." (LLV 207). This theatre in which life's drama is enacted is either the city itself or the "inexorable blue" of the beyond. The ambiguity is intended, as the city is the breeding ground for both eros and agape:

> The city is the only place for love,
> The transatlantic city of my birth
> Taught me this (never, however, enough):
> There at the stadium with the populace
> Roared my emotion which arose because
> Community rang and surrounded me!

It is also destructive of passion:

> This is the dark city of the innermost wish,
> The vivid world has been barred,
> The press of desire shut out. . . .
> This is the city of the innermost wish
> the motion beyond emotion. (J 648)

Eliot's "gesture without motion" ("The Hollow Men" Collected Poems 87) is stood on its head and vitalized in the kinetic energy of Schwartz's city, an energy which allows this syndecdochic image: "The moving street on which the autos slide" ("Someone Is Harshly Coughing as Before" SK 37). Schwartz also shares with Eliot a shorthand notation of squalor, displaying both a rhetorical and a topographical sense of New York as Eliot does for London.

The billboards, neon signs, and skyscrapers constitute a paysage moralisé, even as they punctuate the horizon. The various levels -- subway, street, elevated, skyscraper -- reflect the stratification of social class. It is the city bard's task to rise above the city's "specious splendor" ("Father and Son" SK 31): "This transience shall instruct us like a gift / Secret and strong beneath the city lights . . . / Whence we shall sing beyond the city's lies" ("Dusk Shows Us What We Are and Hardly Mean" VP 98). Schwartz recognizes the skyscraper and tenement

building as a peculiarly American form, a form which, according to Louis Sullivan's apothegm, follows function ("The Tall Office Building Artistically Considered," qtd. in Partington 671). Informing Schwartz's indictment of the conspiratorial "huddled buildings" is Henry James's critique in The American Scene, of the New York skyline, dense with its "tall buildings," flashing broken facades and lacking "quiet interspaces":

> Crowned not only with victory, but with no credible possibility of time for history, and consecrated by no uses save the commercial at any cost, they [the skyscrapers] are simply the most piercing notes in that concert of the most expensively provisional, into which your supreme sense of New York resolves itself. One story is good only till another is told. . . . The essentially invented state twinkles, to my perception, in the thousand glassy eyes of these giants of the mere market. (55-56)

James's "felt life" ("Preface," Portrait of a Lady x), bereft of its concomitant "moral sense" (x), inspires this synaesthetic trope: "Where the underground is charged, where the weight / Of the lean buildings is seen . . ." ("Tired and Unhappy, You Think of Houses" SK 38). Schwartz's streets, where the "dirty rags of snow freeze at the curb" (S 13), are charted as is Blake's London. The neatly-mapped grid of the New York streets and avenues paradoxically yields chaos, as it belies an order which is subjective and capricious.

Literary chaos is born of the disparity between the seen and the felt lives:

> . . . in order to join one perception to another, ideas beliefs and values are necessary as a means of ordering, if nothing else. . . . Indeed it seems as if the fusion of value and perception were a primary motive of writing. . . . It is thus sometimes the gulf between what the writer sees and what he believes which accounts for a certain disorder, strain and obscurity in his work.
> ("Primitivism and Decadence by Yvor Winters" SE 344)

The writer's redactional habit of mind must not distort the data which it assimilates. While A.R. Ammons, in his poem, "Mechanism" (21), addresses entropy directly --

> . . . enough energy held
> to maintain the order in repair,
> assure further consumption of entropy,
> expending energy to strengthen order --

Schwartz's poetry deals with the phenomenon obliquely by stressing the ironic energies contained in assertions of order. Schwartz holds that words are both fed and consumed by the energy found in the streets:

> He moved . . . continually from thing to word,
> Devouring the energy in the life of the street and the city
> Moving all over and everywhere by means
> Of the energy and light contained within the words. (J 488)

The corollary to the Second Law of Thermodynamics has it that entropy, or the measure of disorder, increases in any closed system as energy decreases. Literary treatment of this principle -- Thomas Pynchon is the primary contemporary purveyor -- has shown that entropy can be applied to society analogically in the perpetual running down, moral erosion and decadence of civilisations.[2]

Much of Schwartz's later poetry seems a dumping ground where he has deposited bits of phenomenology, positivism, Platonism, Spinozist Judaism -- perhaps the distribution Monroe C. Beardsley had in mind when he ironically commented, "because the Second Law of Thermodynamics promises an inexorable downhill march to a statistical heat-death, what else can a conscientious artist do but play along with nature by maximizing the entropy of his work?" ("Order and Disorder in Art" 196). Often, however, Schwartz's poetry allows for an orderly containment of city life's teeming disorders and random occurrences. Energy is replenished rather than dissipated by the presence of disorder. Music, hence poetry, receives the liquid sustenance of the river:

Hath not the river's flow
The structure of music, ever
The brim in motion of the present
As it turns to future. . . .

Drawing its energy
From
The riverbeds
of the past
It just has past [sic]. (J 555)

"The occasion / Engenders its own increase" (Coriolanus SK 96) is a physical law which applies to all spheres of living activity. From that increase, formal order is derived. A choreography of musical instruments is the pattern discerned in movement's miscellany:

Like a ballet of black flutes, an erratic
and scattered metamorphosis of the villages
of stillness into the variety of flying:
The birds were as a transformation of trunk
and branch and twig into the elation which
is the energy's celebration and consummation!
("May's Truth and May's Falsehood" SK 213)

This formal order is not a prescriptive one. The natural order defeats its own boundaries, as summer knowledge supersedes its frame:

Summer knowledge is not picture knowledge . . .
.....
It is not the still vision in a gold frame,
it is not the

measured and treasured sentences of sentiments.
("Summer Knowledge" SK 157)

Schwartz's poetry reveals him to be ever-mindful that chaos is one of the first causes in pre-classical cosmogonies. His search for a perceived order, however randomly conceived, lends psychological continuity to his poetic project. Schwartz assimilates, without the scatological foundation, Swift's assurance, "Such order from confusion sprung / Such gaudy tulips rais'd

from dung" ("The Lady's Dressing Room" Complete Poems 452). The only appropriate prosodic response for Schwartz, is to open up the poetic line itself, to combine sonnet with ode, elegy with lyric, so that they might reflect the scrimmages and melées of the city. In the poem "The Choir and Music of Solitude and Silence," the "babel and chaos of desire" contend with the "purity and symmetry of gratification" (LLP 16-17).

The divergence from the conventional wisdom on Lincoln, Coriolanus, Seurat, among others, disturbs and transforms the various acts of assent, harmony and concordance. This turning away from the received poetic tradition, is the creative turning point. One turns away to be consoled, to be engaged:

> All of us always turning away for solace
> From the lonely room where the self must be honest,
> All of us turning from being alone (at best
> Boring), because what we want most is to be
> Interested. . . .
> ("All of Us Always Turning Away for Solace" SK 63)

Here, the swerve is a physical gesture. The speaker of "At This Moment of Time" is "compelled" by the "uncertain" ones who "turn . . . from the mantlepiece" (SK 26). It is a "hesitant," "tentative" motion, choreographed against the fixed, sculptured stance of Caesar, who is "locked in the stone of his act and office." With his focus on the visual arts, Rudolph Arnheim, in his treatise Entropy and Art, contends that disorder and order, entropy and information theory, describe a continuum:

> . . . a maximum of order is conveyed by a maximum of disorder. Obviously this is a Babylonian muddle. Somebody or something has confounded our language. . . . I have insisted that homogeneous random distribution is a state of order but at this point we must admit that it is a low grade order, a limiting case, nothing to brag about. (15, 30)

The speaker's "flickering will" (SK 58) can but eke out a comparable "low grade order." The energies of Schwartz's poems are both dissipative and vitalizing.

Conflicting pairs -- harmony, cacophony, necessity, freedom -- are deployed across his pages like contending armies. Morse Peckham, who went far in dispelling monolithic historical categories, proffers a "rage for chaos" which is stronger than its counterpart. Kermode cites Peckham in explaining the modern failings of form:

> Mr. Peckham would argue that . . . persistent brain washing . . . stuck us with the notion that we have a "rage for order" -- that we seek the consolations of form amid natural chaos inhospitable to humans. This in his view is entirely false. We have, on the contrary, a natural rage for chaos, and that is why, truth prevailing, the concept of form is dead. (Continuities 16)

Referring to Stevens' supreme fictions, Kermode, elsewhere, explains the poetic dilemma which is Schwartz's own:

> [Literary fictions] arrange our complementarities. They do this, for some of us, perhaps better than theology, largely because they are consciously false. . . . It is not that we are connoisseurs of chaos, but that we are surrounded by it, and equipped for co-existence with it only by our fictive powers. This may, in the absence of a supreme fiction or the possibility of it, be a hard fate. . . . It is why literary fictions die, lose their explanatory force.
> (The Sense of an Ending 64)

Fragments from Schwartz's poetry -- "my mind is spilled in moral chaos" (SK 38); [Lincoln] knew in his own soul / Despair's anarchy" (SK 237); "The pears hang . . . sodden brown in erratic places" (LLP 13) -- are fresh reminders of the turbulence our fictive powers are meant to quell. Marc Chénetier cites Keats's "regulative ideas," along with Bentham's "necessary fictions" to explain the literary artist's ability to read across, or write across, sundry "epistemological dislocations" ("Ideas of Order at Delphi" 86).

Paisley Livingston, in his introduction to the volume Disorder and Order, points to the personal and subjective definition of the two terms:

> . . . the notions of disorder and order are central to the elaboration of the "new paradigm" because they lead us to acknowledge the relativity of our concepts. The locus classicus of this subject is the example of the apparent chaos on the desk of a scholar who can find nothing in its place after a well-meaning assistant has arranged his affairs in a more conventional manner. Are order and disorder, then, purely relative to someone's interests or perspectives? (15)

The "charming" disorder of the birds' song and the sweet confusion of nature's variety attest to Schwartz's very idiosyncratic terms of definition. In Schwartz's conception of Seurat's chromatic physics, order (the simple) and chaos (the complex) exist symbiotically: "His vision is simple: yet it is also ample, complex, vex'd and profound / In emulation of the fullness of Nature maturing and enduring and / toiling with the chaos of actuality" ("Seurat's Sunday Afternoon along the Seine" SK 195). Order necessarily includes shades and chromatisms.

Schwartz's idea of order is that which subsumes a complex of other orders. Complexity is an intrinsic feature of the experiential world which the ordering mind tames under its simplifying dominion:

> My simple self is nothing but the speech
> Pleading for overflow of that great cup,
> The darkened body, the mind still as a frieze:
> All else is merely means as complex as a disease.
> ("Out of the Watercolored Window When You Look" SK 36)

It is, one remembers, a "simple door" which "opens upon an abyss" ("Kilroy's Carnival" LLP 180). Yet every order is seen as a host of subsidiary orders. Arnheim, under the caption, "A Need for Complexity," notes that the distinguishing feature of creative persons is a "cognitive preference for complexity" (Entropy and Art 50).

The primordial act -- order from disorder -- animates the poetic act of discerning a form -- here a kiss -- from the "lounging formless blackness of the abyss" ("I Am A Book I neither Wrote nor Read" SK 200). The poet/speaker receives his vocation de profundis: "I waken to a calling, / A calling from somewhere down, from a great height" ("I Waken to a Calling" SK 211). In Cicero's translation of Timaeus, "whatever exists, God developed it from disorder into order" (qtd. in Waterston 27). Plato's Timaeus figures very prominently in Having Snow: "God made the Body (of the Universe), the Heaven, into the most perfect form of the circle: thus it is smooth, even, equal on all sides, from the center. Since it becomes, it must have a bodily form . . ." (Beinecke). In the poem "Disorder Overtakes Us All Day Long" (VP 61), the desperate strains of the closing stanza: ". . . suppose that we are wrong? and in all pathos / We handled foolishly essential chaos?" are understood only when one has read the earlier poems. That is, to have handled chaos foolishly is not to have derived an order from it at all, to have misassembled the "puzzle's parts" with "clumsy, pious hands." And in naming chaos or order in the poems themselves, Schwartz calls attention, metapoetically, to the poem's own devices:

> This self-reflexive moment is a characteristic indication of a metafictional text: it is a moment at which the subject under investigation is neither the ontological nor the phenomenal worlds external to it. . . . To investigate its indeterminacy is akin to exploring the chaotic mannerisms of deterministic disorder; one witnesses both a bewildering randomness and an elusive order. (Stoicheff 86)

Schwartz brings to chaos the consolations of form, the ability of the imagination, as Stevens had it, "to perceive . . . the opposite of chaos in chaos" (The Necessary Angel 153). Again, Schwartz is Stevens' connoisseur of chaos:

> The squirming facts exceed the squamous mind
> . . . And yet relation appears,
> A small relation expanding like the shade
> Of a cloud on sand. . . .
> ("Connoisseurs of Chaos" Collected Poems 215)

c) Symmetry

Schwartz's resolute acts of poetic faith, his ability to shape and direct, his mission to see a supple symmetry in the "flight of the white birds of silence" ("The Choir and Music of Solitude and Silence" LLP 16) often, if not completely, suppress the naturally subversive, dissipative instinct. In this poem, Schwartz explores the relationship between the ideas of visual symmetry and musical harmony; chaos is seen heuristically as a pattern of interactions. These interactions are most notably represented by his dialogues -- between father and son, man and self, artist and precursor -- which are developed with an eye to equitability and symmetricality. While Schwartz gives equal time to father and son, the voice of experience has the last word and stills the voice of innocence. The dialogue's symmetry is upset; the exchange of words is lopsided as it is in Yeats's "Dialogue of Self and Soul" where "My Self" asserts its autocracy in the second part by subverting dialogue to monologue (Collected Poems 265-67). Indeed Schwartz's life task was to conflate them, not distinguish the "Knower from the Known" which as Yeats has it, the "intellect no longer" can accomplish (266).

In Schwartz's dialogue, the Son is no mere interlocutor; the sentiments he voices are both disturbing and provocative. Wordsworth's "intimations" of life's passages are updated: "Time is a dancing fire at twenty-one, / Singing and shouting and drinking to the sun, / Powerful at the wheel of a motor-car . . ." ("Father and Son" SK 30). The poem moves incrementally through a series of posed questions: "Must it be so?"; "What is there to be known?"; "What must I do that is most difficult?" Question and answer, statement and counterstatement create an antiphonal musicality. Although Schwartz could not argue from an ideology of harmonia mundi, for the

re-establishment of classical scansion, musical symmetry is nonetheless Schwartz's strong aesthetic conviction.

A term borrowed from "chaotics," or the science of chaos, is applicable here: "recursive symmetry," or the "repetition of symmetrical configurations across multiple levels" (Hayles, "Introduction: Complexity" 10). While his perceived world tends toward an elemental disorder of which entropy is the measure, Schwartz's poetic cosmos strives toward the condition of order, or "agapism." Agapism, the inverse of entropy, bears with it all the harmonies and correspondences which brotherly love -- agape, -- implies. Its sponsor is Charles Saunders Peirce, one of the "ghosts" which haunt the speaker in Harvard Yard (SK 51) and whose theories on determinism and teleological destiny influenced Schwartz's own. As James K. Feibelman describes it, agapism "calls for increasing cosmic order and symmetry [my emphasis]. Entropy will have reached its maximum when the random distribution is complete. Agapism will have reached its maximum when complete order has emerged from disorder" (7).

While symmetry is a term of aesthetic approbation for Schwartz, it is a virtue which his speaker does not unfailingly attain: ". . . and when the heart has spoken / Not of the purity and symmetry of gratification, but action / of insatiable distraction's dissatisfaction . . ." ("The Choir and Music of Solitude and Silence" LLP 16). While order favours coherent wholes, symmetry, as purveyed by modernist discontinuities, highlights discrete parts. Schwartz himself eschews a repressive order which manipulates events, for an apparent order which finds patterns in random occurrences, "truth" in the "excrement" ("The Masters of the Heart Touched the Unknown" VP 35). The masters of the "parvenu" speaker confirm Yeats's vision which has love

pitch its "mansion in / The place of excrement" ("Crazy Jane Talks With The Bishop" Collected Poems 295).

The couplets of "The Ballad of the Children of the Czar" (SK 21) are elaborately formal organizations, organizations which are absent in the "wheeling, whirling world" (23) itself. Reference to the Aeneid in part III of the poem reminds the reader that the correspondences, recurrent types and repeated oral formulas of Virgil's poetic world are impossible in Schwartz's vision, where "Even a bouncing ball / Is uncontrollable" (24). Hence Schwartz, presenting his reader with an intellectual challenge, inveighs him not to infer relationship and causal connection from the exquisite symmetry inherent in the couplet. Schwartz's symmetries are embedded in a thicket of circuitous syntax. The second stanza of "The Beautiful American Word, Sure" doubles back on itself in a series of confusing qualifications, but as part of the continuum of the preceding stanza, the symmetry of conjunctive phrases beginning "As I have come into a room . . . / . . . and the light blooms with such / Certainty . . ." sets things aright (SK 27). The symmetry, however, is a partial one, for the phrases dangle, missing their proper predicate. In classical and even neo-classical poetical terms, where symmetry is the norm to which all things aspire, the alternating 7-line and 8-line stanzas of "Saint, Revolutionist" (SK 56) is a falling off of order. In postmodern times, it has a design all its own: its recurrence establishes Schwartz's particular pattern and betrays at least a qualified intellectual order.

In his essay, "Rules and Order: Toward a Phenomenology of Order," in his discussion of "prescriptive" and "permissive" orders, Herbert Spiegelberg comes to the simple empirically-informed conclusion:

> How then, are these phenomena given to our consciousness? Apparently we have some kind of awareness of how things do or do not belong together -- even

> without, and independent of, previous experience. We immediately sense the order or disorder in concrete situations. Something in us is offended or gratified when we encounter such configurations. . . . Exploring this sense [of order] may prove to be the key to even more important insights into the phenomenology of order. (306)

This very encounter with such configurations and the ensuing phenomenology is the inspiration behind the following sentiments in "Time's Dedication":

> Deliberately, with care and circumspection,
> Deliberately
> Stop.
> When we are in step, running together,
> Our pace equal, our motion one,
> Then we will be well, parallel and equal . . .
> Like Chaplin and his orphan sister,
> Moving together through time to all good. (SK 77)

Romantic love, with its cinematic fade-out in the end, has capacious and beneficent ordering properties, even though the specific terms of the parallel relationship are suppressed.

Paul Breslin notes Schwartz's pattern of lineal bifurcation: ". . . sometimes the predominantly tetrameter lines are broken with a strong medial caesura, so that one hears an 'entrance,' an implied lineation within the line" (646). Yet binary symmetry is violated, as Emily Dickinson violated the integrity of hymnal form: her dashes occur not where the congregant is meant to pause to take a breath. Rather, they work against the naturally-aspirated pause. In "Time's Dedication" (SK 77) Schwartz inserts the short line, or even the one-word line to frustrate the caesural pause which splits the lines in two. Here scansion presents a break which the lines "Deliberately / Stop. . . . / Working together" seek to sew up both rhythmically and semantically. In his essay, "Ambiguities in Symmetry-Seeking: Borges and Others," George Fayen relates this dual symmetry and division to literary epistemics:

> Human experience (identity as our consciousness of continuity in time) so often demands the reflective and the reflexive: so much of what happens to us tends to be curiously binary -- as if our epistemology had its own metrics. . . . While strict congruence is impossible spatially, the symmetrical can remind us of some of the varied kinds of coherence available in literature. (106)

Such coherence is not always available in Schwartz's poetry, despite the doublings and reflective pairs: "Wishes and turns, gestures and voices, / Angry desire and fallen tomorrow. . . . / Your blood and beauty . . ." (SK 77). Epistemology creates its own scansion, indeed.

Blake sought to undermine the mechanical poetical consequences of Newton's universe with the unframeable and "fearful" symmetry of his "Tyger" (Complete Poetry 24). To this proto-Romantic menagerie Schwartz adds his own bear, "clumsy and lumbering," stumbling and floundering, finally unfathomable (SK 74). Symmetry is once again, like the ubiquitous ball, "caught and uncaught / . . . evaded [by his] will" ("Ballad of the Children of the Czar" SK 24). Since "being never concludes" ("Philology Recapitulates Ontology, Poetry is Ontology" LLP 38), the body of his poetry must be seen as open-ended and resistant to an ethos of containment. This sentiment is embedded in a structurally-accessible poem where lineation is regular, composed as it is of the long and longer line. Nature's inherent symmetries, as found in crystals, flowers and snowflakes, are seen through the poet's perception, angle askew. The Newtonian mechanical universe is supplanted by Pascal's philosophical musings: ". . . But man contains, / As Pascal says, this monstrous symmetry, / Being at once infinite and a pin" (G 152). Indeed polar dualities -- "les extrêmes se touchent" (G 192) -- pervade Schwartz's work, the metrics of "binary epistemology" referred to above. Often a careful asymmetry of unresolved opposites enforces a rare balance in his writing. Some of his more erratic (and critically lamented) poetic rantings -- such as "News of the Gold World of May" (LLP 18) -- present a plexus of rhetorical

flourishes and graceful curves which frustrate any symmetry. As Schwartz determined in his unpublished academic poem, "Examination of Profession," order grows organically and naturally into its artful configuration: "To seek and find / The order natural to the subject-matter / And from that order grow expressive order" (qtd. in Atlas 165). Notions of aesthetic order derive historically from notions of cosmic order.

d) Music's Ordering Patterns

Music's symmetry, as defined in "The Choir and Music of Solitude and Silence," is a "supple" one (LLP 16), subject to the volatility of sonic curves and arcs, "the soaring of the immense intense wings." In endowing his speakers with a cognitive preference for a rich, dynamic music, Schwartz follows Pound's injunction, "regarding rhythm: to compose in sequence of the musical phrase, not in sequence of a metronome" ("A Retrospect" qtd. in Perloff, Dance of Intellect 13). Another humbling directive in Pound's effort to have man "pull down [his] vanity" is echoed here: It is not, after all, "man [who] made Order" ("Canto 81" Cantos 99). Order, counterorder and disorder are on an equal footing: "ordine, contrordine e disordine" ("Canto 41," Cantos 54). Although the patterns and turbulences which challenge a faith in an ordered universe are private and relative ones, the very order of that universe itself is public and absolute. Indeed, transcending thermal chaos, molecular randomness, local fluctuations and the asymmetries of art, is the natural -- not man-made -- order of the Music of the Spheres: "Measure's pleasure" creates the "meaning of the famous saying, / The stars sang" ("The Choir and Music of Solitude and Silence" LLP 16). Unheard melodies, in the tradition of Keats's "Ode on a Grecian Urn" (Poetical Works 209), are indeed sweeter than earthly

resonances: "Silence is a great blue bell / Swinging and ringing, tinkling and singing, / In measure's pleasure"; The "sky's promises" are "the angel's unheard choruses" ("Chaplin Upon the Cliff, Dining Alone" VP 89). This is the music of the spheres, celebrated widely in literature and in which resides universal accord, according to Thomas Browne's Religio Medici: "For there is music wherever there is harmony, order, proportion; and thus far we may maintain the music of the spheres; for those well-ordered motions and regular paces . . ." (79-80).

Poetry's music is seen to be an ordering device: "And when we hear in music's empty halls / ... There is a pace and grace we must fulfill" ("The Recognition Often is Refused" 20). The coupling of pace and grace, measure and pleasure, point to the positive aesthetic value of metre. Summer Knowledge accords a paramount place to music and its impulse toward order and symmetry: "A hall in the house of Aufidius. / Music within blooms with its order and love, / Radiant resolving all voices in its own" (Coriolanus SK 127). Both learning and music are equal constituents of the "vessel" of art into which the past's paraphernalia are placed: "Marbles, pictures, my swollen heart / Now boxed in the learning and music of art" ("The Winter Twilight Glowing Black and Gold" SK 204). In "Sonnet 1" of his youth, Schwartz had already tested this notion: ". . . The past / . . . comes in music charming, slow or fast" (LLV 203). Music recreates the coherence of the world order.

Indeed metrical ordination renders the self its balance: ". . . the self is smitten / By like things: kiss and cough: and in like measure" ("Sonnet 7" LLV 205). "The coughing God [is] an existential motif that underlies much of Schwartz's poetry," as Valenti has it (LLV 210), and bears a closer look in my discussion of self-consciousness in Chapter 5. The dual functions referred to in "Sonnet 7" recall Auden's angst in his song "As I Walked Out One Evening":

> In the burrows of the Nightmare
> Where Justice naked is
> Time watches from the shadow
> And coughs when you would kiss. (Selected Poems 61)

Schwartz's early songs and sonnets do not move with the same metrical steadfastness as do Auden's, but the angst is preserved so that a quotidian air is lent to a rhetoric which would otherwise seem cold and inaccessible. "Sonnet 7" is Schwartz's most consistent statement of the identification of the self with music. The extended simile begins, however, with a provocative denial:

> The self is unlike music. They are alike
> In staying air which flows and having sides;
> Walking around the two, nothing abides
> But melts before you see, flake after flake,
> Note after note, of anger, love and pleasure. . . . (LLV 205)

The vessels of song demand explicit human actions: "The flute gets spit, the cello's string is bitten / By flexing finger."

Iambic pentameter is employed here, not as an abrogation of life's inherent anarchies and asymmetries, but rather as the metre which, as Shakespeare and Eliot knew well, closely approximates the natural rhythms of human speech. Pertinent to a discussion of order, is Antony Easthope's description of the iambic pentameter as a normative force:

> [Iambic] pentameter carries what might be called a constitutionalist significance. . . . For it corresponds to the ideological opposition between the social and the individual an opposition which envisages society as a "necessity" against and within which the individual finds his or her "freedom". . . . Once established as a national poetic institution, pentameter becomes a hegemonic form. It becomes a sign which includes and excludes, sanctions and denigrates. . . . (Poetry as Discourse 67, 68, 65)

In his later poems it had become customary for Schwartz to "[desperately wrap] himself in vatic robes," according to Daniel Hoffman, "chanting in slack long-lined poems" (469). The iambic

pentameter, with its Eliotic accretion of metaphysical and Laforguian irony, is the measure of all things in his earlier work. "Sonnet 9" is an instance of the unrelieved iambic pentameter metrical foot: "The morning blooming on the windowpane / Asserts the theme Columbian and speaks / Of one just introduced becoming known . . . ". The reversed iamb in the first foot of the last line (along with the accompanying spondee) -- "Full of fresh worlds untouched unknown to me" -- is the poem's singular trochaic aberration (LLV 206). According to Paul Fussell, this "trochaic substitution in iambic contexts is the customary technique for producing the . . . effect of a sudden movement or a surprising emphasis or of a change of direction or tone" (49). That is, fresh words require fresh metrical contexts. Yet this last line, set as it is in the sonnet's meditative sestet, provides a continuum of enthusiasm for the challenge of unrealized knowledge.

Referring to Yeats's four stresses per line and Auden's three stresses, Fussell considers Robert Frost's contention that "the contemporary poet has available only two meters, strict iambic and loose iambic" (10). While not sharing Auden's enthusiasm for "curious prosodic fauna like bacchics and choriambs or accentual asclepiads" (qtd. in Fussell 3), Schwartz was influenced by Auden's syllabic count. In "O Love, Sweet Animal," an Audenesque laconicism is approximated both in the Anglo Saxon monosyllabic etymology and in the alternately six- and five-syllable line: "O love, dark animal / With your strangeness go / Like any freak or clown. . . " (SK 28). Even in the exceptional seven-syllable lines -- "For you time is forgiven: / Informed by hell and heaven . . ." -- the spoken contraction of "heav'n" and "forgiv'n" shortens the metrical foot. Similarly, the poem "Saint, Revolutionist" alternates the 5, 6, 7 syllabic line, while retaining the triple stress (SK 56). Frost's designation of the "loose iambic" cannot reasonably apply to the quirky prosody of these short-lined Auden-influenced poems. Yeats's

legacy, too, is farther-reaching than the random instances of the four-stressed line we might find among Schwartz's poems -- and they do exist: "When suburbs dripping sewers take / Used condoms and burnt matches, Spring . . ." ("Sonnet 8" LLV 211). More pervasive is the influence of Yeats's gentle suggestion, Words for Music Perhaps (reprinted in The Collected Poems 290-307), in Schwartz's songs, laments and imitations of the fugue. These are words for music, most certainly.

The "like measure" of "Sonnet 7" evolves from an indicator of egalitarian proportion to a substantive of positive, even programmatic, value: "Love's metric seeks a rhyme more pure and sure" ("Prothalamion" SK 45). The alternating rhymes of the poem, "What is to Be Given" -- abab, cdcd, efef -- hammer home the deterministic message, as does the proliferation of monosyllables:

> . . . Yet let me now be careful
> Not to give too much
> To one so shy and fearful
> For like a gun is touch. (SK 53)

Donald Wesling notes that rhymes seem bolder in short-lined poems because, in Geoffrey Hartmann's term, there is less middle to be "elided" (75). All the bolder is the internal rhyme of the afore-mentioned "pure and sure." Although rhymes are absent in line ends, the narrative thrust of "Prothalamion" -- a young boy's thoughts on his parents' marriage -- bears out Wesling's further observation: "Meter wants rhyme to demarcate line ends, while rhyme craves some principle of substantive plot to halt the poem" (76). Indeed the "marriage" of metre and rhyme mentioned here is built on the solid domestic union of cognitive and aesthetic values. The conceit of love as metre subverts its Romantic definition as freedom incarnate, as it harnesses itself in rhythmic constraints.

The mixed metric exerts another brand of attention by virtue of its jarring irregularities. "Sonnet 2" is a good example of hybrid metrical composition. "That elusive dual citizen of the ear's kingdom and the eye's" (Hollander, "The Poem in the Ear" 5), the accentual-syllabic English heritage, is played with, stood on its head, but never ignored. There is, according to Hollander,[3] a "metrical contract," which "every poet undertakes with his reader from the first few words of a poem" (qtd. in Fussell 15). Schwartz's contracts are not breached -- he is too responsible a prosodist. Rather, his metric resides in Eliot's brand of "unperceived evasion of monotony" ("Reflections on Vers Libre" 33). By adding or omitting a half foot or by throwing in a trochaic surprise, Schwartz avoids both the solemn torpor and the galloping frenzy of the regular iambic line. He also subverts the order legislated for by set metric expectations. Harvey Gross refers to prosody as "rhythmic cognition": "Rhythm is neither outside of a poem's meaning nor an ornament to it. Rhythmic structures are expressive forms, cognitive elements, communicating those experiences which rhythmic consciousness can alone communicate: empathic human responses to time in its passage" (12). He is hence sensitive to Schwartz's brand of expressed acts of cognition which belie their "aesthetic surface" (12).

Gross more specifically names Schwartz's type of modified traditional prosody,[4] referring to the poem "In the Naked Bed, In Plato's Cave" as an instance of a "quasi-metrical" prosody: "These lines are set to a highly varied but unmistakable blank verse rhythm; they recall the energetic forward motion and sudden compressions of 'Gerontion' . . ." (12). This is an impressive prosodic pedigree. Fussell's discussion of fixedness and variation explains Schwartz's metrical caprices which are as expressive as they are ordering. He begins with Pound's conjecture: "Most arts attain their effect by using a fixed element and a variable" and continues,

> the fixed element in poetry is the received or contrived grid or framework of metrical regularity; the variable is the action of the rhythm of the language as it departs from this framework. This opposition between the "silent" or abstract metrical pattern and the actual language rhythm has been described by many terms which mean roughly the same thing: counterpoint, modulation, tension, syncopation, interplay, variation. (32)

Ever since Hopkins gave the term "counterpoint" currency in the preface to his Poems 1876-89, as the "super inducing or mounting of a new rhythm upon the old . . . two rhythms are in some manner running at once and we have something answerable to counterpoint in music" (qtd. in Hollander, "The Poem in the Ear" 6), it has engaged the critical imagination.

In their landmark essay, "The Concept of Meter: An Exercise in Abstraction," Wimsatt and Beardsley make the case for various kinds of rhythmic counterpoint. In the poem, "In the Naked Bed, in Plato's Cave," the pentameter is "always there" as Wimsatt and Beardsley wrote of other blank verse poems, subject to "fluctuations" of syllabic stress lines of three or four (592). For counterpoint and tension, they substitute "interplay": "the interplay of syllable stress meter with various other features of linguistic organisation, but especially with those which are likely to set up other quasi-metric or rhythmic patterns" (597). Here the simplicity of quotidian ritual demands the short line: "Their freights covered as usual" (SK 25). The tag "as usual" bucks against the poem's metrical context and interrupts and reverses the ascending rhythm of the earlier part of the line. The line shows to advantage the relation of two systems, the abstract metrical pattern and the natural stresses of nonmetrical language.

Schwartz's early poetry is rife with these examples of occasional departure from an established and stable metrical structure. In "Sonnets 8" and "9," the trochaic reversal of the first foot of the last lines -- "More than ever his solitude could wish!"; "Full of fresh worlds untouched, unknown to me" (LLV 206) -- creates a syncopated and refreshing order.

Counterpoint is a musical principle which serves Schwartz well, as it helps him order his world into emphatic prominences. The innocuous "as usual" of "Naked Bed" becomes remarkable for its subversion of the pentameter. Easthope stresses counterpoint as an iambic pentametric phenomenon: "It designates meter as the function of two forces, the vector between the two axes. One is the abstract pattern, ti-tum-ti-tum-ti-tum-ti-tum-ti-tum, a grid of expectations explicitly formulated within the culture since at least 1575 and sufficiently confirmed within a poem to fix the pattern as totalized gestalt" ("Problematizing the Pentameter" 478).

Many of Schwartz's songs alternate iambic and trochaic lines, overturning iambic norm, and frustrating the grid of expectations. Easthope goes on to say that Pound was the first to note the "epistemological implications" of the pentameter by rejecting it as metronomic, essentializing and universalizing, and by calling for an absolute rhythm which corresponds to the emotion expressed (487). Some of Schwartz's songs are a testament to Verlaine's celebrated dictum on priorities: "De la musique avant toute chose," particularly to the less frequently-quoted completion of that line: ". . . and for this / Prefer an uneven rhythm" ("Jadis et Naguère," qtd. in Eco, The Open Work 8). According to Schwartz, the unity of the Cantos is not one of "numerical order . . . but, so to speak, against the grain of continuity, which itself seems to be determined by the requirements of musical order, melopoeia, as Pound calls it" ("Ezra Pound's Very Useful Labors" SE 109-10). Indeed Pound's definition of melopoeia as the "inducing [of] emotional correlations by the sound and rhythm of speech" (ABC of Reading 63) applies very happily to Schwartz's combination of musicality and demotic speech.

Music's regular intervals order the rush of images, here seen from the seat of a train:

> And the bird flew parallel and parallel flew
> The black pencil lines of telephone posts, crucified

> At regular intervals, post after post
> Of thrice-crossed, blue-belled, anonymous trees.
> ("All Night, All Night" LLP 6)

As telephone poles punctuate and "cross" the field of vision, so does Schwartz conjure up the sacerdotal associations (crucifixion) and the divine provenance which ordo suggests. The telephone wires are the lines of a staff on which the bird, or the musical note, chooses not to perch. Instead, it hurls itself forward, in silent acquiescence, to the music of the train's whistle: "And the bird flew parallel and still / As the train shot forth the straight line of its whistle, / Forward on the taut tracks piercing empty, familiar" (5). The straight, predictable path of the tracks maps out a confining and orderly journey for the train's dizzy passengers.

Schwartz retains something of the Elizabethan celebration of music as an "emblem of world order" (Hollander, "The Poem in the Ear" 27). The aspiration toward order as of the musical phrase is the ground motif which anchors his later poetic efforts. The eccentricities and felicities of desire and hope are the variations played around the basso ostinato of musical ordering: "Language and music were ambition's loam / And every hope became -- in the end a poem" (J 641). Both words and music, lyric and melodic line, create fertile soil for the soul's longing. Schwartz's epistemology is enacted in the iambic cadences of "Sonnet 9": "The music flows to deepest presages" (LLV 206), full of augury, portending worlds beyond its own strains. Music's precisions and measures are traded in for Impressionist approximation in Coriolanus: "Music anonymous shall witness this, / Music essentially vague shall wholly tell / With what variety man goes to hell" (SK 126). Whatever the mysteries vaguely proposed by the unsettling sound, Schwartz leads them to a point of repose. Rhythm, Schwartz defends, is pervasive: "We

exist in time, that is to say, in rhythm. There is rhythm in breathing, in walking, in opening and shutting doors, in hope, desire and expectation . . ." (PI 8).

The more serene possibilities of music inform his early writing: "Let the musicians begin / Let every instrument awaken and instruct us / In love's willing river and love's dear discipline" ("At a Solemn Musick" SK 147). Music, the river, life's reminiscences -- these themes have an irresistible flux: "Now may all the players play: "'The river of the morning, the morning of the river'" (147). The journal entry --

> Hath not the river's flow
> The structure of music, ever
> The brim in motion of the present
> As it turns to future (555) --

contrasts the river's musical fluidity to the above land-locked image of the music's "loam." If all art constantly aspires toward the condition of music, as Pater has it in his study, The Renaissance (qtd. in Iser 56), many of the titles betray this aspiration: "A Small Score," "A Little Morning Music" under the section "Morning Bells" of Summer Knowledge; "Cupid's Chant" under the section "The Phoenix Choir," to name just a few.

Poetry as fugue is itself a recurrent organizing conceit in Schwartz's poetry. Schwartz's poetry ascribes cognitive positions and visual expectations as it finds consolation in musical predictability. Under the rubric of "The Repetitive Heart" in his first volume of verse, IDBR, are eleven poems "In Imitation of the Fugue." Here order is affirmed by cyclical rather than linear inducements. Present criticism is more condemnatory of such facile cross-disciplinary labels than was the norm in Schwartz's day. John Hollander's above-quoted essay "The Poem in the Ear" painstakingly establishes the historical background for the marriage of literary vocabulary and musical terms such as "syncopation" and "orchestration."[5] Schwartz, as well,

demands vigilance against artistic miscegenation, or using musical terms imprecisely. Casting his attention to comments on the section "Rock Drill" of Pound's Cantos, Schwartz states that "to say that the truth must be hammered home by reiteration . . . to compare the insistence of a rock drill with the repetition of musical phrases is to reveal a complete ignorance of music and to show how metaphor may be a means of justifying anything, if one is also eager to deceive oneself" ("Ezra Pound and History" SE 117).

Yet his own practice often contravenes his personal legislation. In an acknowledgement, Schwartz refers to "The Repetitive Heart" as a suite: "This suite of poems called imitations of the fugue form might perhaps be more exactly called poems in a form suggested by the fugue, since the contrapuntal effect is of course impossible in language" (qtd. in Valenti, Poetic Achievement 136). Selections from the "Repetitive Heart" aspire to fugal conventions of imitative counterpoint. While the contrapuntal texture of music is impossible to reproduce in poetry, where lines are successively voiced, the theme or fugal "subject" is announced and repeated, lines later, in musical answer. The line, "All of us always turning away for solace," is answered by its variation, "All of us turning from being alone," while the directive "Follow the bouncing ball!" is repeated exactly. The last line of the poem is a conflation of the above lines: "The bouncing ball you turned from for solace" ("All of Us Always Turning Away for Solace" SK 63). Repetition and variation, as discussed in the previous chapter, is a check to obscurity. In his essay, "On Repetition," Edward Said refers to Vico's comparison of the musical techniques of repetition to repetitions in human history whose uses "conserve the field of activity; they give it shape and identity: . . . nevermind if epistemologically the status of repetition itself is uncertain" (114, 113). The twice-repeated "(This is the school in which we

learn . . .) / . . . (. . . that time is the fire in which we burn)" becomes "Time is the school in which we learn, / Time is the fire in which we burn," parentheses cast off, the school identified. The lines, "And left me no recourse, far from my home, / And left me no recourse, far from my home" ("Calmly We Walk Through This April's Day" SK 66-67), constitute a heroic couplet, replete with medial pause and iambic pentameter, made more heroic, if you will, by exact repetition. Schwartz generally avoids this canon-like symmetry. In the spirit of reflections on language in Troilus and Cressida, Schwartz, too, rejects truth that is "tired with iteration" (III ii 172, p. 826). His musical helixes exhibit greater complexity, as witnessed in this mirror-imaged reversal: "Her candor and her gaze are marvelous / Marvelous shines [sic] her candor and her gaze" ("She Lives With the Furies of Hope and Despair" VP 77).

For Schwartz the coherence gained in repetition is always a coherence put to the service of understanding the sensible world: "O fellow, follow, / See what is here and clear, one thing repeated" ("All of Us Always Turning Away for Solace" SK 63). Again, fugal restatement is not mere reiteration. Recapitulation orders and clarifies: "But best of all the active mind finds all, / By making humble observations clear / By following the self in all the fugues . . ." (J 37). The poem "Time's Dedication" echoes with truths from the "Repetitive Heart": "When we are in step, running together, / Our pace equal, our motion one / Then we will be well, parallel and equal . . ." (SK 77). We mirror each other's fortunes, repeat history's mistakes. History's recurrence is found in smaller, quotidian repetitions: ". . . the mystery of beginning / Again and again" ("In the Naked Bed, in Plato's Cave" SK 25).

Schwartz is alive to myths of return and repetition as a pattern of "successful" inquiry: "And I knew the rise and return after the failure and the fall" (Narcissus LLP 77). Elsewhere,

the steady inevitability of the phoenix's return serves as an ordering metaphoric anchor in a sea of variables: the seasonal assurance, "How yearly the phoenix inhabits the fruit," comforts the order-seeking speaker, amid the erratic "furs of the rising flames . . . / . . . the consummation of the blaze of fall and of all" ("Words for a Trumpet Chorale Celebrating the Autumn" LLP 15). This type of repetition embedded in variability is addressed by Easthope: "All forms of line organization, all meters consist of equivalences repeated from line to line and so riding across or against the variable material. . . . All meter enacts a necessary closure in which this subject should master differences by holding them in some form of repetition" ("Problematizing the Pentameter" 483). Variation and repetition meet in the recycled statements of theme: "The task is the round, the round is the task, the task and the round are a dance . . ." ("The First Morning of the Second World" SK 153).

The poem bound in time by meter and reiterated theme, is likened to the rhythms of the train's recursive locomotion:

> A poem moves forward,
> Like the passages and percussions of trains in progress.
> A pattern of recurrence, a hammer of repetitive
> Occurrence. . . . Grinding, revolving, gripping, turning
> and returning.
> ("The Journey of a Poem Compared to All the Sad Variety of Travel" LLP 37)

These patterns of recurrence which themselves recur in Schwartz's text serve to align him with the obsessive efforts of the modern literary imagination -- Nietzsche's "eternal recurrence" among them (Thus Spake Zarathustra qtd. in Danto, Nietzsche 212) -- to mythologize the cyclical experience of history. Truth is not "tired with iteration," rather emboldened, clarified and vitalized by it. Schwartz's varied repetitions evince a principled mistrust of mnemonic and formulaic reductions of complex intellectual and perceptual poetic situations.

According to Yuri Lotman, "the belletristic text is a text with heightened features of ordering" [uporiadochnost (37)]. He continues, "repetition figures in the text as the realization of ordering on the paradigmatic plane, of ordering in terms of equivalency" (37). Schwartz's repetitions are often identical and echoing; more frequently they are approximate and equivalent. Aside from the refrain of the last line -- "We who are in love know this" -- in "Song 7," internal recurrences are parallel rather than synonymous. Parallelism Lotman sees as a principle of repetition,[6] as are recurrences on the phonemic level:

> Recurrences of phonemes in verse have an artistic function. . . . Phonemic ordering is transferred to words that are grouped in a certain fashion . . . in a system of sound recurrences we can discover . . . [these] tendencies: firstly, one toward the establishment of a certain pattern of order, a certain automation of structure, and, secondly, one toward its violation. (61)

The first two lines of the poem "Out of the Watercolored Window When You Look" offer these alliterative and assonantal patterns of ordering: "When from the watercolored window idly you look / Each is but each and clear to see, not steep . . ." (SK 36).

e) The Order of Things

As we shall see in the section on catalogue verse, Schwartz divides the world into categories, parts, strata: "The True, the Good and the Beautiful" (VP II); "The Dream of Knowledge" and "Summer Knowledge" (SK I and II). These parts, in turn, arrange themselves into a certain order, grouping and cluster. These are, in ascending Platonic order of precedence and privilege, the "felt, had and wholly known things" of the poem "Father and Son" (SK 29). Randall Jarrell makes this point: "The poet writes his poem for its own sake, for the sake of the order of things in which the poem takes the place that has awaited it" ("The Obscurity of the

Poet" 24). In the introduction to his translation to A Season in Hell, Schwartz himself points to harbingers of a new "poetic order" in the Modernists and in Rimbaud's "alchemy of the word":

> The true context of "A Season in Hell" begins with Blake, who was perhaps the first poet to feel the need for a new vision of life, . . . married Heaven and Hell and used his poetry in order to reveal a system of theology he had himself invented. The Romantics came next, seeking in Nature for what the social order no longer provided. After Rimbaud and until the present day, the need [for a new vision] becomes more intense and more ingenious of various fulfilments. ("Introduction," A Season in Hell)

Hence, before Thomas Kuhn in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions designated a "paradigm shift" of discourse and discursive practices, Schwartz noted the transformations and adjustments which an age demanded. In a letter to John Crowe Ransom, Schwartz calls for a new ideational order and a conceptual shift:

> The whole problem of the place of ideas -- and of the "ideas of the age" -- in the writing of poetry is of course insoluble in any final sense, and the most one can expect is a lucid interval between the exposure and the destruction of one set of abstractions and the emergence of a new set of enchanting concepts. And it is so difficult to remember how inadequate the old and used-up ideas of the past were while in a state of infatuation with a new set of ideas. (330)

Schooled in Kant, Schwartz had at his availability, the reference to an "Order of Things" in the Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics. Here Kant taught that we ourselves impose the sensory orders upon experience so that we may orient ourselves in it. This, along with Whitehead's conviction, expounded in Science and the Modern World, that "there can be no living science unless there is a widespread instinctive conviction in the existence of an Order of Things and, in particular, of an order of nature" (4) inspired Schwartz's epistemology.

Schwartz seeks to express in his poetry what Foucault names the "middle region": "between the use of what one might call the ordering codes and the reflections upon order itself,

there is the pure experience of order and of its modes of being" (Order of Things xxi). His poems are reflections upon order, even as they encode that order; however they must be read simply as recognizing the "modalities of that order, the exchanges owed their laws" (xxi). Foucault's interest in epistemology's archaeological strata finds its corresponding effort in Schwartz's rigorous "layering" of the aspects of knowledge. Schwartz's archaeology similarly addresses itself to the "general space of knowledge, to its configurations and . . . systems of simultaneity" (Order of Things xxiii). It is Schwartz's pervasive poetic task to identify the epistemes underlying forms of thought, that is, the ordering codes animating human discourse. Like Foucault, Schwartz offers a highly-wrought presentation of the order, authority and regulatory power of literary knowledge. Like Foucault, he aims at a classificatory scheme -- an "order of things" -- for his personal modalities of knowledge, and these are deeply embedded in the discursive practices of his period, as well as antecedently.

Aristotle's categories are summoned to be defied. They underline the singularity of the human enterprise:

> "This man," murmurs the Stagirite [Aristotle] to me, "Breaks down the categories. Every man
> Divided by them, yet a surd remains,
> Himself and not his genus, species, class. . . ." (Coriolanus SK 109)

Marcius, "most extreme, most radical," who eludes categorical determination, represents a rupture in the chain of being by which Schwartz seeks to define and order his world. His poem "The Self Unsatisfied Runs Everywhere" (VP 102) signals an anomaly in the pattern of human aspiration, which is traditionally upward, along a chain of ascent. Here the poet, desirous of the bird's beautiful, visceral existence, reverses the evolutionary order of things:

> Then gulls drop from an arch -- scythes of descent --
> Having, I think, no wish beyond the foam.
> Toppling to them at each fresh exercise,
> Knowing success like fountains perhaps more wise
> Than one who hesitantly writes a poem
> -- But who being human, wishes to be a gull
> Knows nothing much, though birds are beautiful.

The poetry soars here, matching flight for flight. To the Elizabethans the fixed links in the Chain of Being were evidence of a divinely-ordered and coherent universe; to Milton all things proceeded from God by "degrees" and "gradual scale sublim'd" (qtd. in Tillyard 33), as they do in the above-mentioned poem. To Schwartz the order of things seems inspired by evolutionary selection:

> Is the spider a monster in miniature?
> His web is a cruel stair . . .
> Other kinds -- more and more kinds under the stars
> and the sun --
> Are carnivores: all are relentless, ruthless
> Enemies of insects. . . . ("Spiders" LLP 28)

Kilroy's Carnival includes "comments of the angelic orders as they looked down upon Creation: . . . Were cockroaches and mosquitoes really required either now, or in the fullness of time?" (LLP 90). These speculations indicate a regnant ordering concern: the Chain of Being in Schwartz's natural world is adapted as a metaphor for the aspiration to a normative order.

Shakespeare's "degree" speech in Troilus and Cressida -- "The heavens themselves, the planets and this centre / Observe degree priority and place . . . / Office and custom, in all line of order" (I iii 85-88, p. 814) -- has its parallel expression in the poem, "Jacob," in "The world of precedence, order, other, under and above" (SK 233). Primogeniture and birthright, as found in the Jacob and Esau story of Genesis 25, serves as an organizing metaphor for order and its dominant poetic ethos. In the poem, "Jacob," the hegemony of order -- "in which the second

must be the second that the first may be first" -- is explored in radically disordering ways (SK 233). The birthright story, which has its first theatre in "the black womb's ignorance" (SK 233) is played to the hilt for its subversion of ideas of absolute divine order. Indeed God himself foments rebellion against the natural order. Esau, dispossessed of his birthright by Jacob's trickery is robbed of his paternal blessing. Hence poetic justice, the mimetic reflection of providential justice, is undermined: "Love is unjust: justice if loveless" (233, 235) is the poem's haunting refrain. Consciously or not, Schwartz's references to gifts, eminence and favor underline the word play and reversal of bekhorah (primogeniture) and berakhah (blessing). Jacob's naked will to power violates the peaceful transmission of power and property through the orthodox principles of genealogical and patrilineal succession. As one of Israel's three forefathers, Jacob's "greed / Impersonation, usurpation . . . "(233) created a dynasty of Amalekites. Indeed Ulysses concludes his description of degree thusly: "This chaos, when degree is suffocate" (Troilus and Cressida I iii 125, p. 814).

Legitimacy and privilege are based on familial order of things, or succession. Schwartz was the first-born of two brothers. Sibling rivalry pervades his early poetry:

> Take wife, get child and show
> That love's wet fruits stay south
> Though every brother go
> To break his brother's mouth. ("Song 25" LLV 213)

The question rhetorically-posed in S -- "Is it not true that every first-born child / Is looked on by his relatives as if / They were the Magic seeking Zion's promise?" (12) -- does not coincide with the Biblical pronouncement, "The older shall serve the younger" (Genesis 24: 23). This means that Jacob was divinely designated to be sole heir to the Abraham-Isaac covenantal heritage, even though Esau was victorious in the uterine struggle. In much of Schwartz's work

we have the poetic equivalent of this destabilizing of patriarchal society by attacking the grid upon which power is based. In reclaiming historical primogeniture as theme, Schwartz gives voice to Stevens' idea of order quoted at the beginning of this chapter, that is, "the maker's rage to order words . . . / . . . of ourselves and of our origins" ("The Idea of Order at Key West" Collected Poems 130). A concern with primacy and ordinality pervades his discussion of summer knowledge: "It is the knowledge of the truth of love and the truth of growing: it is the knowledge before and after knowledge; / . . . it is . . . / second nature, first nature fulfilled" ("Summer Knowledge" SK 158). The first principle or first cause in Schwartz's cosmogony, it appears, is knowledge itself, its anteriority established by the ordering imagination. Filiation, especially as presented in the Jacob story, has epistemological nuances:

> The family metaphor of filial engenderment, when it is extended throughout the whole of human activity, Vico called poetic; for men are men, he says, because they are makers, and what before everything else they make is themselves. Making is repeating; repeating is knowing because making. This is a genealogy of knowledge and of human presence. (Said, "On Repetition" 117)

So, too, do the objects in the natural world fall into their ordered place; the strata on the horizontal field are named in defined order: "I am a poet of the Hudson River and the heights above it, / the lights, the stars and the bridges!" ("America! America!" LLP 4). In Schwartz's poetry, the order of things, ideas, rhythms, the adhesion to probability and certain redundancy, combine to univocalize meaning and musical message into a "lucid picture which these fragments fit" ("Disorder Overtakes Us All Day Long" VP 60). His speaker seeks to bridle and tame the modern experience:

> And the horses cantered and romped away like the experience of skill; mastered and serene

> Power, grasped and governed by reins lightly held by
> knowing hands.
> ("This Is A Poem I Wrote at Night, Before Dawn" LLP 3)

This is modernist formalism at its most rigid. The horses of experience are wild, Romantic and chomping at the bit. They are subdued by the Pound-Eliot hegemony of anti-expressiveness. The poem's "mastered and serene Power" is what Philip Stevick terms modernism's "Apollonian guardedness in the matter of the softer emotions . . ." (qtd. in Beebe 1076).

Schwartz's more discursive early poems such as "At This Moment of Time," move from argued point to argued point, thus defying the tortured logic of the modernist montage, the conundrums of the "connoisseurs of chaos." The Canon Aspirin of Stevens' Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction, who "imposes orders as he thinks of them" ("It Must Give Pleasure" Collected Poems 403) shares with the speaker of "Prothalamion" the desperate freedom in a created order. Schwartz's speaker presses his face against the windowpane, communes with the furniture to affirm life's actuality and certainty, swims hopefully against the "darkness" of his own "deranged" mind. The speaker invokes those who may impose a numerical order and athletic precision on experience: "Bring a mathematician; there is much to count . . . / Bring the poised impeccable diver, / Summon the skater, precise in figure . . ." (SK 47). As with the case of the Canon Aspirin, this is an imposed, not a discovered order, as referred to at the opening of this section.[7] The wish for accuracy in the poem "Prothalamion," couched in the sure and steady diction of imperative urgency, is the figure against the ground of chaotic, disordered and untamed emotion: ". . . hope / Is drunk, and wanton, and unwilled; / In time's quicksilver, where our desires grope . . ." (SK 48).

A couple of Schwartz's early poems can be fruitfully read in the light of what has come to be known, under the tutelage of T.E. Hulme and Joseph Frank, as the "Worringer wing" of modernism. Worringer's 1908 treatise, Abstraction and Empathy, identified an "impulse to abstraction" in the modern habits of stylization and suspension of naturalistic criteria. In the poem "For the One Who Would Take Man's Life in His Hands," and its companion piece, "For the One Who Would Not Take His Life in His Hands" (SK 54, 55), Schwartz is faithful to the modernist creed in maintaining its classicizing instincts in both theme -- the Socratic philosophical musings -- and style -- the spare decorum and good sense. These lines betray a classical precision and horror of loquacity: "Athlete, virtuoso, . . . / . . . bend arm and knee, and seek / The body's sharp distress." In the following lines, the Socratic dialectical method is employed to arrive at the inevitable Platonic lesson of the pervasive and Absolute Psyche:

> . . . The curious Socrates
> I have asked, what is this life
> But a childermass,
> As Abraham recognized,
> A working with the knife
> At animal, maid and stone
> Until we have cut down
> All but the soul alone. (55)

The imagistic hardness of "knife, animal, maid and stone" provide the corrective to the subjective and projective nature of Schwartz's vision; Schwartz has refused to give up the epistemological ground Imagism had won for the concrete object. The ordering truisms such as "For pain is pleasure's cost" (55) and "Murder's fruit is silent stone, / The gun increases poverty" (54) add direction to Schwartz's more spontaneous effusions.

They are testaments to what Hulme described as the creative and liberating forces of order, "the searching after an austerity, a monumental stability and permanence" ("Humanism

and the Religious Attitude" 11). The three stanzas of "For the One Who Would Take Man's Life in His Hands" set up life's lessons. A stanza of examples --

> Samson who was strong as death
> Paid his strength to kiss a slut.
> Othello that stiff warrior
> Was broken by a woman's heart. --

is followed by a stanza of lessons:

> . . . You cannot sit on bayonets,
> Nor can you eat among the dead
> Love is the tact of every good,
> The only warmth, the only peace.

A stanza which exposes the Socratic dialectic ensues: "'What have I said?'" asked Socrates / 'Affirmed extremes, cried yes and no; / Taken all parts, denied myself . . .'" Drawing on Worringer's explanation of the presence of neo-abstractionism in modernism, Hulme explains this kind of art: ". . . pure geometrical regularity gives a certain pleasure to men troubled by the obscurity of outside appearance. [It is] something absolutely distinct from the messiness, the confusion and the accidental detail of existing things" ("Modern Art and Its Philosophy" 87). Schwartz seeks similar assurances. Order, for Schwartz, remains kinetic, dynamic and complicated, and requires a correspondingly agile mentality for its apprehension. If his dispersive and erratic musings are harnessed, they are not so rigidly tethered to defy Pound's injunction that the lyric should possess a cantabile quality, or free singability.

Schwartz's poems are epistemological meditations on the ability of a poem to order the scene. Bruce Bawer sees Schwartz's ordering poetic as part of the impulse of the "Middle Generation" (including Schwartz himself, Berryman, Jarrell and Lowell) who "considered the writing of poetry a veritable act of the ordering will by which the various dissonances of real life

were brought into harmony. Poetry existed to amalgamate the disparate" (63). The surface chaos of VP is misleading: "Schwartz's obsession with order fails to crumble, despite his valiant attempts to make it do so. Ironically, as a result of his choosing the vaudeville show as an organizational model, Vaudeville ends up seeming far more consciously ordered than any volume of poetry by the Middle Generation poets" (133). His poetry presses into service, some might argue, meretriciously, a reflective arrangement and symmetry to bolster a desired order. Behind baseball's choreography, for instance, is a motivated order: ". . . a double play, a ballet of ordered movement" (G 178). In VP the existence of a "true good and appropriate" and "lucid" picture is a "huge assumption," but one made, nonetheless, most earnestly ("Disorder Overtakes Us All Day Long" 60).

In the series of poems in that volume -- "Passing Beyond the Straits of Guilt and Doubt" (82); "After the Passion Which Made Me a Fool" (83); "The Rumor and the Whir of Unborn Wings" (84); "How Strange to Others, Natural to Me" (85); "The Desperanto of Willy Nully" (86) -- the speaker's rage for order quells a disordering amatory passion. He confronts the disjunctive torment of love's failed ardours; he attempts to still the "party rush" to grab back "tall reason's new hat quickly thrown aside" (84). Local resolutions of disorder do not always work globally. Bravura assertions of poetry's ordering powers, referred to at the beginning of this chapter -- "For without poetry, reality is speechless or incoherent: / It is inchoate" ("The Kingdom of Poetry" SK 187) -- fail as a unifying ethos, even as they point to the zeal of his mission. Schwartz's abortive attempts to order through thematic struggles with patriarchy, succession, ordinance, music and codified city iconology, show that there is no authorial sanction to guarantee one ascendant idea of order. The necessity of conceiving together the notions of

order and disorder in their complementarity, concurrence and antagonism is preserved in such lines: "I see the price of care, turning to keep, I care, / But time which circles, dissipates all care / As you knew too, who lifted up the knife" ("Abraham and Orpheus Be With Me Now" SK 73). Here we see rhetorical balance in a disturbing and vigorous thematic context.

I.A. Richards, in his volume, Philosophy of Rhetoric, notes how the organizing activity of some kinds of metaphor is often neurological, visceral or merely physical, as does Schwartz: "The chaos and the waste of Broadway crowds / They with their limbs an inner order know" (G 195); "Order and disorder, form and formlessness must have . . . nervous roots" (J 359). For Schwartz, aesthetic order is, like moral order, normative. Chevreul's physics of the colour wheel is a paradigm of order in its purest form, a mimetic reflection of the order and grace Schwartz seeks in his poetry, "making a mosaic of the little dots into a mural of the splendor of order: / Each micro pattern is the dreamed of or imagined macrocosmos . . . / The profound measure and order of proportion and relation" ("Seurat's Sunday Afternoon along the Seine" SK 195). Kermode notes the consolations of the forms of concord (Sense of an Ending 7). The proliferation and strategic use, throughout Schwartz's texts, of such words -- proportion, order, form, measure, relation -- create a fiction of concord to which the reader provisionally assents. In his journal, he admits to the tenuousness of his success, as cited above: art can fail as an ordering process (24). Although a principle of order is promised, its articulation is often deferred. His own cosmogony, informed by the alternate Empedoclean rules of love and strife, is fuelled by the recognition that certain poetic stabilities and certainties are subject to entropic rundown. Helmut Kuhn's essay, "The Case for Order in a Disordered Age," defines Schwartz's dilemma:

> It belongs to man . . . to preserve the freedom to rebel against the order that he has created in his historical existence. He is not only a creature who is bound by order, and who creates order, but also a rebel. . . . In the historical wear and tear of orders, the ordo ordinans ("Order ordering" -- order as an active force in creating patterns) confronts the ordo ordinatus ("Order ordered" -- order as already existent patterns). (452-53)

Schwartz's task, as I tried to present it in this chapter, is an "order ordering," for he works from the post-Kantian model of human consciousness as the active and diverse shaper of the perceived world. The plaintive note struck by Eliot's Fisher King, "Shall I at least set my lands in order?" ("What the Thunder Said" The Waste Land, Collected Poems 77) set the tone for a whole generation, as it set a serious challenge for Schwartz's poetry, a challenge taken up with an eye to shaping his own personal epistemology, an epistemology further ordered in catalogue, as we shall now see.

Endnotes to Chapter 2

[1] In her discussion of Manhattan Transfer, Ms. Gelfant finds that "people are only representations of the human state of mind intrinsic to the city. . . . The technique of individual characterization raises a crucial artistic problem, for if the people do not emerge with sufficient importance and vitality, the novel loses the appeal of human drama. . . . Like the physical city, the scenes, tempers and atmosphere, [the characters] are created through a technique of compression that abstracts only their essential qualities" (14, 59).

[2] Entropy has been a staple of science fiction since H.G. Wells's The Time Machine (1895). Pynchon's is the most sustained use of entropy as a paradigm of the deterioration of Western civilization. Characters in his novels typically quest for some transcendent meaning in a chaotic world whose energies are breaking down. In the short story "Entropy," Callisto, the main character, explains how he found "in entropy or the measure of disorganization for a closed system an adequate metaphor to apply to certain phenomena in his own world . . .; intellectual motion would, accordingly cease" (qtd. in Mangel 93).

[3] John Hollander is an appropriate reference point for Schwartz's poetry. The Jewish voice is a resounding one for Hollander, as his very competent translations of Yiddish poetry attest. Hollander was a pupil of Schwartz's, a "promising one" at that, according to Atlas (279).

[4] Gross prefers the term "nonmetrical prosody" to "free verse" as a generic term because according to him, free verse is "the prosodist's most troublesome term. It frequently designates prosodic fads or gaucheries: certain kinds of imagistic vers libre, Whitmanized prose, bad iambic pentameter. . . . Those who cannot distinguish dipodies from tripods are also apt to confuse free love and free verse. Since our aim is to provide categories of technical distinction and historical descent, we might better avoid free verse as a generic term and speak rather of nonmetrical prosody. Nonmetrical prosody has social and political neutrality . . .; we need not think of a nonmetrical poet as an anarchist of poetic form" (97).

[5] According to Hollander, "recent accretions [of modern prosody in musical heritage] have included a few noteworthy confusions. . . . The perfectly proper use of the musical terms 'syncopation' . . . would avoid the trivialities and inaccuracies incumbent upon the traditional misuse of 'counterpoint.' Impressionistic descriptions of verse continue to produce such vague metaphors as 'cadence,' 'orchestration,' 'melody,' 'dissonance' etc. Often the rate at which new terms are proliferated seems only a function of the size of the commentator's musical vocabulary. The prevalent influence of symbolism and of Pater on all modern poetry has produced many equivocal aesthetic analogies between poetry and music on the grounds of the expository meaninglessness of both" ("The Poem in the Ear" 21-22).

[6] Lotman holds that in "parallelism, analogy, rather than identity or separateness is stressed . . .: parallelism is a binomial wherein one of its members is known through a second one that functions as an analogue in relation to the first. . . . Such, for example, is the parallelism in: "Rise, rise, sun, rise higher than the forest, / Come, come brother, visit my sister . . ." (77).

[7] These poems have another common point: the odd adjectival designation for fame, i.e. "sonorous." This synaesthetic curio appeared first in "Prothalamion," collected in IDBR in 1938; Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction was published after that, in 1942: "[Let us be] Each to the other his sonorous fame" ("Prothalamion" SK 48); "whiter than wax, sonorous fame as it is . . ." ("It Must Give Pleasure" Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction Collected Poems 403).

Chapter 3

"O LIST, LIST": NOMINAL, VERBAL AND ADJECTIVAL CATALOGUE

> Sweepings from butcher's stalls, dung, guts, and blood,
> Drowned puppies, stinking sprats, all drenched in mud,
> Dead cats and turnip tops, come tumbling down the flood.
>
> Jonathan Swift, "A Description of a City Shower"
> (Complete Poems 114)

a) Antecedents and Practice

Schwartz had a Linnaean obsession with categorizing, classifying and naming. He shared with Linnaeus (Scala Naturae) the need to stabilize and fix what in reality is a continuous flux. It seems noteworthy that Linnaeus himself went mad. In his poem of tribute, "To Delmore Schwartz," Robert Lowell remembers the poetry and the friendship steeped in the sorrows of gin, in a short inventory which borrows heavily from Schwartz's own poetic practice: "it (your stuffed duck) lived with us and met our stare, / Rabelaisian, lubricious, drugged" (53). In G we find a paradigm of Schwartz's poetic idiom. It is a paradigm with a vengeance, as it is a list of lists:

> -- A skein of geese, a walk of snipe,
> A murmuration of starlings, an exultation [sic]
> Of larks, a watch of nightingales, a host
> Of sparrows, a cast of hawks, a pride of lions, a sloth of bears,
> A route of wolves, a rag of colts, a mute of hounds,
> A cowardice of curs, a shrewdness of apes,
> A luxury of nymphs, a lilt of mares,
> A round of girls, a dark of plays, a jig
> Of vaudeville, a crowd of joys. . . . (99)[1]

This list, which includes some of his own coinages, is meant to record the parade of animal life, the rush of sensations, how "in us, all natural being once more lives" (99). These nouns of assemblage, terms of venery, or the hunt, indicate that all sense data are fair game for poetic treatment.

Schwartz's persistent and dogged stock-taking of the phenomenal world in the form of catalogue pervades his entire canon; his imaginative encounter with the confronted world is often an enumerative one. I propose that Schwartz's relentless naming of parts helps him to order, hence understand, his perceived world. It is an aid to reflection and a cognitive metaphor for order at the same time as it stems the often aleatory rush of phenomenal, or epiphenomenal, that is, secondary, details. Schwartz has inherited, and writes in full and conscious instruction of, the genealogical historiography of the book of Genesis, Homer's "catalogue of ships" in the Iliad's second book (ll. 586-1071, pp. 155-72), the moral directives of Burton's Anatomy of Melancholy and Whitman's vatic acknowledgement of the tall ships and the urban structures of Mannahatta (Leaves of Grass 474-75). While his subject matter is quite different, as we shall see, Schwartz nevertheless retains something of the rhetorical force of this tradition. The list, according to Buell, stems from "the long antecedent tradition of prophetic poetry from the Bible to Blake" ("Transcendentalist Catalogue Rhetoric" 325-26). Schwartz shares this pedigree and appropriates the proliferative list as his own, playing to the hilt its rhetorical intentions and sense of design. While Schwartz's metaphysical poetry can trace its spiritual lineage to the American Transcendentalist catalogue of God's creations and correspondences, Schwartz's poems are not a "ledger sheet of devotion" (Spiegelman) as much as a testimony to the "magnitude of secular trust" ("Prothalamion" SK 48).

At times, orderly cataloguing gives way to chaotic enumeration. Schwartz rarely presents anything as formal as a "catalogue raisonée of mutually qualifying and even alliterative antitheses" (Geoffrey Hartman 48). The value of the catalogue as a means of making the world intelligible is openly problematized in certain expansive and all-inclusive lists: "But the goat-god

. . . / Sang from the darkness or rose from the underground, whence arise / Love and Love's drunkenness, love and birth, love and death, death and rebirth . . ." ("Once and for All" SK 222). Hence Schwartz attempts to order the multiformity of the phenomenal world through the catalogue at the same time that he, characteristically, casts into doubt its usefulness as a means of shaping and schematizing an intelligible reality. The list is the poet "engaged in organizing his impulses -- his appetencies and aversions," as Schwartz notes of I.A. Richards' criticism. But Schwartz does Richards one better: ". . . a poem is . . . an effort at perception and evaluation" ("Primitivism and Decadence by Yvor Winters" SK 337). The list charts and organizes those perceptions and evaluations. Schwartz's habit of making an inventory of the things (nouns), actions (predicates) and qualities (attributive nouns and adjectives) in his field of perception spans his entire career. As we shall see, lists appear as pristine ordering statements in his early songs and sonnets, and as dissolute harangues in his later poems. There are actions:

> Reflected headlights slowly slid the wall,
> Carpenters hammered under the shaded window,
> Wind troubled the window curtains all night long,
> A fleet of trucks strained uphill, grinding,
> The ceiling lightened again, the slanting diagram,
> Slid slowly forth . . . .
> .....
> I rose from bed, lit a cigarette,
> And walked to the window. . . .

There are things:

> . . . the milkman's chop,
> His striving up the stair, the bottle's chink,
> .....
> . . . the stillness in which buildings stand,
> The street-lamp's vigil and the horse's patience
> The winter sky's pure capital . . . .
> ("In the Naked Bed, in Plato's Cave" SK 25)

There are qualities: "One scene of the past, / Droll and unreal, stiff, stilted and hooded" ("Cambridge, Spring 1937" SK 57). By far the largest stock in his warehouse is adjectival and descriptive.

Schwartz detests the uncensored list, as is clear from his censure of MacLeish's practice: "MacLeish can get no further, at any time than a catalogue of objects and a reverie, but the reasons for this, whatever they may be, are not simple, as we see more clearly in the instance of Crane, a poet in search of objects of devotion in an age when there were no devotional objects" ("Primitivism and Decadence by Yvor Winters" SE 350). Schwartz's many objects are objects of desire, objects of knowledge, objects of secular devotion. The Homeric and Whitmanian catalogue is found in its pure form in a journal poem: "O let the sensorium be hushed / Before the spectacle of the / troops, throngs, rings and gangs of stars" (195). Schwartz's sensorium is hushed, but not before its objects of perception are tagged and counted. The "conscious aesthetic purpose" of the Whitmanian catalogue applies with equal force to Schwartz's: "The order of importance is the order in which we have proceeded: the individual sensuous and notorial responses are paramount, then the sense of plenitude, and lastly, when it exists, the design" ("Transcendentalist Catalogue Rhetoric" 330).

His lists often offer too much information. We have luxuriant amplifications: ". . . love accepted, rejected, refused, jilted, faded, raided, neglected and betrayed" ("Gold Morning Sweet Prince" SK 174). A proliferation of items often proves to be a fallacious multitudinousness, "error's fecundity" (G 4), an encroachment of information on the original purpose. The list lends itself particularly well to a prolixity of expression, which would come to be Schwartz's hallmark in his later years. The "endless fecundity of poetry" referred to in "Apollo Musagete

and the Leader of the Muses" (LLP 54) and "the abundance so multitudinous" of "Overture" (LLP 61) are offered up piecemeal in a list. The "honey" with which the heavy bear smears his face is "manifold," as are his objects of love and his activities: "In love with candy, anger, and sleep . . . / Climbs the building, kicks the football, / Boxes his brother in the hate-ridden city" ("The Heavy Bear that Goes with Me" SK 73-74). The greater the number of perceptual images enumerated, the fuller the veridical access to the world. However, exhaustive enumeration often yields merely an accretion of detail, not a commentary on it. Exposition crowds out exegesis.

In his essay "The Present State of Poetry," Schwartz cites W.D. Snodgrass's oft-anthologized poem "April Inventory" (Heart's Needle 37-39) to exemplify poetic trends at mid-century. Here a professor takes year-end stock "of all the things [he] ought to know," as well as the knowledge he has imparted:

> I taught my classes Whitehead's notions;
> One lovely girl, a song of Mahler's,
> Lacking a source-book or promotions,
> I showed one child the colors of
> The lunar moth and how to love. (also qtd. in SE 49-50)

Schwartz's lists are more incantatory, less narrative, than Snodgrass's cited effort. One often finds more litany than substance in Schwartz's lists: the "noble values" cited in G -- "Courage, Justice, Kindness, Patience, Love, Forgiveness, Sacrifice, Forbearance, Love," "like the titles on the pediments / Of long museums" (64) -- are merely titular, without subtlety or development.

The perceived world, under the play of Schwartz's ordering imagination, is broken down into aspects and enumerated to help him parse the components of thought. While Detlev Schumann coined the term, Leo Spitzer in his landmark essay on "chaotic enumerations" in modern poetry, acknowledges the practice as a legitimately artistic one.[2] Schwartz's moments

of meditation are a sequential and partitive laying out of what he sees. A naming of parts[3] is the modern poet's technocratic right. Aspects are properly selected and rightly ordered to communicate a truth about the world. Schwartz's lists are often mere mentionings, flatly tendered, without an articulated proposition controlling the agenda. Sequence governs selection; "snapshots" are presented,

> . . . in isolation, rolled out, whitehouse, red
> barn, squat silo.
> Pasture, hill, meadow and woodland pasture
> And the striped poles step fast past the train windows
> Second after second takes snapshots, clicking. . . .

The items in the list are "Snapshots and selections, rejections, at angles, of shadows / A small town: a shop's sign -- GARAGE; and then white gates . . ." ("The Journey of a Poem Compared to All the Sad Variety of Travel" LLP 37). The poem's journey proves that the human mind does not perceive these things as unrelated isolated bits and pieces but, Gestalt-like, as configurations of elements, themes, or meaningful, organized wholes. The variety of travel posits a brand of knowledge which is more than a relentless and progressive accumulation of facts.

The catalogue is also his Jewish birthright, from the Mishnaic[4] lists to the bookseller's list of wares of Mendele Moykher Sforim.[5] Schwartz moves his poems forward on the level of detail and amplification. In Tractate Peah of the Mishnah (1:1) for example, are enumerated "the things which have no measure: the corners of the field and the first-fruits, and the Three Festival Offerings brought on appearing before the Eternal, and charity and the study of the Torah."[6] Tractate Ma'aserot lists agricultural offerings and when they must be tithed (1:1-8). Schwartz's offerings, bereft of ritual significance, are romantic gifts, proffered and declined:

"I bring a distant girl apples and cake, / Pictures, secrets, lastly my swollen heart, . . . / -- But as before accepted and refused" ("The Winter Twilight Glowing Black and Gold" VP 67). Examples accumulate to make the painful point of unrequited love.

Schwartz's poetic logic does its work through a vast labour of classification and through noting shared traits of a taxonomic order. He takes on some literary critics, including Deutsch and Untermeyer for not being as rigorous in the classifying task as are German academicians: "The whole field of painting, sculpture and architecture has been mapped out with the greatest exactitude, categories for every genre . . . and everything so ordered that all the analogies, resemblances, cross-references and recurrences are waiting for the critic. The same thing is true to a certain extent of French literary history . . ." (L 55). Schwartz's categories are convenient ways of notarizing and charting the field of consciousness. Each item in a list partakes in a category, by virtue of its parallel function. The parallelism establishes an unemphatic order so that each item, of equal and non-hierarchical importance, bears a self-evident connection to the other. As Barbara Herrnstein Smith announces, sequential arrangement is not a factor in paratactic structure, so that any unit can be added, interpolated or omitted without destroying the poem's coherence, given the "equal ontological status" (Poetic Closure 99, 106) of any item on the list. Seemingly disparate things -- "Real room, real life, anger and tiredness / Hope and imagination" -- have a connection revealed by a simile: "like the blue / Which Cézanne saw . . ." ("When You Said How You'd Give Me the Keys to My Heart" VP 70). The discrete facts all point to an articulated nexus generated necessarily from the character of the items that are joined.

Schwartz, more often than not, establishes a "grid of identities, similitudes, analogies" which according to Foucault makes things cohere in a category and by which we establish a considered classification (Order of Things xix). Yet, Foucault goes on to say on the subject of categories, "there is nothing more tentative, nothing more empirical . . . than the process of establishing an order among things . . .; nothing that more insistently requires that one allow oneself to be carried along by the proliferation of qualities and forms" (xix-xx). At times, Schwartz's lists fix the nature of perceived experience by bestowing on it an artificial parallelism: things are placed in groups when their natural random distribution would seem to defeat this very categorical enterprise. As stated in the previous chapter, Aristotle's categories do not work: "'This man,' murmurs the Stagirite to me, / 'Breaks down the categories" (Coriolanus SK 109). Schwartz's list-making poetry shows him to be responsive to the philosophical categories, or the classes, genera and types which mark necessary divisions within our conceptual scheme. In his short treatise, Categories, Aristotle holds that every uncombined expression signifies one or more things falling into at least one of the following ten classes: substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, posture, state, action and passion.[7] Schwartz addresses the issue of whether substance or quality is prior to knowledge:

> Every man
> Divided by them [categories], yet a surd remains,
> Himself and not his genus, species, class,
> And not his time, his place, his quantity. (SK 109)

Primary substance is always the individual concrete thing and, as such, it is the subject of attributes in all the categories. Aristotle continues, in Coriolanus: "Something remains, / each man a quality; As is the color blue, the taste of, sweet, / Indivisible, individual, alone, . . ." (SK 109). Qualities in this last exemplary inventory, are adjectival -- Schwartz's principal

preoccupation, as we shall see. The binary balance and reversed positioning in the line, "As is the colour, blue, the taste of, sweet" surprises poetically, as it upsets the received syntactical order and progression of things.

Kant's category-philosophy revives Aristotle's term to designate and enumerate the different types of judgements or ways in which logical propositions function: universal, particular or singular in quality; categorical, hypothetical or disjunctive in the relation of its parts, and problematic, assertoric or apodictic in modality. Kant changed the conception of how a list of categories should be formed, looking for the most universal forms of judgements. He "diminished" Reason, as Schwartz has it, in the sense that the content of knowledge comes a posteriori from sense perception, but that form is determined by a priori categories of the mind. Hence Schwartz's apostrophe: "O Immanuel Kant, / . . . You who diminished knowledge, inverted hope, / Divided day from night, assigned the night / The avid dreams of the practical heart" (Coriolanus SK 102). These lyrical assignments reflect Schwartz's private reading of Kant. The above list is like the Kantian movement of the mind itself which comprises a loose assemblage of rather diverse philosophies which explore the limits of human knowledge. With these sentimental descriptors -- heart, dream, hope -- Schwartz registers his understanding of "axiological Kantianism" which is normative, valuational and ethical. A diminished knowledge is the end product of Schwartz's personal epistemology which emphasizes the limits of knowledge, as we shall see in the conclusion.

b) Dull Catalogue of Common Things: Naming, Nouns, Parataxis

To the extent that ordering the perceived world is a matter of taxonomy and qualitative classification, Schwartz approximates Keats's sentiment that philosophy arrests metaphysical flight in its list of sublunary realia:

> There was an awful rainbow once in heaven:
> We know her woof, her texture; she is given
> In the dull catalogue of common things
> Philosophy will clip an angel's wings.
> (Lamia II, ll. 231-34, Poetical Works 175-77)

The common things become people, Marcius' foot soldiers: "[Marcius] curses us as pusillanimous / Naming us wooden things, dull, clogged, / Inanimate . . ." (Coriolanus SK 88). Schwartz's personal seven wonders is his version of the medieval ubi sunt motif, where the transience of the glories of the world are bewailed: ". . . the seven wonders of nature of the ancients -- the camel, the rainbow, the echo, the cuckoo, the Negro, the volcano, and the sirocco" (Coriolanus SK 103). This habit flies in the face of Symbolist suggestiveness, as pronounced by Mallarmé: "Nommer un objet c'est supprimer les trois quarts de la jouissance du poème....voilà le rêve..." (qtd. in Eco, Open Work 8). At its antipode, Gertrude Stein, with characteristic circuitousness, laid the theoretical groundwork for a definition of poetry as, simply, "naming" and for the equation of that naming with a profound nominalism. This from a piece named, "Narration, Lecture 2":

> . . . poetry was a calling, an intensive calling upon the name of anything as a thing in itself. (It) is the calling upon a name until that name comes to be anything if one goes on calling that name more and more. . . . There has always been this real difference between prose and poetry, that prose is dependent upon the sentence and then upon the paragraph and poetry upon the calling of names. . . . poetry tried to remain with knowing anything, and knowing its name, gradually it came to really not knowing but really only knowing its name.
> (111-13)

Naming has illocutionary force, with the performative utterance, "I name," suppressed and understood. In the act of naming, Schwartz grasps the objects in their ontological fullness. This, according to Willard Spiegelman, is the prototypical American activity:

> The Adamic force in American poetry needs no rehearsing. Our writers -- Emerson or Thoreau, whose ledgers stem from roots in Puritan account-making as evidence of salvation -- have been namers. The list itself extends from even before Whitman down to such unWhitmanesque poets as Robert Lowell or Howard Nemerov, whose acts of mind and naming are informed by obsessions with linguistic theory and who could not walk through an arboretum and enjoy the trees unless he first looked at their labels. (383)

While Schwartz's own "obsession with linguistic theory" reveals itself rather faintly in the lists themselves -- "Exaggeration, braggadocio / Rhetoric and hope and always fear" ("Prothalamion" SK 47) -- the Adamic force[8] is a poetically compelling one. As God charged Adam to name all the creatures (Genesis 2: 19, 20), so does Schwartz charge his speaker to name the world around him. However, according to Schwartz, the poet must improve on Adam's task in an effort of understanding, amplification, exegesis and Midrash[9]: "In the modern world the poet who has been truly called cannot respond as poets did in idyllic and primitive periods when merely the naming of things as Adam named the animals was enough to bring poems into existence" ("The Vocation of the Poet" SE 16).

Naming is, according to Barthes, a reader's, as well as a writer's, lot: "to read is to struggle to name" (S/Z 98). Designation is the primordial act of nomination, the source of all language, "to ascribe a name to things and in that name to name their being" (Foucault, Order of Things 120). Indeed a journal entry confirms the primordiality of the act: "Naming is beginning, power flows from it, repetition and combination, freedom from abstractness, yet ease with generality" (J 53); the Eliot ts tells us, ". . . the naming of things, places and persons is

a primordial act of literature . . . the pressing outside of what is inside" (Beinecke). Schwartz's choice of items in the list highlights the process of interpretation built into the act of naming. Somewhere in the interstices between the limits of knowledge and the possibility of articulation Schwartz locates the poetic task: "'Between the anonymous and nomenclature / Both vaudeville and history resume / . . . In which all wince and which is poetry!'" (Coriolanus SK 91). Nomenclature is the thematic pivot around which the short verse play S revolves: it is about the naming of a newborn child. The name Shenandoah Fish is the discordant and laughable equivalent to "Delmore Schwartz," and meant to echo all the embarrassment Schwartz felt about his own name: ". . . the name they [Delmore's parents] chose was so incongruous that it served only to reveal -- in their son's later estimate -- their precarious grasp of the New World" (Atlas 5).[10] In the play, Dr. Harris reveals the burden: ". . . nothing is more important than a name. He will be mocked by other boys when he goes to school because his name is so peculiar --" (S 19). Our names, for better of for worse, haunt us, gain authenticity, return us to our genesis: "How the truth of our names became, as we grew, more true. / Growing like truth" ("Jacob" SK 233); "This child will learn of life from these great men . . . / And maybe in the end, on such a night / As this, return to the starting point, his name" (S 21). One's name is as ineluctable as one's fate: "Father: You cannot depart and take another name" ("Father and Son" SK 32).

Namelessness must also be confronted: "Your guilt is nameless, because its name is time, / Because its name is death" ("Father and Son" SK 29). Namelessness occasions theological reflection: "The Jews were wise, when, they called God 'The Nameless' / (He is the anonymous Father of all hearts) . . ." (S 16). This reflection is fallacious. Indeed, in the Jewish tradition,

God, though his name (Yahweh) is pronounceable only by the High Priests, is called "Hashem," "The Name."[11] Schwartz is right, however, about the importance of naming in his own poetry: ". . . everyone / Feels with intensity how many needs / Names manifest, resound and satisfy" (S 16). He takes a whimsical delight in telling this tale: "Once upon a time . . . an old farmer named Schrecklichkeitunendlich [horror unending] (a name chosen to tickle me) went to town taking with [him his] brown pony named Ego. 'Ego, Father?' I asked 'That is a strange name for a pony or anyone else.' 'No, no' said my bitter father, 'it is a well-known name'. . ." (Coriolanus SK 103).

Elsewhere in his poetry Schwartz savors the names themselves as they roll trippingly off the tongue. As his nominal lists of observed data signal an accretion of detail, so do his lists of names reveal his breadth of reference: "The poet must be . . . Adonis, Nero, Hippolytus, Heathcliff and Phaedre / Genghis Khan, Genghis Cohen, and Gordon Martini . . . / Professor Tenure, and Dizzy the Dean and Disraeli of Death" ("The Poet" LLP 54). In the poem "The Greatest Thing in North America," the speaker names freely his European sources:

> Europe is the greatest thing in North America! . . .
> Under the famous names upon the pediment:
> Thales, Aristotle,
> Cicero, Augustine, Scotus, Galileo,
> Joseph, Odysseus, Hamlet, Columbus and Spinoza,
> Anna Karenina, Alyosha Karamazov, Sherlock Holmes. (LLP 21)

Writing of a "critical nonconformism," he cites: "Montaigne, Pascal, Voltaire, Kant, Kierkegaard, Tolstoy and Freud; and in America . . . Emerson and Thoreau . . . Veblen and Mencken" ("Our County and Culture" SE 402). This "rhetoric of citation" pervades the poetry itself, informing even his titles: "Sonnet Suggested by Homer, Chaucer, Shakespeare, Edgar

Allan Poe, Paul Valery, James Joyce, et al." (LLP 41), which at once tells us both too much by its inclusiveness and too little by its lack of discrimination.

Choice of names and poetic agility are linked in his criticism: "Sometimes [Eliot's] names and titles originate in the same sense of language . . . as the poetic style . . . not enough has been said about the spare and delicate eloquence of certain names and titles" ("T.S. Eliot's Voice and His Voices" SE 133). In Coriolanus, the obsessed nomenclator combines his obsessions with nomenclature and with lists:

> His autograph, his signature, his own,
> As in Napoleon, Alcibiades,
> Jacob whose name was Israel, and Saul,
> Translated at Damascus, Caesar, Czar,
> Kaiser and Charlemagne, George Eliot,
> Stella, Vanessa, Aloysius, Jones. . . . (SK 90)

The spirit of naming animates his efforts to call the roll for the nation: ". . . or he dies, / A fugitive, a sailor, tailor, jailer / Barber or surgeon . . ." (Coriolanus SK 136). The census-taker enumeratively examines the masques which "all men wear":

> The walker you met in a brown study,
> The president smug in rotogravure,
> The mannequin, the bathing beauty.
>
> The bubble dancer, the deep-sea diver,
> The bureaucrat, the adulterer, . . .
> ("What Curious Dresses All Men Wear" LLP 40)[12]

Schwartz, the literary critic, is particularly interested in the onomastic function of language. In direct reference to an Auden poem, he writes: "It is plain that the healing of illness, the lease renewed, the memoirs, the costs are items of modern life, and this reference is secured not merely by a naming of objects, but by their conjunction, the work of the poet's

language" ("The Two Audens" SE 144). The said conjunction of named objects is not always apparent. In Coriolanus we have the loose spectacle of three-ring theatre:

> . . . The bright lights flood
> Theatre, audience, our strange gaze, and now,
> Amazed as never before, myself I see
> Enter between the curtains' folds appear
> As many titter and some slap hands in glee,
> A sad clown in gown of domino
> X-ray, cartoon, Picasso's freak in blue,
> From the box-seat I see myself on show. (SK 91)

The theatre of self-conscious revery admits all "named objects." Such a list betrays a want of single-mindedness, according to Babette Deutsch:

> Mister Schwartz is betrayed by a failure of concentration. His diffuseness is perhaps inevitable to a sensitive person passing before a mirror which reflects his face against the background of this distracted twentieth century scene. . . . He shows himself open to more perceptions than he can properly control. They crowd upon him so thickly that the effect, which should be one of richness and depth is sometimes that of confusion. ("Useful Entertainment" 21)

Such are the itemized distractions to a little boy who wishes to be Hungarian: "Presents of comic books, marbles, and foreign coins, peppermints and / candy, a pistol and also their devoted sympathy, pity and friendship" ("The Would-Be Hungarian" SK 164). In his discussion of the catalogue rhetoric of the American Transcendentalists, Lawrence Buell summons Harold Bloom's charge, "the American Muse is a daimon of disorder whose whispered counsel in the dark is: 'Evade and multiply'" (qtd. in Literary Transcendentalism 166).

Schwartz is indeed Emerson's Adamic namer, in whom scientific and linguistic mastery meet:

> The poet alone knows astronomy, chemistry, vegetation and animation for he does not stop at these facts, but employs them as signs . . . for in every word he speaks he rides on them as the horns of thought.

> By virtue of this science the poet is the namer, or Language-maker, naming things sometimes after their appearance, sometimes after their essence, and giving to everyone its own name and not another's. . . . The poets made all the words and therefore language is the archives of history. . . . Language is fossil poetry. . . . But the poet names the thing because he sees it. . . . This expression, or naming, is not art, but a second nature, grown out of the first as a leaf out of a tree. ("The Poet" 215)

This passage inspires Schwartz with the linguistic responsibilities of the poet. The "holy bird of words" canonized in the poem, "Philosophy Recapitulates Ontology, Poetry is Ontology" (LLP 38), generates its own lists: "in assured discourse / Harangue, imperative prayer and wish" (Coriolanus SK 96). Here Schwartz endorses taxonomies of rhetoric, without tendering a consistent one of his own. The above "bare" lists find legitimacy in Emerson's belief, "bare lists of words are found suggestive to an imaginative and excited . . . mind" (qtd. in Buell, Literary Transcendentalism 169). According to Emerson the universe is the externalization of the soul, and its objects are symbols and manifestations of the one reality behind them. Words which name objects also carry with them the whole sense of nature and are themselves to be understood as symbols. Thus a list of words (objects) will offer a heightened sense not only of reality but of the variety and abundance of its manifestations.

The "thorned variety" ("Poem" LLP 39) which Schwartz prunes into order through catalogue is a tried American tradition, the Transcendentalist celebration of cosmic unity in diversity. Schwartz alternately registers his bafflement -- "We know our clumsiness, / Our weakness, our necessities, we cannot / forget our pride, our faces, our common love" ("Do Others Speak of Me Mockingly, Maliciously?" SK 70) -- and his wonder -- "The radiant soda of the seashore fashions / Fun, foam and freedom" ("Far Rockaway" SK 34) -- at God's natural plenty. He "reconstitute[s] the world by naming it" (Spiegelman 387), and by naming it, calls

a thing into being. Stan Fogel, in his essay, "The Use of Lists in Contemporary Fiction," makes the point that lists are "a way of retarding the referential character of language, of blocking the easy passage from word to world" (11). Indeed the above list does not depend for its expressive value upon any philosophical assumptions about the nature of the world. Instead the words function aesthetically, having been chosen for their alliterative sonority. The head word "fashion", as well, has been chosen for beginning the alliterative pattern of "f"' s.

Historically, the catalogue is an aspect of the grammar of Transcendentalism which runs from Whitman to Hart Crane, to Roethke and Ginsberg. Schwartz's "effusive" later poetry is reminiscent of Transcendentalist "encyclopaedic" poetry. Certainly Schwartz's analogy of the mind to architectural structures -- cited above (Narcissus LLP 60) -- merits Buell's characterization of the better Transcendentalist verse: "Exuberance, profusion, endlessness, surprise -- these are the most obvious qualities of Transcendentalist enumerations, and the principle that underlies them" (Literary Transcendentalism 170). Varied in substance and typography, a few of Schwartz's lists are blessed with a "certain sense of shape" and the "suggestions of order" with which Buell seeks to reconstruct and redeem Emerson's "bare lists"[13]:

> A brass of gleaming,
> A pewter reticence,
> A lucency, a transparency
> The passing shows of
> plangent passions . . . starlings,
> star-winged
> starwings
> Tapered. (Narcissus LLP 78)

Here Schwartz directs his imaginative vision upward. The earth-bound "brass and pewter" achieve flight by way of "starwings" through a metamorphosis of light and passion. This is

parataxis in its purest form, his proudest departure from sequential thought. Here we have a metallurgical mantra to the wonders of nature.

In G, the characters in Hershey Green's morality play are named and inscribed in stone:

> Among his head [sic], where his perceptions sail,
> Are, like white columns, many highest values,
> COURAGE, JUSTICE, KINDNESS, PATIENCE, LOVE,
> FORGIVENESS, SACRIFICE, FORBEARANCE, LOVE,
> Though like the titles on the pediments
> Of long museums; also like captured lions
> Noble in zoos and pacing nervously --. (64)

Here illustration is accompanied by its own exegesis:

> He must have reasons noble as Jesus Christ,
> Chanted like anthems in great stadiums,
> Sung to Justice, Hope, and Charity,
> Crusades, charades, parades, and masquerades
> To guard democracy or hypocrisy.
> ("Some Present Things Are Causes of True Fear" VP 56).

Schumann cites enumeration as a fitting vehicle for "epistemological development from realism and an ontological one from materialism, toward idealism" (178).

The habit of parataxis, or the asyntactical list of substantives, has its roots in his very private definition of diction: "In 1935 I wrote down single words, and that was diction: discrimination, vice, the millionaire, self, wound" (J 31). Here the colon appears before the proliferative list; in much of the poetry the colon is implied. This is Schwartz, the rhetorician, codifying and teaching how to do things with words. He invokes words as things, the easier to align them in full adjacency and parallelism. In this journal meditation he can follow a startling simile with a paratactic procession of visual points in a landscape: "And the wind howls like a chained beast in pain / River, flowing carpet, / Children, star skaters, silver screen, magnet --" (J 37). The paratactic list also describes the larger narrative sweep of fiction: "In fiction, broad

strokes, the secular sacrament, company, love, fame, striving, humiliation" (J 50). What better way, Schwartz seems to ask, to chronicle the "minute concessions, the nervous contradictions / And the small surrenders by which we live" than to write them down without a sense of co-ordination or subordination, paratactically evading any syntactical connection. Each poem, each thought, each line, each word must generate its own unique order. The succession of surfaces are not mere rhetorical excrescences; they are to be read as a tour de force.

His lists, written in a spirit of pure paratactic dislocation, redefine Vereker's secret from James's story "The Figure in the Carpet": "the string the pearls were strung on" (274). For Schwartz, each pearl, each constituent in the series partakes of the complexity of the necklace. The list is a showcase for the objects of desire: "One, when he is sad, has something to eat, / An ice cream soda, a toasted sandwich . . ." ("Father and Son" SK 31);

> Little the people wish . . .
> They desire merely
> A bit of salt for cucumbers in May,
> A movie once a week, a game to play,
> A visit to the zoo, two weeks in June
> Someone with whom to speak, something
> To read while eating, someone to touch
> Wholly and privately, both hard and soft,
> A little self respect, a place to sleep,
> Stories of immortality. (Coriolanus SK 100)

Gifts are proffered, with acquisitiveness in mind: "Presents of comic books, marbles and foreign coins, peppermints and / candy, a pistol, and also their devoted sympathy, pity and friendship" ("The Would-Be Hungarian" SK 164). As William Gass has it, "as a consequence, lists are dominated by nouns. . . . Lists are juxtapositions, and often employ some of the techniques of collage. The collage, of course brings strangers together . . . and produces thereby a low-level but general nervousness. . . . Substituting for such found objects their names, and then

rearranging those" (120, 118). List-making is collecting. Moreover, in America, according to Spiegelman, "naming is owning" (386).

The oratorical device of anaphora serves the paratactic function of moving the subject matter as independent blocks: "This Hamlet-type to be the President -- / This failure, this unwilling bridegroom, / This tricky lawyer full of black despair" ("Lincoln" SK 236);

> The river was the abundant belly of beauty itself.
> The river was the dream space where I walked.
> The river was itself and yet it was -- flowing and
> freshening --
> A self anew, another self or self renewed.
> ("The River was the Emblem of All Beauty: All" SK 228)

The longest extended paratactic anaphora is Schwartz's prescription for the poet:

> He must be nothing but a poem when he is writing. . . .
> He must be Iago, Desdemona, and a willow tree;
> He must be torn between church and state. . . .
> He must be a nymphomaniacal whore yet preserve
> his virginity. . . .
> He must wish to dance at everyone's wedding.
> He must wish to be everyone and everything,
> He must be a Trappist, but eloquent as Trotsky. . . .
> ("Apollo Musagete, Poetry and the Leader of the Muses" LLP 52)

Anaphora is as old as Cicero. Parataxis, on the other hand, is a strictly modern phenomenon. The broken integers found in Schwartz's lists can be traced to this fact. According to Bob Perelman,

> parataxis . . . is the dominant mode of post-industrial experience. It is difficult to escape from atomized subject areas, projects and errands. . . . Some language writers have attempted to use parataxis oppositionally in the form of the new sentence. . . . In his essay "The New Sentence" [Ron] Silliman writes that the sentence represents the horizon between linguistic and social meaning. Parataxis keeps in check what he calls the "syllogistic movement" that would bind sentences into larger narrative expository and ideological unities. (317)

Schwartz's lists, embedded in demotic speech, enlargement of line and loosening of structure, bespeak a cohesiveness and order which their surface randomness belies. Perelman continues:

> What from one perspective may look like a sign of radical disconnection may from another be a gesture of continuity. . . . Discontinuity or continuity in unity results from complex conditions of reading. The parataxis of Whitman's catalogues that seems bizarre . . . to most of his contemporary readers is much more likely to denote, for this century's readers, connection and a totalizing embrace of society. (314, 321-2)

Schwartz's lists, like the river in the above-quoted poem, "The River Was the Emblem of All Beauty: All" (SK 228), are by definition, open-ended, boundless and fluid, unlike the closural "Rounded Catalogue Divine Complete" of Whitman (Leaves of Grass 554). Additive structure contributes to an ad hoc spontaneity which the co-ordinator "and" indicates. The "and" serves to widen the sentence's grammatical possibilities as it widens one's sense of the past, including a vaster and vaster array of cultural artifacts in its orbit:

> The fantasy and the horror of the circus,
> The crude coarse cruelty, the grace and roar,
> The lion and the whip of reason. . . .
>
> -- The girls upon the horses, fat and white. . . .
> And marvelous the walker at the top,
> And like a doll and dead bowing to deals
>
> And deals of long loud loving applause. . . .
> And the frank smell hangs like August heat --. . . .
> The temple never downed, once truly seen!
> The master of the master of the ring,
> Living forever in the heavy head,
> And making laughter for the tumbling clown,
>
> . . . And giving to the bearded lady, white-
> Armed Hera's capital, and to the acrobats. . . . (J 47)

The "and" in the poem "One in a Thousand of Years of the Nights" sequentializes an assemblage of simultaneous properties and qualities:

> Serene, cool and composed, and easy going
> They think you are because your smiling face
> Is still and generous, and like a growing
> Summer, big and rich and luminous.
> The furies and the foibles do not show
> The sickness, sorrow, weakness, and the fall. . . . (VP 71)

Every list has its own principles of exclusion: however, the "self-regardant" writer, in observing all, is host to a series of inclusions:

> These masters [Bronte, Dickinson, Wordsworth, Dostoevsky] used their lives like
> Christmas trees,
> They skinned themselves alive to find the truth. . . .
> They finger'd every [italics mine] coiled snake
> of the mind,
> Searching for choice and chance and wish and memory.
> ("The Masters of the Heart Touched the Unknown" VP 35)

The "and," in providing the spaces between the pieces of information, delays the recounting of the entire series. As any paratactitian will assert, it is a small, but charged, conjunction. As William Gass asks, "can one word make a world? Of course not. God said, 'es werde Licht, not Licht' alone. But when an and appears between any two terms, a place where these two things belong together has been implied" (124).[14] The following prose coda to the poem, "May's Truth and May's Falsehood," is full of this reverence for the "and": "The desire of the bud and the flower and the fruit the tree and the vine to be devoured and to be phoenix in nature, fulfilled in the phoenix sensuality of blood and of wine, or stilled in the mud near the root under the ground once more awaiting the sun's domination, the sun's great roar and fire" (SK 214). Here the "and" democratizes his realia, while defeating any principle of hierarchy which might privilege one term over any other: in the "normal democracy of lists" (Gass 121) everything is of equal value. Cummings' objectivist poem "Simplex Sigilum Veri: A Catalogue," which presents a list of things, "a truncated pyramid" and "two telephone directories" among them, is

distinguishable from Schwartz's practice, in its avoidance, through nine stanzas, of any connectives (Collected Poems 321-22).

Buell locates a "prosodic equalitarianism: each line or image is of equal weight in the ensemble" in the American democratic consciousness (Literary Transcendentalism 167). This exists within a pattern of repetitions: "The soul is a bird which has suddenly stopped singing: / And listening and silent, and silent and listening, and listening and silent" ("Twelfth Night, Next Year, A Week-End in Eternity" VP 90); "When each bows to the other, kneels and takes / Hand and hand, glance and glance, care and care" ("Prothalamion" SK 45). This small morphological feature is expressive of Schwartz's frequently additive poetic programme. The use of the ampersand in a journal poem schematizes this relation:

> To be the poem when writing or to be the poem
> of another, reading --
> is enough -- is supreme plenitude.
>
> & the waking clarity of spring plenty
> & the horn of the richness of autumn
> & the jewel & the light & of the whiteness of winter
> & the green glow and glory of the successes of summer. (J 504)

This series of sentences which coincide with verse lines, exhibit a strong logical link, while effecting a startling paratactic jolt:

> It [poetry] shows us the pleasures of the city
> It lights up the structures of reality
> It is a cause of knowledge and laughter:
> It sharpens the whistles of the witty
> It is like morning and the flutes of morning,
> chanting and enchanted.
> It is the birth and rebirth of the first morning
> forever. ("The Kingdom of Poetry" SK 188)

Securing closure is not possible; as the items in any one list are as endless and fecund as one's imagination.

c) Heterogeneous Lists, Multiples, Verbs, Participles

In Schwartz's "horn of plenty" one finds varied items in the list; that is, his very "casual bouquets" (Buell, "Rhetoric" 328, 327) accommodate unlike things, so that the constituents belong together syntactically but not functionally or logically. Admixtures intrigued Schwartz, as they are "worthy of careful examination and consciousness" ("The Time and the Place" Beinecke). He later elaborated on Eliot's poem, "Mélange Adultère Du Tout":

> The title, borrowed from a poem by Corbière, is ironic, but the adulterous mixture of practically everything, every time and every place is not ironic in the least: a teacher in America, the poem goes, a journalist in England, a lecturer in Yorkshire, a literary nihilist in Paris, overexcited by philosophy in Germany, a wanderer from Omaha to Damascus, he has celebrated, he says, his birthday at an African oasis, dressed in a giraffe's skin. Let us place next to this another list of names and events as heterogeneous as a circus or America itself: St. Louis, New England, Boston, Harvard, England, Paris, the First World War, Oxford, London, the Russian Revolution, the Church of England the postwar period, the world crisis and depression the Munich Pact, the Second World War. If this list seems farfetched or forced, if it seems that such a list might be made for any author, the answer is that these names and events are presences in Eliot's work in a way which is not true of many authors, good and bad, who have lived through the same years. ("T.S. Eliot as International Hero" SE 121)

Adjectives, nouns and verbs find themselves adulterously side by side in Schwartz's catalogues.

An example of Schwartz's tendency to accumulate disparate elements is found in this tautology: "Knowledge, to be really known, must engage the whole being: Hippocrene, fuselage, annealed, echelon, querulous. . . . Do [these words] add anything to our knowledge and experience of it? Do they do more than display a rich sense of language?" (J 59). Possibly not; yet they do show Schwartz to be alive to the polymorphous nature of language. In fact, his

journal is rife with odd couplings and strange bedfellows. The following poem contains a motley assemblage of circus performers:

> The fantasy and horror of the circus,
> The crude coarse cruelty, the grace and roar,
> The lion and the whip of reason, dressed
> In a black top hat, notable and formal. (J 47)

Elsewhere, we have long, loose catalogues of things physical -- "Apples, peaches, lemons, limes, cigars / These, Jeremiah, teach the sensuous" (J 201) -- and metaphysical:

> Light, clarity and radiance
> Ultimate verbal clarity
> An emotional possibility,
> An imaginative possibility
> A speechless thing. (J 215)

Finally, one luxuriates in pure musicality, in rhythm sprung in true Hopkins style; the lexicon is reminiscent of Hopkins as well. What starts as a list of nouns and noun phrases is interrupted by an adjectival list and returns to its nominal pattern:

> A tattering of rain and then the reign
> Of pour and pouring-down and down,
> Where in the westward gathered the filming gown
> Of grey and clouding weakness, and in the mane
> Of the light's glory and the day's splendor, gold
> and vain
> Vivid, more and more vivid, scarlet, lucid and more
> luminous,
> Then came a splatter, a prattle, a blowing rain!
> And soon the hour was musical and rumorous:
> A softness of a dripping lipped the isolated houses,
> A gaunt grey somber softness licked the glass of hours.
> ("Darkling Summer, Ominous Dusk, Rumorous Rain SK" 149)

Schwartz works the stresses of enumeration to his sonorous advantage. In the poem, "Some Present Things Are Causes of True Fear," the nouns in the list are summoned together for their sheer assonance: "Balloons, buffoons, croons and fine cartoons" (VP 57). This is also the case

with the following mixture of adjectives and nouns: "No one in Rome said this -- bone, stone, unknown, / Thrown and alone --" (Coriolanus SK 126). Elsewhere the simplicity of pure enumeration is bartered for the intricacy of the sustained metaphor of the mind as hunted bird. Tutored on the Yeatsian canon, Schwartz reworks the celebrated image from "The Second Coming" (Collected Poems 210), of falcon and falconer:

> Suddenly.
> Suddenly and certainly, as I watched elsewhere, locked
> And intent in that vigil in which the hunter is hunted
> As the mind is seeking itself, falconer, falcon and
> hawk, victor and victim.
> ("The First Morning of the Second World" SK 152)

His poetry contains more radical accommodations of diversity: reflecting the curiousness of the title, in the poem "A Dog Named Ego, the Snowflakes as Kisses," all manner of grammatical functions co-exist in a list:

> A dog named Ego, the snowflakes as kisses
> Fluttered, ran, came with me in December
> Snuffing the dull air, changing and halting. . . .
> Sniffed at some interests hidden and open,
> Whirled, descending, and stood still, attentive
> Seeking their peace, the stranger, unknown,
> With me, near me, kissed me, touched my wound,
> My simple face, obsessed and pleasure bound. (SK 76)

On the opposing page in this edition of SK we have a series of lists: present participle: "My heart beating, my blood running, / The light burning, / My mind moving . . ., the ground turning"; imperative and negative qualifier: "Abide with me . . . do not go away, / But not as the dead who do not walk, / And not as the statue in the park / And not as the rock which melts the wave"; and noun couples: "Wishes and turns, gesture and voices, / Angry desire and fallen tomorrow" ("Time's Dedication" SK 77).

In the poem, "In the Naked Bed, in Plato's Cave," a series of three verbal phrases and five verbs is followed by a list of adjectives which itself is followed by a rag-tag nominal list

> . . . Morning softly
> Melting the air, lifted the half-covered chair
> From underseas, kindled the looking glass,
> Distinguished the dresser and the white wall
> The bird called tentatively, whistled, called
> Bubbled and whistled so! Perplexed, still wet
> With sleep, affectionate, hungry and cold. So, so
> O son of man, the ignorant night, the travail
> Of early morning, the mystery of beginning
> Again and again. . . . (SK 25)

One's selfhood is postulated in sequential terms. In the poem "Sonnet: O City, City" the noun "self" is modified threefold in a list within a list, while the other items are presented almost nakedly: "Ease, warmth, light, the utter showing" (SK 52). In Narcissus, verbal and nominal lists are stylized into predicates and their objects:

> The gods demanded, required, commanded,
> Instead of a cock, a pigeon,
> a dog, a goat or a pig,
> The sacrifice of a culprit, a cupid. (LLP 81)

The poem "The Sin of Hamlet" boasts a stenographic compression so that we have elliptical and miscellaneous lists: "The horns in the harbor booming, vaguely, / Fog, forgotten, yesterday, conclusion, / Nostalgic, noising dim sorrow . . ." (SK 35). The three above-quoted poems are marked by a mannerism, whose language is remote from the colloquial register.

Schumann maintains that the poet is not daunted by these breaches of homogeneity. In fact, such a series enforces a larger unity: "The stylistically heterogeneous series assumes a metaphysically-conjunctive function. Indeed, the more heterogeneous it is, the more will the idea of ontological oneness be driven home" (183). Schwartz's enumerations must be read in the

context of this conjunctive function. The above catalogue is presented as the key to mastery of the heterogeneity of the world. The above loose aggregate sounds a challenge to the reader to make his own links. The single links in the enumerative chain seem disparate, employing substantive, noun and adverb. Yet the central grammatical pivot determines the "homofunctionality" of the constituents, according to Madeleine Frédéric. She makes the case for the presence of semantic cohesion despite surface disorder.[15]

Here we have a forced series of juxtapositions:

> And I accepted such things as they seem
> The easy poise, the absence of the knife
> The near summer happily ever after
> The understood question, the immediate strife
> Not dangerous, not mortal, but the fadeout
> Enormously kissing amid warm laughter. . . . ("MGM" LLP 22)

Yet, that this is a poem about a cinematic series of stills, temporally arranged, does not help us to sort out the vast variousness of the items in the list which are situational, existential, not imagistic at all. Leo Spitzer defines chaotic enumeration as, "an oriental bazaar . . . consisting of lumping together things spiritual and physical as the raw material of our rich but unordered modern civilization" (qtd. in Alazraki 55). The poise is not easy, nor the question understood by the reader, linked as they are, curiously, with both the "absence of the knife" and the "immediate strife."

Schwartz's catalogues range through every passion and nuance of passion. Another disparate list -- "His mother . . . careless of him; / His fume, his doom, his bedtime and warm milk" ("A Young Child and His Pregnant Mother" SK 43) compels one by the very singularity of its logic. Is his mother as careless of his "fume" as she is of his warm milk? Indeed it was such a motley list -- which appeared in Borges' famed Chinese encyclopedia -- and the

impossible taxonomy it proposes, which provoked Foucault to write his book The Order of Things.[16] Here Foucault addresses the "heteroclite" order and unseemly juxtapositions which pervade some of Schwartz's lists and with which we break up

> all the ordered surfaces and all the planes with which we are accustomed to tame the wild profusion of existing things, and continuing long afterwards to disturb and threaten with collapse our age-old distinction between the Same and the Other. . . . startling though their propinquity may be, it is nevertheless warranted by that and . . . whose solidity provides proof of the possibility of juxtaposition. . . . Where could they [items in Borges' list as well as Schwartz's "hippocrene fuselage, annealed," cited above] be juxtaposed except in the non-place of language? . . .
> [This is the] disorder in which fragments of a large number of possible orders glitter separately in their dimension. . . . Heterotopias are disturbing, probably because they secretly undermine language. . . . (xv-xviii)

Schwartz's surging catalogues of persons and things appear in various multiples, the predominant one being triplets. The double pattern is also a feature. It pervades the first half of the poem: "The servants bring the coffee, the children retire, / Elder and younger yawn and go to bed, / The coals fade and glow, rose and ashen." This series is presented in adjectival pairs: "Golden and sleek / Spontaneous and strong, quickened and one / To wake for joy . . ." ("The Rumor and the Whir of Unborn Wings" VP 84). Here the double set of alternatives enforces the image of the Siamese twin:

> Famous infatuation or disease
> Has fixed me until the end of life,
> As if a monstrous sister or a wife
> Made me a twin tied like the Siamese.
> Hence must I wait in patience and in awe. . . .
> No matter the pseudonym or counterfeit. (VP 85)

The binary motif surfaces again: "The birds in the first light twitter and whistle, / Chirp and seek, sipping and chortling -- weakly, meekly, they speak and bubble. . . . / Gazing and blazing, blessing and possessing all vividness and all darkness" ("A Little Morning Music" SK 168-69).

Finally, however, the three-fold list emerges as the reigning pattern with which Schwartz attempts to take stock, systematically, of the relations which obtain between worlds. I have already discussed the importance of the "True, good and beautiful," the three pillars of classical Realism, which appear in the volume VP. "Justice, Hope and Charity" is the Christian spirit -- with the substitute of Justice for Faith -- which animates the poem "Some Present Things are Causes of True Fear" (VP 56). Often the triplets are adjectival -- " . . . . hope / Is drunk and wanton and unwilled" ("Prothalamion" SK 48) -- sometimes they are substantive: "Amid all the poppy, salve and ointment . . ." ("By Circumstances Fed" SK 42); "You become / the procession / Of bird and beast and tree" ("O Child Do Not Fear the Dark and Sleep's Dark Possession" SK 162). Then we have the verbs, particularly the imperative echo of Eliot's triad, already cited in the first chapter, "Give, sympathize, control": "Imagine, summon, idolize" ("Sterne" SK 180). Schwartz stops at three, not for its magical or folkloric power but because a longer list would tax the reader: in reference to his essay, "Hegel's White Elephant: Notes on the Philosophy of Fiction" he writes, "[it is] called imaginary travels with metaphysicians, guided tours with systematic thinkers, kicking around with Kierkegaard, down the Nile with Nietzsche. . . . I halt here only because this seems as long a catalogue as I can impose upon the reader without losing him or convincing him that my only desire is to be merry" (Beinecke).

In Coriolanus, we have a heterogenous list:

> Contemptuous yet soothing, knowing their will
> And their necessity; divided from them
> And so against them; requiring them
> And therefore politic; consoling them
> With the old Platonic metaphor in which
> The state, that knot of common weakness,
> Consistent need, poor fear, and aching will,
> Becomes an animal. (SK 82)

Within the panoply of rhetorical functions and here, political prescription, the voice clearly serves to document action. The progression is from observation to movement. Within the same poem we have the perennial sorting out: "The cry, the anger, the chaos and the gong" -- along with the compelling imperative clarion call: "Awake!: / Seize your enemy, O, grasp his throat, / Demand your right to live, your right to eat. . ." (SK 82). In the following sequence --

> We need
> Each other's clumsiness, each other's wit,
> Each other's company and our own pride. I need
> My face unshamed, I need my wit, I cannot
> Turn away. We know our clumsiness,
> Our weakness, our necessities, we cannot
> Forget our pride, our faces, our common love.
> ("Do Others Speak of Me Mockingly, Maliciously?" SK 70) --

there is an existential progression from need to knowledge to memory. All modalities are available to Schwartz's speaker: ". . . no music shapes the air / Which did, can, shall restore the end of care" ("Abraham and Orpheus, Be With Me Now" SK 73).

Schwartz proves poetically Wilhelm Von Humboldt's radical claim for the verb, that it is the "nerve-center of the whole language" by virtue of the fact that it is "assigned the act of synthetic positing" (186, 185). The technical problem of finding an appropriate form which would both record the speaker's participation in the epistemological field and involve the reader in the same encounter, is resolved in his free use of the verb as expressive device. Again, the tone is wistful, as in these infinitives: "In the bad cold of sorrow much too weak / To drink some coffee, light a cigarette / And think of summer beaches, blue and gay" ("I Am to My Own Heart Merely a Serf" SK 71). With the proliferation of present tense forms, Schwartz acknowledges the constative force of poetry: his heavy bear "climbs the building, kicks the football, boxes his brother in the hate-ridden city" ("The Heavy Bear that Goes With Me" SK

74). With the line, "How the unconscious stretches, yawns, rises, wanders, aspires and admires" ("Lunas Are Tempting to Old Consciousness" VP 59), poetry does just what prose might do: report an action. Poetry comes halfway to meet the habits of ordinary speech, recording present action simply, stripped of metaphor. The range of man's activity is wide and seemingly endless: "Man murders, travels, sews and bends in fear" (Coriolanus SK 86). The speaker records five degrees of manual engagement: "Each one holds some thing or some one, some instrument / Holds, grasps, grips, clutches or somehow touches / Some form of being" ("Seurat's Sunday Afternoon along the Seine" SK 193).

The many instances of past participles and past verbs awaken Schwartz's reader to the preterite possibilities of his poetry. The list cited above -- "diminished knowledge, inverted hope, assigned the night" -- refers to Kant's philosophical inroads. The fact that reason has only a regulatory function and cannot itself say anything about the nature of the world, is hammered home three times (Coriolanus SK 102). In the above-quoted poem, "A Dog Named Ego," the miscegenation of verbal functions betrays the flurry of activity. Ghosts of Decembers past are propelled into present memory by a relentlessly-detailed narrative sense. The dog ran, snuffed and sniffed, while the snowflakes fluttered, whirled, descended, but this is not clear from the placement of subject and predicate (SK 76). Elsewhere, a list of past activity defines travel: "The other passengers slumped, dozed, slept, read, / Waiting, and waiting for peace to be displaced" ("All Night, All Night" LLP 5).

The past participle functions adjectivally. It is everywhere indicative of a passive, reflexive stasis, the "old act enacted" of "The Ballet of the Fifth Year" (SK 59). The force, the "self-contained grace" has its own passive energy in this series of participles: "Electrified:

deified: undenied" of which each constituent opens up onto a new and fresh possibility. In the poem, "The Sin of Hamlet," the extended list of participles decrees what the "horns in the harbor" do not call: "Not the door opened, the stair descended, / The voice answered, the choice announced, the / Trigger touched in sharp declaration" (SK 35). The act involves the enacter necessarily and empirically in a host of compelling efforts:

> For the gratification of action by those who
> enact it and at once
> In the enacting behold it, actual and antiphonal,
> as antiphonal in
> another and others who are with them and
> look to them, toiling and smiling
> Know the act and their enaction and another's
> and others' who suffer the struggling,
> The effort of effort, as in the toil and ecstasy
> of dancing and climbing.
> ("The First Morning of the Second World" SK 54-55)

In the poem, "Gold Morning Sweet Prince," the passive form descends into a series of clichés about love: "We are such stuff as love has made us . . . / Because of love accepted, rejected, refused and jilted, faded, raided, neglected or betrayed. / Some are defeated, some are mistreated, some are fulfilled . . ." (SK 174).

The present participle is Schwartz's most frequently used marker. Functioning adjectivally, it reveals Schwartz's professed affinity for Whitehead. Atlas records Whitehead's professorial appreciation for Schwartz's discovery, in his class, "Cosmologies," of an "unanalyzed problem" in Process and Reality (75). And it is Whitehead's process philosophy which finds itself in Schwartz's poetry through the seductions of the present participle. Schwartz's criticism is also alive to the expressive and durative function of the present participle, as we see in his commentary on Eliot's line, "Like a taxi throbbing waiting": "The expressive

effect is gained by the participles rather than by the variation of an accentual-syllabic norm" ("Primitivism and Decadence by Yvor Winters" SE 348). The present participle has particular currency in Schwartz's longer poems. Embedded in the long line and unpredictable syntax, the present participle takes up easy residence:

> This is the nervous reality of time and time's fire which turns
> Whatever is into another thing, continually altering and changing
> all identity, as time's great fire burns (aspiring,flying and dying),
> So that all things arise and fall, living, leaping and fading, falling,
> like flames aspiring, flowering, flying and dying.
> ("Seurat's Sunday Afternoon Along the Seine" SK 190)

This idiom is so much a part of Schwartz's poetic discourse, that one cannot read it and ignore its appropriations of Whitehead's thought. W.D. Snodgrass admits in his poem, "April Inventory," to teaching a girl "Whitehead's notions" (qtd. in "The Present State of Poetry" SE 50). Schwartz's poems are less programmatic, hence more of a challenge to the reader looking for reference. Schwartz records Whitehead's scepticism:

> There are no whole truths
> There are only half-truths
> It is by taking the half-truth as the whole truth
> That we make the truth a kind of falsehood. (J 484)

Whitehead's phrase the "hurry of materials" (Process and Reality 131 and Science and the Modern World 154) finds its way into the language by the rush of present participles, again in an ordering list:

> My heart beating, my blood running,
> The light brimming,
> My mind moving, the ground turning,
> My eyes blinking the air flowing,
> The clock's quick-ticking,
> Time moving, time dying,
> Time perpetually perishing.
> ("Time's Dedication" SK 77)

If Whitehead broadly influenced Schwartz in his relaxing of the polarities between object and subject, mind and matter, he more narrowly inspired him with his "Process" philosophy: ". . . 'existence' . . . cannot be abstracted from 'process.' The notions of 'process' and 'existence' presuppose each other" (Modes of Thought 131). Leaving aside the fact that Whitehead's account of physical change carries with it a corollary mistrust of the accuracy of perceptual experience, his Heracleitan view of flux as prime mover lent its dynamism to Schwartz's cosmos. Mutability and process are central to Schwartz's own poetics, everywhere affirming the existential value of change. His is the insistence that underlying the flux or process of nature there is a principle of order which arranges the measured progress of life.

In his essay, "The Cunning and the Craft of the Unconscious and the Preconscious," Schwartz equates the Heracleitan cosmogony with despair in his discussion of Yeats:

> "How shall we know the dancer from the dance?" a Heracleitan statement that all is process and nothing is reality, except as in other poems, the frozen artificial reality of Byzantium. And his poem is affirmative only in the sense of confronting despair and death: It is very close to Valéry's "La Cimetière Marin" [sic], where existence itself and the mind of the poet seem the sole flaw in the pure diamond of being, so that Valery's affirmation too is hardly more than "Il faut tenter de vivre" and he too is appalled by the reality of process and unable to believe in another reality. (SE 199)

This same horror Schwartz turns to advantage by exploiting the affirmations and delights of natural process: "[Seurat's] vision is simple: yet it is also ample, complex, vexed and profound / In emulation of the fullness of Nature maturing and enduring and toiling in the chaos of actuality / An infinite variety within a simple frame" ("Seurat's Sunday Afternoon Along the Seine" SK 195). In "May's Truth and May's Falsehood," while the birds' "choreography" is presented by a plethora of past verb forms -- "flew, soared, darted, perched, perched and whistled, dipped or ascended," the "self-delighting" energy of nature's "celebration" is best told

in a list of present participles: "Arising, waving, flying, glittering, glistening as if in irresistible eagerness. . . . / All space was blossoming. . . . / And every solid sight was a great green drum, throbbing and pulsing in the growing vividness of the greenness darkening . . . " (SK 213). Mutability here is a phoenix hope, born anew of its own ashes. The verdant organicist imperative, the Coleridgean "form as proceeding" (Wesling 11), is intimately bound up with the present participial form and imports into Schwartz's poetics a metaphysics of growth, vitalism and surfeit:

> I was in the presence of the mystery
> Of the amplitude of abundance, dancing,
> Multitudinous abundance, the majesty
> Of ample infinitude, flowing and overflowing
>
> I was in the presence of the mystery
> Of the plenitude and the majesty
> Of the gifts and the giving and the grant
> Of the very-flowing process of reality:
> Love is knowing in unknowing. . . . (Narcissus LLP 75-76)

This is Whitehead's "fluent" world expounded in Process and Reality: "The elucidation of meaning involved in the phrase 'all things flow' is one of the chief tasks of metaphysics" (317). According to Wesling, modernity and Romanticism are co-extensive, based on the "chronological premise that Romanticism, called by Isaiah Berlin the greatest shift in the European cultural consciousness of the west, initiated an epistemological break in European culture" (6). Hence, "Modernity and organic form are born of the same time, and require each other" (2). It is this epistemological break which has allowed for Schwartz to ["know"] how a growing tree is true" ("I Did Not Know the Truth of Growing Trees" (SK 207). This is the Coleridgean marriage of knowledge and growth which I.A. Richards termed, in a defamatory conflation, "growledge": "The scope of conveniences is wide, so wide that the distinctions --

between the self that knows, its knowing, its knowledge and what it knows -- may seem inevitable. . . . [as] when a plant is growing we can distinguish what grows, its growing, the growledge and what is grown" (Coleridge on Imagination 52). So much of the movement of Schwartz's poem itself is conceived on the analogue of the growth of a living organism whose parts exist in self-generated motion: the mind's "continuing and unreleasing wind," repeated in every stanza, provides the breath of continuity through the poem "Will you Perhaps Consent to Be" (SK 64), so that accretion of knowledge is arrived at in gradations. Those things which flow decidedly have their claim in Schwartz's poetic world view, not unlike Stevens' "green" and "fluent mundo" ("It Must Give Pleasure," Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction, Collected Poems 407) which here is rendered as "the wheeling, whirling world. . . . / Spinning in its spotlight darkness" ("The Ballad of the Children of the Czar" SK 23).

Schwartz's participles are used with their full adjectival force -- "O glittering and rocking and bursting and blue" ("Far Rockaway" SK 34) -- and with substantive transformation: "The noon of turquoise diamonds diamonding / and gold golding" (Narcissus LLP 77). The image of the poem's progress finding its equivalence in the train's progress reveals "process" to be a term of markedly high polysemy: "A poem moves forward, / Like the passages and percussions of trains in process. . . . / Grinding, revolving, gripping, turning and returning . . ." ("The Journey of a Poem Compared to the Sad Variety of Travel" LLP 37). The train hurtles inexorably forward, even though freighted with many items in a participial list, defying Buell's belief that the list "creates an impression of vigor and excitement, but also of rambling and redundancy. It seems that everything moves parallel, nothing moves forward" (Literary Transcendentalism 166). Whitehead's philosophy of flux and continuity, his celebrated

"concrescence of prehensions" (Modes of Thought 232) whereby one thing "takes account" of another and finds relation in the universe, is very much in line with Schwartz's dynamic aesthetic: "prehension . . . express[es] [a] process of appropriation. . . . The data appropriated are provided by the antecedent functioning of the universe" (Modes of Thought 206). In the poem, "All of Us Always Turning Away for Solace," the processive pulse can be counted in the twelve instances of the present participle, including

> all of us always turning away for solace
> From the lonely room where the self must be honest
> All of us turning from being alone (at best
> Boring) because what we want most is to be
> Interested, play billiards, poking a ball
> . . . batting a ball
> . . . kicking a ball
> . . . seventy thousand applauding. (SK 63)

In the poem, "The True-Blue American," a list of negative existential choices culminates in a note of affirmation:

> Rejecting the either-or of Kierkegaard. . . .
> Refusing to accept alternatives, refusing to believe
> the choice of between;
> Rejecting selection; denying dilemma;
> electing absolute affirmation:
> Knowing
> in his breast
> The infinite and the gold
> Of the endless frontier, the deathless West. (SK 163)

The American speaker is large, containing, Whitman-style, multitudes: "Both: I will have them both!" The refusal to choose is itself a choice.

Freedom has always been understood as central to Whitehead's metaphysical system. Process came to mean "concrescence," that self-creative activity within an occasion, whereby it brings itself into being (Process and Reality 32); Coriolanus is the locus of Schwartz's

assimilation of Whitehead's idea, expounded in Process and Reality, of "determination" and "self-causation." It is this "aseity," or self-derived existence which engages the reader thematically in Schwartz's lengthy poem: "Sole, single, absolute, per se alone / (Aseity such as is God's alone)." The subtitle to Act V which originates from Shakespeare's Coriolanus (V, iii, l. 36, Complete Works 1234) marks the self-creating will: "As if a Man Were Author of Himself" (SK 135). Marcius repeats: "As if a man were author of himself, / I will be author of myself alone." In his advocacy of human agency, man chooses, above all, choice itself: "He is contingency, it is his will / . . . it is his choice . . . / It is his self-creating will which rules" (138). An occasion effects its own concretion through prehension and concrescence, or literally, "growing together": ". . . the production of novel togetherness is the ultimate notion embodied in the term 'concrescence'" (Process and Reality 32). The river recreates itself: "The river was itself and yet it was -- flowing and freshening / A self anew, another self or self renewed / At every tick of eternity" (Narcissus LLP 65). Here is Whitehead's network, or nexus, of events.

The activity of Becoming, with its attendant potencies and actualities, is essential to Schwartz's poetic constructs. Whitehead's notion of objects as "pure potentials" actualizable in an indefinite number of instances, finds literary confirmation in Schwartz's practice. His actual occasions, or the final things of which the world is composed, are atomic; so, too, can the individuated items in Schwartz's list be seen as atomic aspects of experience, points in a continuum. The process, the "becoming" is often noted in expansive strains: "The trees / Became a grove, a slowly curving orchard / The river's tree became the harp, immense, of goddesses" (Narcissus LLP 79). The word "Becoming" is used in quarrel with the anti-kinetic, anti-vitalistic, Parmenidean monistic world view. The word "care" "becomes" an actuality, is

finally realized, just to be negated: "I see the price of care, turning to keep / I am a price, I turn to keep, I care / But time which circles dissipates all care . . ." ("Abraham and Orpheus, Be With Me Now" SK 73). Becoming is prior to Being: "Delighting in the lights of becoming and the houses of being" ("The Choir and Music of Solitude and Silence" LLP 16), at least contiguous with it: "Gazing or gaping at the river's ever-being, ever-becoming" (Narcissus LLP 65). Concrescence brings the occasion into being -- Whitehead's process whereby "being" is constituted by its "becoming" (Process and Reality). The Schwartzian cosmos, like Whitehead's, is potentiality that is actualizing, perishing and actualizing anew.

Schwartz understands entelechy in its broadest Aristotelian applications, not just as the realization or complete expression of a function, but as an ethical imperative:

> One has to repeat with Aristotle that literature must concern itself not only with what men are, but with what they "ought" to be. Ought is not used in its ethical sense (as of the didactic) for there is no Greek word equivalent to the ethical "ought"; but it is in the sense of the representation of the full scale of human potentialities that "what men ought to be" is meant.
> ("John Dos Passos and The Whole Truth" SE 242)

In his letters, Schwartz exhibits a knowledge of Aristotle via Santayana: "Both entelechy and the identity of meaning and being come straight from Santayana's misinterpretations of Aristotle. This is what comes of getting terms from grammar and logic together with one term from ancient biology and making the brew even more inchoate . . . by tossing in a few metaphysical ideas" (L45). Experience is bipolar -- either potential or realized: "The poet must be all things to be free, for all impersonations / . . . to all situations possible or actual / The cuckold, the cuckoo, the conqueror and the coxcomb" ("Apollo Musagete, Poetry and the Leader of the Muses" LLP 52). Whitehead accepts with Spinoza the notion of primordial "potency in act," actualized in determinate creative acts; Schwartz accepts this compromise as a central strain in his poetics,

without philosophical elaboration: ". . . poetry is the actuality of possibility" ("Kingdom of Poetry" SK 189). Against the Thomist God of De Potentia Dei who is pure act, Schwartz endows his God with potency: "God is in love, in love with possibility / His love are his loves, his love is enough / To make the promiscuity of actuality. . ." (Narcissus LLP 62). This recalls Whitehead's notion that God is an "actual entity" (Process and Reality 27). For Schwartz the present burgeons with the possibility of the future; active potentiality is identified with force.

Schwartz is careful to recommend Aristotelian standards of unified action in his stories; it follows that his obsession with acts of completion and their disappointments animates his prose as well: "My father has always felt that actualities somehow fall short" (IDBR 14). Schwartz's effort to "know the act and their enaction" (SK 155) and "not the child but the child enacted" (J 60), "the old act enacted" ("The Ballet of the Fifth Year" SK 59) is his effort to record actualities. His journal is replete with references to entelechous states of mind. He defers to "[his] lady actuality . . . / and [his] lady poetry / The strange princess of song" (J 227). Actuality and poetry share a courtly identicality; they are "les princesses lointaines," the objects of courtly desire. His artistic credos, as elaborated in his journal, speak powerfully for the human capacity for rendering disorder orderly, as they reveal his teleological habit of mind, of definition of a goal and its attainment: "The entelechy of The Princes rises in me; conceive an action, you have the subject, the matrix, the theme and the forms . . . . What entelechies dawning in me?" (J 76-77).

Whitehead's teleology is more scientifically drawn. Yet his idea that our hopes and disillusions derive their meanings from the potentialities inherent in all things --

> The notion of potentiality is fundamental for the understanding of existence, as soon as the notion of process is admitted. If the universe be interpreted in terms

> of static actuality, then potentiality vanishes: everything is just what it is. . . . Hope and fear, joy and disillusion, obtain their meaning from the potentialities essential in the nature of things. We are following a trail in hope, or are fleeing from the pursuit in fear. The potentialities in immediate fact constitute the driving force of process. (Modes of Thought 136-37) --

is finally as much a statement on the human elements of entelechy as is Schwartz's:

> Part of my progress is the knowledge that the most important element is not the idea but the actuality, the actuality lighted by the nearby idea. For I thought wrongly that the necessary precondition of virtue was the correct idea. But now I know that even if one had the correct ideas about each existent thing there would still remain the problem, most difficult of all, of their embodiment or relevance at any moment of time or place. (J 89)

So, while the process has ontological primacy -- again the present participle intimates its burgeoning fullness: "Hissing and ravenous the brilliant plant: / Rising like eagerness, a rushing pyre" ("The Winter Twilight Glowing Black and Gold" SK 204) -- its realization is very much the point to be made. Motion, dynamism, interrelation and precipitous zeal are reminiscent of Whitehead's ethos.

d) "As if all were a metaphor of place, profound / Elliptic, solid, flat, far, thin and round": Adjectival Catalogue

The above harangue of attributive adjectives from Coriolanus (SK 96) highlights Schwartz's use of what was called in the General Grammar of Port Royal, the "accidents" of speech, which were the signs of the "objects of our thoughts" (Kristeva 167). In Aristotle's description of categories, a distinction is made between the essential, or defining attributes of a category, and the accidental or non-defining attributes which Schwartz's proliferative lists detail. This grammatical category corresponds to the logical category of quality. Schwartz's is the most liberal use of the attributive adjective in modern poetry since the modifier first washed ashore

in "Dover Beach" (Poetical Works 210-12) with Arnoldian rhetorical force. Riffaterre locates the "agent of poeticity" in a "relationship between epithet and noun, which designates a quality of the noun's referent. . . . [and hence] the poetic is born . . ." (Semiotics of Poetry 28).

In the following list the substantive "pennant" exists in the place of an adjective: "Hard wind, high blue and clouded pennant sky" ("The Self Unsatisfied Runs Everywhere" VP 102). This series, which is partially adjectival, presents a rearrangement of normal word order. The image, frozen in the mirror is

> . . . framed, no nearer
> So, the blood stopped,
> The eyes in place, the breast cold
> The hair stiff, the mouth in bands. ("Song 13" LLV 211)

Schwartz's reference to the "adjective's suggestiveness" as opposed to the "matter-of-factness" of the noun in his discussion of Eliot's signature titles ("T.S. Eliot's Voice and his Voices" SE 134) does not mitigate the specifying and purely descriptive function of his own adjectives:

> The wind which is tired, wild and still continuing,
> The wind which is dull and warm, wet, soft
> in every influence . . .
> Winter's wild
> Knife-edged, continuing and endlessly
> Intent and stripping, ice-caressing wind.
> ("Will You Perhaps Consent to Be?" SK 64)

The adjectival triad in the dialogue "Father and Son" appropriately charts the speaker's epistemological development from realism to idealism, from the sensualism of youth to sober reflection in later age, after Wordsworth: "The unction and falsetto of the sentiment / . . . springs / From no felt, had, and wholly known things" (SK 29). The extended adjectival list bears the markings of the boldly ruminative free verse mode, and, in that tradition, is often vigorously enjambed:

What is to be given,
Is spirit, yet animal,
Colored, like heaven,
Blue, yellow, beautiful. ("What is to be Given" SK 53)

Here are more enjambments: "As if all were a metaphor of place, profound, / Elliptic, solid, flat, far, thin and round!" (Coriolanus SK 96); "All the well known events; yet something new, / Unique, undying, free, blessed or damned" (G 208). The poem "Gold Morning Sweet Prince" has the longest series of intermittent adjectival lists whose semantic content, along with Schwartz's enthusiasm for enumeration, overruns its lines:

He knew us all before we were, he knew the
    strong, the weak,
The silly, the reticent, the pious, the powerful. . . .

And our little life, green, ripe, or rotten, is what it is
. . . . . .
And if this were not true, if love were not kind
    and cruel,
Generous and unjust, heartless and irresistible,
    painful to the savant and gentle to the fool,
Fecund and various, wasteful and precarious,
    lavish, savage, greedy and tender,
    begetting the lion and the lamb
The peacock, the spaniel, the tiger, the lizard, the
    chicken hawk and the dove.

The adjectives are chosen for sonority as much as for sense; such prolixity discourages attentive reading. It is little wonder the poem ends in characteristic inclusiveness: ". . . may all the angels sing / With all the sweetness and all the truth with which you sang of anything and everything" (SK 173-75).

While Schwartz would seem to defy the letter of Pound's directive about sloughing off the adjective as ornament -- "Use no superfluous word, no adjective which does not reveal something" ("A Retrospect," qtd. in Perloff, Dance of Intellect 14) -- its spirit is intact. Each

adjective is necessary to the fullness and precision of perception. The adjectival list corresponds to Schwartz's need to record his detailed observation, providing as it does a rhetorical means of enlarging the self. Often this enlargement is painful, as conveyed in the fearful symmetry of the following list, a singular pivot, "stiff," flanked by double trouble on either side: "Droll and unreal, stiff, stilted and hooded" ("Cambridge, Spring 1937" SK 57). When the speaker identifies his own physiognomy with that which he observes, the adjectives are particularly noteworthy: "Hope" itself assumes a human face: "hope / Is drunk, and wanton and unwilled" ("Prothalamion" SK 48). In the poem, "Two Lyrics from Kilroy's Carnival: a Masque," the adjectives are drawn from a warehouse of bad feeling, reflecting, no doubt, Schwartz's own vulnerability:

> -- Kiss me where pride is glittering
> Kiss me where I am ripened and round fruit
> Kiss me wherever, however, I am supple, bare
> and flare. . . .
>
> -- I'll kiss you wherever you think you are poor,
> Wherever you shudder, feeling striped or barred,
> Because you think you are bloodless, skinny
> or marred. . . . (LLP 7)

Some lists define states of mind or ways of being: "Serene, cool and composed, and easy going / They think you are because your smiling face / Is still and generous, and like a growing summer, big and rich and luminous" ("One in a Thousand of Years of the Nights" VP 71); "Awed or indifferent, bemused or ill at ease" ("Disorder Overtakes us All Day Long" VP 60). The effort of recording abstract character traits is an exhausting one. The result is an interpretive labour whose yield is an often too-keen awareness of the self: "Inveterate, gratuitous, too much / Ambiguous, I tire even myself" (Coriolanus SK 135). The poet's office brings with it its own

adjectival designations, here presented in alliterative pairs: "Awed or indifferent, bemused or ill at ease / We who are poets play the game . . ." ("Disorder Overtakes Us All Day Long" VP 60). Adjectival lists are kaleidoscopic, ever-shifting, selective, in that any number of epithets can be added to, subtracted, chosen, selected in or out: ". . . all personae / Flow from choices, sad and gay, wise and humorous are chosen faces" ("All Clowns are Masked and All Personae" SK 65). Life itself hosts a relentlessly-random rush of qualities: "This life will be the same precarious, kind, stupid, sullen, rich and marvellous" ("Today is Armistice, a Holiday" VP 104).

Rhetorical analysis is defeated by the variousness and incoherence of the list. The speaker of Coriolanus pulls from a grab bag of adjectives which define Schwartz's own isolation: ". . . that knot of common weakness, / Consistent need, poor fear and aching will" (SK 82); "naming us wooden things, dull, clogged, / Inanimate. . . ." (85); "Double, absorbed, monstrous, amazed, ashamed" (96); "alone / sole, single, absolute, per se, alone" (98); "But he is quite alone, / Foreign, alien, estranged" (108). Here the adjectives gain force as they betray a fevered imagination: ". . . And then, surely, you will be far different and other / Than the half-believed, half-deceived, revery and lyric of your gazing, gaping, grasping, flickering, fumbling, desperate and possessed memory" ("A Dream of Winter, Empty, Woolen, Ice-White and Brittle" SK 218). Schwartz overwhelms his reader with a surfeit of attributive instances.

"Cupid's Chant" can representatively end this discussion of lists, as it contains, in its thrifty lines, all manner of lists, lists within lists, and resounding anaphora; it begins in organic glory and ends in the disappointments of epistemology:

> Cupid is
> The king of flutes.
> Cupid's kiss
> Wakes winter's roots

Cupid touches
A color's curve.
Cupid reaches
Apples, peaches,
Eye and nerve. . . .

2

Cupid is
A student of leaves,
A scholar of Eros,
A savant of consciousness,
And of sleep's wine-dark seas;
Of the heights of the birds
And the insides of words,
The seed within Adam,
The birth, the death and the rebirth
Which breathes in Eve
-- All that is seedy, loamy, rising, fickle, growing,
seeking, flouring, flowering and unknowable, all
that we hope and hardly dare to believe. (SK 223)

Such typographical pyrotechnics establishes the poem as a radical visual statement, as are most lists. This adjectival list is bereft of punctuation or conjunction: "Some other life dark pretty long hurt dear" ("After the Passion Which Made Me a Fool" VP 83). Schwartz rarely presents such vexations to his editor. The sensual collage presented in "Sonnet 7" -- "ignorant of what / Is safe, blue, right, cold, blind, soft, real and hot" -- is analyzed metrically by Valenti:

> The self, teetering on a tight-rope continues to be unsure -- that unsureness reflected in the dissonant meter of the last line so reminiscent of Milton's famous "Rocks, Caves, Lakes, Fens, Bogs, Dens and Shades of Death." Milton's metrical dissonance, however, moves on to consonance, whereas Schwartz's end is "unmusical," teetering with the dissonance and ignorance of self. (LLV 205)

I began this section with a discussion of Schwartz's nominal lists, that is, his naming and ordering of his sensual field and hence confronting "the tumult, the brass, the flashing heat, / Their congregated act" . . . (Coriolanus SK 97). "Naming is beginning," according to Schwartz (J 53). He continues, "power flows from it, repetition and combination, freedom from abstractions, yet ease with generality." His attempts to order the multiformity of the phenomenal

world through the catalogue are often found in a context of profound mistrust of his own perceptions. Amorphous free verse meditations find heroic stability in the catalogue. The catalogue of names in the poem, "Apollo Musagete, Poetry and the Leader of the Muses" (LLP 52-55), infuses an order, mechanically and formally, to the informal curvings and inlets of the vastly varying verse lines. These lines are themselves instructed by parenthetical thoughts on death and transcendence, and achieved in doggerel fragments and capricious couplets. Each list is its own taxonomy and each taxonomy endorses its own world view. Hence, instead of Milton's items in the natural landscape, "Rocks, Caves, Lakes . . . etc.," Schwartz offers his own urban topography. "Song 8" is a mélange of equivocation, cityscape, urban detritus and depressive angst:

> When suburbs' dripping sewers take
> Used condoms and burnt matches, Spring
> Makes Winter seem a dreamed mistake:
> Thick, thin, gold, null, flashes each thing,
>
> Shifts, turns, odd and even, lost and found,
> Drugged and sentient, obscurely
> Well and unwell: ambiguous and the heart's sound
> Sounds, does it not,
> and unsurely. (LLV 211)

It is a world, Schwartz suggests, in need of repair. His prodigious use of ternary and multiple lists, and repetitions of parts of speech signal a signature construction, a reparative construction. Leo Bersani holds that "a work of art has the authority to master the presumed raw material of experience in a manner that uniquely gives value to, perhaps even redeems that material" (1). But the list also helps the poet learn about himself, and more to the point, helps him reconstitute the poetic self. According to Spiegelman, "naming, listing, repeating and inventorying are

processes of preservation, an instinctual hoarding from within for the construction of a self" (388).

In his own words, the list illustrates "the happy uses of frivolity; it shows how often the frivolous is the royal road to perception . . ." ("Hegel's White Elephant" Beinecke). Schwartz issues, in ever-surprising variations, his own "Salut Au Monde" (Leaves of Grass 137-48) with more of a consciousness of the relations among the orders than Whitman had. The often loose apposition and syntactic alterations of the data are purposeful signals of the tenuous nature of those orders. The serendipity and multiplicity of instances impress his reader with the sense of normative democracy inherent in his serial salutations. Finally, the list shows up, to Schwartz's great profit, his love of language: "Even the jeremiad is a list, and full of joy. Damnations are delightful. Lists are finally for those who love language, the vowel-swollen cheek, the lilting, dancing tongue, because lists are fields full of words and roving bands of 'and.' Life itself can only be compiled and thereby captured on a list, if it can be laid out anywhere at all" (Gass 120).

Endnotes to Chapter 3

[1] James Lipton cites the Book of St. Albans (1486) as a source for these terms. Some recent additions to the canon: a stampede of philatelists, a descent of relatives, a tenure of associate professors, a postponement/cancellation of trains, an embarrassment of twitches an iamb of poets, a tabula rasa of empiricists, a blur of impressionists.

[2] See also Detlev W. Schumann's article where he writes about "anatomical enumeration [and] its rhetorical intent" (172). Alazraki and Frédéric are my sources for Spitzer's essay, available only in Spanish translation.

[3] See Henry Reed's poem "Naming of Parts" where trainees have a lesson in the parts of a rifle, as well as aspects of a garden (Perrine 40).

[4] Mishnah is the Oral Law, including its legends and laws, or aggadot and halakhah. The six orders of the Mishnah were edited and revised in the third century by Judah Ha-Nasi (Urbach, "Mishnah" Judaica).

[5] Mendele Moykher Sforim, the so-called "grandfather" of Yiddish literature, is the pseudonym of Shalom Jacob Abramovitch (1835-1917). As Mendele the Bookseller, he appeared in his own novels, inveighing a sense of wry irony to his exposés of various ideological movements, including Zionism and enlightenment rationalism. Among his seminal works are The Travels of Benjamin the Third (1897), The Nag (1873) and the play, The Tax (1869). (Werses, "Mendele Mokher Seforim" Judaica). (I am using here the Yiddish transliteration of his name, while the entry in the Judaica uses the Hebrew transliteration).

[6] Mishnaic linguistic form analysis and list exegesis has been proposed and defended by a decade's worth of labour on the part of Jacob Neusner. See his chapter "Rabbinic Lists of Theological Things" in his book Symbol and Theology (53-104). Neusner applies principles of Listenwissenschaft to theological settings.

[7] Aristotle later uses the categories to criticize Plato's theory of forms. He distinguishes between primary substance, or particular men and secondary substance or the species and genera to which the individuals belong.

[8] R.W.B. Lewis notes that John Burroughs was the first to call Whitman's poetic task "Adamic" (107).

[9] Midrash is a genre of rabbinic literature which consists of homily and biblical exegesis; its compilation constitutes a running commentary on specific books of the Bible. The early Midrashim of the classical amoraic period are exemplary literary constructs of their own (Herr, "Midrash" Judaica).

[10] Atlas continues, "the protagonist of [S] was to be Delmore himself . . . and he seized on his name as a convenient symbol for the disparate forces that had made him what he was. Its prosaic source was a neighbour. . . . But the truth of its origin mattered less to him than what it represented: a vivid instance of the conflict between American values and his parents' aspirations" (4-5).

[11] For a full explanation of the various names of God including Adonai, Elohim and Yahweh, see Plaut 3.

[12] These lists are reminiscent of Whitman's parade of humanity in "Song of Myself," which are variously descriptive and merely enumerative:

> The pedler [sic] sweats with his pack on his back. . . .
> The bride unrumples her white dress. . . .
> The opium eater reclines with rigid head
> and just-open'd lips,
> The prostitute draggles her shawl, her bonnet
> bobs on her tipsy and pimpled neck
> . . . . . .
>
> Of every hue and caste am I, of every rank
> and religion,
> A farmer, mechanic, artist, gentleman, sailor, quaker,
> Prisoner, fancy-man, rowdy, lawyer, physician, priest.
> (Leaves of Grass 43, 45)

[13] "A good catalogue," according to Buell, "is unified as well as diverse. . . . Its items must not have the rigid order of rational discourse, which would ring as false as Swedenborg's codifications of nature, but there must be a suggestion of order. This can be supplied in two ways: by modulating from item to item by process of association, and by giving to the whole a certain sense of shape." He alters typographically Emerson's list in his journal: "The world is a Dancer; it is a Rosary; it is a Torrent; it is a Boat, a Mist; a Spider's snare, it is what you will . . ." to

> The world is a Dancer
> it is a Rosary
> it is a Torrent
> it is a Boat
> a Mist
> a Spider's Snare
> it is what you will. (Literary Transcendentalists 170-71)

The shape of the above "poem" is similar to the architecture of Schwartz's poem cited here.

[14] Gass lyrically continues, "Furthermore, the homogeneity of chaos, ohne Form und leer has been sundered, for we must think of chaos, Tiefe, not as a helterskelter of worn-out and broken or half-heartedly realized things like a junkyard or potter's midden, but as a fluid mishmash of thinglessness in every lack of direction, as if a blender had run amok.

And

is that sunderer; it divides into new accords; it
stands between Himmel and Erde; it divides
light from darkness . . . and: a sword that
cleaves things as it cleaves them.
And
then some (124-25)."

[15] L'énumération, l'énumération homologique (série homologique) et l'énumération chaotique se rejoignent sur deux points. Le premier, de nature formelle, réside dans la présence d'un point d'attache commun: le pivot, auquel viennent s'accrocher par leur fonction grammaticale, tous les constituants de la série. Ces constituants sont donc tous homofonctionnels. Ce trait est indispensable à l'existence d'une énumération, d'une énumération chaotique; autrement dit, il n'y a pas d'énumération . . . sans homofonctionnalité des constituants de la série. Le second trait qui les rapproche est de nature sémantique: dans chacune de ces séries, il s'agit toujours de l'expression analytique d'un ensemble. . . . La constance de cette parenté sémantique et la permanence de l'homofonctionnalité des constituants . . . permettent de définir chacune de ces trois séries comme l'expression analytique d'un ensemble référentiel, réalisée au travers d'une suite de termes ou de syntagmes homofonctionnels (105).

[16] Borges, who, Foucault tells us, has made some of our more memorable lists, refers to a "certain Chinese encyclopedia" in which it is written that "animals are divided into a) belonging to the Emperor b) embalmed c) tame d) sucking pigs e) sirens f) fabulous g) stray dogs h) included in the present classification i) frenzied j) innumerable k) drawn with a very fine camelhair brush l) et cetera m) having just broken the water pitcher n) that from a long way off looks like flies . . . " (qtd. in Order of Things 122).

Part II

ACTS OF COGNITION

Chapter 4

THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL INSTRUCTION

> . . . axioms in philosophy are not axioms until they are proved upon the pulses. . . .
>
> John Keats, "Letter to J.H. Reynolds. 3 May, 1818"
> (Letters 141)

> Philosophy, that leaned on Heaven before,
> Shrinks to her second cause, and is no more.
> Physic of Metaphysic begs defence,
> And Metaphysic calls for aid on sense!
>
> Alexander Pope, The Dunciad Bk. IV, ll. 643-46
> (Selected Poetry and Prose 514)

a) Methodology as Subject Matter

We have noted in the introduction that the "act of knowing" for Schwartz defines both the process and the product of the poem. If this act is the creative and reflexive consciousness of the world of things or phenomena as they appear to us and also of ourselves, then Schwartz's ways of knowing take on a particularly Husserlian cast. The summoning of Husserl's name here, at this advanced stage in the thesis, is not meant to obtrude upon its proper study -- Schwartz's poetic epistemology -- nor is it intended to widen the sphere of attachments and influence. Instead it serves to arrest the wildly ciliac movement of Schwartz's mind amid the anarchic welter of modernist intellectual thought, to halt the protean literary identity long enough to tackle, tame, and ultimately label it phenomenologist. Phenomenology offers a consistent context for the study of his poetry of knowledge.

In his broader look at the interrelations of philosophy and literature, Thomas McFarland cites phenomenology as particularly "benign to literary interests":

> . . . phenomenology's special kind of analysis provides favored status for purely mental constructs . . . thereby the imagination of the poet and the fictions of the novelist are not relegated to the background as they are in the positivist tradition. Briefly, phenomenology is a philosophy of subject-object relation in which the reality of the object is left out of consideration (its realness is not disputed, but rather "bracketed"). . . . For instance, if I examine a chair from the phenomenological perspective . . . I neither contest its reality nor exercise myself about its "chairness"; I am interested in it solely as an object of attention . . .; the chair in the phenomenological epoché is a mental construct. . . . As Husserl was well aware, the chair taken in this way . . . is not necessarily different from a chair in the house of a family in a Charles Dickens novel. . . . Your great-grandfather and King Lear are both available to consciousness in the same way. Phenomenology . . . is as much at home with fictional imaginings as with locally-encountered actuality; . . . acts of mental attention in both cases "constitute" the world. (36-37)

David Antin makes a broader claim, insisting that "phenomenological reality" is itself "discovered and constructed by poets" (qtd. in Perloff, Poets of Indeterminacy 35). Indeed Schwartz himself cites Eliot's "experience of finding poetic inspiration unexpectedly in such unlikely places as Husserl, among others" ("T.S. Eliot's Voice and His Voices" SE 133).

I will not attempt a study of Husserl's thought -- which ranged widely from the logical and transcendental phenomenology of the early days to the "pure" phenomenology of his later years -- or even his subject matter; I do not pretend to master its subtleties. It is his phenomenological method, refined throughout his career, which affords the reader entry to Schwartz's epistemology. As Eagleton notes, "the methodological concerns of Husserlian philosophy . . . very often become the content of literature for phenomenological criticism" (Literary Theory 59). Phenomenology is both preparatory method and philosophy of knowledge. Certain disciplines and strategies in Husserl's methodology find life in Schwartz's poems and seem unusually suited to Schwartz's own habits of perception and presentation: the bracketing, the descriptiveness, the intentional acts of consciousness.

I take my lead in this enterprise from Schwartz's own "formal exercise in epistemology," Having Snow:

> To the understanding of being finally the utter self-surrender, the phenomenologist, the objectification of the self, defined as the "true way" in the futility of previous solutions. Seeing each thing as it is because the barrier of self is passed, which is the beginning of the world.
> To know . . . is to have snow: the fundamental situation. (qtd. in Atlas 68)

Schwartz sounds the opening phenomenological chord, the dominant one of his poetic career. Hence Husserl is here his implied reference point for epistemological grounding and dialogue. This passage shows Schwartz to fall short of the "essential" knowledge both desired, and recognized as difficult, by Husserlian phenomenology. Schwartz's division of "knowledge" and "knowing," as enunciated in the introduction, is drawn along philosophical and poetic lines. Husserl's distinctions are similarly made with an eye to reflection and experience: ". . . an experiential knowing [Erfahrungswissen] [is that] to which we owe all conceivable cognizance [Kenntnis] and cognition [Erkenntnis] of our intentional living. . . . [one's] reflecting experiencing is precisely an experiencing experiencing" (Cartesian Meditations 34).

Schwartz accepted, with Husserl, the radical claims of consciousness and the attendant centrality of the perceiver in determining meaning. Perception for Schwartz, on the Husserlian model, is a poetically-deliberate act, by which the perceived object is continually, but discontinuously, rediscovered. Intentionality is its hallmark, for "all consciousness is consciousness of something" (Cartesian Meditations 33); subjectivity refers to the activity of consciousness in constituting knowledge. Schwartz's gloss is his poetic obsession with the "wound of consciousness" ("After the Passion Which Made Me a Fool" VP 83). Consciousness is a beast of burden, its cargo, filial guilt. Schwartz's philosophical and spiritual alignment with

Husserl has largely been overlooked, except for Atlas' stirring diagnosis of Schwartz's need to have a "more comprehensive philosophical system" than what radical phenomenalism[1] could provide:

> Spinoza's epistemology, with its emphasis on the capacity of the conscious mind to apprehend reality, its concern with the influence of what he called "the passions," and its postulates toward the evidence of God in the phenomenal world, was congenial to Delmore; but phenomenology, then having an early vogue in America, proved to be even more so, since it abandoned the quest for objective certitude in favor of a surrender to subjectivity as the only legitimate mode of knowing. More Husserlian than logical positivist, Delmore's effort to "see each thing as it is" could illuminate his own experience: "Do I love only my own sense impressions, enacting the sin of Narcissus?" To atone for this sin Delmore sought to ground it in philosophy as if the torment of excessive self-consciousness could be appeased only through rigorous objective discourse. (69)

Some of these points -- subjectivity and the reliability of sense impressions among them -- will be taken up and elaborated upon in this half of the thesis.

Schwartz used the designation "phenomenology" in his own criticism. His projected book on Eliot, which exists in typescript form at the Beinecke, consists of robustly speculative essays, often on a phenomenological theme. He sees the phenomenological and the Christian as mutually-fructifying disciplines, and couches them in a language of "authenticity": "To a Christian the cross is a visual thing too, but also an historical and supernatural event. . . . In terms of vision, or to use the technical term, in phenomenological terms, both images, though very different, are authentic" (Eliot ts, Beinecke). Schwartz is adept at source detective work: in a letter to Allen Tate he claims to have "taken up the very interesting trouble of tracking down" sources, and this trouble has turned up Husserl, among others: "As almost the exact contemporary in the widest sense of Trotsky and Maritain, and also in [Eliot's] curious reading, for example, a post-war German philosophy -- 'The natural wakeful life of our Ego' in

'Triumphal March' [Coriolan] is a quotation from Husserl's foundational work in phenomenology"[2] (L 58-59). Schwartz himself discovers poetically this "natural wakeful life of our Ego," which, according to Husserl, is "a continuous perceiving, actual or potential. The world of things and our body within it are continuously present in our perception" (Ideas 115). Eliot adds urbanity to his understanding of Husserl: "The natural wakeful life of our Ego is a perceiving. / We can wait with out stools and our sausages" (Collected Poems 135). In the poem, "Aubade," wakefulness has phenomenological resonance so that the hortations to "awaken" reveal a world of actualities (Ideas 107) to which the "doors of morning open" (LLV 214).

The fascination with the perspectival relation between knower and known extends to a recuperation of the phenomenological paradigm in Schwartz's own work, as can be seen in this journal poem:

> The shell shoots forward -- slows . . . shoots forward,
> slows . . .
> Under the human will, concerted there.
> And by such artifice contriving strain
> Not to be bored -- whose phenomenology
> Makes God regard the tiger as a trope
> .....
> What! from this nebulae came forth man's mind? (28)

If the referent of phenomenology is in the tiger, then the term is used very loosely to suggest all the foregrounded animality and suspended ontology that word might offer. And if metaphor is a trope of transference, we do not have here the specific terms of that transfer. Trope is an addition to a stable and absolute canon, in its alternate liturgical sense. The tiger then, inspired by phenomenology, and interpreted by "the human will," is clearly seen as a force subversive of that canon. The presuppositions which govern our engagement with the world are suspended.

Schwartz's late poem, "The Kingdom of Poetry," lays out aspects of poetry, preserving the autonomy of each, in a phenomenological division of intellectual labour ranging from Husserlian essential epistemology to Heideggerian existential ontology: "For Poetry is the sunlight of consciousness: / It is also the soil of the fruits of knowledge / In the orchards of being" (SK 188). This poem, as was discovered in the last chapter, is riddled with catalogue; hence Schwartz first established a "phenomenology" of the word "poetry," as Eduard von Hartmann uses it to mean "survey" or "inventory . . . of the empirically given territory of moral consciousness" (Spiegelberg, Phenomenological Movement 14).[3] As such, Schwartz's work offers countless inventories of empirical facts. Hence his encounter with phenomenology is an instrumental one, one which is implemented in the rhetorical structure of the poem. Brodtkorb assures his reader that "phenomenology applied to literature involves few really esoteric literary manipulations. [The narrator] uses the very way that he presents (that is, sees, hears, feels, reports, judges) . . . the relation that is his reconstitution of his world and self [which] is formally present in his rhetorical purpose" (4). Schwartz's speakers, as we shall see, commend this phenomenological world view.

Phenomenology was, according to Husserl, in the entry he wrote for the 1927 edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica,[4] a science of essences which finds its invariant element in the phenomenal object. For Schwartz, too, poetry is the reflective consideration of the essential within the flux of phenomenal and experiential moments. In its broadest outlines, Schwartz's poetic world view includes an active interest in consciousness and its intentional relation to its objects. Aiken, in his discussion of Schwartz's work puts it simply, "the relation 'I: World'. . . is the begin-all-end-all business of the poet's life" (219). Following Husserl's lead,

Schwartz places in abeyance all questions of existence while exploring the essence of phenomena. While there are some references to the Heideggerian and Sartrean existential branch of phenomenology, most of these are not sustained -- ". . . man exists by being-in-the-world" ("Paris and Helen: An Entertainment" LLP 118) -- or merely playful:

> Sartre: Existence de trop, absurd, out of place, not bursting with desire, nausea -- irrational, unlike shoes and chairs. . . .
> Heidegger -- an old shoemaker, said Scheler.
> Da Sein -- concrete reality (the body too)
> Existenz -- self-conscious, present-to-itself;
> being -- the leap of self-determination. (J 277)

Heidegger may have influenced Schwartz's understanding of the modal coincidence of poetry and philosophy:

> . . . poetizing (what Heidegger calls Dichtung) could be called the true vocation of the philosopher and of the experiential phenomenologist . . . . phenomenologically focused . . . articulations of experience cannot be other than poetic. . . . Poetizing addresses and lays claim to our potential for being; and like a metaphor, it carries us forward. . . . In phenomenological discourse, therefore, the deepest transcendent truth of . . . languaging of experience will be articulated with the sensuous resonance, the emotional spaciousness, and the elemental openness of the poetic word.
> (David Levin, "Poetic Function in Phenomenological Discourse" 228-29)

However, it is with Husserl that Schwartz shares a more specific aim: through description to gain insight into the essential structures of phenomena, and by applying reductive tools to ascertain how such phenomena are constituted in and by consciousness. Whatever similarity obtains between Husserl and Schwartz, it derives from their common interest in the life world, the Lebenswelt, as we shall see. What follows here is a summary of the main features of Husserl's phenomenology, features which accord with Schwartz's epistemology; these will be developed by direct reference to his poetic works in Chapters 5 and 6.

The most comprehensive chronicler of phenomenology, Herbert Spiegelberg, has judged its purposes too protean, its adherents too diverse to term it a "school" or "system," even at the time of the first phenomenological platform in 1913. He chooses to call it "a movement" because its definition cannot be other than a "personal venture" (Phenomenological Movement 1-2). Husserl attempted to elaborate a non-empirical definition of philosophy by inventing a new way of looking at the contents of consciousness and sought a fresh approach to concretely-experienced phenomena by bracketing their contingent aspects. Schwartz answers enthusiastically, and with a great deal of local colour, as we shall see in the ensuing sections, Husserl's landmark clarion call, "Zu den Sachen selbst," "to the things themselves" with which he closed his treatise "Philosophy as Rigorous Science" (qtd. in Spiegelberg Phenomenological Movement 109 and Ideas 74), and which was first sounded by Hegel in his "Preface" to the System of Science (Heidegger 379-80).

As we shall see in the section on the limits of knowledge, Schwartz's speaker enacts the situation of the "babbling women" of the chorus in Murder in the Cathedral, who "know and do not know" (21), the phenomenological dilemma. Husserl's quest for apodictic certainty Schwartz assumes as his very own, with varying degrees of success. In the poem, "The Beautiful American Word, Sure," Schwartz directs attention to its title, and forefronts the textures and pleasures of experience: "I drink the time and touch whatever's near" (SK 27). Most poems in the canon, in one way or another, measure the accessibility or attainability of essential knowledge desired by phenomenology. The historical role of phenomenology is seen in its alignment with the foes of naturalism and logical positivism while it defends the traditional

preserve of a spiritual philosophy of values. Schwartz's philosophical evolution followed a similar path:

> Rigorous philosophical speculations proliferated in the poem's [Having Snow] early drafts. Delmore had become a proficient logical positivist while still in college and his notes amount to a sophisticated critique of its limitations. The attempt to confine knowledge to what G.E. Moore described as "sense-data" -- that which impinged on our senses alone -- was inadequate to Delmore's conception of Having Snow. . . . (Atlas 69)

The phenomenological engagement with the nature and reliability of perception, and its concomitant challenge to the logical positivists, haunts his essays, as it does his poetry: "The 'limitation to sense data' . . . is the basis of Having Snow" (Beinecke), as we shall see in the conclusion.

According to David White, "Husserl's work, both methodological and substantive, stands squarely within the perspectives first opened by Kant and developed by his successors" (409). Phenomenon, from the Greek phainomenon, from phainesthai, "to appear," and "phanein," "to show," is both the object of our perception and that which appears to our consciousness. Kant uses the term Ersheinung, in contrast to noumenon or thing-in-itself, as a presentation, cognition or experience whose form depends upon the synthetic forms of sensibility and categories of understanding. Kant's emphasis on the "mental apparatus of the knowing subject" (Gillis 79) appealed to Husserl and to Schwartz alike: "The transcendental turn made a divine bridge between subject and object unnecessary. . . . there is no question of knowledge about things-in-themselves but only of phenomena" (79), or their appearances. For Husserl phenomenon is shorthand for pure phenomenon, or that which has been subjected to the phenomenological reduction.[5] Up until 1910, the term "phenomenological" was "everyone's for the asking" (Spiegelberg, Phenomenological Movement 2). He goes on to offer a historiographic map of

various philosophical phenomenologies. The term was introduced by Johann Heinrich Lambert in his Neues Organon where it meant a "theory of Illusion (Schein) and of its varieties (11), thus distinguishing truth from illusion and error. This work inspired Kant, who named part four of his Metaphysical Principles of Natural Science, "Phenomenology." In his correspondence Kant first mentioned the need for a "negative science (phaenomenologia generalis)," to precede metaphysics as a propaedeutic discipline (11) to distinguish between the sensible and intelligible worlds. Spiegelberg notes that Husserl was in agreement with Kant without being aware of the "terminological bridge" with his own theory (11).

Next under consideration is Hegel, whose Phenomenology of the Spirit the French phenomenologists see as a precursor text to their movement. Phenomenology was for Hegel a morphology of consciousness, which ranged from "sensuous consciousness by dialectical necessity to absolute knowledge" (12). Husserl sought to free the Hegelian system from metaphysical and ontological commitments. The last candidate is Charles Sanders Peirce. Peirce's early phenomenological phase may or may not have been available to Schwartz, but his pragmatism rings through such poems as "The Beautiful American Word, Sure" (SK 27) as do his weightier epistemological musings in "Sonnet: The Ghosts of James and Peirce in Harvard Yard": "They have not slept for long and they know all, / Know Time's exhaustion and the spirit's cost" (SK 51). Peirce's "impressive plea for unprejudiced direct inspection free from theorizing interpretation" (17) foretells the suspension of speculative presuppositions so essential to Husserl and seen so frequently in Schwartz's criticism. Husserl was inspired by the proto-phenomenology of Franz Brentano, particularly his descriptive psychology and theory of

intentionality. The above brief discussion serves to set up an equally cursory discussion of the features of Husserl's thought which accord with Schwartz's aesthetic.

There are many salient definitions of Husserlian phenomenology offered by noted literary critics, among them, Christine Brooke-Rose: "Phenomenology eliminated the old dichotomy between realism and idealism by reducing a world, once regarded as transcendental, to its manifestations within consciousness" (123-24). The investigation and subsequent description of phenomena is carried out in complete freedom from presuppositions, either speculative or practical. The phenomenological reduction refines the intentional object to purge it of naturalistic contingencies and empirical irrelevancies to allow a knowledge of its pure essence. Eagleton lucidly presents Husserl's case:

> Although we cannot be sure of the independent existence of things, Husserl argues, we can be certain of how they appear immediately in our consciousness. . . . Objects can be regarded not as things in themselves but as things posited, or "intended" by consciousness. . . . The act of thinking and the object of thought are internally related, mutually dependent. . . . To establish certainty, then, we must first of all ignore, or "put in brackets," anything which is beyond our immediate experience. This, the so-called "phenomenological reduction" is Husserl's first important move . . .; all realities must be treated as pure phenomena, in terms of their appearances in our mind. . . . Phenomenology is a science of pure phenomena. (Literary Theory 55)

With one sweep of the pen Eagleton shows Husserl to have broken all the vessels: empiricism, psychologism, positivism, as well as Kant's classical idealism which failed to show how the mind can know objects outside itself (56-57).

If Eagleton's explanation is the most sober and accessible -- free as it is from the bias of his own historical determinism -- then Merleau-Ponty's discussion of Husserl's thought in the introduction to his Phenomenology of Perception is the most lyrical. Although he was himself "a dissident disciple," in Eugene Kaelin's words, "denied the possibility of the transcendental

reduction" ("Merleau-Ponty, Fundamental Ontologist" 104), Merleau-Ponty has beautifully mapped Husserl's programmatic landscape in Phenomenology of Perception, while deriving an existentialist ontology for himself. His words bear repeating here, at length, yet with significant abridgement: "It is a transcendental philosophy which places in abeyance the assertions arising out of the natural attitude, the better to understand them; but it is also a philosophy for which the world is always 'already there' before reflection begins" (vii). His discussion of the "famous phenomenological reduction" is inspired:

> It is because we are through and through compounded of relationships with the world that for us the only way to become aware of the fact is to suspend the resultant activity, to refuse it our complicity (to look at it ohne mitzumachen, as Husserl often says) or yet again, to put it "out of play." Not because we reject the certainties of common sense and a natural attitude to things -- they are, on the contrary, the constant theme of philosophy -- but because being the supposed basis of any thought, they are taken for granted, and go unnoticed, and because in order to arouse them and bring them to view, we have to suspend for a moment our recognition of them. . . . Reflection does not withdraw from the world towards the unity of consciousness as the world's basis; it steps back to watch the forms of transcendence fly up like sparks from a fire; it slackens the intentional threads which attach us to the world and thus brings them to our notice. . . . (xiii)

Leaving aside the matter of poetry and truth claims, as I.A. Richards waived the entire issue in 1926,[6] Schwartz defends the idea that the view seen out of his window is often a mendacious one: "How each view may be false! / The moonlight's lie, error's fecundity" (G 4). Schwartz issues his own normative recommendation not to take literary sentences as truths: "The most attractive and valuable traits of fiction and poetry -- are clearly, primitive forms of fiction, like telling or making up lies" ("Zola's Camera and Hegel's White Elephant: Notes on the Philosophy of Fiction" Beinecke). Husserl himself is sensitive to the paradoxical co-existence of fiction and truth: "Hence if anyone loves a paradox, he can really say and say with strict

truth, if he will allow for the ambiguity, that the element which makes up the life of phenomenology, as of all eidetic science is 'fiction,' that fiction is the source whence the knowledge of 'eternal truths' draws its sustenance" (Ideas 184). Poetry, as a sub-class of fiction, must also bracket our "natural" attitude to the appearance of objects, allowing for "error's fecundity." Penned in post-Ricardian times, Schwartz's poems must be read independent of empirical canons of truth and falsity.

Husserl developed his theories of reductions and epoché[7] to purge phenomena of all constructive interpretations. With all beliefs placed in abeyance as a matter of method, one can truly speak of "pure" phenomena. Toward that end, a procedure of reduction is instituted: "I do not . . . deny this 'world' as though I were a sophist, I do not doubt that it is there as though I were a sceptic; but I use the 'phenomenological' epoché which completely bars me from using any judgment that concerns spatio-temporal existence" (Ideas 100). Husserl sees the reductive aspect of phenomenology as deriving from Descartes' program of universal doubt.[8] While most parenthetical poetic statements are of the manner of the aside, or simply information which is of parenthetic importance -- "(Extremely gratifying signs of pleasure)" ("The Silence Answered Him Accusingly" VP 54);" (Pretend no more that happiness does not exist!)" ("Some Present Things Are Causes of True Fear" VP 56); "(After so many years to come to this!)" ("I Wish I Had Great Knowledge or Great Art" VP 73) -- others evince a conscious will to suppress truth: "(His mother once so svelte, so often sick! / Towering father did this: what a trick!)" ("A Young Child and his Pregnant Mother" SK 43). Husserl's thoughts on the subject run parallel: "This 'putting out of play' of all positions taken toward the already-given Objective world and . . . all existential positions . . . does not leave us confronting nothing. . . . What we acquire

by it is my pure living: . . . phenomena in the phenomenological sense" (Cartesian Meditations 20-21).

While Husserl's earlier career -- Logical Investigations (Logische Untersuchungen) -- concentrated on logical forms and their openness to phenomenological investigation, in his later writings -- Ideas (Ideen zu einer reinen Phanomenologie und phanomenologischen Philosophie) -- the word "transcendental" began to figure more prominently. Schwartz's career followed a similar diachrony as noted above in Atlas' insight on his logical positivism. Yet Schwartz complained in a letter to Maurice Zolotow about the trend of "noting down logical relations, so that they will be entirely free of metaphysical consequences, and thus . . . entirely free of meaning" (L 27). Schwartz's interest in the metaphysical possibilities of the concrete world preoccupied his early career, as we shall see in the last chapter of this section. After 1907 phenomenology passed over into a form of German idealism, employing a "transcendental" mode of inquiry, which, according to Kant, attends to the experiencing of an object rather than to the object itself. By "unhusking" or "stripping" reality of its naturalistic and common sense assumptions, one is left with a focused apprehension of the essences of things. In the poem, "Time's Dedication," the speaker, through a series of renunciations and negative definitions, has reduced the world to its essential features: ". . . not as the dead who do not walk, / And not as the statue in the park, / And not as the rock which meets the wave" (SK 77). These reductions are neither decreative nor indicative of absence; rather they are heuristic and restorative, pointing to recovery and discovery of meaning.

In the Ideas, pure phenomenology is defined as the eidetic science of transcendental subjectivity, contrasted with psychology, or the empirical science of actual subjectivity in the

world. With the three reductions -- phenomenological, transcendental and eidetic -- the perceiver transcends the "natural standpoint" which Husserl defines: "Natural knowledge begins with experience and remains within experience. Thus in the theoretical position which we call the 'natural' standpoint, the total field of possible research is indicated by a single word: that is, the World" (Ideas 45). The phenomenological reduction makes possible the transcendental reduction, rendering pure consciousness accessible. This, in turn, lays the groundwork for the eidetic reduction which reduces things to their essential form. Husserl's rejection of the natural standpoint has its precursor in Nietzsche's exposé of the "anthropomorphic error," that is, the error of identifying the constructs of the intellect with reality itself. Schwartz, contrarily, legitimizes that error in his poem "I Did Not Know the Truth of Growing Trees":

> My hands stretched to touch the rough and broken
> Bark to feel, again and again, an instance and a token
> Of reality's texture . . .
> .....
> . . . but the tree is true:
> And this is what I did not know, although I
> always thought I knew
> how a growing tree is true. (SK 207)

Though not specifically named, the "truth" evasively alluded to is not one of correspondence, or "truth to," but rather one of coherence, or "truth of." Indeed truth and reality are antipodal: "[the dynasty of discovery] . . . is ruled by a dialectic of poles apart: / The synthesis is thus: / It is true. It is not real . . ." ("Narcissus" LLP 72).

In his efforts to elaborate this faith, Schwartz's poetry features the seeing and fixing of essences as they are revealed both in the intentional act (noesis) and its objective referent, or the stuff of intention (noema), thus anchoring the phenomena of perception in the phenomenology of the lived body. The noema, or the objective manifestation of the intentional act is, according

to Mikel Dufrenne in his essay, "The Phenomenological Approach to Poetry," the poem itself. He goes on to describe the central labour of the phenomenological critic: "to understand the semantic function of poetry we must go from the poetic noema to the poetic noesis" (17).

b) Schwartz and Critics of Consciousness

There have been landmark studies of the bearing of the phenomenological movement on important authors, of whom Poe, James and Stevens are the most essential.[9] This is not a phenomenological reading in the manner of Merleau-Ponty, who seeks to furnish the reader access to the author's consciousness, or Iser who divides critical attention along lines of implied or actual readership, or the Geneva Critics, Poulet and Starobinski among them, who want to understand the essence of writing as it appears to the critics' consciousness, or J. Hillis Miller who seeks to uncover recreatively the work's pervasive mental structures: "The cogito is the primary moment of the revelation of the self to itself in an 'act of self-consciousness' separating the mind from everything which may enter it from the outside" ("Geneva School" 290). While Miller's task of defining a new existentialist ontology is not applicable to Schwartz's aesthetic, his concern with "immanence" in his books Poets of Reality and The Disappearance of God is commensurate with Schwartz's phenomenological world view: "the belief in literature as a form and revelation of human knowledge, and the belief in a progressing history of metaphysical insight" (Lawall 208). As I noted in the introduction, I am not as concerned here with entering Schwartz's consciousness, as I am with pointing to consciousness as one of his thematic preoccupations. Schwartz himself was bracingly uninterested in reception theory as conceived by Jauss and exposed in his day by Wimsatt's and Beardsley's formulation of the "affective

fallacy." Schwartz preferred his own typologies. The phenomenological centrality of the reader's experience to the literary process, along with the intersubjective relation between author and reader, will be set aside.

Schwartz openly problematizes phenomenological hallmarks of criticism, although what this might have meant to him is imprecise: "The Phenomenological Analysis of: Fiction, Poems, Plays, and other Artworks. Irreversible track of Arthood [sic], of Selfhood. Lists and Catalogues fugalized [sic] as by sensational juxtaposition" (J 511). Phenomenological analyses of art and literature are greatly diversified, highly idiosyncratic and peculiar to each individual critic. And insofar as these variations highlight, in one way or another, the role of perception in both the creative and critical acts, there are some points of convergence with Schwartz's works. Schwartz asserts the concrete terms of exchange between writer and critic: "One would suppose . . . that the mastery of experience involved in a poem is a matter of perception, the mastery of language, and the poet's ability to bring to bear upon perception and within language his sense of values" ("Primitivism and Decadence" SE 335). Mario J. Valdés makes the point that phenomenological hermeneutics is "relational" rather than absolutist, based as it is on art as experience and "world-making" within a community of readers (Phenomenological Hermeneutics 3). He further points to the importance of Vico in laying the groundwork: "Vico . . . postulates that when man perceives the world, without being fully aware of it, he perceives the shape of his own mind imposed on the given data. Therefore data can have meaning only in so far as the mind that perceives has structures to cope with them" (8).

Schwartz shares this homocentricity: "The sunlight bright on the green windowshade" is apparent because the "mind's knowing" is there to register it ("Sonnet: O City, City" SK 52).

As Schwartz collapses the distinction between subject and object, the phenomenological critic reconciles the division between the subjective self and the objective world to establish a unity of the lived reality in consciousness. Bachelard's psychogenetic project of determining the onset of the image in consciousness, his return to the primordial and archetypal structures of consciousness and his "phenomenological determination of images" in a "phenomenology of the soul" (xviii) is foreign to Schwartz's ambition. And while Schwartz might have rejected the anti-cognitive sentiment of the thought that "forces are manifested in poems that do not pass through the circuits of knowledge" (xviii), Bachelard's location of the "poetic logos" in spatial structures of the image is instructive in an elucidation of the visual descriptiveness of the hard data of Schwartz's poetic world.

There is much in Schwartz's view of the conciliatory relation between essences and empirical objects which accords with Merleau-Ponty's anti-idealist revision of Husserl[10] and his phenomenology of perception. The poem "Prothalamion" offers a connection between consciousness and body ("owned body," corps propre): "And what your body and what your spirit bears / I will, like my own body, cure and tend" (SK 45). Schwartz characteristically injects here a note of responsibility into the familiar spectacle of the body's corruption of the soul. Schwartz's poem, "The Would-Be Hungarian," is testament to Merleau-Ponty's existential rendering of Husserl's quandary: "Because we are in the world, we are condemned to meaning" (xix): "Or in the secret places of the mind and heart. . . ./ This is the fame the game and the names of our fate: / This we must suffer or must celebrate" (SK 165). Both Merleau-Ponty and Schwartz (Aiken, "I: World" 219), then, were inspired by Husserl's characterization of man as a creature of relatedness: "Man is always in the world, yes!" (Coriolanus SK 93).

Roman Ingarden, along with Mikel Dufrenne, as essentialists, "reject, in the spirit of Husserl, the psychologistic tendencies of the search for the author's consciousness hidden in the experiential patterns of his works" (Detweiler 32). While he addresses the cognition of the literary work of art in the book of that title, in the companion text, The Literary Work of Art, Ingarden asks the question, one Schwartz implicitly answers in his criticism: "What are the essential properties . . . of that mode of being which the literary work of art uniquely possesses?" (David Levin, "Foreword," Literary Work of Art xvi). While drawing on certain Husserlian principles for ideological grounding, Ingarden is as firmly grounded as Schwartz is in an Aristotelian sense of the literary unities. Ingarden's four strata of the work of art as detailed in his opus, The Literary Work of Art, would have appealed to Schwartz's enumerative and categorical sense: word sound and higher phonetic forms; units of meaning; represented objectivities and schematized images of these objects. Rules are embedded in "phenomenological strata" (368). Husserl himself distinguished layers in phenomenological description, while defining "substrative categories" (Ideas 74-75). According to Ingarden, the literary work's "spots of indeterminacy" ordain only a partial grasp of its strata by the reader. Schwartz's strata of activity are enacted on various levels: street, window, sky ("In the Naked Bed, in Plato's Cave" SK 25); subway, street, office building, elevated train ("Sonnet: O City, City" SK 52). According to a phenomenological theory of description, ". . . we recognize first of all that the representation of a fictive world involves as diverse and complex a system of epistemic strata as the apprehension of the phenomenal, real world" (Gelley 417).

The attempt to enter the consciousness of the writer and hence interpret the work in the same spirit in which it was created is one to which Schwartz occasionally gives poetic voice.

His admission falls just short of Auden's idea that a book reads us: "I am a book I neither wrote nor read. . . . / I no more wrote than read that book which is / The self I am" ("I Am a Book I Neither Wrote Nor Read" SK 200). Yet elsewhere he affirms the enclosure of the hermeneutical circle in the reciprocity of the interpretive act: "So virtue lies in circumstances alone, / And every time interprets us" (Coriolanus SK 130). As Magliola assesses it, "because language is gestural . . . the literary work bears within itself the unique imprint of the author's own consciousness . . . [which is] immanent in the literary work and critically available there" (28). While the question of how the self knows itself is of great consequence to Schwartz, its grammatological transformation at the hands of the phenomenological critics -- how the self writes itself -- is foreign to him.

Schwartz issues an appeal to the reader, delivered in vocative tones: "Be then the active reader, active knower / Even in parts -- Bend down the page you want" (J 29). Schwartz believes, with the "critics of consciousness"[11] after him, that responsiveness to the aesthetic object "which has objectively ascertainable forms" (Lawall 1)[12] is fundamentally active and presuppositionless. In a letter to Paul Goodman, Schwartz, anticipating Miller's reflexive term, "consciousness about consciousness, literature about literature" ("The Geneva School" 277), defines critical knowledge: "It is more like knowledge than 'like' anything else, because in each instance we have a kind of conscious contact with the object" (L 29). Georges Poulet, in his essay, "Phenomenology of Reading," goes further in making claims for the identity of the consciousnesses of the reader and the writer:

> In short the extraordinary fact in the case of a book is the falling away of the barriers between you and it. You are inside it; it is inside you; there is no longer either outside or inside. . . . I am aware of a rational being of a consciousness . . . of another [which]

> welcomes me and lets me look deep inside itself, and even allows me, with unheard of license, to think what it thinks and feel what it feels. (1213)

However, for Schwartz, because the objective reality of the work is mitigated by the creative power which gives it shape, the identity of writer and reader can never be complete.

Mikel Dufrenne labelled the poem an "expressed world"; Schwartz's poems grapple with the epistemological terms of that expression. The writer must exert an historical imagination and have a "sense of his own time and a sense of intellectual responsibility toward his own experience [and] must of necessity attempt to digest [it] into his own poetry. . . . The difficult and ineluctable task is to say something intelligent and just about modern experience . . . and the intelligence and the justice made relevant to it" ("Ezra Pound's Very Useful Labors" SE 108). Schwartz lends supportive voice to Dufrenne's determination of the task of the phenomenological approach to poetry, that is, "to describe the lived-experience of poetry and to bring out the meaning of poems revealed in the experience" ("The Phenomenological Approach to Poetry" 13). Dufrenne goes on to say, in language reminiscent of Jakobson's concern with the "literariness" of the text, that the phenomenology of poetry lets one take hold of "the poeticalness as well as the ontology of poetry" (13). To identify Schwartz's characteristic metaphor -- "the grammar of night," "attention's white breakfast" -- is to grasp the "poeticalness," as well as the essence of Schwartz's poetry. To the extent that the phenomenological viewpoint affords one access to a "grammar of poetry," it is indeed, according to Dufrenne, a "privileged" approach (14, 17, 13). Schwartz registers that privilege in celebrating in his poetry both the phenomenality of his lived world and its essential aspect.

Endnotes to Chapter 4

[1] Phenomenalism, distinguished from phenomenology, reduces knowledge to what can be perceived or observed in consciousness about the external world. As opposed to transcendental phenomenology, phenomenalism posits that we cannot know the ultimate nature of reality itself. Its arena is only physical matter; the intentional structures of phenomenology are inimical to it.

[2] This is borne out by Harriet Davidson. While noting that Husserl is mentioned in Eliot's thesis on F.H. Bradley, she traces Eliot's interest in Meinong who studied under the ur-phenomenologist Brentano (65). She goes on to attest to Eliot's attraction to the phenomenological method of "rejecting assumptions about reality in order to describe the world accurately" (66).

[3] Establishing a hierarchy, von Hartmann determined that a phenomenology of the moral consciousness was preliminary to the discovery of moral principles.

[4] Husserl's article was retained until 1955.

[5] Spiegelberg notes various specific usages of the word "phenomenon," including "Brentano's: any item for scientific exploration, notably physical and psychological phenomena; Hegel's: whatever appears in the history of the spirit, as a manifestation of that spirit and Heidegger's: what shows itself directly, the apparent" (Phenomenological Movement 750).

[6] In his Science and Poetry with his designation for poetry, the "pseudostatement." The phenomenological method of placing our beliefs in abeyance, resonates through Richards' view of poetry which has us "cut our pseudostatements free from . . . belief," and yet retain them in this released state as the "main instruments by which we order our attitudes to one another and to the world" (61).

[7] From the Greek for "a check." Epoché is a technical term used by the Greek sceptic philosophers to refer to a suspension of judgment about truth or falsity, or belief or unbelief in ideas until a better determination can be made. Husserl, however, was not advocating a return to scepticism but rather a questioning of presuppositions until they could be established on a firmer basis, after examining the full range of experience. As a mathematician, Husserl used the term bracketing (Einklammerung) to place an equation out of question for a moment while its larger context is investigated. In his later philosophy, he uses the terms "reduction," "bracketing" and "epoché" interchangeably.

[8] Descartes' procedures of doubt instructed Husserl. In the Britannica article he writes: "The theme propounded in the meditations was still dominant as a philosophy which it had initiated. All reality, so it ran . . . may be said to exist only as the content of our representations judged in our judgements, or at best proved by our knowing. . . . Descartes' doubting first disclosed transcendental subjectivity and his 'Ego cogito' was its first conceptual handling. One could be mistaken in his judgements about the world or anything 'transcendent' of experience. But the 'immanent' experiences concerning the world . . . cannot be doubted."

[9] For books on specific authors see Armstrong on James, Brodtkorb on Melville, Halliburton on Poe, Hines, Macksey and Miller (The Act of the Mind; Poets of Reality) on Stevens, Rowe on James, and Silver on Ortega Y Gasset. For the general theoretical crosscurrents of phenomenology and literature see works by Bové, Lawall, Magliola and Valdés.

[10] For a full discussion of the theoretical and political misalliances of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, see Eugene F. Kaelin's discussion, An Existentialist Aesthetic.

[11] See Sarah Lawall's landmark study where she distinguishes the ontological, phenomenological, genetic and thematic strains of the school. "Criticism of consciousness" is Poulet's term (viii).

[12] She goes on to say that "these unimpeachable aesthetic observations (are) a welcome relief from the historical and philosophical attitudes that used to tie literature to a variety of extraliterary beliefs" (1).

Chapter 5

CONSCIOUSNESS, SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS AND REFLEXIVITY

> Chiefly his reflection, of which the portrait
> Is the reflection once removed.
>
> John Ashbery, Self-Portrait in a Convex Mirror (68)

> To begin with, let us affirm that philosophy and literature . . . stem from a common source: the invention of the sense of experience. "Inventing the sense" means . . . "inward" promptings, propulsions, reactions. . . . It means orchestrating [one's] functions of sensing, intellecting and imagining in a mode of reflection upon [oneself], [one's] life and its meaning; means the origin of culture and the establishment of the specifically human life-world.
>
> Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, "The Theme: The Poetic, Epic and Tragic Genres As the Existential Coordinates of The Human Condition"
> (Analecta Husserliana 18, ix)

a) "Attention's White Breakfast": Consciousness

Schwartz's poetic project bears the stamp of Husserlian intentionality, or Intentionalität, as he expresses it in his Cartesian Meditations: "Conscious processes are . . . called intentional; but then the word intentionality signifies nothing else than the universal fundamental property of consciousness: to be conscious of something; as a cogito, to bear within itself its cogitatum" (33).[1] In the poem, "True Recognition Often is Refused," the speaker intends not only objects in the phenomenal field ("Knowing there are, in fullness and in flower, / Chrysanthemums and Mozart in the room. . . ."), but also himself: "We poets by the past and future used" (VP 20). In further Husserlian language, the subjective processes are reflectively discovered as immanent in the stream of consciousness itself. Mental acts are coterminous with their objects: "The mind

resembles all creation, / The mind is all things, in a way: / Deceptive as pure observation . . ." ("My Mind to me a Kingdom Is" VP 8).

Schwartz is aware of the vital symbiotic relationship between noesis and its noemata located within the sphere of the cogitative life. This is what Spiegelberg terms the Husserlian "parallelism between the subjective act and of its objective correlate" (Phenomenological Movement 93). In this section, and the next, we will see how the Schwartzian poetic mind constitutes phenomenal reality through acts of intentional consciousness, perception and description. If, according to Brodtkorb, "phenomenology applied to criticism assumes that arrangements of letters on a page express states of mind and thereby make manifest states of being" (3), then Schwartz's poetic declarations have abiding intentional resonance. His countless references to acts of will highlight the importance of intentionality to Schwartz's world view. The objects to which consciousness is intentionally-directed are for Schwartz "the willed [emphasis mine] / Icons of purified consciousness" ("Seurat" SK 196).

Between the act itself and the object to which it is directed, Husserl has identified a fundamental correspondence, a "radical community" (radikale Gemeinsamkeit) (Ideas). For Schwartz, as well, the subject intending and the object intended exist in communion. He refers to the De Anima:

> Aristotle describes the mind's act, when it knows, in such a way that a kind of identity seems to exist between the act of knowledge and the act of imitation. The mind when it knows "becomes" the object which it knows. . . . The intellect, when it knows the triangularity of a triangle, becomes at the moment merely that meaning, triangularity. . . . (PI 4-5)

He cites Aristotle again: "actual knowledge is identical with its object." Schwartz goes on to establish, through phenomenal instance, that the eye becomes that green olive, as the finger

becomes hot. Hence "knowledge and sense impression are made possible" (PI 4). Here we can see that theories of intentionality and identity had their proper purchase on his imagination from a very young age. In DBB, Dr. Bergen's philosophy, which has a cult-like following, is replete with Husserlian imperatives to "consciousness of":

> Think of the objects for which you care. . . . Be conscious of the different worth you confer upon them. . . . Resort to a painstaking examination in the fullness of consciousness, examine your desires in the detail of a moment. . . . Be conscious of . . . the event active or passive, multitudinous, misunderstood at the moment of being. . . . This examination of consciousness is your duty and your consolation. (IDBR 155, 151)

Since Kant, the act of cognition came to be understood as a dialectic of subject and object, replacing the strict dualism of Descartes' res cogitans and res extensae. Coleridge, drawing on Schelling, subsequently institutionalized its applications for literature by suggesting in the Biographia Literaria that in the "act of knowledge objectivity and subjectivity . . . are co-instantaneous" (Engell and Bate 255). With Husserl, the process of de-polarization is complete. As Quentin Lauer explains The Triumph of Subjectivity:

> The ideal which Husserl held out by avoiding in philosophical investigation the Scylla of uncritical objectivism and the Charybdis of arbitrary subjectivism. . . . [He saw] the necessity of lessening the gap between subject and object. . . . He also faced the necessity of approaching the problem with the only instruments at his disposal . . . [those] clearly contained in consciousness itself. (11)

In Having Snow, Schwartz presents a series of epistemological observations by R.P. Blackmur, which point to the difficulty of reducing consciousness to its objects. It is a meditation on the redirecting of the study of consciousness from internal sensation to its outward objectivities: "Consciousness seems always to stop short of its objects . . ." (Beinecke). Robert Magliola is quick to indicate that this distinction between modes of consciousness and its contents is an artificial one for the phenomenologist:

> Nor is it the case that modes of consciousness designate the subjective, and the contents of consciousness designate the objective. Needless to say, such a formula would vitiate phenomenology's whole raison d'être. Rather the modes designate the concretely differentiated functions of consciousness and consciousness here means intentionality, the reciprocal implication of self and world.
> The contents of consciousness are the quiddities, self and world involved in consciousness, that is, intentionality. (35)

The subject of a portrait is confounded by the boundaries of her subjective self and the external world:

> Her father's early portrait shows
> Her gaze turned inward and her hands
> In a delicate diffident pose
> Tiger-lilies lightly clasped.
> Who shall [sic] say he understands
> What fingers on flowers signed and masked?
> ("The Desperado of Willy Nully" VP 81)

Spiegelberg concedes that Husserl's inclination "toward subjectivity is the ultimate foundation for the new scientific rigour which he wanted to bring to philosophy" ("How Subjective is Phenomenology?" 72). Since all objective experience is really intersubjective, or public, experience, there is no escape from subjectivity. Schwartz, like Husserl, presents a radical subjectivism. In Narcissus, self and other are equated by the parataxis of conjunction: "Other than all the others and my self" (LLP 80). Altieri notes this unifying tendency in another of Schwartz's sources, Whitehead. Percept and the action of the perceiver are complicit: "Human knowledge is a way of unity with the world, of creating meaning and of being created by what one perceives. . . . Knowledge is the indestructible unity of the action of a prehending agent and a set of data" ("From Symbolist Thought to Immanence" 623-24).

In true phenomenological form, a literary work is both an object and a form of consciousness because it arises from the intentional preserves of the authorial act. But

subjectivity, as a central category of the phenomenological approach, takes Schwartz beyond confessionalism, intentionalism and lyricism. For Bachelard the ontology of the image must be studied in the context of "the duality of subject and object [which] is shimmering, increasingly active in its inversions" (xv). Schwartz betrays just this sense of active inversion in deflecting attention from subject to object in this bit of autotelicist objectivism: "The act of contemplation is concentrated upon the thing itself, by itself and for itself; that is to say, for what it is, apart from the beholder. . . . The high degree of order in any kind of art . . . functions to enforce a concentration upon the object as itself. . . " (Eliot ts, Beinecke). Isolating and distinguishing the poem as a separable and knowable object, he does not batter the object[2] by negating its singularity and iconicity. Although he makes the subject-object opposition the subtext of his study, The Uncreating Word, Irving Massey notes that this antipathy is anathema to the dominant philosophies of this century, especially phenomenology, "in which percept is a field of fire and force, a crucible of stresses rather than a reality reflected in a subjective screen" (6). One reads these lines of Schwartz's with an eye to just this trial of force: ". . . hardly aware / Of the tumult, the brass, the flashing heat, / Their congregated act" (Coriolanus SK 97).

According to Douglas Dunn, "A revelation of consciousness, an apperception of consciousness itself, was Schwartz's subject. Abstract as it undoubtedly sounds . . . it was nonetheless a goal that Schwartz made tangible" (xvi), which tangibility is owed to the phenomenological instruction. R.P. Meiners more boldly offers, "to a remarkable degree, the explicit subject of his poetry is the implicit subject of all modern poetry: the terrible difficulties of consciousness" (325). Schwartz tenders a more active definition than Henry James offers in his "Art of Fiction," where the "immense sensibility" of experience is seen as a "kind of huge

spider-web of the finest silken threads suspended in the chamber of consciousness, and catching every air-borne particle in its tissue" (56). For Schwartz, consciousness, in its intentional cast, is knowledge: "the predicament of the consciousness that knows" (Blackmur, qtd. in Having Snow, Beinecke); "And possessing the knowledge which is behind knowledge and after consciousness / After consciousness is known to be a part of passage" (J 472). Both anterior and posterior, the processes of intending and the objects as intended, are often poetically confounded. The dual spiritual citizenship is a characteristically Wordsworthian predicament, as he details it in The Prelude: ". . . musing on them, often do I seem / Two consciousnesses, conscious of myself / And of some other Being" (Book II, 75). Dual consciousness can be read phenomenologically as the monosubjective constitution of the phenomenal world existing within the intersubjective harmony of multiple noetic systems:

> When we are in step, running together
> Our pace equal our motion one
> Then we will be well, parallel and equal,
> Running together down the macadam road,
> Walking together on the receding road,
> Like Chaplin and his orphan sister,
> Moving together through time to all good. ("Time's Dedication" SK 77)

The happy ultimate line, "Moving together through time to all good," contains unspoken moral recommendations and directives.

The Husserlian conception of intersubjectivity is "a plurality of subjectivities making up a community sharing a common world" (Spiegelberg, Phenomenological Movement 747). This pairing of transcendental egos, established in his Cartesian Meditations, is the model, possibly, for Schwartz's thoughts on the natural tendency toward universality in the poetic text:

> . . . a poet has feelings, observations, attitudes which are in him speaking crudely once more, in their full qualitative happiness. The poet wishes to establish these

> observations, feelings etc. outside himself once and for all, in the full light in a stadium from which the crowd never goes home. The only way in which to get his private possessions into that public place is by using words in certain formal ways . . . and by otherwise drawing upon what is the common property[3] of all who can read the language. All of this and more is involved in the notion of representing a substance. ("Critical Method of R.P. Blackmur" SE 354)

Schwartz attests to an intersubjective nexus of reciprocal relations: "The mind possesses and is possessed . . ." ("Overture" Narcissus LLP 60). Here a joint epistemological situation is enacted. Ihab Hassan, in one of his "paracritical" works, identifies consciousness as both a modern and post-modern literary preoccupation, whose "nimbus hangs over our rhetoric": "Certainly, Consciousness has become one of our key terms, replacing Honor, Faith, Reason, or Sensibility as the token of our intellectual passion, the instrument of our cultural will" ("The New Gnosticism" 549). His gnostic project is "the creation and continual recreation / of human consciousness / until consciousness redeems itself in complete knowledge" (555).

The most extended contemplation on consciousness, its poetic vagaries and literary vicissitudes, is the part of Having Snow called, "Exercise: That Kind of Consciousness." It is a meditation, largely, on the historical consciousness, whose chief task it is "to see the present as if it were the past, head reversed upon the body's trunk." But the specific "scenes," as Schwartz calls them, where "this kind of consciousness" is played out, are arenas of extreme self-awareness: "The trackrunner was himself in imagination before the starting gun, bursting against the tape, breathless, paralyzed, at one moment of time by the camera; just as the hurdler sees himself sideways in the air, his stick just released and falling the other way, forever placed in that aerial passage" (Beinecke). The "scenes" of "consciousness [as] memory" are in the poetry: "Winter passes in the lighted streetcar / Moves at midnight, one scene of the past, / Droll and unreal, stiff, stilted and hooded" ("Cambridge Spring, 1937" SK 57). Again, we have

a temporal definition: ". . . consciousness is memory . . . I go forwards, backwards, a most solemn clown. . . . The present is not seen but lived through" ("Exercise; That Kind of Consciousness," Beinecke). In the theatre of the poem, "In the Naked Bed, in Plato's Cave," the scenes from "That Kind of Consciousness" are presented aspectually, with incrementally-heightened awareness:

> I rose from bed, lit a cigarette,
> And walked to the window. The stony street
> Displayed the stillness in which buildings stand,
> The street lamp's vigil and the horse's patience. (SK 25)

Metaphors function truly as figures of intentionality, on the Husserlian model: "Thinking of a key, each confirms a prison" (Having Snow). The constituted world emerges, without traditional syntax, out of the stream of one's experiences: "Meanings spring quickly and a-grammatically into consciousness" (Having Snow). Schwartz himself writes passionately on the theme of the vital relation of consciousness to life's moral and intellectual concerns. In citing Blackmur again as an arbiter of taste and master of definition, Schwartz endows consciousness with deontological commitments: "The weapon is knowledge, a sharpening. . . of the fragments of consciousness. The pursuit is full of victory and assertion. . . . the abyss surveyed by consciousness widens, consciousness topples and is engulfed. . . . Between terms we are conscious of more or less" (qtd. in Having Snow). Husserl's triad "ego-cogito-cogitatum" inspires some poems: "My mind's [ego] continuing and unreleasing wind [cogito/consciousness] / Touches this single of your flowers [cogitatum/intended object] ("Will You Perhaps Consent To Be" SK 64). Consciousness, according to Husserl, "bears in itself . . . its particular cogitatum. . ." (Cartesian Meditations 28). Schwartz similarly stresses the active nature of consciousness, endowing it here with visual properties: "It is the city consciousness / which sees

and says: more: more: and more: always more" ("America! America!" LLP 4). Elsewhere its dynamism boldly dances on the page: "How suddenly all consciousness leaped in spontaneous gladness" or ascends to uncharted heights: "Their voices . . . / speaking the words / which are more than words, with mounting consciousness" ("The First Night of Fall and Falling Rain" LLP 14; "Is It the Morning? Is It the Little Morning?" SK 166).

Consciousness is his passport to new worlds on vertiginously moving ships: "I am an immigrant of consciousness" (J 128). For Schwartz, the poet as maker effects the creative office of his "making" consciousness which both "assumes" and "constructs":

> These are acts of invention and love,
> Uniting experience and heightening consciousness,
> Hence poetry makes the past rise from the
> sepulcher, like Lazarus
> It makes a lion into a sphinx and a girl
> As it gives to a girl the splendor of Latin
> For poetry invented the unicorn, the centaur,
> the Phoenix. . . .
>
> Hence it is true that poetry is an
> Everlasting ark
> An omnibus of all the mind's animals
> It is the supreme sunlight of consciousness
> Making love eloquent, giving tongue to forgiveness. (J 501)

Schwartz does not distinguish poetry from the poetic consciousness, implicating them both in a grab-bag of functions. The junction of poetry and the poetic consciousness is also the meeting place of epistemology and ontology: "Poetry is the sunlight of consciousness / It is also the soil of the fruits of knowledge / In the orchards of being" ("The Kingdom of Poetry" SK 188).

The "inventiveness" of the poetic consciousness calls to mind Coleridge's "co-adunating," or secondary, imagination which "dissolves, diffuses, dissipates in order to recreate" (Biographia Literaria, Woodring 98). In the modernist idiom, consciousness is seen as "germinal," projecting

visionary forms which interpret nature anew. This is what Schwartz terms acts of invention, combining experience and "heightened consciousness," the "primordial act of literature" (Eliot ts Beinecke). Schwartz can isolate the moment of contemplation, "the mind still as a frieze" ("Out of the Watercoloured Window" SK 36). Consciousness invites a meditative turn in some poems, inward toward its own processes, like the "masters" such as Wordsworth who "fingered every coiled snake of the mind," and "harked to the mariner who talked all night / Of the real world, pure consciousness as such" ("The Masters of the Heart Touched the Unknown" VP 35). Although he might have confused Coleridge for Wordsworth here, Schwartz nonetheless falls squarely into the tradition Louis Martz has earmarked, "meditative" (4). This is Stevens' "poem of the act of the mind" of his poem "Of Modern Poetry" (Collected Poems 240), which finds itself, interstitially for Schwartz, "at some crack / Of [his] mind's form" (J 200). Schwartz confirms Winters' assessment of poetry as "the last refinement of contemplation" ("Primitivism and Decadence by Yvor Winters" SE 334).

Schwartz responded to Henry James's challenge to "place the centre of the subject in the [character's] own consciousness" ("Preface," Portrait of a Lady, xv). He read well James's corollary directive: "Stick to that -- for the centre; put the heaviest weight into that scale, which will be so largely the scale of [the character's] relation to herself." Consciousness is, in its most colloquial incarnation, awareness, the spider web whose "finest silken threads" (cited above) do not merely catch life's particles, but register and assimilate them. The proliferation of words in his poetic lexicon, such as "grasping," "awareness," and "understanding" points to the ever-widening circumference of Schwartz's hermeneutical circle. Indeed, deep understanding and interpretation, however vaguely conceived, are necessary for poetic maturity, as we see in

Schwartz's citation of Bossuet's epigram in Having Snow, about understanding and penetrating a matter, cited in Chapter 1. After Schwartz's day, hermeneutics passed from Schleiermacher's biblical exegesis to the arena of literary criticism with Gadamer's idealizing efforts, later to be validated by Richard Rorty's claim, referred to in the introduction, that epistemology, is reborn in hermeneutics (Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature 389-94). This development seems to be anticipated by Schwartz: "We have to insist that the poem is . . . experience grasped, understood and evaluated. Yet we cannot as literary critics, dictate the terms of such understanding and evaluation" ("Primitivism and Decadence by Yvor Winters" SE 339).

This non-directive interpretation of the poem's idiolect defies Riffaterre's programmatic efforts to establish a hermeneutic model which is a "frame, system, angle of vision": as the "sociolect or the intertext" ("Hermeneutic Models" 7).[4] It is a small leap from the hermeneutic circle -- part - whole - part / past - present - past -- to the proliferation of ball imagery in Schwartz's writing: "The "bouncing ball" of the Czar's children becomes the spherical "baked potato "of Brooklyn, and finally, the circle is complete: "The ground on which the ball bounces / Is another bouncing ball" ("The Ballad of the Children of the Czar" SK 23). What is more, consciousness engages the exegete in a phenomenological confrontation: "Consciousness (in this moment of the circle) is seen once more as phenomenal: the two brown chairs seen by Mutt and Jeff" (J 43). One is reminded here of Poulet's various metamorphoses of the circle, developed in his book of that name, whereby the perceiving agent (Mutt and Jeff) projects a central emanating thought in concentric circles which animate the space between himself and the circle of his perceptions (two brown chairs).

In a recuperative quest for understanding, consciousness, as awareness, becomes necessary for a thoughtful life: "Knowledge," Schwartz avows in a letter to Paul Goodman, is "a kind of conscious contact with the object" (L 29). This awareness of awareness as a guiding force is also present in his poetry: "You, my photographer, you most aware" ("Poem" LLP 26); "The warm bath of awareness mounts again" (Coriolanus SK 107). Awareness is intensified to "attention," as our naturalistic affirmations are suspended in order to understand, and gain naive contact with, the world. His poetic programme, expounded in the introduction to G, is simply to "declare the miraculous character of daily life and ordinary speech" (ix). Generally, however, Husserl's astonishment, or sense of "wonderment" in face of the world (Merleau-Ponty xiii) is rendered more soberly by Schwartz as, simply, "attention." He further radicalizes Husserlian consciousness by removing it from its objects so that it becomes itself an object of inquiry: "It is time for pure attention's / White breakfast. . . ." ("Aubade" LLV 214); "This is the celebration of contemplation, / This is the conversion of experience to pure attention" ("Seurat" SK 195); "To be, to become, and to participate in the sweet congress of serene attention . . ." ("Vivaldi" SK 178).

What is more, "observation," attention's more visual and passive counterpart is a positive value -- "the rapture of observation" (J 110); "Let every line contain an observation, / As every street has, at both ends, a light" (J 27) -- or a deceptive one: "The mind resembles all creation, / The mind is all things, in a way: / Deceptive as pure observation" ("My Mind To Me a Kingdom Is" VP 8). The visual attention of Schwartz's speakers is a directedness toward the intentional object, in Husserlian terms, "to the cogito itself belongs the immanent 'glancing-towards' the object, a directedness which from another side springs forth from the 'Ego' . . .

apprehending an object . . . coincides with mindfully heeding it" (Ideas 109-10). However, "this wakeful intercourse with the correlate-object, this directedness toward it" (223) is not always successful, no matter how resolute one's gaze. Instead of turning towards a given object, the Ego may indeed, not in full "readiness" (178), turn away. Hence the characteristic pose of Schwartz's unfulfilled speaker: "All of us always turning away for solace" ("All of Us Always Turning Away for Solace" SK 63); the uncertain ones "turn from the mantelpiece" ("At This Moment of Time" SK 26).

His "gaze and gazing mind" (Coriolanus SK 107) turn consciousness to attentive regard in a series of imperative gestures: "Regard the child, regard the animal" ("Dogs Are Shakespearean, Children Are Strangers" SK 68); "Regard and judge and having judged, move on!" (J 47); "Return, regard the other incident, / The theft of sickle pears, like Augustine" (G 91). For Shenandoah Fish "regard" defines his life, which is one of oblique commentary: "While they gaze at their glamorous ruling class, / I must stand here, regardant at an angle . . ." (S 14). Sartre later developed Husserl's Blick into a phenomenological description of the human gaze (regard) which establishes the existence of other consciousnesses (Spiegelberg, Phenomenological Movement 523). Consciousness issues its own imperative: "Faithful to your command, O consciousness, O / Beating wings, I studied / the roses and the muses of reality" ("Poem" LLP 39). Consciousness is at once an endowment of privilege -- "O your life, your lonely life / What have you ever done with it / And done with the great gift of consciousness?" ("All Night, All Night" LLP 6) -- and a festering badge of illness: "sick in all consciousness" ("There'll Be Others But Not So For Me" VP 75); "All of this life, it is no happiness / Only the

open wound of consciousness" ("After the Passion Which Made Me a Fool" VP 83). This last image marries Schwartzian guilt with Husserlian intentional engagement with the world.

In reworking previous paradigms for the way we know the world, Schwartz turns acts of consciousness inward toward self-cognition: "Let the observer be observed by all observers in the act of observing what there is to observe" (Coriolanus SK 116). The poem is both an object and a form of consciousness, intent on itself, muscular and prehensile. The ternary construction triply identifies cognitive understanding with a more physical awareness: "They saw me truly, saw my true colors, grasped /And understood the role of my profession" (S 18). The lifeworld is caught in intimate embrace: ". . . poetry is most valuable and most important when it grasps [emphasis mine] experience as such, experience as something lived through" ("The Revaluation of English Poetry" Eliot ts, Beinecke). Yet objects of phenomenological inquiry are known in isolation from the contingencies of their existence. Each poem's local idiom generates the logic of its own idiolect. Mastery and knowledge are given equine embodiment: "And the horses cantered and romped away like the experience of skill; mastered and serene / Power, grasped and governed by reins, lightly held by knowing hands" ("This Is a Poem I Wrote at Night, Before the Dawn" LLP 3). The octopus multiplies the grasp eight-fold, and, as mind, holds onto the fluid sea, remarkably, with stubborn tenacity: "I am the octopus in love with God . . . / Until my mind, deranged in swimming tubes, / Issues its own darkness, clutching seas" ("Prothalamion" SK 48). Elsewhere, observation delivers a combinative function: "My grasping gaze seizes what is a blur / And makes a hybrid of the blur and my desire" (Narcissus LLP 80). The poem is itself a hybrid mutation of mythology and personal anecdote.

Husserl's perceptual terminology corresponds with Schwartz's: ". . . the apprehending and taking possession of involved in perceiving turns . . . into 'having in one's grasp'. . . . synthetic consciousness 'still maintains' in its grasp what it had just grasped: apprehending the new thematic object . . ." (Ideas 316). In a typical Schwartzian signature, consciousness is given a triple duty: "Consciousness has consented, is consumed, has surrendered, to hear only the players playing / This is the grasped reality of reality" ("Vivaldi" SK 179). Characteristically, Schwartz preserves the autonomy of each conscious act in an intellectual division of labour. The horizon is twice segmented by Schwartz's attention, which "constitutes" the "reality" of the musician's lyric song. Schwartz attempts to integrate fragments of the phenomenal world by his sustained and abiding observation. Attention is unadulterated: "Only by looking at the sky, grasping its nature by means of pure attention, can you be convinced that the sky is God's sensorium, God's blue eye" (DBB 164).

Whitehead gives prehensions or sentient graspings a particularly phenomenological reading: "The theory of prehensions embodies a protest against the bifurcation of nature. . . . Prehensions have public careers but they are born privately" (Process and Reality 443-44). The garbled coupling of psychic and existential philosophy -- "Each soul unique and in perpetual prehending is ontology" (J 572) -- might owe its terminology, at least, to Whitehead's notion of the "percipient event" within nature as expounded in Science and the Modern World. An actual occasion is seen as a "prehending" entity in active interaction with its environment. This is Schwartz's self-same sense of the environing realities which press in upon us through kinesthetic sensation. The sense of touch is essential to Schwartz's imaginative struggle with the confronted

world: "The touched, seen substance" ("Abraham and Orpheus Be With Me Now" SK 73) describes the felt and observed affects of the lived world.

Schwartz's alter ego, the heavy bear, lays his imprint on the speaker and on those in his circle:

> That inescapable animal walks with me
> .....
> Stretches to embrace the very dear
> With whom I would walk without him near,
> Touches her grossly. . . .
> ("The Heavy Bear That Goes With Me" SK 74)

With manipulation comes a sort of manual intelligence, reminiscent of Sherwood Anderson's endowing of his characters (notably Wing Biddlebaum, "Hands") with mystical powers effected through touch. While Anderson admits in A Storyteller's Story that love of life "comes only through the love of surfaces, sensually felt through fingers" (81), Schwartz's own motley group of lovely eccentrics "wish to touch each other, touching and touched" (Narcissus LLP 64). Hershey Green's touch allows the objects to figure in his private epistemology:

> What have I ever known? the senses tear,
> Smear, and wring out each luminous thick thing,
> Break the nut, tear at the plum and bloom!
> -- What were they before I touched them? (G)

In his essay, "Tactus Eruditus," R.E. Foust makes the point that the primacy of touch and tactility, the "liberating potentiality of the sensuous touch," is a key to understanding the phenomenological strategy of the author, that is, "this phenomenological concern with the body as recipient of sensation, as percipient of consciousness and as communication's linkage between the two" (208). In Williams' poem, "Della Primavera Transportata al Morale," tactus eruditus is a fragment found in a grab bag of credos, signs and grocery lists (Collected Poems 335). In

"Prothalamion," Schwartz crossbreeds this phenomenological manual erudition and Wordsworthian instruction on childhood sensation from "Ode: Intimations of Immortality" (Oxford Authors 297-302): "Passing the terror of childhood at second hand, / Through nervous, learned fingertips" [emphasis mine] (SK 46). Merleau-Ponty confirms that knowledge is somatically felt: "And like the exploratory gaze of true vision, the 'knowing touch' projects us outside our body through movement. . . . Movement and time are not only an objective condition of knowing touch, but a phenomenal component of tactile data" (315). The "educated touch" which mediates these twin realms for Schwartz's speakers is, here, explosively dangerous, urging one to guarded perspication:

> Yet let me now be careful
> Not to give too much
> To one so shy and fearful
> For like a gun is touch. ("What Is To Be Given" SK 53)

The poem "Seurat" is replete with acts of tenure and manipulation. One's grip is, on the Freudian model, telling of personality: "Each one who holds an umbrella holds it differently" (SK 190):

> Each one holds some thing or some one, some instrument
> Holds grasps, grasps, clutches or somehow touches
> Some form of being as if the hand and fist of holding
> and possessing,
> Alone and privately and intimately, were the only
> genuine lock of bond or blessing.

Whitehead has it that an actual entity "feels" another actual entity in acts of "prehension"; similarly, Schwartz defines relation as a network of prehensions, or "graspings." Charles Altieri defines what this means for the postmodern writer: "Subject and object complement each other. . . . The individual prehending entity is itself a part of the world and potentially data for the

prehending action of others or even of further stages in the life process of the 'prehending' individual" ("From Symbolist Thought to Immanence" 612). With the agenda of intellectual inquiry into our reflective cognition, "grasping" evolves into "beholding": "The one who beholds them, beholding the gold and green / Of summer's Sunday is himself unseen" ("Seurat" SK 190). "Beholding" is a necessary condition for perception:

> A young man of thirty years beholds them
> from a distance. . . .
> He is rich, handsome and empty standing behind
> the linen curtains
> Beholding them
> .....
> . . . poverty darkens discrimination and makes
> perception too vivid. . . .
> ("A Dream of Whitman Paraphrased, Recognized and Made
> Vivid by Renoir" LLP 47)

One observes oneself in the act of observing; one beholds oneself in the act of beholding: "Let the observer be observed by all observers in the act of observing what there is to observe" (Coriolanus SK 116); ". . . so much / Like death that the fearful self, beholds beholding" (Narcissus LLP 69). The temporal succession of moments has been arrested in the process of self inspection.

Husserl's refusal to separate the act of perception from its object may have contributed to Schwartz's formulation ("beholds beholding") of mutual implication. Magliola states: "Neo-Kantians assert that form emanates entirely from the side of the subject and that only undifferentiated sense data issue from the side of the outside object. For the phenomenologist (to use one of Husserl's famous slogans), knowledge is the grasp of an object that is simultaneously gripping us" (17). Schwartz, then, borrows not only Husserl's sentiment, but also his lexicon. The exercise, "That Kind of Consciousness" marries a modernist sense of self-

reference to a phenomenological introspection. These are the "scenes," as Schwartz calls them, where "consciousness shows itself":

> The tennis star sees his raised arm, beginning to fall, in the newspaper photograph; the track runner views himself in imagination, before the starting gun, bursting against the tapes breathless paralyzed at one moment of time by the camera; just as the hurdler sees himself standing sideways in the air, his stick just released and falling the other way. . . .
> "Come, we will go into the dining room," he said, and saying it, knew the departure in his words. . . . Let the lover grasp his middle age, at the moment of avowal also let his middle age at that moment grasp himself as lover. (Beinecke)

b) "Selfhooded-Selfhood": Faust at the Mirror of Narcissus

Consciousness examines its own structures: "I close my eyes to see a crème de menthe / (How consciousness thus turns upon itself)"(J 63). While for Husserl, an unrestricted reflection upon the self necessarily tends toward intersubjective universality, for Schwartz, the wound of consciousness, often self-inflicted, often a badge of honour, is not meant for anyone but the artist himself. Based on a radical sense of individualism, Schwartz's self-awareness is alternately recessive and insistent; "Selfhooded selfhood" is concealed and discovered, at once active and contemplative ("The First Morning of the Second World" SK 155). This reduction of the phenomenal world to one's reflexive vision assumes a particularly American cast, as John Stephen Martin cites "consciousness of selfhood [as] the major theme of modern American literature." He further notes the political etymology of the word:

> The term consciousness arises in the post-Enlightenment world . . . and it referred both to the revolutionary scepticism of such traditional power as well as the individual "rights" to personal power found in the Romantic concepts of universal Reason and Nature. . . . In this sense the American experience of individualism -- its "consciousness of individualism" -- is itself an ideological struggle. (181-82)

Emerson, as poet and sayer of the spirit of self reliance,is the founder of this central tradition of American poetry in which Schwartz has a prominent place. In the American grain, then, Schwartz concedes the "social value" of self-consciousness.

Schwartz paints himself into a landscape which he both contemplates and constitutes[5] with many intricate reciprocities, including both the metapoetical treatment of poetry and establishing the poet/speaker as subject. An examination of the subjective inner life (Erlebnis) becomes, through Husserlian acts of noetic reflecting, an examination of the inner life of the poet as well as the poem as they are defined by the dramatic space marked out by the confluence of text and self. If for Pound's anti-hero Hugh Selwyn Mauberley, "the obscure reveries / Of the inward gaze" (Personae 188) are anathema to poetic development, for Schwartz's speaker these same reveries are lifelines to self-definition. His poetic project to poeticize his "simple self" (SK 36), to "grasp firmly [his] fear, thus grasping [him]self" (SK 31) is a phenomenological one. Schwartz is Barthes' écrivain[6] for whom writing is self-directed, about itself as language. Writing becomes an "intransitive" act, as the exterior referent absents itself. In his poetry Schwartz puts the traditional idea of the world as book to varied and unusual use. He presents texts which call attention to themselves as writing (écriture) while underscoring their own artificiality.

In tune with William Spengemann's claim in his study, Forms of Autobiography, that "to call any modernist work 'autobiographical' is merely to utter a tautology" (qtd. in Jay 17), Schwartz identifies this "grasping one's sensibility as subject" as a hallmark of modernist writing:

> Since the only life available to the poet as a man of culture has been the cultivation of his own sensibility, that is the only subject available to him. . . .

> Thus we find that in much modern poetry, the poet is writing about other poetry . . . for writing about other poetry is the most direct way of grasping one's sensibility as a subject. ("The Isolation of Modern Poetry" SE 11)

Schwartz's attempt to attain "the moment of integrity of the self and external object" (Martin 183) is not a shared interest of his contemporary colleagues. John Berryman, for instance, offers this bald-faced statement about his personal project: "The subject [of the Dream Songs] was solely and simply myself. Nothing else. A subject on which I am an expert" (qtd. in Labrie 397). Eagleton insists that phenomenology "restored the transcendental subject to its rightful throne," after positivism supplanted man as central figure:

> If phenomenology secured a knowable world with one hand, it established the centrality of the human subject with the other. Indeed it promised nothing less than a science of subjectivity itself. The world is what I posit: it is to be grasped in relation to me, as a correlate of my consciousness, and that consciousness is not just fallibly empirical, but transcendental. This was a reassuring sort of thing to learn about oneself. (Literary Theory 58)

However, for Schwartz the exclusivity of the subject matter often leads to isolation, marginalization and solipsism. One's reflexive energies can very well be directed against oneself:

> I am to my own heart merely a serf
> .....
> Being the servant of incredible assumption. . . .
> I have been sick of its cruel rule, as sick
> As one is sick of chewing gum all day.
> ("I Am to My Own Heart Merely a Serf" SK 71)

Schwartz falls short of his fondest wish for utter intersubjectivity expressed so lucidly in a most Husserlian moment: "In my dream at night I wished with all my heart to participate in the minds of people I like very much, I mean directly not indirectly: to feel their consciousness as

they do" [emphasis mine] (DBB IDBR 60). The speaker seeks to enlist the transcendental cogito in the service of a universal consciousness.

Spiegelberg notes that cogitata or noemata are the referents or intentional objects of our cogitation in their capacity of being referred to. For instance, "the perceived page as being perceived, the imagined author as being imagined. . . . [They] share the absolute being of the phenomenological ego and its cogitations" (Phenomenological Movement 126). The "Ego," as Schwartz notes in the title of a whimsical essay, is "Always at the Wheel." Whether this is intended phenomenologically or psychoanalytically is not clear. The two Audens, of Schwartz's essay of the same name, are the Auden of the Id and the Auden of the Ego, the agent of primitive desires and the integrator of outer and inner worlds. In the final assessment, Auden overcomes the Ego's tendency to adapt to the exigencies of reality through his talent: "Auden's sheer natural gifts for language . . . can survive social catastrophe, international terror, and the solicitations of the Ego" (SE 152). In his effort to define discourse as the "epistemological context within which the self is produced" (29), Paul Jay recognizes the "self" as a "direct response to a changing epistemology of the . . . literary subject":

> Augustine's belief that his soul is a unified spiritual creation of an all-knowing God . . . to whose transcendent Word he has access, dictates that he produce a certain kind of autobiographical work. On the other hand, Carlyle's conception of the self as a . . . secular "moving rag-screen, over-heaped with shreds and tatters" . . . dictates quite another kind of autobiographical work . . . which [has] its clearest . . . philosophical articulation in Nietzsche's . . . insistence [in The Will to Power] that the "subject is not something given" but that it is "something added and invented and projected behind what there is". . . . This "self" . . . refers not to a . . . unified psychological condition, but rather, to a historically constituted set of ideas and assumptions whose referents are . . . dispersed within [our] language. (28)

Schwartz's "self" is an equally invented and rag-tag epistemological construction which discloses "private parts" to "those who know what a poem knows" ("What Curious Dresses All Men Wear" LLP 40).

The poem, "A Dog Named Ego, the Snowflakes as Kisses" is a crude application of Freudian theory to matters of voluntarism and claims of the will:

> A dog named Ego, the snowflakes as kisses
> Fluttered, ran, came with me in December
> .....
> You will not be free. . . .
> So spoke Ego, "Mine is the kingdom,
> Dynasty's bone: you will not be free,
> Go, choose, run, you will not be alone." (SK 76)

The images of ego as dog, snowflakes as kisses enact a personal process of perception, as we shall see in a discussion of the phenomenology of perception in Chapter 6a. When faced with such startling images as the "octopus in love with God" ("Prothalamion" SK 48), the reader finds illuminating F.H. Bradley's remarks on the privacy of sensation, from Appearance and Reality, which T.S. Eliot quoted in a footnote to line 411 of The Waste Land: "My external sensations are no less private to my self than are my thoughts or my feelings. In either case my experience falls within my own circle . . . the whole world for each is private and peculiar to that soul" (qtd. in Collected Poems 86). Eliot was soon to impose the rigours of impersonality on the egocentricities of his vision. In the end, Schwartz is the self-consumed "knowing subject" which Foucault rejects:

> If there is one approach that I do reject . . . it is . . . [the phenomenological approach] which gives absolute priority to the observing subject, which attributes a constituent role to an act, which places its own point of view at the origin of all historicity -- which, in short, leads to a transcendental consciousness. It seems to me that [there should be] not . . . a theory of the knowing subject, but rather . . . a theory of discursive practice. (Order of Things xiv)

The assertions of the self, the "I, all alone, / I, I, I" devolve into ever more painful expressions of self-consciousness: the selfhooded selfhood, referred to above (Coriolanus SK 155). This bracketing of the self is reaffirmed in Schwartz's journal: "Freedom from selfhood / the torment of self / Hooded by self" (158). Sarah's saga of superannuated fertility becomes a paradigm of self-conscious incredulity at the divine comedy:

> Laughing! Not me! Who was laughing? I did not laugh.
> It was
> A cough. I was coughing. . . .
> .....
> Clearing my throat; something inside of me
> Is continually telling me something
> I do not wish to hear: A joke: A big joke:
> But the joke is always just on me. . . . (SK 232)

Coughing often signals self-consciousness for the modernist age, as Auden's speaker of "As I Walked Out One Evening" finds: [Time] "coughs when you would kiss" (Selected Poems 61) In Schwartz's poem, "Someone Is Harshly Coughing as Before," it is God who, somewhat bathetically, coughs self-consciously, and

> harshly . . . on the next floor,
> Sudden excitement catching the flesh of his throat:
> Who is the sick one?
> .....
> But it is God who has caught cold again,
> Wandering helplessly in the world once more,
> Now he is phthisic, and he is, poor Keats. . . .
> .....
> Longing for Eden, afraid of the coming war. (SK 37)

The theological implications of such a needy soul are rife: he is A.J. Heschel's God, wandering in his own diaspora, seeking redemption by man and craving his company. Self-consciousness seems the least of his worries. Tikkun olam, or "repairing of the world," from such a position

of disadvantage, seems a nigh impossible task. God, instead, is occupied with a contemplation of the intentional features of his own tubercular Being.

If, as Valenti contends, in his early songs and sonnets, Schwartz "has not learned . . . to exploit the ironic complexities of self as subject" (LLV 203), the irony he does develop later on in his career is a particularly metapoetical one. What was for Husserl an analysis of the subjective structures out of which the concrete individual world may be legitimately and intersubjectively formed, became for Schwartz a lyricism which allowed him to explore both the phenomena of the outer world and states of the poetic self. Perloff argues, in her chapter on the "impasse" of the lyric that objectivity / impersonality and subjectivity / personality conjoin in the modernist lyric:

> But doesn't Mallarmean self-reflexivity stand opposed to Romantic subjectivity, to the "coloring of human passion"? I think not. From our vantage in the late twentieth century we can see that Modernist "objectivity" or impersonality was no more than an extreme vision of the interiority it claimed to reject. [Images] . . . come from the innermost recesses of the Self. (Dance of Intellect 179)

The lyric, however, slips its taxonomic moorings with Schwartz, to add a measure of tortured self-consciousness to mere emotional expressivity: "To understanding all my unbroken suffering, / My studious soft regard, the pain of hope, / The torment of possibility . . ." (Narcissus LLP 67).

The "studious soft-regard" (one wants to read, "self-regard," as it appears in Having Snow) is as "strict" a science for Schwartz as phenomenology is a rigorous science (Strengephilosophie) for Husserl. Vigilant against self-indulgence, Schwartz seeks to temper the reflection on one's experiences with objective fact: "The long conversation of the soul with itself ought now, by the help of this exercise, to turn more frequently to objective observation. Self

analysis is easy and has been accomplished often enough" (J 3). Still and all, the individuating process is an overarching one; the complex formal mediations between poet and world are more compelling than the unmediated objectivities of fact. The poem is mimetically bound to the phenomenal world. However this mimetic faithfulness to an objective realm of truths and values is deferred[7] for a vision which Lukács has termed in his essay, "The Ideology of Modernism," the worst aspects of "subjectivistic" modernism: alienation, rootlessness, egocentricity. Schwartz's is a resolute failure, by historically-determinist standards, to integrate subjectivity and community, private idiolect and its public manifestation.

The mirror Lukács would have the artist hold up to nature, is held up, instead, to one's own visage: "Be guilty of yourself in the full looking-glass" ("Father and Son" SK 33). This reflected guilt takes on a particularly Jewish cast, as it is tied up with familial betrayal and filial disloyalty. The lines, "I am my father's father / You are your children's guilt" ("The Ballad of the Children of the Czar" SK 22) are a testament to the oppressive inevitability of the generations. To his son's question, "What is there to be known?" the father answers, "Guilt, guilt of time, nameless guilt" ("Father and Son" SK 31). Mark Shechner puts this cynical spin on Schwartz's cycle of misery and guilt:

> He even kept a journal in blank verse, as if to remind himself that nothing less than Paradise Lost was the model of his own tragic passage through this veil of tears. In the end, his only anchor was the guilt that bore him down entirely, drawing him to the profession of poetry as to a priesthood of the guilty. . . . He had nothing of Baudelaire's contempt or Joris-Karl Huysman's voluptuary metaphysics or Proust's genius for reverie. . . . He declared himself daily for Beauty and Art, but never knew quite how to conjure up either except to invoke Pegasus, broadcast his misery, and wait for the reviewers to anoint him troubador of misery. . . . Impatient with the given rhythm of things, he short-circuited the normal processes of crime and punishment and got right to the guilt without troubling with the sin. (After the Revolution 50-51)

In "Faust in Old Age" guilt is expressed in a coda of contrition: "If we could love one another, it would be well. But as it is, I am sorry for the whole world, myself apart. My heart is full of memory and desire, and in its last nervousness, there is pity for those I have touched but only hatred and contempt for myself" (SK 50).

For Schwartz, the Narcissus myth is the most obvious touchstone for self-reference. As a seeker after truth, often reflected in his own image, Schwartz's speaker is a paradigm of modernist culture itself, which Robert Alter calls "a kind of Faust at the mirror of Narcissus" ("The Self-Conscious Moment" 210). Faustian pride and Narcissistic hybris each effect their own brand of apostasy: there is room in the mirror only for the self. Divinity is abjured not for Mephistopheles, but for oneself. The dialogic encounter is I-I not I-Thou. As the Lady of Shalott sees the world in reverse reflection in her hand-held mirror, so, too, does Schwartz's "furtive/Fugitive, looking backward, see his / Ghost in the mirror, his shameful eyes, his mouth diseased" ("The Sin of Hamlet" SK 35). The mirror, the posturing before one's own image, is in Schwartz's terms a "stenographic metaphor" ("Poetry and Belief in Thomas Hardy" SE 66) for the idiom of self-reflection and specular reciprocity.[8]

For a time, Schwartz's window on the perceptual world loses its transparency to refract that same world in a poetic hall of mirrors. Indeed Altieri, reflecting on modernist impersonality, uses this very image:

> We are tempted to treat the stance of objective observation as in fact one of the self's most "interested" or subjective ways of producing or maintaining private desires. Coleridge's "imagination" seems less relevant to our age than Lacan's "imaginary" because the act of creative synthesis of self and world is precisely what we must question. The "I" confronts or reveals its own duplicity in a hall of inevitably self-distorting or self-ennobling mirrors. (Self and Sensibility 37)

It is Schwartz's "I" which emerges as from a palimpsest of reflections of his manifold alter egos: Narcissus, Shenandoah, poet of the Hudson River, Coriolanus, the heavy bear. In the poem, "Faust in Old Age," we have a rich overlay of various aspects of the Faustian ego. The poem is "purple with persons like a tragic play":

> Plucked Venus, sneering at her moan
> .....
> I cast down every king like Socrates
> .....
> Polonius I poked, not him
> .....
> I pierced the pompous Premier, not Jesus Christ,
> I pricked Polonius, and Moby Dick. . . .
> (SK 49-50)

Consequently, Faust avows, "the ego bloomed into an octopus"; few historical figures escape its tentacular reach. It is finally the poet himself who, in a supreme act of self consciousness, must be (to add to the mad synchrony) a Solomon to the poem's latter-day Faust: "You must be judge / Deliver judgement, Delmore Schwartz." Hence the focus, true to phenomenological form, is on the perceiving agent, here the poet himself.

In his landmark discussion of mimesis and Romantic theory, The Mirror and the Lamp, M.H. Abrams explores the mirror as an analogue for poetry, specifically in Platonic theory, where natural things are mere reflective simulacra of their prototypes, or ideas (30).[9] Abrams' terminology is demonstrably phenomenological:

> While many expository analogues, as conventional opinion proposes, are casual and illustrative, some few seem recurrent and, not illustrative, but constitutive: they yield the ground plan and essential structural elements of a literary theory. By the same token they select and mold those "facts" which a theory comprehends. For facts are facta, things made as much as things found, and made in part by the analogies through which we look at the world through a lens. (31)

Our analogues change with our philosophies of perception, the mirror a particularly apt metaphor for the passive registration of images: "The change from imitation to expression, and from the mirror to the fountain, the lamp and related analogues, was not an isolated phenomenon. It was an integral part of a corresponding change in popular epistemology . . ." (57). Schwartz marries both trends by using the mirror image expressively as it reflects inner states of mind such as estrangement and anomie:

> So, once in the drugstore,
> Amid all the poppy, salve and ointment,
> I suddenly saw, estranged there,
> Beyond all disappointment
> My own face in the mirror. ("By Circumstances Fed" SK 42)

Even where the mirror imitatively captures life as it is, it betokens the emotive spirit breathing there:

> [Apollo's] torso has a candelabra's glow,
> His gaze, contained as in a mirror's grace,
>
> Shines within it. Otherwise his breast
> Would not be dazzling. Nor would you recognize
> The smile that moves along his curving thighs,
> There where love's strength is caught within its nest.
> ("Archaic Bust of Apollo" LLP 34)

Apollo's glance is richly refractory.

Shenandoah Fish sees Narcissus as a Shakespearean lover, doomed to die at his own hands:

> I am bound
> By the sick pity and the faithful love
> The ego bears itself as if Narcissus
> And Romeo were one: for I am you
> By that identity which fights through time. (12)

Schwartz seeks to ground the varied literary manifestations of the confessional imagination in the issue of reflexivity. This confirms Melville's determination in Moby-Dick, that "meditation and water are wedded forever. . . . And still deeper the meaning of Narcissus. . . . But that same image, we ourselves see in all rivers and oceans. It is the image of the ungraspable phantom of life and this is the key to it all" (14). Narcissus' reflective mirror is also his drowning pool. The following journal meditation links Narcissus to consciousness:

> Narcissus says: He is the starting point
> Each being exists as such the
> First time when he says:
> I am myself -- I am Narcissus
> Therefore I exist
> Or when he recognizes
> Himself in the looking glass
>
> I am Narcissus: I am conscious
> I am Narcissus: I am consciousness. (550)

Narcissus' tragic fate is at the same time an exemplary act of self definition.

The long poem The Studies of Narcissus, replete with prologue and overture, is Schwartz's most extended meditation on the mythological figure. When Narcissus was born, Tiresias told his mother, Liriope, that Narcissus would live to an old age if he never came to know himself. Schwartz's Narcissus learned too late that in much self-knowledge is much grief. Contrarily, the idea that virtue is connected with self-knowledge finds expression in Pope's Essay on Man: "That true SELF LOVE and SOCIAL are the same; . . . / And all our Knowledge is OURSELVES TO KNOW" ("Epistle IV" Selected Poetry 232). Narcissus, speaking "in the first person" (LLP 59), "discovered the self or -- to insist again -- / Invented it, by staring in a glass / And misconceiving the image of my face" (78). The self inventing itself is the primordially-intentional act. He "describes his passion and the various forms of

misunderstanding which others have committed, regarding his behaviour." The prologuist further protests that the river was the object of his affection, hence the misinterpretation of the "devotion and concentration, excluding all other things with which he gazed upon the river's surface" (59). As a characteristic Schwartzian hero, Narcissus thirsts after knowledge, but a knowledge larger than himself, larger than the effects of the sensible world: "Eternity is the roar you hear / When you hold a sea shell close to your ear" (63); "How many structures of reality / I saw within the river" (71). Narcissus brings music, flowers and the river to our phenomenological awareness.

Narcissus is Schwartz himself, reviled by his critics, the tormented and self-indulgent artist unfairly assessed:

> How then could I have expected them to see me
> As I saw myself, within my gaze, or see
> That being thus seemed as a toad, a frog, a wen, a mole
> Knowing their certainty that I was only
> A monument, a monster who had fallen in love
> With himself alone, how could I have
> Told them what was in me within my heart
> trembling and passionate
> Within the labyrinth and caves of my mind. . . . (67)

Radical self reflection may purchase self knowledge, but it is a self knowledge attained, on the Aeschylean model referred to in Chapter 1, through suffering. There have been many literary treatments of the Narcissus myth, from Ovid's Metamorphoses to Dante's Divine Comedy to Guillaume de Lorris' Roman de la Rose to Shelley's Adonais (Poetical Works 430-44). It is in the preface to Rousseau's play Narcisse where epistemological problems of "connoissance de soi-même" and "amour propre" are first engaged (Vinge 280-81). More recent treatments are consonant with Schwartz's revisionist vision. For D.H. Lawrence it is an occasion for metaphysical reflection: "You undine-clear and pearly, soullessly cool / And watery, / The pool

for limbs to fathom my soul's last school" ("Narcissus" Complete Poems 161). Auden's sad conclusions in "Death's Echo" take a carpe diem turn:

> A friend is the old old tale of Narcissus
> Not to be born is the best for man
> An active partner is somebody disgraceful
> Sway your partner, dance while you can.
> (Collected Shorter Poems 103)

While Schwartz's Narcissus encounters his own invariant essence, he had to sift through its conglomerates, phases, aspects and perspectives to get there:

> I was for a long time every kind
> Of shining angel: kind of angle,
> And kind of light: each point of view
> Drew up something new. Every picture possessed
> Four sides and four thousand sides and sights. (70)

Phenomenology looks for the constant in the phenomenal object, which the river, the classical locus of flux and changeability, hardly affords: "The river sang: there are many truths / Look how they glitter and ripple, radiant" (72). Yet Narcissus arrests "The ultimate vineyards of variety" (75) and the "ever-flowing process of reality" (76) by turning them into the constant reflection of his own image. Narcissus, in an earlier poetic incarnation, is "undrowned," but still unrepentantly self-observing: "Willed to the hurt of our undrowned Narcissus, / Our self-regardant lion, his raided heart" (Coriolanus SK 102). The reflected pool of water contains within it more cerebral reflections. In the sections, "Phenomenological Study of Reflexion upon Experience," and the "critical excursus" on the "Difficulties of Self-Observation" (Ideas 200-13), Husserl defines reflection as both visual (Blick) and experiential (Erfahrung) so that it is ultimately a "perceiving" activity: "As his glance turns towards the experience, it first becomes that which now offers itself to his gaze; as he looks away, it becomes something else" (207).

Schwartz's Narcissus enacts a similar fate. Some might argue that the Husserlian agenda of self-revelation is a Narcissistic one: "I, the meditating phenomenologist, set myself the all-embracing task of uncovering myself, in my full concreteness, that is, with all the intentional correlates that are included therein" (Cartesian Meditations 38).

On rare occasions the speaker's sense of self recedes in the face of an overtaxed perceptual faculty:

> Of the first perception of the actual fall,
> The long and late light had slowly gathered up
> A sooty wood of clouded sky, dim and distant
> more and more
> Until, at dusk, the very sense of selfhood waned
> .....
> Waking a sense . . .
> Beyond emotion, for beyond the swollen distorted
> shadows and lights
> Of the toy town and the vanity fair of waking
> consciousness!
> ("The First Night of Fall and Falling Rain" LLP 14)

But for the most part, Schwartz's "sense of selfhood" waxes rather than wanes, the self being for him an amplified literary construct. Indeed the reader must suspend the self to cede to the self of the text. Schwartz muses: "The act of contemplation is a radical shift . . . from the self as practical being, and from the self as a self. . . . We are in Denmark, on a platform, at midnight waiting for a ghost to appear; we are not given to consciousness as citizens of the community seated in a theatre" (Beinecke).

The poetic self moves centripetally toward its own articulation: "In the slight ripple the fishes dart / Like fingers centrifugal, like wishes / Wanton" ("In the Slight Ripple, The Mind Perceives the Heart" SK 39). The centrifugal movement of the fishes is opposed to the centripetal self-regard of the speaker. Here, the poem, likened to a train, is, more affectively,

like the sad variety of travel. The phenomenal world, it seems, is not only an emblem of self-knowledge, but also its source and occasion. In his challenge of Yvor Winters who, in his neo-classicism "does not understand Laforgue / And Eliot in this, that the self-consciousness / Marks a beginning of morality" (J 58), Schwartz indicates that this self-consciousness invites even broader ethical imperatives: ". . . what knowledge / Can be possessed by consciousness? . . . / For life is rooted in memory's damnation and blessedness" (Narcissus LLP 64). The language with which the self-consciousness expresses itself, in turn calls attention to itself as artifice: "Poor Schwartz rapt in his thoughts / Rapped by his thoughts, wrapped in's thoughts" (J 19).

Perloff insists that the Romantic and Modernist cult of personality has given way to what the new poets call "the dispersal of the speaking subject . . . the denial of the unitary, authoritative ego" (Dance of Intellect x). Although in Schwartz's later poetry the poetic selves are "dispersed" aspectually and situated multivalently -- "With the ego's pomp, self conscious as a stammer . . . / These pieces of the self are with my friends" (J 293) -- the ego continues to assert itself authoritatively. However, self inquiry proceeds to burden: the speaker is "tied to the Siamese twins, self witness and withness" (J 293). The self is coincidental with the workings of the mind arrested in self-examination: "My simple self is nothing but the speech . . . / The darkened body, the mind still as a frieze" ("Out of the Watercolored Window, When You Look" SK 36). The self is the sum of these linguistic, somatic and mental assertions. The individual Lebenswelten -- here represented in speech, body, mind -- are "materializations of our subjectivity," that is, "we encounter ourselves in our perceptions of the universe," as Brodtkorb (152) has it. In language reminiscent of Rorty's rhetoric, "our bodies relate to the experienced

world, gracefully or awkwardly, in a continuous conversation" (Brodtkorb 152). Here it is the "simple speech" (SK 36) which engages the universe in phenomenological conversation.

The young child of his poem "A Young Child and His Pregnant Mother" delivers this conversation in Biblical tones:

> No better example than his unborn brother
> Shall teach him of his exile from his Mother,
> Measured by his distance from the sky,
> Spoken in two vowels,
> I am I. (SK 44)

This, along with the relentless "I" of his journals are an echo of God's pronouncement to Moses, variously translated, "I am that I am" or "I will be what I will be" (Exodus 3:13). Yet Schwartz's need to explain himself to himself is more compelling than the theodicic mission which seeks to justify God's ways to man. This journey from innocence to self-knowledge holds the transfigured self to be identical with the indwelling God. On rare occasions, morality and aesthetics are seen to be located outside the self altogether: "One departs from the small world of the self and discovers that beauty and goodness have their center outside" (PI 19). Indeed Husserl answered objections to the solipsism of phenomenology with his theory of intersubjectivity. His fifth Cartesian Meditation bears this subtitle: "Exposition of the problem of experiencing someone else, in rejoinder to the objection that phenomenology entails solipsism" (89).

The affirmation of self appears anecdotally in the entr'acte of Coriolanus, in an historical reference: "I recall the fact that Fichte drank champagne when his infant boy said "I" for the first time" (SK 92). Hugh J. Silverman, in his essay "The Self in Question," offers an illuminating footnote to this anecdote: "What price consciousness? Hegel proposed in his

Phenomenology of Mind that self-consciousness arises only from the desire of others. As Fichte would put it, Ego follows from the positing of non-Ego" (157). It was Emerson who called attention to this aspect of selfhood in his essay Nature, where the Fichtean idea of the "Me and Not Me" was elaborated. Schwartz poses the "Not Me" in terms of negative definition: "Himself and not his genus, species class. . . / And not his time, his place, his quality." (Coriolanus SK 109). This often tiresome self inspection leads inevitably to the radical responsibility and accountability of choice:

> Inveterate, gratuitous, too much,
> Ambiguous, I tire even myself. . . .
> I choose myself, I die
> Crying to Rome its fate, that I am I!
> (Coriolanus SK 125-26)

However, the "self-creating will" does not always survive its own aseity: "'And thus the exhausted hero is struck down,' / Says Aristotle, as the curtain falls, / 'Even in the affirmation of himself'" (141). While Schwartz's speakers possess a relative freedom to will, they are often denied the absolute freedom to act. The "achieved self," as Blackmur names Schwartz's "alter ego" in G, has many freedoms as well as limitations ("Commentary by Ghosts" 468).

Schwartz's poetic structures enjoy a metonymic relationship to the self. If the "mind" is a "city" -- a straight declaration of metaphorical equivalence -- then its "ruins" -- "catacombs, aqueducts, amphitheatre, palaces, / Churches and equestrian statues" -- are contiguous to it (Narcissus LLP 60). These architectural structures hold subjective reality within their walls. According to Gaston Bachelard's poetics of space, "inhabited space transcends geometric space" (7). Ultimately, however, it is within the space of one's own room where one must confront one's unique existential existence: "All of us always turning away for solace / From the lonely

room where the self must be honest" ("All of Us Always Turning Away for Solace" SK 63). Phenomenologically, the self is identical with the mind and its intentional features, which he calls in Having Snow, "the motion of the will, which is the mind as commanding" (Beinecke).

Schwartz's obsession with "the secret life of belly and bone, / Opaque, too near, my private, yet unknown" ("The Heavy Bear Who Goes With Me" SK 74), this "internalized quest romance," is according to Harold Bloom, a poetic inevitability since Wordsworth: ". . . from 1744 or so to the present day the best poetry internalized its subject matter, particularly in the mode of Wordsworth. . . . Wordsworth had no true subject except his own subjective nature and very nearly all significant poetry since Wordsworth even by American poets, has repeated Wordsworth's inward turning" ("Measuring the Canon" 287). Bloom also points to the "major American trope of solitude," one on which Schwartz offers ceaseless variations: "I, all alone, / I, I, I . . ." (Coriolanus SK 83). By pure Ego Husserl means the personality as purged of all psychophysical reference. It is the "I to whom I am present" ("Phenomenology"), the "I am I" of Coriolanus. In his Ideas Husserl intones in language reminiscent of Schwartz's experiential assertions of self: in reflective apprehension the self is grasped as the pure subject so that one can affirm plainly, "I am": "to its essence belongs in principle the possibility of a 'reflexive' directing of the mental glance toward itself . . . every cogitatio can become the object of a so-called 'inner perception'" (111). In Husserlian terms, the "I" as empirical object must be "set aside," "put out of play," bracketed, for the purpose of gaining a vision of the pure sphere of "transcendental subjectivity" that constitutes the content of pure consciousness. Hence the "hero," or non-transcendent Ego must be "struck down," even "in affirmation of himself"

(Coriolanus SK 141). The first person declaration, "I cut my name / Into your soldiers' hearts, I, I, I" (SK 141) is a primordial cry from one's interior self.

The artist is isolated by virtue of his art: "The novelist [here, Henry James] tangential on the boardwalk overhead / Seeks his cure of souls in his own anxious gaze" ("Far Rockaway" SK 34). It is the artist's sensibility which determines his peripheral or tangential status. Since the relation between the constitutive Ego and the world out there is intentionally correlative, we find the novelist of the above poem seeking deliverance in his own self definition. The reciprocity of object and act of consciousness has its most enduring site in the artist-speaker, as the deeper constituting levels of transcendental subjectivity can be found in the creative acts of the mind. However, the non-artistic soul, bereft of an integrating creative act, feels the rift between doer and deed in this supreme expression of existential anomie:

> The one anonymous in the audience,
> The one expressionless in the subway,
> In the subway evening among so many faces,
> The one who reads the daily newspaper,
> Separate from actor and act, a member
> Of public opinion, never involved . . .
> .....
> Buying sleep at the drugstore . . .
> .....
> and everywhere a specious splendour. ("Father and Son" SK 30-31)

Confirming the multiform world by affirming his own multiformity, the Schwartzian speaker is artist - Coriolanus - Baudelaire - Holderlin - Jacob - Sarah. Yet amid such multivalency of identity, the artist-self is Schwartz's most pervasive persona, one which allows for revisionist inventions of self. While Poulet calls for the critic to identify himself with the expressed literary subjectivity ("Phenomenology of Reading"), my task is the less ambitious identification and location of that subjectivity in its various incarnations. Very frequently the

speaker and the poet are identical: "What almost no one seems to have noted in Coriolanus is that the hero of the whole thing is the I, the poet; and what he sees is what is important and constitutes the true action" (L 75). The artist can be either the purveyor of Arnoldian high seriousness -- a seeker after the "cure of souls" (SK 34) -- or a plier of low artistic trade:

> My faces were my apes; my apes became
> Performers in the Sunday of their parks
> Buffoons or clowns in the comedy or farce
> .....
> I waited like obsession in solitude. (Narcissus LLP 66)

Solitude is a conventional lyric subject which Schwartz radicalizes by applying to it the artistic experience.

Quentin Lauer notes, in his study of phenomenology and subjectivity, that the fourth Cartesian Meditation has it "that the constituted subject can be concretized by being objectified -- by reflection we can grasp our own subjectivity as an object. It remains to find a means of grasping some element of the objective world as subject" (149). The indissolubility of subject and object, referred to earlier in this chapter, manifests itself poetically as the indissolubility of the self and its emotional life: "Grasp firmly your fear, thus grasping your self" ("Father and Son" SK 31). In the Schwartzian version of intentionality, the percipient subject is co-extensive with the act of consciousness; so must the poet coincide with the poem: "For the poet must become nothing but poetry / He must be nothing but a poem when he is writing" ("Apollo Musagete, Poetry and the Leader of the Muses" LLP 54). However, Schwartz calls on the speaker to be Keats's chameleon poet -- "The poet must be or become both Keats and Renoir and Keats as Renoir" (LLP 53) -- whose negative capability registers the plurisignative world by encountering his own plurisignation:

Hence the poet must be able to become a tiger like
Blake -- a carousel like Rilke
Hence he must be all things to be free for all
impersonations
A doormat and a monument
to all situations possible or actual
The cuckold, the cuckoo, the conqueror and the coxcomb.

As Brodtkorb has it, "the poetic voice is alive to the phenomenological object as his subjectivity is assigned qualities" (10). Schwartz's admission in G, that "he was to himself / The center of the turning world" (35), is at variance with Eliotic impersonality whose locus classicus is "Tradition and the Individual Talent." This "extinction" of personality, instead of its expression, defines the age as much as does modernist self-consciousness. Among the poet's incarnations in the poem "Apollo Musagete" are Nero, Phaedre, St. Francis, Ghengis Cohen [sic!] Professor Tenure, Iago and Desdemona. The poet, amongst roles and responsibilities assigned him, must be a "monument to fallen wisdom." Finally, without fear of overstating his case, Schwartz states that the poet "must wish to be everyone and everything" (G 55). Hence the natural attitude toward the experienced world is suspended in favour of a poetic discovery of the "richness" of omniformity. The designation, "poet," takes on dimensions of plurisignation undreamed of by Wheelwright,"[10] as it radically transcends the sum of its aspects.

Under the poet's masque one finds the "keeper" of the reader's ontology as well as the chronicler of his emotional life: here Schwartz metaleptically conjoins being and archive in a trope[11] while compressing the intermediary steps in the causal chain:

The poet is a shepherd of being,[12]
The poet is the one who keep the archives of the stones,
And makes immortal the lady among the rocks.
And is the crying of the rocks. . . . (Narcissus LLP 79)

More abidingly, the poet is Delmore himself, drawing on Eliot's distinction, expounded in "The Three Voices of Poetry," between meditative voice (speaking to himself) and rhetorical voice (addressing an audience). Eliot's third, or dramatic, voice is apparent only when Narcissus speaks in his own created voice, a voice which the audience does not always understand: "How then could I have expected them to see me / As I saw myself, within my gaze . . ." (67). The poem's subject in "America, America!" that is, a poet who fiercely enjoys his privileged modes of access to the world, is thinly disguised: "I am a poet of the Hudson River and the heights above it, / the lights, the stars and the bridges, / I am also by self appointment the laureate of the Atlantic" (LLP 4). The self disclosure is effected with Whitmanian braggadocio.

Artistic self-definition is thick with the teeming smells, sights and sounds of immigration, as it is heavy with its yoke: "I am burdened with the truck and chimera, hope, / acquired in the sweat of sick - excited passage / in steerage, strange and estranged." The Lebenswelt and Transcendent Ego comment musically on each other: "(This is the chant of the urban metropolitan and metaphysical self . . .)" (LLP 4). Robert Magliola's discussion of Merleau Ponty's thesis is instructive here:

> It is not ordinarily the author's task to enverbalize the spontaneous mutual implications of his Lebenswelt without scientific regard for subjectivity and objectivity as such. . . . In other words, the mutual implication found in a literary work usually involve inextricable and therefore highly ambiguous interactions of self and world. (15)

So implicated are they, that the speaker renders the world of the poet thus: "This is the city self . . ." (LLP 4).

The poet's voice, alternately resolute and (although parenthetically presented above), self-affirming; it endures beyond the caprices and contingencies of human history. These are

composite, rather than competing, articulations of the artist self. This moi profond -- that aspect of the author which "crosses over" into poetic language according to the critics of the Geneva School (Magliola 9) -- is forged in the smithy of the artistic consciousness. The quiddities of the artistic self are its creations: Vivaldi's "dark church of music" (SK 176) and Baudelaire's "book . . . monument / To [his] obsession" (SK 185). The most visible character in terms of frequency of appearance and fullness of presentation is the eponymous artist in the poems "Vivaldi" (SK 176-79); "Sterne" (180); "Swift" (181-83); "Holderlin" (184); "Baudelaire" (185-86). Oblique reference to the Yeatsian self-conscious "assuming of the masque" is made:

> When I was a young man I loved to write poems
> And I called a spade a spade
> And the only thing that made me sing
> Was to lift the masks at the masquerade.
> ("The Foggy, Foggy Blue" SK 207)

However, the theory of Yeatsian persona is exploded by instances of bald self reference in a few poems, as we shall see below.

Schwartz kept diaries, journals, wrote in ledgers and scraps of paper, all testaments to the mind's self-reflexive labour. For him, as much as for Husserl, the starting point of philosophical inquiry was his field of original experience. Schwartz's writing is nakedly "confessional," as Robert Phillips and M.L. Rosenthal used the term[13] to identify the type of poetry written by Robert Lowell, but which had its roots in the tradition of Sappho, Catullus, St. Augustine, Rousseau, Rilke and Baudelaire, among others. Indeed Phillips, in the introduction, admits to this sin of omission: ". . . Others who might have been included in this book are Denise Levertov, Randall Jarrell. . . . So might Delmore Schwartz, whose fiction and

early poetry were important precursors to today's confessional literature" (xiv). According to Atlas, "his only subject was himself -- quite undisguised" (3).

This lack of disguise, the "lifting of the masques" referred to above, reveals itself in multiple instances of self address in his journal and more extensively in his poetry: "See in me the obscene, for you have love, / For you have hatred, you, you must be judge / Deliver judgement, Delmore Schwartz" ("Faust in Old Age" SK 49). As mentioned in the chapter on nomenclature, Schwartz summons his own name, which struck him as discordantly Gentile-Jewish, with a measure of discomfort. Variants of his name appear throughout his works: Richmond Rose, Shenandoah Fish, Cornelius Schmidt, Faber Gottschalk. In the poem "Parlez-Vous Français?" the poet is referred to obliquely:

> And now who enters quietly? Who is the one
> Shy, pale and quite abstracted? Who is he?
> It is the writer merely, with a three-day beard . . .
> His tiredness not evident. (SK 41)[14]

One notes the verbal restraint and technical control with which Schwartz marks his own entrance.

Schwartz/poet/speaker is the poète maudit, in the tradition of Baudelaire, who documents his own marginalization:

> But well you know the life which I have led.
> Cut off, in truth, by all that I have been
> From the normal pleasures of the citizen.
> How often in the midnight street I passed
> The party where the tin horns blew contempt
> .....
> I am a student of the kinds of light,
> I am a poet of the wakeful night. . . .
> I am a student of love's long defeat.

The speaker is ultimately consoled by the Jewish determination that the deed be sanctified by the intention: "I gave the boys and girls my mind and art, / I taught them of the early morning

light: / May I not cite this as a little good?" ("Such Answers Are Cold Comfort to the Dead" VP 55). In his stories he faces artistic marginality within his family, who values the philistine enticements of money and popular acclaim: "He was a monster to them. They would be pleased to see his name in print and to hear that he was praised at times, but they would never be interested in what he wrote" ("America! America!" IDBROS 19). The poet must be prepared to live under similar censure. In his essay, tellingly entitled, "The Isolation of Modern Poetry," Schwartz finds much to deplore in the gulf separating poets from the lives of other men, a condition which he traced to the mid-nineteenth century when the poet had lost touch with the "common language of daily life, its syntax, habitual sequences and processes of association" (SE 3-13). This is Schwartz's impassioned plea for Beauty to be decreed in the marketplace.

The ultimate horror of the artist's situation is that the word is irretrievably committed to the page:

> Look well and you will see there is no stay:
> No one takes back a word, but once for all
> What has been said can never be unsaid
> .....
> This is the poet's power, this is his dread.
> ("How Each Bell Rings and Rings Forever More" VP 96)

Elsewhere, art's wages is, quite simply, madness: "For thirty years what madness I have known; / Of solitude, the blankness and longueurs / The nervous doubt which thought and art assure" ("The Masters of the Heart Touched the Unknown" VP 34). Schwartz's artists live outside the pale of normative humanity, and, as such, la condition juive is proposed metaphorically for the isolation of the artist. Witness this traditional image, as old as the Septuagint and as vivid as Michelangelo's sculptural realization of Moses, that is, the confusion of rays of light for horns: "He would have worn the horns of existence upon his head / He

would have perceived them regarding the looking glass" ("Apollo Musagete" LLP 54). The Jew and the artist were co-inhabitants of the American subculture, as Norman Podhoretz writes: "The Jewish writer in America was doubly schooled in the experience of alienation and so, paradoxically could speak as the quintessential modern man" (307).

In Schwartz's contribution to the symposium entitled, "Under Forty: American Literature and the Younger Generation of American Jews," Schwartz holds that his literature has always thrived on the separateness which is his heritage:

> I understood my own personal squint at experience; the fact of being a Jew became available to me as a central symbol of alienation, bias, point of view and certain other characteristics which are the peculiar marks of modern life, and, as I think now the essential ones. . . . The fact of Jewishness has been nothing but an ever-growing good to me, and nothing but an inexhaustible inheritance. (363)

It may well be Narcissus who "discovered the self" (Narcissus LLP 78) but it was Schwartz who applied his "personal squint" to its poetic realization. Schwartz's displaying of this identification as a badge of honor is given context with Irving Howe's remark: "Alienation was a badge we carried with pride, and our partial deracination -- roots loosened in Jewish soil but still not torn out -- gave us a range of possibilities. . . . [We] regard ourselves as partisans of modernism, defenders of the European experimentalists against middle-brow sluggards" ("Strangers" 22).[15] Schwartz thrived on the Jewish-artist identification and the appropriations literature had made therefrom, enlisting Meyer Schapiro in his essay, "The Vocation of the Poet":

> The answer to the question of Joyce's identification with Jews [Bloom in Ulysses, Shem in Finnegan's Wake], Schapiro said is that the Jew is at once alienated and indestructible; he is an exile from his own country and an exile even from himself yet he survives the annihilating fury of history . . . the poet must be prepared to be alienated and indestructible. He must dedicate himself to poetry although no one else seems likely to read what he writes . . . In the modern world, poetry is alienated; it will remain indestructible as long as the faith and love of each poet in his vocation survives. (SE 23)

His determination of the Jewish artist as "chosen for wandering and alienation" (S 27) draws on the same rage and sorrow available to the Yiddish poet Kadia Molodowsky:

> O God of Mercy
> For the time being
> Choose another people
> . . . . . .
> Grant us one more blessing --
> Take back the gift of separateness.
> ("God of Mercy," trans. Irving Howe, Howe and Greenberg 289-90)

Exile was for Schwartz both an historical condition and the artist's particular curse. This soliloquy from S proffers a summary description of the modernists, who

> find in art
> What exile is: art becomes exile too
> A secret and a code studied in secret
> Declaring the agony of modern life. (21)

This draws on the traditional view of modernism as insurgency confronting loss of community. The pursuit of one's art is an act of intellectual subterfuge, enacted in an environment of deracination. This kind of "incarceration" confirms the metaphysical nature of exile:

> The separation of the human being from all other human beings is implicit. . . . It is stated directly in The Waste Land when, as answer to the command, sympathise, the protagonist replies that each is locked in the prison of his own being . . . . it is by thinking of the key which locks the prison, by this act of thinking, the prison is confirmed. . . . The separation is metaphysical. (Eliot ts Beinecke)

Although describing a time which was a full decade before the inception of Schwartz's writing career, Frederick Hoffman, in his consideration of the modernist twenties, defines an artistic expatriation similar to Schwartz's brand of interior exile: "What Blackmur calls 'ingrown expatriation' is a normal reaction . . . of a person who . . . has no means of escape, or does not wish to leave . . . richly fortified by reserves of irony . . . through which isolation is always

possible without physical uprooting" (35). Schwartz sees himself as one of a community of exiles, like Joyce in Trieste and Pound in Rappallo, but takes cold comfort there. Schwartz's speakers wander homeless, in a psychological and existential diaspora. Poetic quest is spatialized as pilgrimage; artistic redemption is arrived at through peregrination: "One cannot carry a mountain, but a poem can be carried all over" ("The Kingdom of Poetry" SK 187). Artistic freedom, for a moment, becomes aphorism. While the artist, as Jew, longs for rootedness, he must be déraciné, with roots in the Poetic Intelligence: "We are of Zion: this exile is innate" ("Song 14" LLV 212).

Galut, or the diaspora, is not understood as separation from Israel, but as a longing for the old country: "Her one longing, one which she knew would never be satisfied, was to return and visit the old country. You would like it there, she said to Shenandoah, speaking of the country of her young childhood" ("America! America!" IDBROS 27). Schwartz, as first generation American, was in between two worlds. Irving Howe describes the state of limbo where the American Jewish writer must hover:

> Being an American we have been told repeatedly, is a complex fate, and being an American writer still more so: traditions ruptured, loyalties disheveled. Yet consider how much more complex . . . it could have been to grow up in an American subculture, one of those immigrant enclaves driving itself wild with the clashing hopes that it would receive the new world's blessing and yet maintain a moment of identity neither quite European nor quite American. ("Strangers" 11)

Schwartz presents a twofold pattern of separation and yearning indigenous to poetry of exile, although the thing lost is not so easily named:

> I gave a girl an apple when five years old,
> Saying, will you be sorry when I am gone?
> Ravenous for such courtesies, my name
> Is fed like a raving fire, insatiate still. ("Prothalamion" SK 45)

His poem "Abraham" echoes the psalmist's lamentation, "How shall I sing the Lord's song / In a foreign land?" (Psalm 137) with this reference: "Exiled, wandering, dumbfounded by riches, / Estranged among strangers . . . / An alien to myself until at last the caste of the last alienation . . ." (SK 231). Abraham, whose "learned presence" is invoked in an earlier poem ("Abraham and Orpheus Be With Me Now" SK 73), here questions the morality of sacrifice. Schwartz's speaker weeps, but not by the waters of Babylon, and not for the memory of Zion. Joseph's Egyptian exile figures forth the poet's intellectual Galut. Joseph, more than Abraham, is Schwartz's Biblical döppelganger. Both a favourite son and an exile, he is a central metaphor for Schwartz's blessed curse. It is his "exiled intelligence" which sets him apart, although, in the Schwartz rendering, the terms of exile, along with the object of desire, are unclear:

> Now Joseph is, as I was: in Egypt's pit
> In that accustomed depth and isolated height
> The solitude of eminence, the exiled intelligence
> Which separated me even as it created me:
> Estranged and unloved, gifted and detested. ("Jacob" SK 234)

Joseph, the dreamer, cast out by his brothers is seen by Fiedler as a "paradigm of the . . . artist" (qtd. in Alter, "Jewish Dreams and Nightmares" 25). Schwartz himself invites the analogy, as he underlines their shared fate: "Now Joseph is, as I was . . . / Joseph a stranger in Egypt may only know / What I have known: my gifts, my victory, my guilt . . ." (234). All premonitory dreams -- the bowing down of the sheaves (Genesis 37:6-11), the dream of his parents projected on a movie screen in "In Dreams Begin Responsibilities" -- seem to come true.

Eagleton applies his critical acumen to the issue of modernist exile, claiming that exile afforded Yeats, Pound and Eliot "immediate access to alternative cultures and traditions: broader frameworks against which, in highly creative tension, the erosion of contemporary order could

be situated and partially understood" (Exiles and Emigrés 15). For Schwartz, exile is not so much emigration from geographical or class-bound location, as a loosening of the roots of religious and secular culture, the existential and Heideggerian dread of being not-at-home, unheimlich.[16] Referring to Dostoevsky's Underground Man, Hugh Silverman explores "The Self in Question" from a phenomenological perspective: "The problematic of the self is central, but the self per se escapes centrality in the act of questioning itself . . . [this] leads to what Michel Foucault might call an archaeology of the self. By following the path of his discursive practice . . . the Underground Man's identity will show itself in diversity and dispersal . . ." (153). Schwartz's speaker, too, searches for primary causes, but finds no definitive answers: "One million times a single question drags / Its incompleteness, its unfinishedness / Through the unending corridors of consciousness" (DBB IDBR 145). Schwartz lays bare his soul in the process as do Dr. Bergen's disciples, with no want of method: "Here they construct a system to make their lives / Self-regarding, self gratifying, self conscious . . . / A mission, a justification, a declaration" (IDBR 144). Schwartz, having found no enduring monuments in the "archaeology of the self," creates metaphors of consciousness grounded in subjectivity; then he cedes this ground to the question of the self-consciousness of the poetic text.

c) "What a Poem Knows": Reflexivity and Metapoetics

Along with formalism, irony and myth, "reflexivism," or the "solipsistic worlds-within-worlds" is one of the four cardinal points of Modernist literature as enunciated by Maurice Beebe in his article, "Ulysses and the Age of Modernism" (qtd. in Beebe 1073). With his poetological effort to show the reader "What a Poem Knows" (section title, LLP and "What Curious Dresses

All Men Wear" LLP 40), Schwartz engages the reader in what Robert Scholes terms "intramural" (173-74) acts by laying bare the devices of his art, in Russian formalist terminology. Occasioned by the long poem, Self-Portrait in a Convex Mirror, Altieri's thoughts on John Ashbery, "who turns self-reflexiveness into metaphysical poetry," are applicable to Schwartz's triad, self knowledge, poetic knowledge, knowledge-of-the-world out there:

> By refusing the vain poses of definite thoughts, the poem produces a self-consciousness capable of moving from perception to reflection, from immediacy to self criticism to the opportunity for linguistic play that the multiple folds of consciousness allow. . . . For Ashbery the mind stands toward its own knowing in the condition of infinite regressiveness that Derrida shows is the dilemma of trying to know about the language we use in describing our knowledge. (Self and Sensibility 163, 132)

The literary work is both object, and generative form of consciousness which brought it into being. Schwartz derived the greatest satisfaction, if not quite the "onanistic gratification of the artist pleasured by his art" (Alter, "The Self-Conscious Moment" 214), in the reflexive examination of the intentional correlatives of consciousness, that is, the literary text.

If, according to Georges Poulet, the cogito is the "primary moment of the revelation of the self to itself in an act of self consciousness" (qtd. Miller, "The Geneva School" 291), then Schwartz broadens this definition in his contemplation of the act of poiesis. Schwartz examines the cogs of "pure consciousness as such" ("The Masters of the Heart Touched the Unknown" VP 35), what Alter calls the "obtrusions of the artificer into his artifice" (Partial Magic 77), an examination of the inner life of the poet as well as the poem. In Husserlian terms it is the "reflexive directing of the mental glance towards itself . . . by way of a simple apprehension" (Ideas 111). The Daedalian engagement with one's own construct is a postmodern enterprise although, according to Alter, it is as old as Sterne and Cervantes (Partial Magic Ch. 1). Tracing

reflexivity to a theory of homo ludens, Robert Stam historically illuminates such metapoetical efforts:

> Reflexive works break with art as enchantment and call attention to their own fictitiousness as textual constructs. . . . The practitioners of the sacred rites of archaic culture, Huizinga argues in Homo Ludens, simultaneously believe in and doubt the reality of their representations. . . .
> In the Renaissance reflexivity takes center stage; artistic self-consciousness becomes endemic. Foucault, not surprisingly, traces the modern episteme to the Cervantic critique of representation and to Don Quixote himself as a purely textual entity, a thin graphic equestrian embodiment of writing itself wandering through a problematic world. (1)

The kind of contrivance which has Schwartz examine the "scene / And mise-en-scène of every human act" (G 63), then, has a long pedigree, which includes Shakespeare's plays within plays which are themselves interrupted. Although Schwartz presents radically revisionist versions of the Coriolanus story and Narcissus myth, the only true mise-en-abyme (a term coined by Gide from the language of heraldry), or Chinese box of story within a story, the regressus in infinitum[17] is the story, "In Dreams Begin Responsibilities," where the young hero sees his life unfold on a screen, powerless to stop the already-elapsed march of events. Husserl uses the same paradigm to explain the circularity of perception: " . . . possible perception itself again, and with essential necessity, must be a perception through appearances, and that we have therefore fallen into an inevitable regressus in infinitum" (Ideas 144).

The mirroring of life in art has as its model the locus classicus for all modernist and postmodernist mises en abyme: Gide's Les faux monnayeurs (The Counterfeiters), where by multiple regress and reduplication, the hero Edouard pens a journal about writing a novel. Schwartz approximates this in the gaze of Narcissus which becomes the poem gazing at its own reflection. Indeed Gide himself appears in this invocation: "It is a story for the poet Gide . . ."

(G 18). The writer's comments are characteristically self-aware, at times openly self-corrective: "Enough: back to the poetry of statement" ("Paris and Helen" LLP 110). This wish for discursiveness grows out of a poetry which takes itself for a theme, which makes a host of parthenogenetic statements about itself, and which in turn grows out of the conviction that poetry itself is pervasive: "This shows how all things come to poetry" (S 14). In S even the stage directions reveal that the poetry and sounds of the play provide their own commentary: "(The baby begins to howl, in a formalized way which does not get in the way of the dialogue, but seems a comment on it)" (11).

The title of the section What a Poem Knows (LLP) is a mise-en-abyme of the poetological order. Most of the poems in this section metalinguistically confront their own defining features. Poetic truth is measured inversely by the success of its artifice: the truest poetry is the most feigning, the most aware of its own contrivance. The title of the poem, "Philology Recapitulates Ontology Poetry is Ontology" (LLP 38) playfully turns Haeckel's celebrated genetic-anthropological syllogism, "Phylogeny recapitulates ontogeny"[18] into linguistic-philosophical curio. The equivalence of philology, ontology and poetry is not very finely drawn; it reappears in these lines, where language, sound and existence come together: "Studying the sibilance and splashing of the seas and of / seeing and of being's infinite seas." The ascendant image is that of "being [which] never concludes" as an albatross around the neck of the ancient mariner. The speaker is, more likely, the reluctant wedding guest, "hesitant forever as if forever were an albatross." While this poem ends with an analeptic action: "Staring at the ever-blue and the far small stars and / the faint white endless curtain of the / twinkling play's endless seasons," the poem "Poem," ends with this curious conundrum: "It is our belief that hope itself was not, from

the beginning, / before believing, the most important of all beliefs" (LLP 39). The involution turns further in on itself, shell-like, to reveal a solipsistic realm where human consciousness cannot transcend its own workings. The above poems share the phenomenologically-correct invocation, "Faithful to your commandments, O consciousness, O."

By calling attention to its own devices, the poem is a renewal of perception. Fredric Jameson draws a likeness between the phenomenological emphasis on perception and Russian formalist restoring of conscious experience (Prison House of Language 50-51). Fresh discovery has a positive epistemological value: "They never knew -- or knew for the first time. . . . / A thing -- an experience -- which, never having been known before . . ." (Narcissus LLP 73). The language of such passages --

> The function of the meter is to heighten
> Attention to the words as such
> The function of the meter is to strengthen
> The power of the words so that they flow
> Into each other and create fresh sense
> Or hang like robes, fluent about the body,
> Letting the meaning have its varied way.
> ("Paris and Helen" LLP 107) --

is as fluid as the image it hangs on; the words are draped in articulate folds, even as Schwartz lets the spectator behind the scenes to see the racks and pinions of the poetic process. Such intransitivity of the poetic text[19] has its theoretical antecedent in Friedrich Schlegel. Pondering this lineage, Pol Vandevelde writes in his essay, "The Possibility of a Phenomenology of the Text,"

> . . . it is widely accepted that Schlegel brings to its end a conception of literature based on the mimesis, that is, on the transitivity of signs referring to the external world. Schlegel is credited with the claim . . . that literature has no transitivity and refers to itself. . . . It also means its own theory: "All poetry is poetry of poetry; for it already presupposes language, whose invention pertains to poetic

> acuity and which is itself a poem of humankind" (Kritische Ausgabe II, Fragment 238). To this extent, such is the general picture, a literary text has no external object, but has only an object insofar as it is grasped, identified or described through a text. A text thus, properly "creates" its own object. (277)

Schlegel was also the first to elaborate the hermeneutic circle as word-sentence-whole opus. Schwartz offers a similar progression in this philosophical evocation:

> Each thought an intuition, instant,
> Spontaneous, coherent in the mind
> Of words: and seemed and were and are
> -- As first I named them -- endless sentences . . .
> Proven abundantly in all the instances. (Narcissus LLP 68)

Poetry is a "force," a way of philosophizing: "Only in poetizing may one be, not only a poet, but a human being" (Vandevelde 280). All of literature constitutes an archive or museum: "The poet is the one who keeps the archives of the stones" (Narcissus LLP 79). This is the self-conscious act that writes itself individually within the archive, as Foucault has it: "L'archive, c'est d'abord la loi de ce qui peut être dit, le système qui régit l'apparition des énoncés comme événements singuliers (L'Archéologie du savoir 170). The poet is also, according to Schlegel, "a keeper of the force," as poetry is an "elemental force of humanity" (Kritische Ausgabe II, frag. 285 qtd. in Vandevelde 280).

> With all the classic terms (Reversal here
> and Recognition like an old Man's smile)
> "All of this is a recognition scene.
> And we have logos of this recognition --"
> The story has an epic movement. (G 64)

Thus anagnorisis extends to the recognition and understanding of the Aristotelian poetic process itself: "'This is the turning point,' said Aristotle, 'This is the peripety'" (Coriolanus SK 126).

The text turns the mechanism of reference back to its own process of production and actualization; Schwartz's poems, while contemplating their own poeticalness, name the poetic

devices with which we articulate our experience of the world. The mirrored, or posed, self has its poetological equivalent: as the body cannot escape its specular image, so does the poem not transcend its own linguistic system. Schwartz charts the poem's movement ("The Journey of the Poem Compared to All the Sad Variety of Travel" LLP 37) as it defines its function:

> It is as useful as light and as beautiful
> .....
> For poetry is like light and it is light. . . .
> It is also the soil of the fruits of knowledge
> In the orchards of being:
> .....
> It is a cause of knowledge and laughter. ("The Kingdom of Poetry" SK 187-88)

The unforgettable metaphors of the above excerpt seem to challenge Craig Tapping's lament that this poem "which promises to be an ars poetica is actually a catalogue of abstract absolutes which avoids fulfilling its own terms of specific definition" (392). Wittgenstein's ideas on transference of truth, namely that thinking in similes is a way of thinking cognitively (Jessup 483) is an aid to reflection on the above poem, and on like similes -- "And the bird flew . . . / Like a ballet of black flutes" ("May's Truth and May's Falsehood" SK 213) -- which pervade Schwartz's canon.

Schwartz presents, with characteristic want of diffidence, a series of definitions of metaphor:

> The art of poetry makes it possible to say: Pandemonium
> For poetry is gay and exact. It says:
> "The sunset resembles a bull-fight
> A sleepy arm feels like soda, fizzing."
> ("The Kingdom of Poetry" SK 189)

Poetry's exactitude enforces modern notions of paraphrase as heresy. With beggarly simplicity of image, Schwartz works out the transferences and valences of metaphor. He does the same

in his criticism. In the essay, "The Vocation of the Poet in the Modern World," he trots out this classical idea: "The distinguishing mark of the poet . . . is metaphor, according to Aristotle. Now metaphor is literally a bearing-across, or a bringing together of things by means of words" (SE 15). He reiterates this definition in his journal: "To compose is to put together; to make a metaphor is to bear across; thus both are a kind of love and they are the same" (135). The etymologically-derived definition of ferrying-across (meta-phorein) gives way to the sense of adjacency of language in this epigram: "Poetry, the art of putting things next to each other by means of metaphor" (J 98). In the journal poem, "Metaphors," adjacency gives way, if agrammatically, to tangency: "We two are jigsaw-puzzle parts / Touching / Are angles and unfinishedness" (193). Trigonometry is put to the service of poetic theory.

Metaphor has a rich intellectual history, from Dante's "Letter to Can Grande," wherein he separated figure and meaning; to Locke's valorization of metaphor over the "arbitrary, metonymic contiguity of word-sounds to their meanings, in which the word is a mere token in the sense of the natural entity, concluding with catachresis . . . that has no equivalence in nature" ("An Essay Concerning Human Understanding" qtd. in De Man 19); to Kant's distinction between schematic and symbolic and his definition of the term "hypotyposis," which "makes present to the senses something which is not within their reach . . . of elements too abstract for sensory representation" (qtd. in De Man 24). Kant's idea that we translate from sense perception to image, from image to language, from percept to sound is close to Schwartz's own phenomenology of poetry. Metaphor, Schwartz tells us in a journal entry, "is the effort of lyricism seeking an object" (45). Wheelwright introduced into our language "epiphor," or antecedent resemblance and "diaphor," or induced resemblance. The "steno" language of science

is distinguished from metaphorical, tensive language ("Semantics and Ontology"). Schwartz refers to the "stenographic" uses of metaphor, as mentioned earlier. Most relevant to Schwartz's use of the term is John Middleton Murry's characterization of the metaphor as a mode of sensuous apprehension (33). This is akin to the conviction, held independently by Max Black[20] and Paul de Man, in the metaphorical and cognitive nature of all human discourse, the "phoenix knowledge of the vine and grape near summer's end" ("Summer Knowledge" SK 158).

De Man traces an epistemology of metaphor back to Locke who constructed a theory of tropes: "One may wonder whether the metaphors illustrate a cognition or if the cognition is not perhaps shaped by the metaphors" (14). Rhetoric, de Man insists, "cannot be isolated from its epistemological function" (27). As Schwartz has it, functional relation is rendered causally: "poetry . . . is a cause of knowledge" ("Kingdom of Poetry" SK 188). This resembles Charles O. Hartman's opinion as expressed in his essay, "Cognitive Metaphor," that "we ask [metaphor] to transcend the old categories. . . . we expect it to function cognitively . . . [we] propose that metaphor, somehow, is or creates or communicates knowledge" (327). "If poetry both heightens reality and gives speech to that reality" (SK 187), then Schwartz treads the middle road which Jonathan Culler has

> christen[ed] the <u>via philosophica</u> and the <u>via rhetorica</u>. The former locates metaphor in the gap between sense and reference, in the process of thinking of an object <u>as</u> something. The latter situates metaphor in the space between one meaning and another, between the literal or "proper" verbal expression and its periphrastic substitute. (219)

Schwartz's figures reside somewhere in the "metaphoric nexus"[21] where incompatibilities are said to be "fused and yet not fused" (220). It is the nexus which allows Schwartz to write of semantic meaning and the physical image in two successive lines: "Significance like sunlight,

the symbol's glory / As two crossed sticks of wood shine with the story / Of Jesus Christ" . . . (S 8). Schwartz uses surprisingly modern language, with an eye to shifting fields of signification: "Poetic [sic] of everyday experience (twofold nature of poetry). Effort to see all as a sign . . ." (J 393). He is obsessed with the semiotic marriage between word and thing (Ernst Gellner) and word and object (Willard Van Orman Quine): "To go . . . from word to thing, from thing to word" (J 31); "constant observation, constant passage from word to thing, from thing to word, is what is necessary" (J 44); "These easy images . . . / Unable to distinguish symbol from thing" (G 89). Hence Schwartz speaks of metaphor in experiential and intentional terms, reflecting the poetic nature of the phenomenological view.

The pictorial dimension of Schwartz's metaphor bears the influence of the distinction between sign and icon made by Peirce, one of Schwartz's ghosts who walk Harvard Yard (SK 51). Schwartz underlines the iconic function of symbol as he does the explicative function of metaphor:

> The concrete details immediately provide a fertile ground for the significance of the symbol: In fiction broad strokes, the secular sacrament, company, love, fame, striving, humiliation. A symbol is one thing which stands for another thing and explicates it: the Cross. A metaphor is the bringing together of two or more things, one to explicate the other: an ox sits on my tongue. (J 50)

The image of the tongue, used elsewhere in his poetry, is deployed here in its metonymic iconicity: Yeats, according to Schwartz, has taught his heart to beat a song "in which man's strict humanity, / Erect as a soldier, became a tongue" ("Yeats Died Saturday in France" LLP 43). Schwartz implements metonymic images reminiscent of Auden's: "By mourning tongues. . . . . A way of happening, a mouth" ("In Memory of W.B. Yeats," Selected Poems 81-82). Indeed it is poetry itself which gives tongue, or speech, to inchoate reality: " . . . without

poetry, reality is speechless or incoherent: / It is inchoate, like the pomp and bombast of thunder: / Its perorations verge upon the ceaseless oration of the ocean" ("The Kingdom of Poetry" SK 187-88). What the thunder says is that the assumptions of human knowledge and human articulation converge in metaphor.

Schwartz draws on Aristotle's belief that metaphors spring from our capacity to contemplate similarities. The sunset and bullfight equivalence referred to above (SK 189) is changed in the poem "I Wish I Had Great Knowledge or Great Art" (VP 73). Here the speaker calls revisionist attention to the cleavage between the two terms of the metaphoric equation:

> I'd grasped with bulging eyes like a hooked fish,
> Dumbfounded by my gratified intent:
> Behold how in this trope drawn from the sea,
> Two worlds are separated endlessly.

Here Schwartz tends, instead, toward the metonymic pole as we saw in the chapter on lists, where aspects of things figure forth the contiguous relations of two terms [In the journal we read this cryptic wish: "To express new aspects, new objects (Eliot-Swinburne): one purpose of expression" (30)]. The selection of metonym over metaphor is one of contiguity over comparison.[22] David Lodge notes the Russian Formalist idea of the binary opposition between metaphor and metonymy, "the chief earmarks of the Romantic and Classic styles respectively" (73). Peter Ramus reduced Quintillian's twelve tropes to four; Jakobson further polarized them to metaphor and metonymy in his essay, "Two Aspects of Language and Two Types of Aphasic Disturbance,"[23] where he examines aspects of language suppressed by the language disturbance, aphasia, namely "selection and substitution or combination and contexture" (245).

Some of Schwartz's metonymic images clearly would defend Kenneth Burke's idea that abstract and spiritual words are metonymic in origin ("Metonymy is a device of poetic realism

but its partner, reduction, is a device of scientific realism. . . . Metonymy . . . convey[s] some incorporeal or intangible state in terms of the corporeal or tangible" Grammar of Motives 506): "My mind's continuing and unreleasing wind / Touches the single of your flowers . . . / The very rack and crucifix of winter" ("Will You Perhaps Consent To Be" SK 64); "The smallest color of the smallest day" ("Calmly We Walk Through This April's Day" SK 67); "Love's metric seeks a rhyme more pure and sure" ("Prothalamion" SK 45). One must not confuse emblem for object emblematized, container for contained. The metonym, "the tin horns blew contempt" is meant to imply something of the person behind the horn. Another metonymic substitution appears: "The party where the New Year popped and foamed, / Opening like champagne or love's wet crush" ("Such Answers Are Cold Comfort to the Dead" VP 55).

Schwartz's understanding of a protean world is expressed in more partial and dynamic terms than metaphor allows. He chooses parts selected from, and embedded in, his external realities: "The curtain / Rises on the heart of man" (Coriolanus SK 81). Here we see the notion of replacement (heart for the entire man) on which a typology of figures has historically depended. The heart is a metonymic displacement of all of mankind, the world in little, multum in parvo. The "carflights flashed sleeves" metonymically figure the city in toto which is named in the next line ("Demons and Angels Sing Ever in the West" VP 95), just as the "luna of the heart's desire" extends a larger gaiety and freedom from care, beyond the laughter of the amusement park ("Lunas Are Tempting to Old Consciousness" VP 59). Schwartz means to point emblematically, and by metonymic extension, to some noumenal reality beyond the concrete data supplied in the text.

Schwartz's tropology serves a salvationist function with this deliberate engagement with its own invention:

> . . . consoling them
> With the Old Platonic metaphor in which the state
> That knot of common weakness,
> Consistent need, poor fear and aching will
> Becomes an animal or organism
> Wherein each organ must deny itself
> That the great corpse may be well fed.
> "How metaphors may serve the ruling class!
> Hypostasis itself shall soothe the poor!" (G 56)

Metaphors alone cannot fill a hungry belly, despite Schwartz's enthusiastic avowal, "metaphor is my salvation" (J 35). In the poem, "Calmly We Walk Through This April's Day," poetry is ubiquitous, if casually summoned: "Metropolitan poetry here and there" (SK 66). Elsewhere poetry fails: "Beyond my metaphor and parable" ("Passing Beyond the Straits of Guilt and Doubt" VP 82). The journal entry, "make many notes, find many metaphors, / But hardly make a poem" (48) points to the insufficiency of metaphor in the poetic enterprise. A metaphor, however thoughtfully conceived, does not a poem make.

The once mobile army of metaphors have become, in their fixity and canonicity, immobile, ineffectual, or as John Barth defines it for the novel in his celebrated essay, "The Literature of Exhaustion," a used-upness of certain forms, or "exhaustion . . . of possibilities" (73). Schwartz anticipates Barth by a few years in his 1959 essay, "Novels and the News": "The obsolescence of the novel is, in literary circles, as perennial a subject as the weather among most human beings. . . . Thus it is said, and it will be said time and again that it is the realistic novel of the past 150 years which has exhausted its possibilities and which cannot be renewed as a major form of literature" (SE 387-88). The received systems of signification have

themselves lost their meaning, at least in terms of the meaning-dispensing consciousness suggested by Husserl:

> The words for what is in my heart and in my mind
> Do not exist: But I must seek and search to find
> Amid the vines and orchards of the vivid world of day
> Approximate images, imaginary parallels.
> For what is in my heart and dark within my mind:
> Comparisons and mere metaphors: for all
> Of them are substitutes, both counterfeit and vague.
> They are, at most, deceptive resemblances,
> False in their likeness. . . . (Narcissus LLP 67)

Here, in pondering its own semantic exhaustion, the above poetic citation is the kind of thing, mutatis mutandis, Linda Hutcheon has in mind when she writes of the narcissistic narrative:

> Certain texts explicitly point to the fact that they are texts; in other words, their identity is a linguistic as well as a narrative one. . . . the overt piety or self consciousness about the processes of language thematizes both the fact and awareness of it. The focus can be either immense potency of words in creating worlds or the inadequacy of language -- as a means of communication, cognition or creation -- . . . . This kind of narcissism is no less "vital," no less connected to "life," for its linguistic self-recognition. (Narcissistic Narrative 104)

What is more, Schwartz's poetry is discutable, as Henry James describes the French tendency of "having a theory, a conviction, a consciousness of itself behind it -- of being the expression of an artistic faith . . ." ("Art of Fiction" 49). Tropes themselves are examined for literary authenticity and figural truth: "Through the thick forest of North America / Since men are trees walking as St. Paul says, / This trope is true" (G 33). St. Paul's alteration of image (thick forest) to a trope of transference through an explicit predication (men are trees walking) is judged by the speaker to be appropriate and adequate, a happier assessment than the "approximate images and imaginary parallels" of Narcissus.

There are many instances of tensions, ambiguities, collisions, fusions and juxtapositions of metaphor in G: " . . . Here Love and Death / Meet in a metaphor: love is a kind of death" (113). No new typology here, just strict attention to the epic and tragic diegetic process itself: "A notable epiphany!" (106); "Beauty, dénouement, denunciation" (128); "In medias res, in the middle of life" (99); "All of this is a recognition scene / And we have logos of this recognition -- / The story has an epic movement" (64). Metaphoric import is guaged and registered: "How in death we need the metaphor" (88); "Such metaphors like the rack torture us" (99); ". . . one obscure metaphor / Moved in the infant mind" (99); "His was a version of Arcadia / Really no more than a trope, really no more / Than metaphors with which to fly away" (158). With this statement -- "The basis of the art of poetry, / The hard identity felt in the bone" (70) -- Schwartz proleptically concurs with Timothy J. Reiss's determination of the prevailing language of modernism as one not of "analogy, but . . . of identity. Its exemplary statement is cogito-ergo-sum (reason-semiotic-mediating system-world)" (31). Although for Schwartz, it is a somatic or intuitive identity, "felt in the bone," both Schwartz and Reiss have chosen identity rather than equivalence as a defining feature of the modernist literary act. With this speculation -- "seeing how one thing is another thing / In certain ways, a girl being a rose, / In certain ways, a poet being a train" (G 88) -- Schwartz establishes semantic co-incidence.

Although Schwartz finds this anonymous quote from the (London) Times Literary Supplement worthy of note -- "Metaphor is not simply the perception of similarity in dissimilar things but the changing of words by one another. . . ." (J 624) -- his own canon is full of such metaphors which rest on the Aristotelian model of the intuitive perception of the likeness of unlike things (Poetics 1458b):

> Comfort me, bring me to the morning
> Willing and smiling . . .
> To box its shadows, lead its brutish dogs,
> Knowing its vanity and the vanity of waves
> .....
> The government of love's great polity. (J 380)

C. Day Lewis' epigram that "poetic truth [is] struck out by the collision rather than the collusion of images" (qtd. in "Metaphor," Preminger 493) is confirmed in the following synaesthetic clash of sensations: ". . . to live where death / Has his loud picture in the subway ride" ("Sonnet: O City, City" SK 52). Schwartz's inventive yoking of visual or aural and conceptual elements accounts for the characteristic resonance and energy of his metaphors, an energy possibly derived from a flirtation with catachresis.

We turn now from what Linda Hutcheon termed, "the epistemological self-consciousness of modernism" (A Poetics of Post-modernism 219), to the aspects of that epistemology -- the separate "acts of knowing" (PI 3-4). Schwartz's particular poetic idiolect includes novel and various treatments of knowledge, its description, perception and limits. "It is possible to achieve . . . a modified transcendence by self-consciously luxuriating in the mind's inventive powers" (Altieri, Self and Sensibility 151). This modified transcendence -- the absolute mitigated by the phenomenal, the universal mitigated by the concrete -- is part of the agenda for the next chapter.

Endnotes to Chapter 5

[1] For a complete connection between Husserl's "cogitations" and Descartes' "meditations" see the section of Spiegelberg's book, Phenomenological Movement entitled, "The Phenomenological Residue: Ego Cogito Cogitata Mea" (124-26) wherein he explains that, unlike Descartes' doubt, Husserl's conversion of the world to pure phenomena does not lead to a "catastrophic impoverishment of our universe." He follows Husserl's idea of Pure Ego from its conception in Logical Investigations as a "bundle of acts" to Ideas, where the Ego is a "substance, à la Descartes." Further, Husserl's absolute cogitations comprise all the acts enunciated by Descartes, such as, doubting, understanding, affirming, denying, willing, refusing, imagining and feeling. (I have referred, briefly, to Schwartz's use of performative illocutionary acts in Chapter 1). In his later writing, Spiegelberg writes, Husserl "applies the term noesis to the act of cogitating and noema to its object" (125).

[2] As W.K. Wimsatt so accuses the Geneva school in an essay of the same name, "Battering the Object."

[3] Hugh Silverman distinguishes between Dufrenne's "common reader" who is "anyone confronting the poem, with the freshness that the poem demands. . . . Every reader who is prepared to take himself to the poem with his corporeal presence, activating the senses, which in turn reveals meaning" and Woolf's "common reader" who is neither critic nor scholar, who "reads for his own pleasure rather than to impart knowledge" ("The Common Reader" qtd. in "Dufrenne's Phenomenology of Poetry" 21).

[4] Riffaterre notes the fruitfulness of models in the particular case of an ambiguous text, "if the reader finds himself unable to choose between mutually exclusive meaning within the same sign" ("Hermeneutic Models" 7, 8). He distinguishes here between "sylleptic" models, an abandonment of linear reading and "hypogrammatic" models, where a "deictic sign points to a latent text to a hypogram underneath the text" (8, 13).

[5] According to Horia Bratu and Ileana Marculescu, Husserlian "constitution" is itself a hermeneutic act: "In no case is phenomenological constitution a poiesis, a 'making up,' a constructing of the world in physical terms. But it is certainly a construing, a deciphering, an interpretive reading, a making out . . . a bestowal of meaning upon the presentations from which all naturalistic connotations have been suspended, reduced" (338). Schwartz offers the reader many such acts of "decoding," rather than "encoding" in the poetry itself, as we shall see in the section on reflexivity.

[6] In his essay, "Écrivains et écrivants" (1960), Barthes makes the distinction (closely connected with the one he will make fifteen years later in S/Z), between lisible and scriptible, (readerly and writerly), between écrivants who write about something for an ulterior purpose and the self-directed écrivains. The intransitivity of the written act, as we shall discuss, has been a feature since the Symbolists.

[7] Gerald Graff insists that insofar as art fails to hold the mirror up to nature "and present a criticism of life, it has to that degree helped to frustrate and weaken the epistemological realism upon which bourgeois culture is based" ("The Myth of the Postmodern Breakthrough" 386).

[8] For a discussion of the image of the mirror and self-reflexiveness, see Alter's chapter "Mirror of Knighthood, World of Mirrors" in his book Partial Magic (1-30). Alter's focus is diegetical: "This ontological doubleness of language in Cervantes is mirrored in the new kind of narrative structure he devised: the fictional regress of imitations that call attention in various ways to their own status as imitations" (11). Linda Hutcheon provides a taxonomy of the mirroring image including simple reduplication, repeated in infinitum, including the work in which it itself is included. She refers here to Lucien Dallenbach's "extensive study of this reflexive modality" in Le Récit spéculaire (Narcissistic Narratives 55-56).

[9] Abrams notes other sources: Caxton's Mirror of the World, Barclay's The Mirror of Minds and Gascoigne's Glass of Government. There are, he defends, "Mirrors for fools and mirrors for magistrates" (32).

[10] Wheelwright distinguishes the univocality of the steno-sign from the plurisignative aspect of the "depth symbol" in his treatise, The Burning Fountain. I use "plurisignation" rather loosely here to apply to a "both-and" rather than an "either-or" ambiguity.

[11] This trope, which we have seen many times in the Schwartz canon, is characteristically elliptical, according to John Hollander: "I propose that we apply the name of the classical rhetorician's trope of transumption (or metalepsis in its Greek form) to . . . diachronic figures. . . . Proper reading of a metaphor demands a simultaneous appreciation of the beauty of a vehicle and the importance of its freight. . . . It involves ellipsis, rather than a relentless pursuit of further figuration" (from The Figure of Echo qtd. in Bloom, "Whitman's Image of Voice" 195).

[12] Schwartz might be indebted here to Heidegger who speaks of Hölderlin as a "shepherd of being" who is "housed in language" (qtd. in Cambon 238).

[13] One can look to Schwartz's prose writings and polemical pieces for instances of confessional writing. According to Louise Bogan, "the classic confessors, from St. Augustine to Rousseau were not poets. . . . The kind of confession that is good for the soul requires not the condensation of poetry, but the discursiveness of prose" (qtd. in Phillips and Rosenthal 13).

[14] Moishe Leib Halpern, New York Yiddish poet of the group Die Yunge, "The Young Ones," and fellow literary iconoclast, writes with similar oblique self-reference in his poem "Dos Lied Fun Sof Zuntik," "Song: Weekend's Over," as it is translated by John Hollander:

> It isn't that he's ill the sad one
> Who contemplates these things at night;
> But sick of his own sadness only,

He lies and broods, his pipe alight
(A little love in big Manhattan). (Howe and Greenberg 108)

In Halpern's poem, "Djingili," the self apostrophe is more directly to "Moishe Leib."

[15] While Adolph Ochs and Walter Lippman were, through the legitimate channels of their insightful journalism, giving the Jew entry into the American consciousness, some writers, notably Alfred Kazin, insisted that Jewish alienation was fit punishment for the literary crime of parochialism. Leslie Fiedler felt, as noted in the introduction, that their "much vaunted alienation" was an "eminently marketable commodity . . . passport into the heart of Gentile American culture" ("Zion as Main Street" in The Literature of the American Jews 405). Schwartz's abject declaration to Dwight MacDonald, "to exploit the alienation which only a Jew can suffer and use, as a cripple uses his weakness in order to beg" (qtd. in Atlas 166) seems to give fodder to Fiedler's harsh critical pronouncements.

[16] For a discussion of Heidegger's ideas of Homecoming and Arrival see Halliburton's book, Poetic Thinking 101-112.

[17] For definitive theoretical studies of reflexivity, see Alter's article "The Self-Conscious Moment: Reflections on the Aftermath of Modernism" as well as its companion book, Partial Magic. Linda Hutcheon fully chronicles this typology in Narcissistic Narrative; A Theory of Parody and parts of A Poetics of Postmodernism. Hutcheon opens up the discussion of this kind of diegetic narcissism "to suggest that the mise-en-abyme" contains a critique of the text itself, as in Borges' world of Flon, 'a book which does not contain its counterbook is considered incomplete'." She quotes Barth as well: "'Another Story about a writer writing a story! Another regressus in infinitum! who doesn't prefer that which at least overtly imitates something other than its own processes?'" (qtd. in Narcissistic Narrative 55).

[18] The following appears in Quine's Word and Object: "Ontology recapitulates philology -- James Grier Miller." Schwartz's familiarity with this quotation is unknown. This is an obvious turn on the dictum, "Phylogeny recaptulates ontogeny" which derives from E. Haeckel's Generelle Morphologie der Organismen (1866) and was popularized by Darwin in Origin of the Species ("Phylogeny" Oxford English Dictionary).

[19] Vandevelde also insists on Heidegger's place in the theory of intransitivity as it exists in his lecture "The Origin of the Work of Art": "A work does not say anything, does not communicate anything, does not represent anything. A work is not an allegory, nor a symbol, nor an expression. If art is expression it is . . . because it is art. . . . A work is not only the result of a making, but more primarily, an event" (284).

[20] According to Ted Cohen, Max Black's seminal text, "Metaphor," has been "an extremely influential and provocative piece and continues to hold a central position in contemporary discussions. . . . Black, refusing to concede that metaphor's only legitimate capacities are emotive, argues for the cognitive status" (3-4). Black's essay in turn influenced Nelson Goodman's Languages of Art wherein metaphors are seen as potential vehicles of knowledge, "systems of things" rather than "things." Schwartz's view of art as ordering mechanism tends toward a similar view.

[21] For a discussion of "the metaphoric nexus" and its history, replete with graphs and schematic drawings, see Umberto Eco's "The Garden of Metaphor." Eco discusses "overlooked" authors such as Heidegger and Greimas. He writes of "an epistemic break, allowing the concept to drift toward other territories -- ever so slightly, but just enough" (217-58).

[22] Hugh Bredin, in his essay "Metonymy," finds the term "clouding" and "unrevealing": "In the realm of figurative language, [contiguity] is made the common dumping ground" (47).

[23] David Lodge responds to Jakobson in The Modes of Modern Writing, by counter-claiming that postmodern writing deploys both metaphoric and metonymic devices without choosing one over the other. With Lodge's discussion of contradiction, permutation, discontinuity, randomness, excess and short circuit, the pole is abandoned as a working tool.

Chapter 6

"FELT, HAD, AND WHOLLY KNOWN THINGS": NOT THE WORLD, BUT ONE'S SENSE OF THE WORLD

> Goodbye now Plato and Hegel,
> The shop is closing down; . . .
> There ain't no universals in this man's town.
>
> Louis Macneice, "Autumn Journal"
> (Collected Poems 127)

a) The Windows of Perception: Percept and Description

Schwartz's poetic language, in Barthes' words, "celebrates itself" (qtd. in Ricoeur 151); its more pressing commitment, however, is to celebrate the world, "to declare the miraculous character of daily life" (G ix). The world, seen out of Schwartz's window, is celebrated; what is more, it is recognized as an immanentist reenactment of a more essential world. If indeed, as Whitehead has it, the entire Western intellectual tradition is a "series of footnotes to Plato" (Process and Reality 63), then Schwartz, having read Husserl's version of that footnote, holds the earthly simulacra of the Absolute models in greater reverence than Platonic Realism would allow: Schwartz searches for universality of form by recognizing surface particularities. Perceptual realities are the life-world, life-blood, if you will, of vaster and more perduring ideal essences and intelligibilities.

The window, a recurrent image in his early poetry, frames within its casement both the quotidian "travail" -- "Carpenters hammered under the shaded window" -- and the promise of supernal transcendence: "The winter sky's pure capital" ("In the Naked Bed, in Plato's Cave" SK 25). Schwartz records how he apprehends the world, with its temporal contingencies, as it is seen through the glass of a window, darkly. Stevens' thirteen modes of looking at a blackbird, in Eugene F. Kaelin's words, "from the purely surface appearance to their placement somewhere within that persona's worlding world" ("The Fourteenth Way of Looking at a Blackbird" 191)

applies with equal force to the view from Schwartz's window. Kaelin is referring here to Heidegger's "'worlding' of a subject's world, the context of all that subject's lived experience" (197), which in turn draws on Husserl's notion of the "life world." Similarly the image of transcendence bounded by the limitations of the senses is the pictorial presupposition which governs engagement with the world: "A glaring whiteness in a leaded frame" ("The World Was Warm and White When I Was Born" SK 199). More tellingly, one's world is defined, or limited, by the "very sense of selfhood" ("The First Night of Fall and Falling Rain" LLP 14) and its idiosyncratic use of language, harking back to Wittgenstein's sense in the Tractatus that the borders of one's world are drawn by the borders of one's language: "The world is my world: this is manifest in the fact that the limits of language . . . mean the limits of my world" (qtd. in Redner 227). To read Schwartz phenomenologically is to understand the limits of his world, that is the world seen out his window.

Whether Schwartz enhanced perceived experience narcotically is a matter of biographical conjecture; here we simply note that he trades in Aldous Huxley's "doors of perception" for the opaque windows of perception, through which a world of possibilities is seen, and hence recorded, in phenomenological notation. Schwartz's windows are Blake's "cleansed" doors, in this citation which serves as the epigraph to Huxley's book: "If the doors of perception were cleansed every thing would appear to man as it is, infinite" ("A Memorable Fancy"). In her discussion of the poetics of perception, Mary Ann Caws refers to the door/window as a perceptual threshold: "Matisse's 'Porte-fenêtre' or 'Door-Window' expresses the double point of juncture between inside and outside -- between looking toward the exterior or the interior -- and the scene on which the opening or outlook opens -- between the gaze and the gazed at" (16).

In the early poem, "Aubade," the doors of nascent awareness "frame" the window itself, in a catachretic "blow" to naturalistic presuppositions:

> Awaken, awaken
> The doors of morning open.
> .....
> The sky deepens dimensions,
> The sun, fat first
> Punches the window
> Nursing blue shadow. (LLV 214)

The window within the door's frame opens, regressively, to a Chinese box, a mise-en-abyme: "The door's frame is no more the careful bud/Opening a small box limiting the deep; /It is the window's brink" ("Sonnet 8" LLV 206).

John Hollander's observation, in his essay, "The Poem in the Eye," puts one in mind of Schwartz's box-shaped sonnets, as it does his phenomenology of world-enframing: ". . . the look of poems, square and frame-like as they may invariably remain . . . will serve as lenses for the look of things. A poem's shape, then, may be a frame for itself as it may be a frame for its picture of the world" (284-85). The long, thin columns of such poems as "Saint, Revolutionist" (SK 56), "put together from fragments of assertion," as Hollander has it, are indeed "shaped rather than incanted" (287) and hence registered visually and vertically in a phenomenology of the senses. For Schwartz the windows of poetry must refract life's realism and trope their cognition: "The duty of prose is to be a window / The effort of poetry is to be a stained-glass window" (J 30). The window is experienced in the context of a phenomenology of images, what Gaston Bachelard has termed, "felicitous space" (xxxi):

> The image is no longer under the domination of things, nor is it subject to the pressures of the unconscious. It floats and soars, immense in the free atmosphere of a great poem. Through the poet's window the house converses about

> immensity with the world. And as metaphysicians would say, it, too, the house of men, opens its doors to the world. (69)

While I will not consider "the onset of the image," which according to Bachelard, it is the privilege of phenomenology to do, I do define the window as an image, through which, by virtue of its transparency, other images and signatures of nature are seen:

> Even at the level of the isolated poetic image, if only in the progression of expression constituted by the verse, the phenomenological reverberation can appear; and in its extreme simplicity, it gives us mastery of our tongue. Here we are in the presence of a minuscule phenomenon of the shimmering consciousness. The poetic image is certainly the psychic event that has the least importance. (xxiii)

In Schwartz's poems, the speaker, the window and visual perceptibility are typically partners in the intersubjective enterprise. Marc Chénetier uses the window and vision as analogues of the poet's encounter with his perceived universe:

> Between the poet and the universe is a transparent pane of mist, a sheet of sensitive material on which nodules of meaning sent from beyond leave their imprint. The meta- or para-reality of the world is thus accessible to the sensitive soul through vision and the traces visions leave on that panel, mapping out a transcendence. . . . The poet may kaleidoscopically rotate the received forms and reorganize their distribution, derive associative forms from them, link with, anchor and hitch up to them other forms on this side of the universe . . . . ("Sign and Symbol" 123)[1]

Schwartz's pane of mist -- "And clouding vagueness fogged the windowpane" -- is like a personal palimpsest where one's impressions can be inscribed, to be wiped clean and re-inscribed at the next encounter ("Darkling Summer, Ominous Dusk, Rumorous Rain" SK 149). This clouded and limited window is reminiscent of F.H. Bradley's perceptual scheme of "limited transparencies" whereby "contact with reality is through a limited aperture" (229).

The ever-presence of the window offers a bit of epistemological reassurance through leitmotif; it affords a kind of perceptual order where it might not in fact exist. According to

Riffaterre's semiotics, "literary windows serve as settings for contemplation, as symbols of contact between the inner life and the world of sensation. Their glass panes permit visual communication but prevent direct touch . . ." (Semiotics of Poetry 43). Indeed certain epistemological issues are raised through the iconography of the window, among them, the "abyss-like thought, full of insane disorder, / O full of terror like an accident's / Sheer imminence upon a window-edge . . ." (G 64). The speaker is either, as in the above poem, precipitously poised on the ledge of a perceptual aperture, or peering through its opacity. As such, the window assumes full and suggestive metaphoricity. About the poem, "In the Naked Bed, In Plato's Cave," Paul Bauer intones: "The poet arises and walks to the window to gaze out at the city below. Could there be a more typical modernist moment? Windows are always Faustian. . . . Faust is the archetypal modern man. . . . It is also no accident that the Stevens who energizes Schwartz is always looking out windows and down from towers . . ." ("Politics of Reality" 212-13).

Murray Krieger, in his study, A Window to Criticism, uses the window/mirror opposition as paradigmatic of the extra-poetic / New Critical difference between "meaning coming through it" and "meaning locked in it" (3). To see poetry as both window and mirror, transparent and reflexive, is to "make poetry into that magically monistic effigy that is . . . sign and the substantive thing itself" (6). The window opens up, referentially, to use Krieger's model, to other worlds, which are both true -- ". . . standing by the window, sees the truth, / Four stories down the blank courtyard on which / The moonlight shines, diagonal and pale" -- and false: " . . . 'How each view may be false!' . . ." (G 3). The view is false because it is perspectival, hence possibly untrue to the next person. Epistemological models which have

exercised authority over Schwartz's poetic world view are typically partial ones. His window commands a personal vista: "No longer the grandstand, nor the balcony / Nor the formal window gives me cool perspective" ("Abraham and Orpheus, Be With Me Now" SK 73). The "dim window glass" itself presents an altered form of the light which shines through it ("All of the Fruits Had Fallen" SK 205).

In Having Snow Schwartz heralds "various kinds of objects which change, 'grades of permanence' . . . seen from different 'points of view,' 'perspectives' . . ." (qtd. in Atlas 68). This awareness of the distorting possibilities both from behind the dim glass and from various windows, is reminiscent of Husserl's theory of Abschattungen, or "gradations of shading," the "slanted view presented by an object, especially a many-sided spatial object, from a certain angle" (Spiegelberg, Phenomenological Movement 117, 737). From a window, it is "essentially impossible to achieve adequate frontal presentation for all aspects" (117). The modification of appearance by "perspective shading-offs" (Ideas 119) is embraced in Having Snow as the stick in the water, the epistemologically-necessary error. Each adumbration of reality, seen from a different window, is part of the big picture, "perspectivity" from each roof (Having Snow, Beinecke).

Thoreau puts a more veridical spin on the window's perspectives: "I sit here this fourth of June, looking out on men and nature from this, what I call my perspective window, through which all things are seen in their true relations" (Selected Journals 40). Schwartz is in the good American tradition of those who "think . . . about the nature of our relation to what one sees out of the window . . .," as is Stevens (Letters 602, qtd. in Leonard and Wharton 332).[2] Instead

of the "million-footed Mannahatta" of Whitman's urban iconology, Henry James notes the million-windowed variety of perspective, a "felt life," in his fictive domicile:

> The house of fiction has . . . not one-window, but a million -- a number of possible windows not to be reckoned, rather; every one of which has been pierced is still pierceable in its vast front, by the need of the individual vision and the pressure of the individual will. . . . But they have this mark of their own that each of them stands a figure with a pair of eyes, or at least with a field-glass which forms, again and again, for observation, a unique instrument, insuring to the person making use of it an impression distinct from every other. He and his neighbours are watching the same show, but one seeing more where the other sees less . . . one seeing coarse where the other sees fine. . . .
> ("Preface" Portrait of a Lady x-xi)

In G, the speaker proffers many and separate acts of perception enacted by a motley assemblage of humanity:

> -- Dentist, barber and hangman are in us,
> Painter and actress, all the old professions,
> As if all things are always from some window
> Viewed. . . . (162)

What better way to view the city in its breathless tempos and tensions than from the identifiably urban vehicle, the taxicabs?[3] Instead, Schwartz renders photographs of a rural scene, taken at headlong pace, from the window of a train:

> . . . white house, red barn, squat silo
> Pasture, hill, meadow and woodland pasture
> And the striped poles step past the train windows
> Second after second takes snapshots, clicking,
> Into the dangled boxes of glinting windows
> Snapshots and selections, rejections, at angles. . . .
> ("The Journey of a Poem Compared to All the Sad Variety of Travel" LLP 37)

The horizon is segmented by the camera's serial, frozen-frame attention.

The people at the various windows in Schwartz's world -- the water-coloured window (SK 36); the windows of morning (SK 49); the window next to the naked bed (SK 25); the factory

windows (SK 57) -- face the challenge of amalgamating private perspectives into a shared and intersubjective space. Except for the "surd" in Coriolanus who "remains . . . / Indivisible, individual, alone" (SK 109), each monad reflects the whole world.[4] Husserl's "monad" casts a wide net to include the "fully concrete ego, with its constituted as well as its constituting components, its potentialities, its actualities, and other appurtenances of its private life" (Spiegelberg, Phenomenological Movement 748). Husserl points to the integrative focus on aspects of the phenomenal world arrived at through sustained observation. Schwartz's gloss on this is filtered through Husserl's sense of "wonderment" (see below) at the world:

> If you look long enough at anything
> It will become extremely interesting;
> If you look very long at anything
> It will become rich, manifold, fascinating.
> ("Seurat's Sunday Afternoon along the Seine" SK 190)

Here we have beholding without explication, as Quentin Lauer notes, "'wonder' in the face of the world replaces the desire to explain it mythically" ("Introduction," Husserl, Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy 18).

In their study of Stevens as phenomenologist, James S. Leonard and Christine E. Wharton note the "savage transparence" of the poem "The Pediment of Appearance" ["By its form alone, by being right, / By being high, is the stone / For which they are looking" (Collected Poems 361)], along with the emphasis on appearance, to be an instance of Stevens' "phenomenological disposition" (356). This transparency expresses itself in its iconographical correlative, the window, the mind's aperture. The figure at the window itself is figured thematically in Schwartz's work. The window enframes, contains, selects and mediates perceived reality within its casement. Repose at the window is occasion for, and site of, reflective meditation:

> Tired and unhappy, you think of houses
> Soft-carpeted and warm in the December evening,
> While snow's white pieces fall past the window,
> And the orange firelight leaps.
> A young girl sings
> That song of Gluck where Orpheus pleads with Death.
> ("Tired and Unhappy, You Think of Houses" SK 38)

One sees "pieces" of absolute reality in the snow, invariably falling past the window's glass: ". . . white pennants streaked upon the windowpane" ("Seurat" SK 194); "A blond girl stood at the window and looked toward the snow" ("I Did Not Know the Truth of Growing Trees" SK 207); "The world was warm and white when I was born: / Beyond the windowpane the world was white" ("The World Was Warm and White When I Was Born" SK 199). Here the spirited alliterative "whoosh" enforces the Old Norse etymology of window, or "wind's eye." In note 12 for Having Snow Schwartz opines, "Snow is . . . light . . . snow is from the sky like grace, snow is possible like white paper. . . . Here is the light making whiter the white paper . . ." (Beinecke).

The snow, "always in Schwartz an image of transcendence, of heavenly intimations" (Brans 515), occasions an epiphanic experience, on the Joycean model:

> And struggled with balance until [Hershey] came to
> the window and saw,
> And stood stock still, shocked and overwhelmed
> That the whole world was white! . . .
> Hallucinatory calm, utter quiet pleasure . . .
> At the actual presence of snow, the apotheosis of winter. (G 140)

The "death of the colored world" (G 140) inspires Stephen Dedalus' brand of "sudden spiritual manifestation" so that its "whatness leaps to us [phenomenologically] from that vestment of its appearance" (Stephen Hero 211, 289). Indeed Irving Howe singles out "the lip of snow" which clings to the window sill at the end of the story "In Dreams Begin Responsibilities" (IDBROS

9) as a particularly moving instance of Schwartz's literary signature: "It is a lovely, haunting phrase. The plenitude and renewal of nature become through metaphor a human shape, soon to melt, but still the shape of that part of our body with which we speak and love . . . as if through God's or nature's generosity of purity, beauty, evanescence" ("Delmore Schwartz: An Appreciation" 184-85). Thus Schwartz's thematic turn on Keats's "magic casements" ("Ode to a Nightingale" Poetical Works 209).

Any focus of a field of consciousness is noted by Husserl as a "theme;" here snow merits "thematic" consideration (Spiegelberg, Phenomenological Movement 754). The eidetic theme is intended in "universality, essentiality and ideality" (Bruzina 147). Hence Howe's description fittingly raises Schwartz's "snow" from image to phenomenological theme; the image vouchsafes truths larger than itself by virtue of its repetition. As Jean-Pierre Richard has it in "L'Univers imaginaire de Mallarmé":

> The locating [repérage] of themes is most ordinarily accomplished according to the criterion of recurrence; the major themes of a work, those which form its invisible architecture, and which then must deliver to us the key of its organization are those which are found developed most often. . . . [This repetition builds a] . . . multiplicity of lateral relations which create here the essence of meaning. (qtd. in Magliola 50)

The inverse epistemological situation to the impossibility of having snow is the knowability and friendly accessibility of a verdant, flowering world, which lies within reach, just outside one's window:

> The morning blooming on the windowpane
> Asserts the theme Columbian, and speaks
> Of one just introduced becoming known . . .
> .....
> When future flowered on the bright sea-shore,

> And shows such newness in my happiness
> As promises contain, and more and more.
> ("Sonnet 9" LLV 206)

A lone tulip is an oasis of viable movement in the cityscape:

> The tulip will arise and reign again from awnings and windows
> of all colors and forms
> its vine, verve and valentine curves
>
> upon the city streets. . . .
> ("News of the Gold of May" LLP 18)

This mode of perception is phenomenological in that the sensory mediation is chiefly a visual one; Schwartz attends to what Husserl terms, "'visual things' of higher and lower order" (Ideas 387). The painterly sense pervades the window's definition, so that, with full trompe l'oeil effect, the window is itself a picture which gives out onto another picture, in framed confinement:

> When from the watercolored window idly you look
> Each is but each and clear to see, not steep
> So does the neat print in an actual book
> Marching as if to true conclusion reap
> The illimitable blue immensely overhead. . . . (SK 36)

In the poem, "America, America!" the fenestrated side of a building suggests a Mondrian-like tableau, with geometric points of light:

> -- This is the city self, looking from window to lighted
> window
> when the squares and checks of faintly yellow light
> Shine at night, upon a huge dim board and slab-like
> tombs,
> Hiding many lives. . . . (LLP 4)

Sometimes these openings reveal human dramas which are played out in claustral spaces. Schwartz insists on the optical metaphors of the observing mind. Poetry, we remember, is a

refracting prism: "the effort of poetry is to be a stained glass window" (J 30). This cannot but remind us of Shelley's Platonic image of the white radiance of eternity "stained" by life's dome of many-coloured glass ("Adonais," Poetical Works 443). The mind receives the data of sensation, as through a prismatic window, and apperceptively -- "bit by tiny bit," "piece by piece" -- assimilates them ("Concerning the Synthetic Unity of Apperception" SK 40; "Sonnet 1" LLV 203). The broken surface of the stained glass window and life's dome refract aspects of sensual awareness; it remains, on the Kantian model,[5] for Schwartz's speaker to derive an intellectual order out of the sensuous units.

It is an easy transition from consideration of the window to the "passages of poetic aperçus" (L 81) which they enframe. Because the "causal nexus between . . . perception and poetry" is an "obvious" one for Schwartz, "the poetic form . . . lift[s] the perceptions from [his] mind into the open air" (L 38, 155). One considers here Reuven Tsur's conviction that "one of the major functions of poetry is to yield a heightened awareness. It may be the heightening of the awareness of the reality perceived, or of the cognitive mechanisms that enable us to perceive reality" (35): "For Poetry magnifies and heightens reality: /. . . It is / The mastery of meaning" ("The Kingdom of Poetry" SK 187, 189). The object itself is not as phenomenologically interesting as that object experienced, apprehended, felt and lived through. Perceptual knowledge claims the privilege of the firstborn: "I must know the color, shape and proportion of the blue sky before it can give me aesthetic pleasure. . . . the knowing comes first and is a necessary condition of the pleasure" (PI 26). Schwartz's recognition of the ontological primacy of perception is not just a phenomenological habit; it is deeply rooted in the Russian Formalist conviction, noted in Chapter 1 in the context of novelty, that the "purpose of art is to

impart the sensation of things as they are perceived and not as they are known . . . the process of perception is an aesthetic end in itself . . ." (Shklovsky, "Art as Technique" 12).

Schwartz's criticism bears out his poetic awareness of the modes of appearing, along with their instances of sensation: "Each of the constituents of poetry is, in its very nature, an instrument of perception. . . . the mastery of experience involved in a poem is a matter of perception, the mastery of language, and the poet's ability to bring to bear upon perception and within language his sense of values" ("Primitivism and Decadence by Yvor Winters" SE 334, 335). In his discussion of Stevens, Schwartz fears that the fact that "each perception is itself valuable and beautiful" might inhibit the reader's ability to see that lines like "'With my whole body I taste these peaches'" are "essentially springboards" to larger statements, such as "'The greatest poverty is not to live / In a physical world'" ("In the Orchards of the Imagination" SE 188, 189). As the following poem presents the programme, perception leads to a greater good:

> Or know a girl upon the sofa's ease,
> Curved like a stocking, being profoundly round. . . .
> We see in strict perception probity,
> The lasting soil and good of all our art,
> Which purifies the nervous turned-in heart.
> ("True Recognition Often is Refused" VP 20)

Schwartz derives his poetic interest in apprehension, as well as its specific vocabulary, from Husserl. In Having Snow Schwartz claims to address knowledge, "'as something perceived'" (qtd. in Atlas 68). This echoes Husserl's observation on consciousness which is "not grasped in its absolute essence, in its flowing thisness, but 'as something apprehended'; and in this quite distinctive form of apprehension, a quite distinctive transcendence shapes itself . . ." (Ideas 150). Schwartz notes the phenomenality, as well as the randomness, of the perceived event. Schwartz participates in the common cultural tendency, heralded by Henry James's

"centre of consciousness" (as cited in Chapter 5), that is, attention to the personal experience of sensation. With consciousness centred on itself, perception assumes centre stage, thus assuring psychological continuity amid the adjacencies of the modern mind, the teeming welter of city images, the instability of crumbling orthodoxies, and the aesthetically-discontinuous presentation of poetic voice.

The title of the poem, "In the Slight Ripple, the Mind Perceives the Heart," approbatively ascribes a positive aesthetic value to perception, as the perceived world offers up its most beautiful movements, textures and events:

> In the slight ripple, the fishes dart
> Like fingers centrifugal, like wishes
> Wanton. And pleasures rise as the eyes fall
> Through the lucid water. The small pebble,
> The clear clay bottom, the white shell
> Are apparent. . . . (SK 39)

The human simile and the identification of visual pleasure draw on Husserl's resistance to sundering the act of perception from its object. However, Schwartz's poetic rendering of sensate life flies in the face of Husserl's notion that sense-apprehension is propaedeutic to essence-apprehension. Schwartz's assessment that the "best way to define the substance of Roethke's poetry is to quote Valery's remarkable statement that the nervous system is the greatest of all poems" applies with equal force to Schwartz's own sensual notations ("The Cunning and the Craft of the Unconscious and the Preconscious" SE 197).

The "first methodological principle" for Husserl is the acceptance of experiences as they are given in perception and as they are evident in the senses: "It is plain that I, as someone beginning philosophically, since I am striving toward the presumptive end, genuine science, must neither make nor go on accepting any judgement as scientific that I have not derived from

evidence . . ." (Cartesian Meditations 13). The phenomenological perceptual consciousness is an active one, as Schwartz defends in his poetry, as it is variously concerned with figure-ground, grouping, object constancy and interpretation of sensed data, "the mind as apprehending," as he observes in his notes for Having Snow. Addressing aspiration and desire, Schwartz uses the language of phenomenology:

> . . . O you require
> A big black piano . . .
> A safe for memory, a giant glass . . .
> Wit, learning, and a deck of cards
> . . . . . .
> None of these things are given. But you get
> what you do not want, what you do not need,
> Do not expect, or do not recognize. . . . (DBB, IDBR 143)

Schwartz's definition of perception falls mid-way between choice and necessity, as we see in this startling image: "Sharpen the long knives of perception / Perception is half creative, half Anagke" (J 27). Echoes here, of "Tintern Abbey": ". . . all the mighty world / of eye and ear, both what they half create, / And what perceive" (Oxford Authors 134). Schwartz notes the "particular datum of the poem" upon which "belief and disbelief operate" ("Poetry and Belief in Thomas Hardy" SE 69). The sense features, "Colored, like heaven / Blue, yellow, beautiful" are "given" necessarily (Anagke) in consciousness and created by choice:

> The blood is checkered by
> So many stains and wishes
> Between it and the sky
> You could not choose, for riches. ("What Is To Be Given" SK 53)

Hence givenness means both necessity and what is immediately available to the senses, a "primordial" experience, according to Husserl: ". . . objects appear as . . . given in a primordial (originärer) sense . . . and the primordial dator experience is perception in the

ordinary sense of the term. To have something really primordially given and to 'become aware' of it and 'perceive' it in simple intuition, are one and the same thing" (Ideas 45). Marc Blanchard, in his discussion of descriptiveness in literature, explains such designations as Schwartz's "blue, yellow, beautiful" in terms of phenomenologial givenness: "What has happened is that the object has now been given. . . . I, the reader, am asked to pause and gaze at it. . . . This experience I call the experience of the object being given, or the givenness of the object" (183). It is indeed the "business" of Schwartz's descriptions "to make us share in that experience itself, in the givenness of the world of that experience" (186), in "what is to be given," as he has it in the title of his poem (SK 53).

Schwartz is concerned, typically, with the epistemological value of a poem, that is, how far, if at all, it can be regarded as a source of knowledge about the world. Hence in the poem, "In the Slight Ripple, the Mind Perceives the Heart," the "lucid water" and "the clear clay bottom" provide their own exegesis:

> "The old error, the thought of sitting still,
> "The senses drinking by the summer river,
> "On the tended lawn, below the traffic,
> "As if time would pause, and afternoon stay.
> "No, night comes soon
> "With its cold mountains with desolation,
> unless Love build its city." (SK 39)

Mary Ann Caws notes that "theoretical phenomenology . . . may help in the practical refreshing of the literary gaze" (4). Toward the end of "training the literary eye . . . so that it might perceive inner structures and relations and relate them to its own complex knowledge" (3), she quotes, as epigraph to her chapter, "For a Poetics of Perception," Rudolf Arnheim's observation based on the Gestalt principle that perception grasps significant form, in Art and Visual

Perception (viii): "All perceiving is also thinking, all reasoning is also intuition, all observation is also invention" (3).

For Schwartz, poetic perception is similarly aligned with cognitive function, as in this reference to a "kind of intellectual eyesight": "The complication which strengthens the images is often intellectual, that is to say, the bond between the image and the subject depends upon the intellect, which has seen a relationship not given to visual observation, although often framed in visual terms" ("The Poetry of Allen Tate" SE 165). This coincides with Arnheim's case for an "intelligence of visual perception" put forward in his book, Visual Thinking (37), along with the "pictorial analogues [which] fulfill a mediating position between the world of sensory experience and the disembodied forces underlying the objects . . . of that experience" (148). In the introduction I referred to Alan Wilde's idea that there has been a shift away from the early modernist connection of truth and depth to a phenomenological "counterassertion that truth inheres in the visible" and in surfaces. Wilde goes on: "Reading appearances correctly is, in fact, the project of late modernism. . . . Sifting appearances rather than plumbing depths. . . . Auden's prewar poems, with their repeated injunctions to look, see, consider and watch are relevant here . . ." (212, 211). Schwartz is implicated in this "epistemology of surfaces" (212): "Poet and veteran of childhood, look! / See in me the obscene . . ." ("Faust in Old Age" SK 49); "See the evasions. . . . / See the wart . . ." ("Father and Son" SK 30, 31).

In this journal entry, perception comments on itself: "Every perception rejoices in itself / Like a fire catching fire through itself" (81). This progression has heuristic momentum: "Perception, narrative, analysis, / All in a rhythm like a running boat" (81). Here the hermeneutic circle includes percept and its artistic expression: ". . . the play of knives of flame

of candlelight, the perception understood by means of literary forms, or grasped anew by means of them" (85); "The power of the symbol comes from the nature of perception and thought. The train whistle makes us see the train, the footstep in the hall reminds us of the family relative. The oranges bring back the breakfast room" (J 106). Language can hence enact the process of perception which takes place within the mental landscape. Poetic language provides a verbal equivalent to the reflective and transformative process that takes place in the intentional relation between perceiver and perceived. Schwartz found Winters' "fallacy of imitative form" itself fallacious, as I pointed out in the chapter on obscurity ("Primitivism and Decadence by Yvor Winters" SE 344). Hence discontinuous values can be presented in discontinuous syntax, the process of perception can be enacted in the poetic line and lexicon:

> Athlete, virtuoso . . .
> Bend arm and knee and seek
> The body's sharp distress,
> For pain is pleasure's cost,
> Denial is the route. . . .
> ("For the One Who Would Not Take His Life in His Hands" SK 55)

The spare ascetic nominalism replicates the athlete's effort and deprivation.

Schwartz's speculations on "the nature of perception" inevitably lead him to question whether one perceives at all: ". . . perception does not exist sans a perceiver" (J 107). This is Schwartz's active version of the most passive of statements on perception, Berkeley's esse est percipi, "to be is to be perceived," from his essay, "A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge" (152). Husserl characteristically downplays the ontological ramifications of this principle: "Its esse consists exclusively in its percipi, except that the meaning of this statement is about as far removed as it can be from that of Berkeley, since here the percipi does not contain the esse as a real . . . constituent" (Ideas 265). Whether with stained glass or long

knives, perception of the world is troped; moreover, the lyric dimension of such perception is asserted thematically. Description addresses both organizing percept and pure phenomena: ". . . there is in a description something like a surplus value. . . . A description then is that system which enables us to modify a common frame of reference and to introduce our own view of the world" (Blanchard 182-83). Schwartz's own view of the world is fraught with surplus value, as his copious lists suggest.

The negative suspension of the natural attitude or standpoint (Einstellung), that is, the avoidance of presuppositions about the existence of the workaday world must be followed by a "second, or positive stage [which] consists in describing what remains of our experience when the natural attitude is suspended" (Kaelin, "Merleau-Ponty, Fundamental Ontologist" 103). Schwartz combines description and reflection in overlapping fields of perception in the personal, localizeable universe of the poem. We have a particularly visual mode of perception: "You saw your love's face abstract, the weak-kneed stilts, / You saw and knew, and knew how 'no more'. . . . / The touched, seen substance . . ." ("Abraham and Orpheus, Be With Me Now" SK 73). In his essay on "The Objective Correlative," Schwartz identifies seeing and phenomenology: "In terms of vision, or . . . in phenomenological terms, . . . images are authentic" (Beinecke). This recalls Husserl's emphasis on intuition as "seeing" an essence; poets transfer abstract ideas into concrete, visible objects. Schwartz is what Husserl calls a "descriptive student of nature" (Ideas 190). In the above poem, the line of vision can be traced from thing to knowledge of that thing. Seeing and knowing are identical: "The phenomenologically particular object (the eidetic singularity) is . . . just this imagery of the thing in the whole wealth of its concreteness . . ." (Ideas 192). Husserl defines phenomenology as a descriptive theory of the essences of pure

experience (Ideas 191); essences immanent in experience are retrieved descriptively through the seen and given structure.

A simple definition of description is helpful here: "My knowledge of the table is the kind which we shall call 'knowledge by description.' The table is the physical object which causes such and such sense data" (Russell, Problems of Philosophy 26). For Schwartz, the parsing of sense data is effected through a highly developed descriptive sense, a sense which has its roots in phenomenological practice. Schwartz follows Merleau-Ponty's path from primacy of perception to a phenomenology of spatial reality and its concreta. The latter's essay, "The Eye and the Mind,"[6] constitutes an ontology of painting as radical as Schwartz's inclusion of painterly descriptiveness in his poetic iconology, or iconography, to use Erwin Panofsky's distinction, as the former implies the total symbolic horizon of an image, while the latter refers to a descriptive method of specific procedure.[7] To write of Seurat's "Sunday Afternoon along the Seine" as "the willed / Icons of purified consciousness" (SK 196) is to address both the phenomenological intentionality of the work of art as well as its graphic percepts. As Schwartz demonstrates how image assimilation is governed by a will to meaning, if not always an access to knowledge, W.J.T. Mitchell's reference to Foucault in his study of iconology, applies to Schwartz's own aesthetic: "The image is the general notion, ramified in various specific similitudes . . . that holds the world together with 'figures of knowledge'" (11). Schwartz attests to the continuity within our subjective processes of perception and cognition, image and signification. In his discussion of the Divine Comedy, Schwartz yokes mimetic and descriptive function: ". . . words as descriptive, selva oscura . . . are the means of imitation" (PI 7).

The "I" and the "Eye" meet in a mutual embrace, recalling the discussion of "grasping" in Chapter 5, as Pierre Ouellet has it in this most phenomenological observation:

> The Latin verb percipere signifies "to overcome," "to seize in its entirety" (. . ."to grasp something in all its globality"). Accordingly, the Ego is clearly identified as a kind of invader: its relationship to the empirical world is precisely "imperialist," and in this sense, the "real" as the exclusive domain of experience . . . constitutes its own "empire," onto which it projects and thrusts itself, overcoming or invading it. . . . Hence the modern or classical "I" is constructed on the model of the "eye" which is itself conceived as the source of vision and of our knowledge of the real; the ego is construed as a kind of "magic eye" inside our physical eye which transmits and relates everything we see to our experiential self. . . . (68-69)

Schwartz's poetry, by dint of its participation in a descriptive phenomenology, says something of the world, in the world and to the world. Mitchell ponders the political import of such a relationship between image and word:

> Among the most interesting and complex versions of this struggle is what might be called the relationship of subversion, in which language or imagery looks into its own heart and finds lurking there its opposite number. One version of this relation has haunted the philosophy of language since the rise of empiricism, the suspicion that beneath words, beneath ideas, the ultimate reference in the mind is the image, the impression of outward experience printed, painted or reflected in the surface of consciousness. . . . (43)

Schwartz waged a polemical battle over the canons of aesthetic and social value on the pages of The Marxist Quarterly. This dispute was with Meyer Schapiro, Marxist art critic. Schwartz answered Schapiro's article the "Nature of Abstract Art" which appeared in the first issue of the Marxist Quarterly[8] with his own "A Note on the Nature of Art." Schapiro relates issues of economic determinism to questions of aesthetic value. Here he rails against what he believes is a "mistaken idea that represented objects are impurities, imposed historical elements with which the artist was burdened and in spite of which he finally achieved his underlying, personal abstract expression" (85). Far from denying the historical situation of his own iconic

figures, Schwartz plays devil's advocate in decrying Schapiro's need to find "a social fact for every pictorial element . . .: How is any social product less expressive of social facts than a work of art?" (305). He goes on to oppose expressivist to mimetic theories of art. While allowing that the work of art is "an assertion of values," Schwartz claims that it must never subserve propagandist ends (310). Schwartz strenuously opposed any form of "epistemologism," "an aesthetic discourse along Hegelian lines that was based upon a literature-centred theory of reflectionism that valorized art as a form of knowledge through images. . . . Art was better according to the extent that it had the capacity to transmit knowledge that was external to art itself" (Mosquera 76). Schwartz proposes, in a phenomenological vein, that the important feature is the "critical-evaluating focus which the artist directs upon his perceptions. And it must be insisted that this focus is interesting and significant only because it represents a new and individual reaction and response to social facts" ("A Note on the Nature of Art" 309).

I mean here not to decide matters of ideological and aesthetic convergence, rather to point to the extent to which Schwartz was engaged with questions of pictorial art. Schwartz offers his own impressionistic distortions of reality, what Lukács calls the modernistic and subjectivistic "attenuation of actuality" against which artists of "social realism" pit their view of the world (718). The phenomenological tendency to ground and attenuate knowledge in the evidence of the visual sense gets full play in Schwartz's prodigious use of painterly techniques and subject matter. Passages such as the one below confirm the "sisterhood" of the visual and literary arts, long a contentious issue since Horace penned his comparatist observation, ut pictura poesis, "as is painting, so is poetry" (or as it is rendered in Adams' anthology, "as with the painter's work, so with the poet's" 73) in his Ars Poetica:

The country winter dusk wholly possessed
By milky serenity, still lucidity
As if a tableau frozen for eternity
Or posed by Poussin -- perfected in arrest
Only -- along the horizon in the west
A ridge of salmon pinkness faintly glows. (J 521)

The horizon, or vanishing point, calls the perceiver into play, even as it occasions a phenomenological description. Instead of the usual ascents and declensions of the Schwartzian imagination, we have the frozen still point of the vanishing world, the arrested spatial fixity of the above poem. There is movement from an undifferentiated background to a clear pictorial definition of objects in the landscape. Husserl's language in Ideas is replete with the language of pictorialism: he speaks of the "horizon" of experience, the ego's "perspective" on an intended object while defining phenomenology's "field of perception" (Ideas 91) and the necessity of bringing remote objects "into focus." The horizon (Horizont) for Husserl is the "fringe" of marginal acts and "dimly apprehended depth of . . . indeterminate reality" which pervades all "determinate" perceptions (Ideas 92). The "milky serenity" envelops Schwartz's horizon (above, J 521) in like obfuscation. Horizon is understood phenomenologically as context: "the perceived object then becomes a theme for the understanding of the larger context; in this sense the object thematizes its horizon" (Stewart and Mickunas 46). Schwartz fashioned Husserl's method of rejecting assumptions about the world in order to describe the world accurately into a graphic poetic sense.

The image caught in the mirror is Schwartz's most pervasive tableau; however the face is in motion. The matrix on which one's emotional life is transcribed is a gestural one. Murray Krieger challenges the reader to

> locate (as it is the poet's job to produce) the spatial orders within the temporal: the circular principle within progression; the freezing principle within the free-flowing; the emblematic as the ekphrastic within that which resists all spatial fixity. . . . the ekphrastic principle becomes the poetic principle in that it invokes "still movement" (in both the Keatsian and Eliotic senses of "still") as the special grace with which poetry is to be endowed. ("Mediation, Language, Vision" 603)

Ekphrasis, and its poetic applications, will be taken up in a moment. Against the backdrop of urban kinetic energy, Schwartz often paints his personae as sculpturally-frozen and caught "between terms" ("Sonnet: City, City" SK 52). Yet the suggestion of motion wins out over static visual statement. Before the reader is returned, primordially, to the still of the "white bed [where] all things are made," the speaker takes him on a bumpy, agitated, vertiginous "subway ride." Berryman terms the poems of Schwartz's late, manic period, "rapid sketchings" (qtd. in Dunn xvi). The quick touch, the swirling textures, the surface activism is once again caught in frozen frame: "All of them are fixed . . . / . . . all these things are still now" ("All of Them Have Gone Away, Although They Once Were Near" SK 208). Here is the gesture without motion of Eliot's hollow men (Collected Poems 87). Schwartz offers his version of Keats's lovers on the Grecian urn (Poetical Works 209), in straining stasis:[9]

> Rome, Rome,
> The history-ridden arena shown by
> A temple painted on a canvas backdrop;
> On fluted columns, fat and white, there rests
> The pediment wherein a writhing frieze
> Of armed men strain to kill the other team. . . . (Coriolanus SK 81)

The sculptural monumentality of the tableau, the suspended animation, stress the immobility within which the poetic moment is caught. Elsewhere, architectural designations of mass, volume and distance add dimension to the articulated space: "As if all were a metaphor

of place, profound, / Elliptic, solid, flat, far, thin and round!" (Coriolanus SK 96). Dimension is soon diminished. Architecture gives way to painting:

> O evening like a frieze . . .
> The heavy huddled buildings look like toys . . .
> The Square -- Georgian façade . . .
> Thins to a postcard's picayune décor.
> ("Dusk Shows Us What We Are And Hardly Mean" VP 98)

Dried plaster cannot be decreated; the fixed columns are likewise unmalleable. The above passage (SK 81) reveals a clever trompe l'oeil: the temple is not real but painted. According to Merleau-Ponty, visual gestalten combine the all-at-onceness of painting and the diachronicity of poetry: "it's a certain knot in the weave of the simultaneous and the successive: a concretion of visibility . . ." (qtd. in Kaelin, "Merleau-Ponty, Fundamental Ontologist" 114). To complicate matters further, the linear progression of events in Schwartz's poetry must be understood within the contrapuntal texture of city life.

If a picture is, in an oft-quoted phrase which Plutarch ascribed to Simonides, "mute poetry" (Bartlett 68),[10] then the obverse is true for the poem, as we see in this Petrarchan concetto: "death / Has his loud picture in the subway ride" ("Sonnet: O City, City" SK 52). Wendy Steiner thinks poetry gains in its convertibility:

> . . . next to the "speaking picture" the mute poem seems a blighted thing: painting is poetry minus a voice. The asymmetry behind Simonides' rhetoric suggests that a poem has everything to gain in the pictorial analogy -- all of its own symbolic properties and the palpability of a visible medium as well: it becomes speech emanating from a body. But what has painting to gain? It acquires not a voice, but some ineffable property termed "poetic." Simonides' formulation reveals the commonest thrust of the inter-artistic comparison -- that poetry needs to be supplemented with physical presence to be aesthetic, while painting has presence and is also poetic without using language. (Colors of Rhetoric 6)

With reference to both the lexicon and the poetic line of a poem such as "What Is To Be Given," one can speak of both its bright palette and its vigorous, if sketchy, brushwork:

> What is to be given
> Is spirit, yet animal,
> Colored, like heaven,
> Blue, yellow, beautiful. (SK 53)

William C. Johnson notes how our "vocabulary of knowing has been appropriated by visual connotations" and quotes Walter Ong for support: "The entire philosophy of noetics, including the Platonic idea, Cartesian clarity and distinctiveness, Lockean sensational noetics, the Kantian phenomenon, Hegelian phenomenology . . . is inextricably involved with thinking, of intellection by analogy with vision" (33).

However, one must first accept the parallelism and interchangeability of terms; Schwartz's concession that the "image of the poem ['. . . so noble from head / To great shapely knees / The long flowing line' (Yeats, "A Thought from Propertius")] simulates the visual without being visual . . ." ("An Unwritten Book" SE 97) might not go far enough. Indeed mutual elucidation of the arts is not a given, as we see in his resistance to giving credence to a shared artistic vocabulary: in a letter to Ransom, Schwartz enters an elaborate plea against Van Wyck Brooks's "fatuous" critical "impressionism." Schwartz "more or less boiled over by the time [he] reached the passages on Eliot and Wallace Stevens." He quotes from the passage:

> "Wallace Stevens of Hartford published the polychromatic poems that suggested Henry Adams' Old French window. For reading these poems, one felt as if a window of Chartres had been shattered, and the lovely bits of colour lay on the grass, and one forgot the picture, which one could scarcely reconstruct, in the pleasure of letting these fragments fall through one's fingers." (L 99)

He ends with the "hope [that] at least one dissenting voice can be raised to this kind of systematic superficiality." The necessity of keeping cross-disciplinary terms of comparison

separate is as axiomatic for Schwartz as is the difference of the languages of philosophy (knowledge) and poetry (knowing), as determined in the introduction. Schwartz seems to be saying that beyond an apparently valid intellectual and epistemological correlation between the two fields,equivalences are whimsical and contrived. The degree to which Schwartz accepted or subscribed to such comparisons affords an important measure of his sense of the integrity of the arts.

Yet Schwartz phenomenologically describes and poetically transcribes what "nature . . . invents / Upon the sky's great canvas" (J 53). Such images as ". . . high blue and clouded pennant sky, / . . . gulls drop from an arch -- scythes of descent!" ("The Self Unsatisfied Runs Everywhere" VP 102) are most fruitfully explained with reference to backdrop, balance and visual lines of force. As the eye traces a certain traversal on the canvas, so does the reader follow the arcs and parabolas of figurative thought. Intentionality is rendered visual with Husserl's reference to the "glance" of the Ego and the perceived "background" (Hintergrund): ". . . the objective background from which the perceived object . . . emerges as the glance of the Ego singles it out, is an objective background in a really experienceable sense. This is a potential field of perception in the sense that a special perceiving . . . can be directed towards everything that thus appears" (Ideas 223).

The problem besetting the relationship between poetry and painting, prior even to questions about shared historiography and periodization, has presented itself with particular acuity since the time of Lessing, who divided poetry and painting along lines of succession and simultaneity, respectively. Beyond the common sense conviction, one held by Schwartz, that "absolutely everything distinguishes a literary text from a painting or drawing: its conception,

its method of production, its modes of appreciation, its identity as an object irreducible to any other object, and its autonomous functioning" (Laude 471), the idea that each art has its own expressive capacities which are determined by the nature of the medium, received its classic formulation in Lessing's Laokoön. W.K. Wimsatt took up this objection to the reciprocity of the arts, and made it relevant for formalist criticism in Schwartz's time, in his essay "Laokoön: An Oracle Reconsulted." Here he concedes that language is iconic of auditory qualities and diagrammatic of numerous logical relationships. However, this begets a confusion of the arts, not a supportive interpenetration of them.[11] Wimsatt more broadly delineated the natural boundaries of his literary interest by undertaking the role of "defending the domain of poetry and poetics from the encircling (if friendly) arm of the general aesthetician" ("The Domain of Criticism" 221). Schwartz, then, shares with Wimsatt the idea that we must evolve a separate set of descriptive terms for each art and respect the "decorum" of the medium. Yet Wimsatt defends the poetic work as a "spatial object" ("Battering the Object" 195) and implicitly the figure of the icon or urn.

Schwartz takes pleasure in the knowledge that the common mother of all the Muses, including the muse of painting and the muse of poetry, is Mnemosyne, or memory: "This Muse is memory and nothing else" ("Sonnet 1" LLV 203). In a letter to R.P. Blackmur, Schwartz notes how he pointed out to a student that "she admired Picasso for doing the same kind of thing in painting as Eliot did in verse" (192). What is more, a close reading of Aristotle's Poetics (Chapter 2) where it is claimed that poetry and painting, as arts of imitation, should use the same principle of composition, might have furnished Schwartz additional authority to measure the degree of kinship of the arts and determine the order of precedence among them.

His forays into synaesthetic experiment frustrate the phrenological compartmentalization of the various artistic faculties and point to a larger belief in Baudelairean "correspondences," or commutability of perceptions. Death's "loud picture" (SK 52) referred to above and the transference of sense modalities, prepare the reader for more audacious catachrestic acts: "The syntax of heaven, the grammar of night" ("Sonnet 1" LLV 203). The "loud" picture, painted in shades of yellow, green and white, draws on the tradition of audition colorée,[12] another instance of a confounding of the senses.

Schwartz's extended use of colour betrays a personal and vigorous implementation of a grammar of colour.[13] The "sky's inexorable blue" ("Socrates Ghost Must Haunt Me Now" SK 48) is a backdrop of infinite transcendence against which life's earthbound creatures play out their finite acts and gestures: "The blueness of the sky is overhead / Seen or unseen. The city's burden is. . . . / The dark nature thick with graves and jewels . . . ("Song 6" LLV 207); "Everything happens in the mind of God: / Thence is the blueness of the quality" (G 118); "Logos alone can understand the blue" (G 98). Only the Word, secularized as poetic understanding, can penetrate the essential mystery. The blue sky, the white "super-Nature" signal the "death of the colored world" (G 144). The poem's organizing epiphany is not narrative, but chromatic.

Husserl follows Plato and Schwartz follows Husserl in drawing a parallel between vision and intellect, image and concept. Eidos and idea share the meaning of the "look of something . . . a common look shared by a group of phenomena, thus a shape as viewable by the eye" (Bruzina 150, 152). The eidos, the intuitively exemplified pure essence, structures the perception

of one's phenomenal landscape; while Nature may invent, "the real," according to Merleau-Ponty, must be described, not constructed or formed (x):

> And all the clouds are abstract, in a sense
> Nature may imitate; but it invents
> Upon the sky's great canvas constantly,
> And this, perhaps, is quite enough to see
>
> -- A great and curving wing, long purple-black
> Composed upon the sky above the sun
> Going down orange, yellow, orange
> In a smear. . . . (J 53)

Nature registers its variety and colour in prismatic and painterly statements. Merleau-Ponty notes that brute perception (perception sauvage) does not register colour as a secondary quality: "Between colors and the pretended visible thing, one finds the tissue which lines them, sustains and nourishes them; and which for its part, is not a thing, but a possibility, a latency, the flesh of things" (qtd. in Kaelin, "Merleau-Ponty, Fundamental Ontologist" 114). Schwartz evinces an equally somatic sense of colour. The supernal and the earthly are consummated in a blaze of colour in a trope: "Let us a while comment on honeymoons / Where blues and greens of the mind begin to be, / The blue of heaven, and the green of Nature" (G 49).

We have in Schwartz's poetry a testament to Dreiser's The Color of a Great City. He animates the colours so that they glitter, rock and burst ("Far Rockaway" SK 34); static scenes contain dynamic relationships of light and hue which "shadow no pleasure." The peculiar beauty of the urban scene is reproduced through kinetic colour arrangements as of fireworks: ". . . first the spuft, / Then the colored lights, rising" ("At This Moment of Time" SK 26). Mutability is of the essence of colour perception, according to Husserl's scheme: "The colour of the thing seen is not in principle a real phase of the consciousness of colour; . . . . even while it is

appearing the appearance can and must be continually changing. . . . The same colour appears in continuously varying patterns of perspective colour-variations" (Ideas 118). Schwartz preferred vivid colour depictions over the chiaroscuro contrasts of light and shade which pervade impressionistic poetry. The quick charcoal and sepia sketch --

> -- the fields are pencilled light brown
> or are the dark brownness of the last autumn
> -- So much has shrunken to straight brown
> lines, thin as the
> bare thin trees. . . . ("Poem" LLP 13) --

is a dark aberration in Schwartz's palette. This brightly-pigmented natural scene full of very available light, is much more typical: "They did not remember the summer blues / Or the orange of June. They did not think at all / Of the great red and bursting ball" ("Poem" SK 11). Colour is phenomenologically registered: "How can you prove the greenness of the grass?. . . Only by looking at the sky, grasping its nature by means of pure attention, can you be convinced that the sky is God's sensorium, God's blue eye" (DBB, IDBR 164).

Hence the speaker's "colorful sight" [sic] ("Prothalamion" SK 48) registers in descriptive notation the objects and states of consciousness as they appear to the apprehending subject. It is "in strict shape and color / . . . that whatever is present will be known to [the speaker]" ("The Ballet of the Fifth Year" SK 59). For Schwartz, the colour adjective is more than a delimiter of the plain noun; it conveys his sense of the world. Indeed Wittgenstein saw colour perception, in his Remarks on Colour as both exact like mathematics and relative as private sense experience. [The relativity of colour-perception leads him to say: "There is no such thing as phenomenology, but there are indeed phenomenological problems" (9)]. We see the same principle at play in this very personal trope: "May memory restore again and again / The

smallest color of the smallest day . . ." ("Calmly We Walk through This April's Day" SK 67). Schwartz's descriptions of states of heightened awareness through which one may achieve clear intuition of the essential world are most often expressed chromatically.

Schwartz describes not just the phenomenal field, but pictorial -- here sculptural -- renderings of the phenomenal field: "Brancusi's bird in flight like a new kind of palm -- airplane, propeller" (J 256). Ekphrasis, or the description of a work of art in another work of art, a topos in Renaissance poetry, affords the poet the occasion to display his own mastery of monumental masterpieces. The poem gains something of the permanence of the spatial artwork; Jakobson believed "that in painting, the visual artwork remains at the time of concretization, while the poem has disappeared by the time its perception is complete" (qtd. in Steiner, Colors of Rhetoric 42). This "iconic embodying of stillness" (41) is Schwartz's effort to stay the self, "articulate . . . and flowing" ("Sonnet: O City, City" SK 52), and recurs many times in his canon, as with this salutory apostrophe of the Dutch master:

> O Jan Vermeer of Delft, descend, come near . . .
> Here is the new Ophelia beautiful:
> Only your lucid brush could make her clear
> And vivid as the daughter of the Swan. . . .
> ("She Lives With the Furies of Hope and Despair" VP 77)

Murray Krieger's essay, "The Ekphrastic Principle and the Still Movement of Poetry; or Laokoön Revisited," defends the poem's "linguistic self-sufficiency" and "sense of roundedness" (105). Schwartz's ubiquitous bouncing ball is not unlike the poem's "transcending of mere stasis through its unending movement . . . its circularizing of its linear movement" (106). Opening up its definition to include any poem which addresses the still plasticity of a spatial art in the poem's own temporal and empirical particularity, Krieger clears the path for general allusion to

a painting, as we have in this self-conscious reference: "A sad young clown in gown of domino, / X-ray, cartoon, Picasso's freak in blue, / From the box-seat I see myself on show" (Coriolanus SK 91). Elsewhere objects are ekphrastically realized as still life:

> The acts, drums and horses
> Touched by the mind
> The book like a dish of fruit
> The solid and clear shapes
> Of chair, table and bowl. . . . (J 220)

Ekphrasis etymologically means, "speaking out," or "giving voice and language to the otherwise mute art object" (Hagstrum, The Sister Arts[14] 20). The most extended ekphrastic articulation of space is Schwartz's poem on Seurat's "La Grande Jatte," "Seurat's Sunday Afternoon along the Seine" (SK 190-96). This poem, a hotbed of phenomenological reference[15] -- "pure attention," "icons of purified consciousness" -- allows Schwartz full Husserlian description. A thorough and close account of phenomena is effected through enumeration of accidental attributes and inventories of prehension -- "holds, grasps, grips, clutches or somehow touches / Some form of being" -- and movement: ". . . as time's great fire burns (aspiring, flying and dying), / So that all things arise and fall, living, leaping and fading, falling, like / flames aspiring, flowering, flying and dying --" (193-94). However, Schwartz violates canons of neutrality ["It is a matter of describing, not of explaining or analyzing" (Merleau-Ponty viii)] by allowing evaluative judgment and critical comment to intrude on pure observation: "His vision is simple: yet it is also ample, complex, vexed and profound" (195); "Flaubert was right: Ils sont dans le vrai" (196). There is techno-philosophical content, to distract from the description at hand:

Each micro pattern is the dreamed of or imagined
macrocosmos
In which all things, big and small, in willingness
and love surrender
To the peace and elation of Sunday light and sunlight's
pleasure, to
The profound measure and order of proportion and
relation.

Yet philosophy is a descriptive enterprise, according to Edward S. Casey in his study of literary description and the phenomenological method: "Philosophy in its dominant nisus is decisively descriptive in orientation; its main task, . . . is one of description, whether . . . at the micro-level (so characteristic of phenomenology) or at the macro-level (especially characteristic of metaphysics, at least of 'descriptive metaphysics')" (185). Phenomenological description, then, is not "necessarily a caesura in philosophical discourse" (192), as one subsumes the other. In true phenomenological form, Schwartz for the most part treats the "superficies": "the surface of things . . . their contours and movements, their colors and textures, without seeking what is latent or withheld from view" (187). Indeed Schwartz's sonnets fulfill the strictures of the Elizabethan sonnet form, with a descriptive statement of problem, situation or incident -- including in "Sonnet 9" the "mind's particular clear facts" (LLV 206) -- followed by a reflective sestet or by an epigrammatic turn in a couplet: opposed to the "descriptive detail that remains resolutely on the surface" is the "philosophical or reflective residue of the preceding descriptions" (Casey 188).

Just as descriptive phenomenology breaks up experience into constituents and particularities, so does Schwartz attempt to poetically approximate Seurat's technique which is itself an atomistic one. If "words are descriptive," as Schwartz has it in PI (7, 8), then they are descriptive of the sustained intentional act, enacted here through the agency of pointillist

technique. The poem, inspired by Schapiro's lecture on Impressionism given at the New School (Atlas 242-43), was worked out first by a series of notes in Schwartz's journal: "Seurat as scientific (Gauguin,'a little chemist') . . . Dots -- grains -- each unit a sensation as in [Ernst] Mach's theory of experience. . . . Violations of perspective to gain collective experience. Compositions in terms of straight-line look: a strong glance, a weak glance -- each as an undrawn line" (268). The pointillists phenomenologically reduced the chromatic profusion of the visible world to a mosaic of minute dots of colour. They applied pure colours unmixed on a palette in juxtaposed hatchings of vibrant luminosity. Schwartz understands the physics of the colour wheel (as noted in its relation to order in Chapter 2e), as well as the alchemical mysteries mastered by Seurat: "Seurat is at once painter, poet, architect, and alchemist: / The alchemist points his magical wand to describe and hold the Sunday's gold" (SK 192); "His marvellous little marbles, beads, or molecules / Begin as points which the alchemy's magic transforms . . ." (193). A spot of blue next to green becomes, as Schwartz observed, simply "the green, blue ground" (193).

The resultant colour happens in the eye; this optical mixture coincides with the "ocular value" of the phenomenological viewpoint which "sought to reinforce the description of things and places by making the object of the description coincide with the object of the specular act, image or process. Ways of seeing . . . are thus to be understood as pre-eminent indicators of intentionality" (Gelley 420). Gelley further notes that these ways of seeing serve as a "type of deictic at a phenomenological level, a sign important not so much on account of its content but because it is capable of identifying the instance of observation and tracing its functions" (420). Schwartz demonstratively serves to contextualize and situate Seurat's figures: "This is the

nervous reality . . . / This is the conversion of experience . . . / Here is the holiness of all the little things . . ." (194, 195). As the Divisionist demands the spectator to step back to see the mix of pigments, so does Schwartz ask his reader to make sense of his poetic juxtapositions. Spatial form has its varied way in Schwartz's poetry, as Joseph Frank has it in his essay of the same name, through a subversion of linearity by techniques of synchronic adjacency.

Stevens, seeing poetry as an "art of perception," insists that we see the world "the moment after" ("A Collect of Philosophy" Opus Posthumous 190). Similarly, Schwartz urges his reader through the directional rigours of "reading" the painting; the all-at-onceness of the viewed canvas is sequentialized: "All things are fixed in one direction: / We move with the Sunday people from right to left" (192). Each "micro pattern," along with its neighbour, makes up a world intersubjectively; it makes a very different and diminished statement on its own. Ultimately, descriptive passages such as this one -- "A yellow-headed, gold-hammered, sunflower-lanterned / Summer afternoon: after the sun soared / All morning to the marble-shining heights of the marvellous blue . . ." ("The Mounting Summer, Brilliant and Ominous" SK 216) -- must be reconciled with sceptical sentiments which find poetic images to be counterfeit, vague and deceptive (Narcissus LLP 67).

The ekphrastic poetic canvas which points the way from the sheer descriptiveness of this section to the phenomenological interpenetration of percept and concept to be discussed in the next and final part of this thesis, is also found in his journal. Here we have a tableau vivant of sorts whose visual axis is felt rather than seen. It is the cinematic projection of shadows on the cave, Plato's trope for the possibility of a world elsewhere, which succeeds a still life of the here and now:

> Restaurant tables like solar systems
> White tablecloth, the lamp, flowers, and wine
>
> -- Plato perceived the plot, chained to the Cave
> Deceptively the light flickers on walls
> Charcoal chiaroscuro, caricature
> Until we take the blacks as ultimate -- real. . . . (192)

Indeed Jo Brans sees the movie theatre of the story "In Dreams Begin Responsibilities" as Plato's cave, where Schwartz's "mind has shaped . . . experiences into alignment with Platonic ideas" (524), Platonic ideas read phenomenologically as essences.

Robert Sokolowski in his essay, "The Theory of Phenomenological Description," reminds us of the perceptual feature of phenomenological description which helps us locate "our place in the world and the world's power of manifestation," so that indeed each experienced "micro pattern" can become one's own "imagined macrocosmos":

> . . . when I carry out a transcendental phenomenological description, I describe an object not in terms of special features that it has, but in terms of the ways in which it can be experienced. I describe the modes of experience and the modes of presentation, not the contents of what is presented. I can describe noematically, in which case I describe the presentational forms of the object experienced; or I can describe noetically, in which case I describe what I and anyone else must do in order to let the object appear. . . .
> And furthermore, since we are essentially constituted as human by being a center of understanding and awareness, and since we are essentially a dative of manifestation, when we unravel the forms of presentation in which objects are given to us, we also unravel the forms that let us be human. . . . (16, 18)

In Having Snow, Schwartz allows that the "ordering of one's sense impressions are given because all scientific knowledge does not result from one's own will" (Beinecke). The spare descriptors of the poem "What is To Be Given" (SK 53) define the speaker as this "dative of manifestation."

Finally, then, Schwartz reserves his most detailed descriptions for his poet self, the "servant of incredible assumption" ("I Am to My Own Heart Merely a Serf" SK 71). This is as it should be, according to Whitehead, who explains this "fallacy of misplaced concreteness": ". . . bodies are perceived with qualities which . . . are purely the offspring of the mind. Thus nature gets credit which should in truth be reserved for ourselves: the rose for its scent. . . . [The poets] should turn [their lyrics] into odes of self congratulation. . . . Nature is a dull affair, soundless, scentless, colourless . . ." (Science and the Modern World 154). Schwartz addresses this fallacy in his essay, "The Theory of the Concrete in Modern Philosophy from Hegel to Whitehead" (Beinecke).

b) "Lift Your Mind From the Local Color": The Concrete Universal

Some of Schwartz's poems, notably "Concerning the Synthetic Unity of Apperception" are written as if to test their own titles. In this section we shall see how they seem to test Wallace Stevens' titles as well: the truth Schwartz's phenomenological method delivers is confirmed somewhere in the interstices between Stevens' "The Course of a Particular" (Opus Posthumous 96) and "It Must Be Abstract" (Collected Poems 380-89). The interpenetration of poiesis and eidos (Imber), of the concrete and the universal, or what Jay Halio has referred to as Schwartz's "felt abstractions" is also a phenomenological locus of integration for phenomenon and essence. Husserl's phenomenological banner, "Zu den Sachen selbst," "To the things themselves" ("Philosophy as Rigorous Science" qtd. in Spiegelberg, Phenomenological Movement 109 and Ideas 74) enjoins one to turn to objective realities and away from abstruse theorizing. Husserl adds ideas and essence -- "scholastic entities, metaphysical ghosts" -- to the

empiricists' "fact-world": "essential vision grounded upon . . . new data, 'eidetic in nature'" (Ideas 74).

Williams' version of Husserl's battle cry ("to the things themselves") -- "no ideas but in things" -- is also an instructive code. It first appeared in the Dial award poem, "Paterson," and recurs throughout the epic poem of the same name: "Say it! No ideas but in things; / Nothing but cylindrical trees / bent, forked by preconception and accident . . ." (Collected Poems 263). Schwartz's sense of the idea in the localization of particulars, the poetic logos in the spatial structure of the image, is the spiritual twin of another Williams' credo, "the local is the only universal; upon that all art builds" (Autobiography 391). The embodiment of knowledge (the title of Williams' collection of essays), or confronting the universal in its firsthand immediacy, is Schwartz's poetic mission. The epigraph to S serves as Schwartz's tacit spiritual dedication for all his writings: "It is the historic nature of all particulars to try to prove that they are universal by nature" (unnumbered).

The methodological attempt to create meaning through bracketing and descriptively reporting what is given in any encounter with the fictive object is useful for a first person determination of what is before us, "the uniqueness of every application" (Having Snow, Beinecke), or as Stevens has it: "It is never the thing but the version of the thing" ("The Pure Good of Theory" Collected Poems 332). J. Hillis Miller relates this line to this "adage": "The soul . . . is composed / Of the external world" ("Anecdote of Men by the Thousand" Collected Poems 51) to say, "his poetry is the reconciliation of these two truths, truths which are always simultaneously binding in the endless discourse of imagination and reality. . . . Language is at once the expression of a style of life and the embodiment of a local weather and geography"

(Poets of Reality 225). Schwartz has his own thoughts on the interpenetration of the imagination [read: metaphysical] and the real [read: concrete]: ". . . if the imaginary were not either literally or symbolically real, then the phases of participation and identification which are so important in a beholder's contemplation would be impossible" (Beinecke).

Schwartz's local geography is expressed in this poetic truism: "Metaphysicians could have told me this, / But each learns for himself, as in the kiss" ("Faust in Old Age" SK 49) and this observation on Tate's poetry: ". . . the metaphors are grasped by the poet existentially, and by this is meant that the poet contemplates the metaphors by which he lives with an intense sense of the concrete circumstances of his being" ("The Poetry of Allen Tate" SE 159). This is Schwartz's understanding of Tate's "version of the thing," which serves as a reference point for all of Schwartz's poetry: "'from our senses come the metaphors through which we know the world and in turn our senses get knowledge of the world by means of figures of their own making. . . . To hear the night, to crave its coming, one must have deep inside one's being a vast metaphor controlling all the rest . . .'" (from God Without Thunder qtd. in SE 157).

Schwartz's sensual logic is a private one, figuring a unique knowledge of the world: "Blind Tiresias, stony as Lot's wife. Remove instant upon the skin, as the striking of a match, the immediate flame, yellow and black" ("That Kind of Consciousness" Having Snow, Beinecke). Schwartz everywhere affirms, in the personal correspondences of his symbols, the phenomenological "privacy of sense perceptions" (Having Snow, Beinecke). Schwartz answers, along with Stevens, the self-posed question: "What is the poet's subject? It is his sense of the world" (Necessary Angel 121). Schwartz's poetry is one of mediated immediacies -- not of the objective world, but of his version of it, not of truth, but of "felt" truth (Bruzina 149), or as

Husserl put it in his article, "Phenomenology," "not the world or any part of it appears, but the 'sense' of the world":

> Our comprehensive epoché puts, as we say, the world between brackets, excludes the world which is simply there from the subject's field, presenting in its stead the so-and-so-experienced-perceived-remembered-judged-thought-valued-etc. world, as such, the "bracketed" world. . . . To enjoy phenomenological experience we must retreat from the objects posited in the natural attitude to the multiple modes of their "appearance," to the "bracketed" objects. . . . So that the phenomenological description will comprise two parts, description of the "noetic" or "experiencing" and description of the "noematic" or the "experienced."

For Schwartz, too, experience is not co-extensive with its natural objects of attention, but is wider, so that the rain and wind of the poem, "Dogs are Shakespearean, Children Are Strangers" (SK 68) are "understood," and understood privately. On the model of the Husserlian Lebenswelt, one is "never really released wholly from the toil of the lived-through" (J 188). Questions of the reality or ontology of the phenomena are consigned to the margins, so that Schwartz may phenomenologically register his particular sensual experience of them, that is, to note the snowflakes as kisses (SK 76). To have "walked within and seen each sea, / The fish that flies, the broken burning bird" ("Faust in Old Age" SK 49), to have seen his particular view out the window, with "pressed face" and "substantial touch" ("Prothalamion" SK 48), is, as Daniel Stempel writes of Wordsworth's phenomenology of textual constitution, not seeing things but seeing into the life of things, to paraphrase Wordsworth himself. He goes on to say that this is the "nous of the mind of man, not the physis of nature . . . what is left is a pure subjectivity directed toward a pure objectivity, a cogitatum that presents the thing as idea, not natural object" (154, 153).

Whether working by poetic induction -- general truths are abstracted from particular realities -- or deduction -- concepts lead inevitably, through inverse intellectual labour, to their

percepts -- Schwartz exhibits a nominalist bias: the "chill thrill of immediacy" ("Prothalamion" SK 46) is more attractive than its source of legitimation, "the dry ribs of metaphysics" ("T.S. Eliot as the International Hero" SE 125). Indeed the Lebenswelt is often drawn in temporal terms: "But what are your immediacies?" ("To Figaro in the Barbershop" VP 41); "Thus we depend on our immediacies . . ." (Coriolanus SK 135). Without giving up the epistemological ground Imagism had claimed for the poetic object, Schwartz's poetry still points elsewhere. But Schwartz's "elsewhere" is complicated: it appears as the hapless ghost of the out-of-step Socrates, whose "disused voice" teaches "hope to [his] flickering will . . . / -- Old Noumenon, come true, come true!" ("Socrates' Ghost Must Haunt Me Now" SK 58). Schwartz has fashioned Socrates as a Kantian wishing desperately upon the star of the ding-an-sich. Elsewhere this aspiration proves fruitless in a series of unfortunately-mixed metaphors:

> . . . I knock at the door
> Of the ding-an-sich, and all that I hear
> Is the vain shower of a telephone ringing,
> No one at home. . . . (G 169)

Kant introduced the term noumenon as an object of purely intellectual intuition devoid of all phenomenal attributes. It assumes no knowledge of the world and is a mere limiting term for an object not given in sensuous apprehension. Socrates' anachronistic appropriation of "Noumenon" signals a desire, on Schwartz's part, to participate in the term's redefinition. In this poem Socrates, central mouthpiece of Plato's dialogues, out-Platos Plato. The Platonic Idea, unlike the Kantian noumenon, is the transempirical model of its earthly emanation. Schwartz identifies more completely with the Socrates of another poem, "For the One Who Would Take Man's Life in His Hands" (SK 54), the one who asks shrilly, "'What have I said?' . . . / 'Affirmed extremes, cried yes and no, / Taken all parts, denied myself. . . .'" For Schwartz,

as well as for Socrates, "les extrêmes se touchent": the Idea and its sensuous particular meet in an unhappy marriage. Kant posits a "third thing," the transcendental schema, which mediates between category and appearance, noumenon and phenomenon, "the sky's inexorable blue" and the "mechanical whims of appetite" (SK 58). Schematism knits time and space, temporal determination and extension, synthetically: "Now he must knit / Time with apperception, bit by tiny bit" ("Concerning the Synthetic Unity of Apperception" SK 40). The knitting which Schwartz refers to in the above poem refers as well to a transfer of meaning, or as Ricoeur puts it, a schematization, "a kind of semantic proximity which suddenly obtains between terms in spite of their distance" (147).

So, it is Kant who ultimately resolves the Socratic "contradiction in every act" ("For the One Who Would Take Man's Life in His Hands" SK 54). It is Husserl however, who answers Schwartz's question, "What do all examples show?" with his valorization of instances. Eidetic intuiting is an insight into essences that spans the gap between an exemplary phenomenon and its universal class. By freely varying the perspectives of the examples, by introducing other qualities of shape, size, color, one still retains the essence of the thing into which the example affords insight. A thorough analysis of particular exempla is the stepping stone to a comprehension of general essences. Husserl emphasizes the putative reality of these examples: descriptions are "exemplary-suppositional" in status, that is, "free variation in imagination" or "free fancies" (Ideas 182), as he came to call the technique. Husserl underscores the fictionality of descriptive exempla: fiction is the vital element of phenomenology, as of all the eidetic sciences. Schwartz's suppositional exempla are at once fictional, real in being concrete, and affording of lessons:

> You cannot sit on bayonets,
> Nor can you eat among the dead --
> .....
> Murder's fruit is silent stone,
> The gun increases poverty.
> With what do these examples shine?
> The soldier turned to girls and wine.
> Love is the tact of every good,
> The only warmth, the only peace. . . . (SK 54)

Schwartz points prescriptively to a higher good through our deontological commitments, and incidentally, in rhythm and lexicon which recalls Auden. This is a reading of Plato with the instruction of Kant's moral imperative.

As Schwartz avoids the claims and resists the suggestions of both an absolutizing Realism and a radical Nominalism, Aristotle's mediating route seems appropriate to his epistemology. Donald Dike has it in his look at the presence of the Poetics in Schwartz's work, "as Aristotle might have put it if Schwartz's interpretation [in "Poetry as Imitation"] is correct: poetry imitates a universal, a reality of nature, but the universal is discoverable only from the imitation, just as form or type inheres only in a particular instance" (Note 27 unnumbered). Aristotle's presence in Schwartz's work reminds us once again of the picturing function of metaphor, its vividness consisting in its ability to "set before the eyes," as Ricoeur reminds us (144). Metaphor lends its power of figuration, as in this three-fold picture: "White house, red barn, squat silo" ("The Journey of a Poem Compared to All the Sad Variety of Travel" LLP 37). Auditory metaphors are sound pictures: "This wine would tock, as from the bottle dropped, / How pigeons rose with a sound like shuffled cards . . ." (G 94). Thick with a chronicler's documentary sense of detail, passages such as this --

> Generous and unjust, heartless and irresistible, painful to the savant and gentle to the fool,

> Fecund and various, wasteful and precarious, lavish,
> savage, greedy and tender, begetting the lion
> and the lamb
> The peacock, the spaniel, the tiger, the lizard, the
> chicken hawk and the dove. . . .
> ("Gold Morning, Sweet Prince" SK 174) --

reveal Schwartz as an invincible visualist who often is de trop, offering too much information culled from the multiplicity of particular ideas and events.

To appropriate a fitting designation from the New Historicist vocabulary, the above poetic lines are instances of "thick descriptions," coined by Clifford Geertz.[16] Henry James's well-upholstered novels come to mind, but so do these "overdetermined" descriptions of the Schwartzian list. While the New Historicist leap is from these scenes of "local knowledge" to their application in a broader culture, Schwartz's application is an epistemological one, from local knowledge to concrete universal, as we shall see in a moment. Indeed, Schwartz diagnoses his own textual overdetermination:

> . . . what did I know?
> What had I ever known? the senses tear
> Smear, and wring out each luminous thick thing
> [emphasis mine],
> Break the nut, tear at the plum and bloom! (G 169)

We remember from Willard Spiegelman's essay that lists are seen as evidence of an "inherent American materialism" (383). Yet concepts are not seen as mere names without a corresponding reality, given that all orders of intentionality . . . are rooted in "'incarnate modes of knowing' as Dufrenne . . . puts it" [in "The Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience" (Bruzina 163-64)]. According to Husserl, what we study is not this or that particular desire, but the essence of desire, of which the particular act or accident is merely an instance. The chronicler's challenge

to "study daily things" ("Dogs are Shakespearean, Children are Strangers" SK 68) and record their brute phenomenality is taken up most enthusiastically.

The modern, according to Panofsky (Gothic Architecture and Scholasticism 11-12), is signalled by post-medieval nominalism, a point elaborated by Christopher Braider in his book Refiguring the Real. The inductive approach to general truths through abstraction from particulars defines the new mode of knowing and perceiving the world:

> Philosophy, for example, has known the term [modernism] at least since the advent of the via moderna of fourteenth century nominalism. . . . And philosophical modernism has been a central thread of the "modern" tradition from Descartes to the present, most visible whenever philosophers make or claim a tabula rasa enabling them . . . to sever the link with their besotted forebears and begin wholly anew on the basis of some more immediate or concrete acquaintance with "things themselves." (214)

Schwartz makes the connection of the things and accidents of ordinary temporal experience to modernity: "Moonlight upon the hatrack, picture and clock, / Here have I come, here rule the modern powers" ("Running Like Every Other Jill and Jack" VP 93). Here sense, as Dufrenne announces in his essay, "The Phenomenological Approach to Poetry," is "totally within the sensuous. The meaning carried by the discourse is not signified, it is expressed. . . . Poeticalness realizes and actualizes expressivity" (17).

Sometimes Schwartz presents surface image without representational, much less conceptual, depth. What is more, the speaker of "Abraham and Orpheus, Be With Me Now" (SK 73) enacts a Platonic descent by falling off Diotima's ladder of love, as described in the Symposium: "You saw your love's face abstract . . . / Love sucked me to the moving street below." Intellectual love succumbs here to its appetitive rival. Yet "the scrimmage of appetite" of the poem "The Heavy Bear Who Goes With Me" (SK 75) suggests a spiritual hunger. The

speaker "stumbles" (75) rather than soars into the white radiance of eternity. Braider's nexus of nominalism and modernity -- "When, inaugurating the via moderna of medieval nominalism, Ockham wields his famous razor to rid the object of knowledge . . . of the mare's nest of intentions, virtues and quiddities" (5) -- fails as a determining metaphor for Schwartz's epistemology. Intentions and quiddities inhere in the world's body, its physiognomy and features: attending the "wart on your face and on your friend's face / On your friend's face and indeed on your own face" is "the ideal which is with us like the sky" ("Father and Son" SK 31). With his assessment that "the small pebble, / The clear clay bottom, the white shell / Are apparent, though superficial" ("In the Slight Ripple, The Mind Perceives the Heart" SK 39) comes the suggestion that meaning transcends the superficies of local particularity, or as Dufrenne puts it quite simply, "a description which aims at an essence, itself [is] defined as a meaning immanent in the phenomenon and given with it" (qtd. in Magliola 142-43). Schwartz suspends presuppositions about the world's absolute. Hence his relatedness to the noumena which, on the Kantian model, cannot be experienced and to which no properties can be intelligibly ascribed, is a complicated one. Indeed Schwartz briefly holds a conceptualist position: "That of which you have a conception, exists" (L 13).

Before looking at the structure of the Schwartzian universal essence, we will look at its concrete manifestations. However general the reference, Schwartz gives it local habitation: "Consciousness (in this moment of the circle) is seen once more as phenomenal: the two brown chairs seen by Mutt and Jeff . . . " (J 43). Schwartz's signature confrontation with the entire sublunary spectacle includes, typically, an inventory of empirical events: ". . . the spectacle of the troops, throngs, rings, and gangs of stars" (J 198). Leo Spitzer insists on the "contour-

blurring," and the "weakening of the sensuous content" in the use of plurals (qtd. in Tsur 23). Tsur goes on to say that the use of the plural creates a "regression" to a "less differentiated mode of cognition" (24). Nonetheless the "whole sensorium" to which Schwartz's entire canon implicitly and reverentially refers registers the emanations or aspects of the "actual," his preferred designation for his own poetic Lebenswelt: "I am a knight of such perceptions / As come to me, a fisher or a hunter / Of aspects of our lady actuality . . ." (J 230). The courtly conceit inevitably culminates in the ennobling, if passionless, "consummation" of agapic love. The subservience of poetry to a moral end is noted, with want of irony, as prostitution:

> Myself I dedicated long ago
> Or prostituted, shall I say? to poetry
> The true, the good, the beautiful
> All that has been, all that is possible. . . . (231)

The absolute is sought among the effects of the lived world; this "sense of the actual" pervades Eliot's poetry, according to Schwartz, and is the most frequently-applied honorific. Experience is "grasped" as "something lived" ("The Revaluation of English Poetry," Eliot ts, Beinecke). De Man refers to this grasping in his epistemology of metaphor: "things become 'truly real' only by being appropriated and seized upon with all the etymological strength implied in Begriff, the German word for concept. To understand is to seize (begreifen) and not to let go of what one has thus taken hold of" (22). Again, the actual is confirmed in a context of "tactile erudition," as explained in Chapter 5, and converted to its visual counterpart:

> . . . . I touch a chair,
> Or go to the window, press my face
> Against it, hoping with substantial touch,
> Colorful sight . . . to gain once more
> This look of actuality. . . . ("Prothalamion" SK 48)

The encounter is further confirmed in a handshake: "The actual is like a moist handshake, damp with nervousness or the body's heat. This should suggest degrees of actuality and the difference between such a handshake and the gloved hand of an ambassador. The latter is also actual, but one has encountered less of the reality of the person. . ." ("The Sense of the Actual" Beinecke).

Schwartz's phenomenal field is located in the "possible" and universal World of essence: before apprehending the eidos of his objects, Schwartz must be able, on the Husserlian model, to imagine all its possible perceptions. It is this sense of actuality, or the property certain acts have of being fully realized which is used by Husserl: the Ego, in its wakeful mode is directed toward focal actualities (Ideas 107). In the Cartesian Meditations intentional thoughts (cogitationes) are termed actual subjective processes; all possibilities are "actualizable by the Ego" (44). Schwartz uses actual in this sense as seen in the chapter on lists but also in its common sense to mean "what is immediately present here and now, and is opposed to what is past, future or absent" (Cairns, "Index," Husserl, Ideas 398). Indeed in his meditation, "The Sense of the Actual," Schwartz assimilates Husserlian postulates as well as vocabulary: "The actual is important in itself and it is important as a means of perceiving and formulating the ideal and the possible. In poetry and in many other matters, it is the degree to which the actual is grasped that determines our grasp of the ideal" (Beinecke).

Sometimes a window is just a window, without the Platonic Form of windowhood to back it up: "Here is a window, O curiosity, / And here, O sensuality, a sofa / Behold . . ." (J 646). The invocation to sensuality confirms that the appeal is on the appetitive level. And sometimes what is seen out the window -- give or take a misplaced modifier -- marks the distinction between the essence and the lived experience for which it is the correlative articulation: ". . .

and I have seen, / From the open bathroom window, urinating, / The abstract moonlight and the perfect stars" ("Song 7" LLV 209). The phenomenological task is an atomistic one, as we see in Schwartz's reminder to himself to "find minute particulars, atoms of observation. . . . What are the structures of Reality: Knowledge and Sleep, Dream and Becoming" (J 511). Husserl's notion of the life-world (expounded in Crisis of the European Sciences) is riddled with like immediacy. David Carr notes:

> Science operates with abstractions, the life-world is the concrete fullness from which this abstraction is derived; . . . The emphasis here is on the immediacy of life-world experience in contrast to the mediated character of scientific entities. The life-world is prior to science, prior to theory, not only historically but also epistemologically. . . . The life-world is primarily a world of perceived "things," "bodies." (206)

Ransom's opposing designations of "physical" and "Platonic" poetry are instructive in an elucidation of the hard data of Schwartz's poetic world. In his essay, "Poetry: a Note in Ontology,"[17] Ransom pits Platonic, or a poetry of abstract ideas, against physical, or a poetry of lively detail and "irrelevant texture," by means of which the fullness of phenomenal particularity -- or the world's body -- is returned to us. To speak of poetic ontology is to recall Kant's purposiveness without purpose: the poem has autonomous being, it is. Ransom claims that the strict Dinglichkeit of imagist poetry is compromised by the meter, the "powerful intellectual determinant marshalling the words, and, inevitably, the things" ("Poetry: A Note in Ontology" 76). Schwartz's example of Dinglichkeit is thing, or image, without contingency: "Thinginess: a toad touched in the dark garden" (J 360); ". . . all things are always, from some window / Viewed, and if the senses smear the dings . . ." (G 162). Ransom has his own spin on one's ability to take a word and derive a world from it:

> But we must be very careful: idealists are nothing if not dialectical. They object that an image in an original state of innocence is a delusion . . . that no image ever comes to us which does not imply the world of ideas, that there is "no percept without concept." There is something in it. Every property discovered in the image is a universal property, and nothing discovered in the image is marvelous in kind though it may be pinned down . . . as a single instance. But there is this to be understood too: the image which is not remarkable in any particular property is marvelous in its assemblage of many properties. . . . ("Poetry: A Note in Ontology" 76)

Schwartz likewise strikes this middle ground, as I have shown with the assertions and counter-assertions of idea and thing in this section. If it is Hershey's "dark body's awkward brutality" which effects a "profanation of pure Idea," it is a violation in which he luxuriates, while exploiting its very relevant textures: "And let my dear dark body be by water's silk / All over touched and known" (G 194). For Schwartz there is no concept without percept; percept occasionally appears denuded of conceptual reference.

In his essay on Allen Tate, Schwartz sounds the alarm for the "peril" inherent in the "abstract theme" unattended by a specific scene." In a discussion of Tate's "The Last Days of Alice," Schwartz writes: "The symbol, being seen too much as idea, does not yield the images which would give a dramatic existence to the idea, and hence the poet's habitual use of language also stands apart and dislocated from the symbol and the idea" ("The Poetry of Allen Tate" SE 163, 153). Echoes of Eliot's -- or de Gourmont's -- pronouncements on post-metaphysical poetry resound, as we shall see below in a discussion of the poem "In the Naked Bed." An image which is too intellectually- or ideationally- drawn is discounted as literature by virtue of its discursiveness:

> What is lacking is lacking in the symbol, in its capacity to be complicated richly and yet concretely. . . . There will always be the tendency or temptation to grasp the subject too intellectually and thus too abstractly. . . . The symbol, being seen

> too much as idea, does not yield the images which would give a dramatic existence to the idea. . . .(163)

Hence literariness is constituted by the concreteness of the figure and is inversely related to the abstractness of the trope. This is explained further in Having Snow: "The fable should never lose its literal interest, . . . thus stay concrete" (Beinecke). Schwartz avows dual loyalty -- "I am both a Platonist and an Aristotelian" (J 252) -- and offers this history lesson:

> Plato saw structures as the cause of things
> Because they were the cause of knowledge. But
> The Stagirite, having the pupil's benefit
> Saw nature vivant in particulars -- (J 49)

The praxis of his living immediacies and singularities betrays Schwartz's true allegiance: he pleads, "new symbols must be made . . . / And fresh particulars to ancient acts / Be brought . . ." (G 50). Jay Halio insists that the central conflict presented in Schwartz's work is one "between an earthbound sensuality and a soaring spirituality, between the actuality of concrete, material existence and its muddying effect upon man's conception of pure idealism" (805).

Indeed in the Encyclopedia Britannica article, Husserl determines that all phenomenal "examples" are "variations" through which we observe the invariability of essence: "Any closed field may be considered as regards its essence . . . and we may . . . use them as 'examples' merely . . . to learn their 'possible' forms." Schwartz's speaker -- here, the poet, in language remarkably like Husserl's -- must be free to register this possibility: ". . . he must be all things to be free, for all / impersonations . . . / to all situations possible or actual" ("Apollo Musagete, Poetry and the Leader of the Muses" LLP 53). Hence Schwartz's rendition of Dufrenne's phenomenological statement, "what poetry reveals is a possible of reality" ("The Phenomenological Approach to Poetry" 17). After the phenomenological reduction, which

reduces the world to the contents of our consciousness, is effected, eidetic reduction or abstraction must be enacted in order to grasp what is essential and unchanging about an object. Hence Schwartz's sensual depictions show him to be "stuck" at the level of the phenomenological reduction. Many such instances pervade his poems, as they figure forth his desire to "take the pure event and touch its bones" (G 14). "The sensuous skins" are "souciant to the fingertips" (G 142, 152) and defend Lawrence's brand of "blood knowledge": "In drunkenness I knew that Unity / Of Being named by Lawrence the dark god" (159). Indeed his speaker abjures Apollo for Dionysus: "And I followed Dionysus, forgetting Apollo . . ." ("Once and for All" SK 222). Schwartz shows himself to be here a devotee of Husserl of his late period, when he emphasized the lived world as the concrete context of all experience.

Owing to Schwartz's "fine capacity for combining lyric immediacy with philosophical reflection, [he] can thus command both the particular and the general" (Matthiessen 113). Try though he may to resist bald sensualism -- "This is the dark city of the innermost wish. / The vivid world has been barred, / The press of desire shut out" (J 648) -- still, whatever essences are retrieved from the phenomenal field, they are essences immanent in experience: "For Husserl, essence is not equivalent to appearance . . . but is immanent in appearances. . . . The [phenomenologist] discriminates between surface configurations . . . and underlying experiential patterns" which vary and assume different "'modes of appearing'" (Magliola 50-51). Schwartz flirts with the naturalistic assumptions he aims, phenomenologically, to avoid; he laments in Having Snow, the "non-transcendence of standpoints" (Beinecke) and admits unabashedly in his poetry, a fondness for "some girl [who is] /. . . in love with natural things" ("The Rumor and the Whir of Unborn Wings" VP 84). The phenomenological reduction, as Edward Casey has

it, "is designed to free us from the tyranny of the factual -- of the natural attitude, for which a description of the empirically real is a constant desideratum" (182). The father spares no detail in this caveat to his son: "The loveliest woman sweats, the animal stains / The ideal which is with us like the sky" ("Father and Son" SK 31). Correspondingly, Schwartz's signata rerum, relations of world and word, are not sacramental correspondences. His ideality is a decidedly secular one. Quoting Bellow's Herzog in a phrase borrowed from French philosopher Jean Wahl, Mark Shechner speculates on the spiritual forces at play for Schwartz's generation, that is, "a transcendence downward":

> . . . it was an aesthetic that captured many of Bellow's contemporaries bereft of all traditional forms of spirituality. . . . How much of this secular transcendence is a residue of the God-intoxicated Hasidism of their grandparents, exalting the splendor of this earth as the handiwork of divinity is difficult to say, for there are lines of force in this writing that are difficult to trace with any assurance and which the writers themselves may hardly be conscious of. . . . (After the Revolution 47)

In his "world of pure Extension" (J 33),"all experience is phenomenal, even the self . . ." (167). Phenomenal, or epiphenomenal, that is, secondary and concomitant: "Epiphenomena of the head's great force" (J 49). He writes of the epiphenomenal surface tension which changes and "ripples" (J 49). In the poem, "True Recognition Often is Refused," the speaker/poet intends the world that is available, as well as intending himself, as part of that world. Here the knower reflects on himself and his knowing life:

> We poets by the past and future used
> Stare east and west distractedly at times,
> Knowing there are, in fullness and in flower,
> Chrysanthemums and Mozart in the room,
> A stillness and a motion, both in bloom.

> Or know a girl upon the sofa's ease,
> Curved like a stocking, being profoundly round,
> As rich and dark as April's underground. . . . (VP 20)

The directional staring "east and west" serves as a geography of mental concepts, a "directedness-to" objects [discussed in Chapter 4 in relation to "gaze"] whether sense-given -- "chrysanthemums and Mozart in the room" -- or abstract: "A stillness and a motion, both in bloom." The selection of concrete detail peculiar to the poet and the originality of the similes -- the girl "curved like a stocking," "rich as April's underground" -- highlight the phenomenological primacy of the human actor in the understanding of external events and perceptual milieu. In DBB, consciousness is located in the sensual moment: "Resort to a painstaking examination in the fullness of consciousness . . . seize the moment of feeling, grasp the care involved in such statements as 'salt', 'sugar', a 'gleaming automobile,' 'the pungency of tobacco,' . . . 'the continuous exercise of the much-used body,' . . . 'the look of the white pitcher upon the brown dresser'. . ." (IDBR 155).

Schwartz's pristine images -- "Rest hands upon the bite of sand" ("Song 14" LLV 211) -- are testimony to Alexander Baumgarten's sensual definition of a poem: ". . . by sensate discourse we mean discourse involving sensate representations . . . by poem we mean a perfect sensate discourse" (qtd. in McFarland 34). If Schwartz's short fiction does not quite crawl with Michael Gold's "bedbugs" and other low forms of life of the local colorists, a "thinginess" thickens the texture of his poetry, a "thinginess" which has its roots in Duns Scotus' haeccitas, or the "thisness" of an individual object which distinguishes it from other objects of the same kind: "It is the gift which makes the haecittas [sic] . . . / His thisness tiptoes on Might-Not-Have-Been!" (G 66). This "haecceity" (Casey 188) allows the co-perceivers [readers] to

"glimpse an eidos that might otherwise have eluded us utterly. There is . . . no eluding of the phenomenological eidos since it structures the perception of every landscape" (191). In PI, Schwartz locates "what can be known in . . . the work of art": "this chair, this room, this morning, the suchness, the thisness . . . the look of a countryside, the pleasure of breakfast . . ." (6). This in turn leads to a solidity of specification, as "every particular must have a name / Every uniqueness needs a special sound" (S 14):

> The arks, drums and horses
> Touched by the mind
> The book like a dish of fruit,
> The solid and clear shapes
> Of chair, table and bowl
> Touched by the mind.
> The sofa by the mind.
> The sofa like a mountain
> The window like a lake. ("Noah" J 220)

And, as "every solid thing must shadow in the light" ("Abraham and Orpheus, Be With Me Now" SK 73) so does Schwartz update and adjust Plato's familiar analogy. In the poem, "In the Naked Bed, in Plato's Cave" (SK 25), the shadows are cast, not by Ideal Forms, but by trucks straining under their sublunary labour:

> Reflected headlights slowly slid the wall,
> .....
> A fleet of trucks strained uphill, grinding,
> Their freights covered as usual.
> The ceiling lightened again, the slanting diagram
> Slid slowly forth. . . .

This poem is Schwartz's most extended meditation on the failure of the Platonic vision to redeem the modern world. Poetic attention is often cupidinous: surface delight is not immediately transferred to an Ideal end. "Let anger be general," Schwartz's speaker insists: "I hate an abstract thing" ("The Ballad of the Children of the Czar" SK). Hence Schwartz seems to accept

Aristotle's revision of Plato in his middle period, with its view of universalia in rebus, "nature vivant in particulars" (J 49), or as Whitehead appropriated and named it, "seeking the forms in the facts" (Emmett, "Whitehead" Encyclopedia of Philosophy). Indeed, in PI Schwartz studies Aristotle's nous poietikos, the aspect of the intellect which derives the forms of reality from sense experience (Swann 91).

The anthropomorphizations -- "Wind troubled the window curtains"; "A fleet of trucks strained uphill"; "the street-lamp's vigil and the horse's patience"; "a car coughed" [emphases mine] -- are not evidence only of an injection of authorial ego, they also, in the German tradition of Dinggedicht,[18] describe the objects from within themselves: the things are of such epistemological import, that they take on a life of their own. Indeed Altieri draws together Husserl and Whitehead in an objectivist thinginess. They share equally with Schwartz "the sense of value in the sharp definition of particulars . . . concerned primarily with the quality of objects in the world" ("From Symbolist Thought to Immanence" 618). As objects are attributively self-sufficient, they fly in the face of their Platonic function, that is, as mere shadowy images of their Ideal models. Owing that Schwartz "dramatizes, literally to inform in ["In the Naked Bed"] the characteristic modern conflict between values and perception," George Marion O'Donnell insists that "an immediate tension is set up between the physical image and the philosophical concept . . . resolved in a generalization founded upon the particulars" (106, 105).

Poets, according to Jay Halio, "immemorially have tried to reconcile, to merge, to somehow fuse their experience of ideas with their experience of concrete actuality -- to give the Big Lie, in short, to Plato's dualism and thus earn a rightful place in the Republic" (803). The speaker is too world-weary, too mired in the "freight" of the here and now to be anything but

bored by the prospect of a far-off ideal: "The winter sky's pure capital / Turned me back to bed with exhausted eyes" (SK 25). His vague animal movements -- what Halio calls Schwartz's "kinesthetic" sense (808) -- bespeak existential dread, while they keep the larger verities at bay: "I rose from bed, lit a cigarette / And walked to the window." No spiritual effects attend the bedroom choreography. Like Plato's poet who writes a poem about a bed rather than apprehend the Bed's true Idea, Schwartz is thrice removed from truth. Instead of true knowledge, he possesses false opinion, while watching shadows on the cave's wall. Elsewhere Schwartz deploys Platonic Realist vocabulary when speaking of metaphors: ". . . substitutes, both counterfeit and vague: / They are, at most, deceptive resemblances / False in their very likeness . . ." (Narcissus LLP 67). We cannot rise above our quotidian sentience, our "neatest arrangements, doorway exchanges" (J 200) because there is "everywhere a specious splendour" ("Father and Son" SK 31).

Most of us are at two removes from truth, as seen in the title, "Most Things At Second Hand Through Gloves We Touch" (VP 62). The defeat of the classical triad is complete: "The true, the good, / And the beautiful have been struck down . . ." as they pass unceremoniously into the quotidian repertoire:

> Three words I speak, though they are bare and far,
> untouchable as a star,
> The true, the good and the beautiful,
> Shifting my tones as if I said to them
> Candy, soda, fruits and flowers.
> ("The Silence Answered Him Accusingly" VP 54)

Although "The True, the Good and The Beautiful" are the organizing epiphanies around which Part 2 of VP revolves, their sudden manifestation is decidedly unspiritual: "Victrolas, coca-colas, powerful cars" ("Some Present Things are Causes of True Fear" VP 56). These images

are available to the "sensuous reader [who] lingers at the visual images" (Tsur 31). The most one can wish for is "a picture true, good, and appropriate," and without rubrics ("Disorder Overtakes Us All Day Long" VP 60).

Schwartz quotes Stevens, in a critical essay on him, as always seeking "'in a good light for those who know the ultimate Plato'" [in "Homunculus et la Belle Etoile," Collected Poems 27 (SE 195)] The "street lamp" in the poem "In the Naked Bed" does not afford enough light: the speaker might know Plato, but not the ultimate one. In his discussion of the poem, Halio assimilates Eliot's vocabulary of his essay, "The Metaphysical Poets" (1921) wherein he notes that the poets had a "direct sensuous apprehension of thought" (286) and a unified sensibility which effected "felt thought" until Donne and Herbert of Cherbury when a "dissociation of sensibility set in" (288). Halio defends,

> the full measure of the poem's carefully organized system of details finds an expression ["while History is unforgiven"] which adequately transmutes, in abstract terms at last, the significance toward which everything else has been tending. But the idea is felt before it is understood, or rather the idea is both felt and understood simultaneously. (809)

The phrase "ignorant night" points to a failed Realism, as it collapses and foreshortens Arnold's reference in "Dover Beach" to a people unenlightened by the sweetness and light of Hellenistic learning: "where ignorant armies clash by night" (Poetical Works 212).

For the Realist, universals exist in themselves and would exist even if there were no minds to be aware of them. For Schwartz, essences are intended; they are there by virtue of "the mind's sufficient grace" ("The Beautiful American Word, Sure" SK 27). The poet then, must be more than the "dog in humble inquiry along the ground" ("Dogs are Shakespearean, Children are Strangers" SK 68). He must look upward, in transcendent aspiration, despite the

"body's drag upon the spirit" (Bonham 132-35) which is as present in the heavy bear as it is in the "weight" of the buildings in the above poem. The "white breakfast" of "Aubade" refers to the pristine Absolute, as does the "unmarked blue" ("Song 25" LLV 213). Lila Lee Valenti terms these instances, along with "the sky's inexorable blue" and the "sky's pure capital," a "Schwartzian signature": he addresses the Ideal with "the image of radiant source" (LLV 208).

Schwartz further challenges one to effect an eidetic abstraction or reduction to essential forms:

> Explain the other furniture yourself,
> But lift your mind from the local color,
> For the particular as particular
> Is not itself, as a house is not its front,
> And as a man is not his flesh:
> Come now,
> See the particular as universal
> .....
> -- The union of particular and universal
> That's what one ought to see, as Aristotle
> Has said for years:
> he knew a thing or two. (S 8)

Once the real world has been bracketed in the phenomenological reduction, the "transcendental reduction" is possible, rendering pure consciousness, or the transcendental "pure" Ego available to uncovering the subject in its full concreteness: "All transcendences having been disconnected, the glance is directed in reflection upon the absolute pure consciousness" (Ideas 109). All this paves the way for the eidetic reduction which reduces things to their essential form. In moving from appearances to essence, particular to universal, we practice the eidetic reduction. Eugene Kaelin points out, "Husserlian phenomenologists are judged more or less orthodox, depending upon the number of reductive procedures employed in analysis" ("Merleau-Ponty, Fundamental Ontologist" 103). Schwartz is to be judged heterodox in his personal and loose application of

Husserlian categories; in studying daily things he studies himself primarily, then the world and idea. An anonymous author refers to Schwartz as a man with "one foot in the Zeitgeist and the other in the eternal verities" ("New and Reconsidered" 33).

The concrete universal has a long and distinguished pedigree which I will merely highlight in a moment. Schwartz's poetry bears the stamp of Condillac's "realized abstractions" (Essai 179 qtd. in De Man 21): "As soon as one is willing to be made aware of their epistemological implications, concepts are tropes and tropes concepts," as De Man understands Condillac's epistemology of metaphor (21). In his essay, "The I's Eye: Perception and Mental Imagery in Literature," Pierre Ouellet states:

> Literature cannot be reduced to brute sensation . . . but at the same time, literature seeks to emancipate the percept from the material conditions of its formal appearance. . . . Neither pure art nor mere knowledge, literature is ideas crossbred with affects, knowledge mixed with sensations; in short, it is épistémè married to esthèsis, without any possible divorce between concept and percept, united for better or for worse in what we could call, following the lead of the cognitive psychologists, a mental image -- a kind of percept elevated to the rank of the concept, or better yet, a concept anchored into the ground of the percept. (65).

Schwartz sees concept in percept, ideas in affects, infinity in a grain of sand, eternity in an hour -- "Eternity is the roar you hear / When you hold a sea shell close to your ear" (Narcissus LLP 63) -- but not without first lifting the mind from the local color. The abstract configurations of his thought are presented as sublunary, or substellar, "under the starlight's / Small knowledge . . . " ("All the Fruits Had Fallen" SK 205). The "smallest color of the smallest day" must be "restored" ("Calmly We Walk Through This April's Day" SK 67) before attaining the transcendent. In giving each particular a name, as he is directed to do in S (14), the poet reduces, by poetically subduing, his sensory field.

"To live between terms" is Schwartz's declaration that our existence is bracketed, but the terms of that circumscription are vague. One knows only the phenomenal object of the "mind's knowing," that is, "the sunlight bright on the green windowshade" ("Sonnet: O City, City" SK 52). In the poem, "Some Present Things Are Causes of True Fear," interpolated, bracketed lines are merely explanatory or exemplary. We are not left with a "phenomenological residuum," or the "theoretical inquiry to pure consciousness in its own Absolute Being" (Ideas 140). In the poem, "Today is Armistice, a Holiday" (VP 104), the possible world is bracketed -- "And some will find that knowledge is an ark / . . . (New works are possible because of this) -- while elsewhere Schwartz adopts this methodological trick to rid himself of painful realities:

> (A mad world, my masters,
> A world senseless and cruel)
> .....
> (A sad world, my masters,
> Yet beautiful, withal).
> ("Most Things at Second Hand Through Gloves We Touch" VP 62)

He brackets and suspends belief in the natural world but often searches in vain for what to put in its stead: "If we are / Unfinished (we are, unless hope is a bad dream)" ("At This Moment of Time" SK 26).

Wimsatt has provided a comprehensive critical history of the term "concrete universal," reviewing the Hegelian formula for inquiry into the "relation between metaphysical poetics and more practical and specific rhetorical analysis" ("The Concrete Universal" 69). He notes the continuity between Mill's semantic use of denotation and connotation, and Tate's logical terms of extension and intension. He cites the neoclassical coincidence of universal and moral nature, Coleridge's unity in diversity, and Croce's individual act of intuition - expression which militates against concepts of generality. Having cleared the critical ground, Wimsatt himself posits that

a theory of particularity leads ultimately to the idiosyncratic, while a theory of universality leads to platitude, that is, the average human form.

The "concrete universal" appears in Merleau-Ponty's writings in the guise of "les idées concrètes," structures made manifest by poetry and music. Such incarnation[19] is never far from Schwartz's mind:

> The inner essence of particulars, and the ideas which it entertains are never separated from their particular embodiments. When we bear in mind that a symbol is that which is at once particular and universal, two crossed pieces of wood and the Cross itself, we see how necessary to the poet is a knowledge of particular things, on the one hand, and a knowledge of ideas on the other. (Eliot ts, Beinecke)

He uses the example of the cross as the most radically-fused union of detail and universal idea. Schwartz goes on to attest to the phenomenological "authenticity" of both the visual image and supernatural event: "What saves us and redeems exactitude always is the specific and the concrete . . ." ("The Objective Corrrelative" Eliot ts, Beinecke). Ronald Bruzina makes the point in his essay, "Eidos: Universality in the Image or in the Concept?" that for Husserl, grasp of truth is the seeing of essence, the vision of the intellectual eidos. The essence-capturing concept -- the intentional object -- is comunicated in "language shorn as much as possible of particularity-bound determinants": "Perception and imagination intend presentations that embody the eidetic but . . . are necessarily contingency- and circumstance-bound" (147). He goes on to say that images are an enhancement of meaning: "intellectual articulation can [never] be achieved without investiture in the sensuous as a factor necessary to it" (152). Sensuous investiture of idea is precisely Schwartz's point in this human paradigm: ". . . man contains / As Pascal says, this monstrous symmetry / Being at once infinite and a pin" (G 152).

The "objective correlative," as Schwartz understands it, is cognate both to the concrete universal and to phenomenological attempts to achieve it. In his essay on the objective correlative Schwartz notes its derivation from "logical and epistemological terminology." He names experience as something "lived-through" as opposed to art which is the contemplation of that lived-world. His own terminology is decidedly intersubjective and Husserlian: "[Objective correlatives] are the bridges . . . between the subjectivity of the poet (each in his prison, like Coriolanus) and the subjectivity of the reader" (Beinecke). Harriet Davidson is unique in noting the more universal strains of Eliot's particularist agenda:

> The substance of the poem is not interior any more than it is empirical; rather it is a gathering up of the tradition in a particular moment. The only authority rests in the unstable hands of culture, and culture is uniquely both subjective and objective in that it is created yet it creates, both temporal and timeless in that it retains everything in a state of continual change, both personal and universal in that it is both homogeneous and a unique horizon from every point within it. In short, the self becomes a locus of culture with no transcendental dominion over the cultural matrix. (5)

Quite a mouthful, for a simple "formula" for the evocation of an emotion by a correlative object or event, as Eliot calls for it in his essay "Hamlet and his Problems" (Selected Essays 145).

While the idea has been variously traced to Poe, Santayana and Pound (Preminger 581), the term itself descends from Husserl's Logical Investigations, where he refers to the "objektive Korrelat" as a synonym for the intentional object (qtd. in Sanford Schwartz 166). In the poem, "Will You Perhaps Consent to Be," Schwartz offers an objective correlative -- flowers -- but names the feeling to which it refers, in an appositive phrase: ". . . this single of your flowers, faith in me . . ." (SK 64). The emotive idea, if you will, which can be an intersubjective and universal one, needs an object to gain particularity of reference: ". . . the fusion of concreteness

and universality is the mark of the most important literary works" ("The Objective Correlative" Eliot ts, Beinecke).

The locus classicus of the concrete universal in modern times is in Hegelian idealist philosophy. He proposed this theory as a solution to the ancient philosophical problem concerning the nature and reality of universals, suggesting that philosophy go beyond the abstract universals of science and be oriented to the individual parts (Preminger 149). Schwartz's concrete universal is a purveyor of the "epistemological passion" which registers "intellectual curiosity" rather than Hegelian spirituality whose "poems are recapitulations of the Spirit in the act of occupying its world," more reason than religious fervour, as Ransom understands it ("The Concrete Universal I" 279, 278). In his essay, "The Theory of the Concrete in Modern Philosophy from Hegel to Whitehead," Schwartz speaks of Hegel's achievement in reflexive terms: "Like Whitehead, Hegel upsets the traditional notion of abstract-concrete, raises the contrast . . . to an issue itself, endows it with a remarkable dialectic, gives it, so to speak, a new consciousness of itself" (Beinecke). Hegel's "World Whole" allows this metaphor:

> This formal beauty
> Permits the city
> The rage of cars
> And the quick taxi. (J 112)

Forms, or essences are immanent in consciousness, as well as in cars and taxis. They are present, as well, in the etchings of popular culture: "[He] looked at the history books in public school / And what his mind saw was cartoons in Hearst, / The concrete universal makes its way . . ." (G 190). Hegel lurks in comic strips. A mere boy may "encounter concrete abstractions" (G 197). W.H. Auden insists on the metaphysical aspect of the equation. At issue is Schwartz's preface "To the Reader" to G: "Some authors . . . do not have to bring in their

beliefs . . . from the outside; they have only to examine their experience in order to find particular beings and actions . . . like the authors of the Gospels who perhaps had only to look up or remember" (vii). Auden glosses thus: ". . . metaphysics is important as a work of clarification once it can presuppose a faith to clarify. . . . The central fault in your poem is . . . just this hope that if you only look up and remember enough, significance and value and belief will appear of themselves . . ." (Atlas, "Nine Letters," 196-97). Schwartz does not look up, but rather down, a sense of the essential inveighed in the stuff of existence itself (Shechner's "transcendence downward," as cited above).

Schwartz refers, in the Beinecke manuscripts, to the noted comment (based on Aristotle's De Anima) by the empiricist Pierre Gassendi, in "A Philosophical Treatise (Compendium)" nihil est in intellectu nisi prius fuerit in sensu: "Nothing is in the mind which is not first in the senses." This is a sound bridge to the Husserlian derivation of universal validity in accidental figures. In a thoughtful reflection on subjectivity and the concrete universal, Altieri links Hegel to Husserl in language not unlike Schwartz's meditation on Hegel above: "Because the self-knowledge correlates immediate existence with the universal predicates characterizing mental life, consciousness of self is also a potential for grasping identity in larger . . . terms. One grasps himself as simultaneously concrete and universal. Hegel is a proto Husserlian in his positing a universal Self" (Act and Quality 323-24). And Schwartz is post-Husserlian in taking the ego as his starting point. The eidos can be exemplified intuitively in the data of experience. This Husserlian thought turns Schwartz's reflection to Kant: "The tree I see is not the dog's tree; he lifts his hind leg up. / O the veritable ding an sich" (J 85). Kant's "sensible concept" is a version of the concrete universal. He proposed the use of the classical trope of hypotyposis,

which is a vivid description of a scene or event, a "bringing before the eyes" to make an abstraction understood (De Man 27). Schwartz presses figuration into service of concept: "You saw your love's face abstract, the weak-kneed stilts" ("Abraham and Orpheus, Be With me Now" SK 73). The stilts are "ornamental" epistemologically; yet they add descriptive precision.

Ransom's doctrine of local texture or the degree of irrelevant concreteness in descriptive detail ("Criticism as Pure Speculation" 138-39) is at the heart of his dismissal of the theory of the concrete universal as mere Platonic poetry -- "the concrete detail is partly extraneous to the abstract universal or concept" ("The Concrete Universal, I" 279).[20] Schwartz's spare still life by which he seeks to enliven a monochromatic absolute, hardly provides irrelevant texture: "Logos alone can understand the blue . . . / Blue grapes and yellow pears beside a jar!" (G 98-99). The "death of the colored world," then, does not coincide with the white of pure essence (G 140). Whiteness requires color. The Idea actively and peripatetically seeks its concrete manifestation: "With all the deepest generalities / Which rove the living world for images!" (G 141). Husserl's above-noted emphasis on intuition as "seeing" an essence (Ideas 382) is echoed in Schwartz's habit of figuring abstract ideas into concrete objects.

The concrete universal, where particular and general interpenetrate, suggests the nature of Schwartz's world. Truth has a natural location: "but the tree is true: / And this is what I did not know, although I always thought I knew / how a growing tree is true" ("I Did Not Know the Truth of Growing Trees" SK 207). This epistemological conundrum proceeds, typically, from a tactile knowledge: "My hands stretched to touch the rough and broken / Bark to feel, again and again, an instance and a token / Of reality's texture." Yet it is the supreme effort of Schwartz's work to see beyond surface attraction to make evident essential realities. Donald

Dike notes no disparity between Schwartz's theory of poetry as the "perception and evaluation of experience and the definition of poetry as an imitation such that within the specificity of the particular work the object imitated is realized as a universal" ("A Case for Judgement" 500). Without resources of specification, universals will frustrate attempts at understanding: "Too quick a universal will perplex him / Seem merely a mélange. He has just learned / To name the essence . . ."(G 111). Universals which "are involved in apprehending an object of art just as they are involved in knowing a person or knowing a neighborhood" (L 29) are part of Schwartz's aesthetic sense. Elsewhere universals are dramatis personae in a morality play:

> . . . (somewhat Platonic then
> My frame of mind). But as the clowns slid on,
> Perceived the universals in the art,
> Saw Jiggs as Everyman and Jiggs' wife. . . . (G 134)

The Platonic framework, then, confers value and significance on a comic book reality.

Hence Schwartz's form of hypostasis, or the abstract notion to which one assigns privileged status, is grounded necessarily in the concrete. Here universal virtues are engraved in stone and tell of his penchant for remodelling perceptions into conceptual images, as much as they confirm Rahv's observation that Schwartz has a "tendency toward a critical and intellectual italicization of experience, regardless of its given weight or inner disposition" (qtd. in Valenti, Poetic Achievement 240):

> Among his head [sic], where his perceptions sail,
> Are like white columns, many highest values
> COURAGE, JUSTICE, KINDNESS, PATIENCE, LOVE
> FORGIVENESS and FORBEARANCE
> And though like titles on the pediments
> Of great museums, also like captured lions
> Noble in zoos and pacing nervously. (J 31)

Both monumentality and rubrification give way to a graceful kinetic image drawn from the world of living things. Schwartz cannot present abstractions "thing-free," as Tsur calls them, to our sense of cognitive organization (17). Abstraction and concretion are found on a two way street. They are arrived at both inductively -- "Delmore possessed a tireless mythologizing imagination, a genius for eliciting general laws from the particular scenes of his life" (Atlas 3) -- and deductively: ". . . there is a suite of statements which can be understood less and less in terms of a specific scene, and which seem to be deduced from, not engendered by, the abstract theme of the poem" ("The Poetry of Allen Tate" SE 163); ". . . German transcendentalism [is] the comfort of a world deduced from the abstract nature of consciousness . . ." ("Rimbaud in Our Time" SE 56). A "world of pure Extension" is as elemental as "an Aqueous Habitat" (J 33).

But finally, a poetic phenomenology, to quote Stevens, "must be abstract." Eagleton makes the point, in his Literary Theory, that, although the aim of phenomenology was to return to "solid ground. . . . [Yet] to grasp any phenomenon wholly and purely is to grasp what is essential and unchanging about it. . . . Phenomenology examined not just what I happened to perceive when I looked at a particular rabbit, but the universal essence of rabbits and of the act of perceiving them" (55, 56). Toward the end of determining universal essences, Schwartz leaves his text free of deictic, demonstrative indicators of place and time. Hence although local knowledge is provided by descriptive "concreta," he also liberates his reader to apply his terms as generally as possible:

> If you could be wholly taken
> By attitudes in the abstract mirror,
> Detached from care's dress,
> Framed, no nearer,

> So, the blood stopped,
> The eyes in peace, the breast cold
> The hair stiff, the mouth in bands. . . . ("Song 13" LLV 211)

Whether the physical "thing" yields up its essence or no, it is always, as Husserl has it in his watchword, returned to, as a methodological attempt to impart meaning.

While I note with enthusiasm the congeniality of the phenomenological method to Schwartz's art, I also recognize the contradictions inherent in said method and said art. Both Schwartz and Husserl are large, containing multitudes. Husserl holds that phenomenological description "of the essence of pure transcendental experiences" operates in the "middle range of human experience . . . neither idealizing nor working at the substructure of things" (Ideas qtd. in Casey 196). Schwartz radicalizes Husserl by insisting that his poetic world view include other philosophical visions, sometimes nominalist, sometimes idealist, sometimes empirical. The absolute, after all, is derived from the tomato sauce: ". . . revery over the essences might be an adequately dignified title for the activity of considering the tomato sauce on the veal cutlet, and the slice of tomato beside it as both a problem and a moment" (L 25). Pierre Ouellet notes the meeting ground of "cogito and percipio" (67), which matches the reflectiveness and sentience of Schwartz's effort:

> A hybrid of sensible figures and pure notations, literature functions from conceived perception, or from conception perceived, and reminds us that an idea is always an image or eidos, placing before the mind's eye the multifarious things of the world, to which we lend our own thoughts . . . at the same time that these things lend us their qualities. . . . What literature gives us is a medial perceptual experience . . . which by nature and definition aesthetic, concerns less the objects of the perceived world, than the subjective conditions of their perception. . . . (66)

Schwartz's white world includes earthly colorations. Still, it "glistens" with the "shy quiddities / Marinely hidden" ("Aubade" LLV 215) -- a phrase turned so effortlessly, it soars, despite its freight.

Endnotes to Chapter 6

[1] Chénetier is referring here to the poetry of Vachel Lindsay and to that of William Blake, another graphic artist. To speak of the "pane of mist" as a visual and ideological place of storage is, "of course, to speak of signs" (123).

[2] Henry James goes farther in this identity: "The novelist is a particular window, absolutely -- and of worth in so far as he is one" (Letters, 1:165 qtd. in Armstrong 50).

[3] Dos Passos' kaleidoscopic scenes spring to mind. In Manhattan Transfer the processional goes by, indifferent to a lover's embrace: "Inexorably his lips closed on to hers. Beyond the shaking glass window of the taxi, like someone drowning, she saw out of a corner of an eye whirling faces, streetlights, zooming nickelglinting wheels" (30).

[4] In his book, Our Knowledge of the External World, Bertrand Russell outlines a way of constructing a common physical world out of the private experiences of different perceivers, using the Leibnizian monad as analogue.

[5] The concept of apperception was taken up by Kant in his Critique of Pure Reason where he distinguishes between empirical apperception, the person's awareness of himself which depends on the changing conditions of his consciousness and transcendental apperception, or "pure reason," the inner, unchangeable fundamental and therefore "transcendental" unity of consciousness. It consists of ideas of space and time which are not objects of perception but modes of perceiving. Husserl refers to apperception as a "peculiar type of apprehending or experiencing . . . [which] completes what is brought about by this so-called 'linking-on,' this realization of consciousness" (Ideas 150).

[6] According to Bratu and Marculescu, in their study of aesthetics and phenomenology: "The aesthetic of Merleau-Ponty is thoroughly influenced by the quintessential Notebook of Paul Klee. Even the titles of Merleau-Ponty's essays 'The Eye and the Mind,' 'The Visible and the Invisible' etc., are taken from Klee's Creative Confession where he states his artistic credo starting with these words: 'Art does not render the visible; rather it makes visible'" (349).

[7] As it appears in his book, Studies in Iconology and its further elaboration, "Iconography and Iconology."

[8] Schapiro's essay takes as its "point of departure" Alfred H. Barr Jr.'s book, Cubism and Abstract Art. In this book Barr puts forward the view that the return to objects in art (Neo-Concretism) is occasioned by the "exhaustion of abstract art" (79).

[9] Leo Spitzer cites Keats's poem as "a most splendid example of ekphrasis" more narrowly conceived as a sense of circular objects (shields, cups, etc.) in his essay, "The 'Ode on a Grecian Urn' or Content vs Metagrammar" (qtd. in Krieger, "The Ekphrastic Principle" 109).

[10] See Vol. 3 (1972) of New Literary History devoted entirely to the cross-application of the arts. Of particular interest is Svetlana and Paul Alpers' article, "Ut Pictura Noesis" where they note, "like the political right and left, les extrêmes se touchent: the conservative field of art history joins with the structuralist avant-garde in rejecting distinctions between the arts and traditional hierarchies of evaluation" (440).

[11] Wimsatt offers a popular illustration: "Artificial signs, as Lessing and his century would put it, strive in poetry to become natural signs. Still, the artifice is always deeply pervasive. The boy in the comic strip blows up his balloon and it breaks. POP! Onomatopoeia, of course. But his father looks in from the other room and asks, 'Did you call me, Henry?'" ("Laokoön" 42).

[12] First employed by Jules Millet in his treatise of the same name (1892). Rimbaud's sonnet "Voyelles" -- "A noir, E blanc, I rouge, U vert, O bleu voyelles!" -- was inspired by this chromatic/poetic theory (Preminger 56).

[13] I refer here to the title of Albert H. Munsell's landmark book on the physics of colour, A Grammar of Color.

[14] Hagstrum elucidates a rather unphenomenological position: imagery is most effective when it is "metaphorical rather than purely descriptive of . . . visual reality" (xx).

[15] For an interesting comparatist view of painting and another discipline, see "Philosophical Parallels to Abstract Art" where Zupnick makes the point that both phenomenology and abstract art drop traditional presuppositions in a "succession of renunciations" (476). Both affirm a deeper structural system more basic than the universal class, while suppressing a priori attitudes.

[16] In his essay, "Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture." He took it up again in his book Local Knowledge. Geertz borrowed this term from philosopher Gilbert Ryle. In its anthropological sense, "thick description" seizes upon "an event or anecdote -- colonist John Rolfe's conversation with Pocahontas' father, a note found among Nietzsche's papers to the effect that 'I have lost my umbrella' -- and re-read it in such a way as to reveal through the analysis of tiny particulars the behavioral codes, logics and motive forces controlling a whole society" (Veeser xi). My application of the term here is more limited and literalist.

[17] Ransom sits on the fence, recommending neither imagistic purity nor the purpose-bound poetry of Platonism. He also addresses Metaphysical Poetry as a category, attacking its "miraculism."

[18] Rilke developed this method of description, which means "thing-thick" in his volume of 1907, Neue Gedichte where he further related sculpture and Thing (in Preminger 193-94).

[19] Michel Pierssens speaks of the terms of transfer between scientific concepts and their figuration as one of "incarnation": "Au-delà des disparités, le trait commun de tous ces opérateurs de transfert, c'est bien sûr la figuralité. Ils s'offrent à la fois des objects 'concrets' (puisqu'ils peuvent s'incarner dans des 'choses' dont les noms sont là, dans le texte) et comme les composants d'une structure plus complexe et plus englobante, rhétorique pour l'essentiel . . ." (Savoirs à l'Oeuvre 10).

[20] In its successor piece, "The Concrete Universal, II," Ransom is more tolerant of the Kantian strains in Hegel's theory, as he raises a polemic about "whether the Concrete or working Universal realizes in precise measure the blue-print, the Universal in the mind, or whether there is more Concreteness than is actually needed" (289).

Conclusion

"HAVING SNOW": THE DIFFICULTY OF KNOWLEDGE

> The importance to me of preserving in Yeats's words the asserting and the questioning of knowing is that I am interested in the possibility of art as a possibility of knowing, or acknowledging. This means to me an interest in its confrontation with the threat of skepticism, with the possibility that the world we claim to know is not the world there is.
>
> Stanley Cavell, "The Politics of Interpretation"
> (Themes Out of School, 47-48)

Cavell's self-elected task is Schwartz's own, the enduring subject of his poetry. Whatever Schwartz has to say about the nature of life's realia -- "the things of modern life, the subway, the bridge, the harbor, the metropolis as a whole" (L 80) -- and the eternal truths of which they are but reflective simulacra, is hobbled by his poetic conviction that their knowledge is unattainable. He sums up his own epistemic capabilities thusly:

> What do I know?
> What have I ever known?
> I hardly know my fumbling ignorance
> My knowledge is suspicion and desire. (J 223)

Socrates' avowal, "I know nothing except the fact of my ignorance,"[1] has left its sceptical legacy to echo in such lines as, "I do not know I do not know" ("Socrates' Ghost Must Haunt Me Now" SK 58). In Having Snow, the theme is trumpeted in Husserlian terms:

> The theme of the poem is the difficulty of knowledge "as something perceived" in the attempt to know. The existence of objects which do not perserve their identity, for even as we form an idea of what they are, they are becoming something else. . . . To the understanding of being finally the utter self-surrender, the phenomenologist, the objectification of the self, defined as the "true way" in the futility of the previous solutions. Seeing each thing as it is, because the barrier of the self is passed, which is the beginning of the world.
> To know . . . is to have snow: the fundamental situation. (qtd. in Atlas 68)

If "having snow" is, according to Schwartz, the "fundamental situation" it is also his most fundamental and enduring metaphor. Although it can be perceived and apperceived, snow can

never be "had" [read epistemologically: known]. Empiricist assurances are betrayed by this Wordsworthian contingency: ". . . sentiment . . . springs / From no felt, had, and wholly known things" ("Father and Son" SK 29).

At the heart of his poetry then, is Schwartz's effort to domesticate the untamed tension of Husserlian phenomenology: "apodictic," or indubitable and necessary certainty is sought in the context of the unreliability of the senses. What is more, to reiterate a central citation, essential truth is embedded in fiction: in Ideas Husserl owns up to the "ambiguity" that the "element which makes up the life of phenomenology as of all eidetic science is 'fiction,' that fiction is the source whence the knowledge of 'eternal truths' draws its sustenance" (184). Hence, according to Paisley Livingston, Husserlian constitution is "inflected" with a "poetic sense" (Literary Knowledge 125). And poiesis demands a different order of certitude than does scientific truth. Schwartz takes cold comfort there: the background of suppression, bracketing and reduction cannot enforce a suspension, willing or otherwise, of disbelief. Although his plea, "O let the whole sensorium be hushed" (J 198), is his suspension of the natural attitude of unthinking engagement with the world of experience as much as it is the abstraction from any claims concerning its existence, the possibility of complete knowledge is discounted. Still, the world appears as "spectacle" which remains phenomenally interesting whether or not it is metaphysically real.

As a vocabulary of vagueness, indeterminacy and ignorance pervades his canon, Schwartz cannot, ultimately, say with Husserl: ". . . although we have 'Suspended' the whole world with all things, living creatures, men, ourselves included [we] have literally lost nothing, but have won the whole Absolute Being, which, properly understood, conceals in itself all transcendences

. . . " (Ideas 140). Instead, Schwartz's poetry studies the apories or impasses to which a phenomenological exploration of phenomena has brought him, as we shall see presently. As Atlas has it, "his desire to know, to be certain of reality, was possessed of such urgency that it could only fail to be achieved" ("Mind of God" 4). Only the desire for creature comforts, far from the arena of "justified" knowledge, is assured:

> Breakfast is good.
> An income is good.
> It is good to be sunburnt, warm and clean.
> Besides this, what can you say with certainty? (DBB IDBR 142)

When Dr. Newman in Dr. Bergen's Belief disputes the "indubitability" of intuitions (164), he confronts Husserlian apodicticity head on. Hussserlian apodicticity -- "what is described is not described simply as a matter of fact, but as not capable of being otherwise . . . the inability of the structure to be other than it is" (Sokolowski 18) -- is defended by Dr. Bergen: "I know by intuition -- by gazing upon the inevitable blue until it becomes self-evident that it is so" (IDBR 163). This is subsequently shouted down by Dr. Newman: "Suppose another person had an intuition of the sky as God's round wall. . . . How would you show him that he was wrong and you . . . correct?" (164).[2] Schwartz admits to falling short of the necessary confidence in one's own ability to recuperate essences apodictically: "Every point of view, every kind of knowledge and every kind of experience is limited and ignorant" ("Author's Note" SK unnumbered). Husserlian knowledge of phenomena, Eagleton insists, is certain and irresistible because it is intuitive. He goes on: "Despite its focus on reality as actually experienced, as Lebenswelt rather than inert fact, its stance towards that world remains contemplative and unhistorical. Phenomenology sought to solve the nightmare of modern history by withdrawing into a speculative sphere where eternal certainty lay in wait" (Literary Theory 57, 61).

"History" for Schwartz is likewise "unforgiven." But it is the confusions ("Perplexed, still wet / With sleep"), doubts and contingencies of modern life, despite the deceptive assurance of iteration ("Again and again"), which underwrite any claims to phenomenal knowledge ("In the Naked Bed, in Plato's Cave" SK 25). Husserl himself moved from asserting in his Formal and Transcendental Logic in 1929, that the Ego exists absolutely, to its modification in his Crisis of the European Sciences in 1936 that the transcendental Ego exists correlative to the world. For Schwartz, certainty and clarity were desiderata throughout his career. But the pristine confidence of this sentiment of correlation -- "Simple and certain, known through the truth of touch . . . " is undermined by its successive poetic line: ". . . another form and fountain of falsehood's fecundity" (Narcissus LLP 65). Schwartz does proceed from a belief in the "experienceability" (Welch 13) of ordinary objects: "Whatever is present will be known to me" ("The Ballet of the Fifth Year" SK 59); "The small pebble, / The clear clay bottom, the white shell / Are apparent . . ." ("In the Slight Ripple, The Mind Perceives the Heart" SK 39). Experienceability, however, betokens relation: "[it] contains the concept that a 'known' object has, and must always have, its motive in the system of experience. To be known is to be experienced; to be experienced means nothing less than to be in relation to an Ego and its consciousness" (Welch 14). The above cited poetic line (SK 59) bears the stamp of another of Husserl's convictions, that is, that the world is "present to [hone]" (Cartesian Meditations 13).

We saw in the first part of this thesis how clarity was a heuristic value, effected through symmetry, simplicity and catalogue among other features, as it guided textual decisions Schwartz made along the way. "Clarity" also pervades his poetic lexicon, ever dominating his search for phenomenological certainty: "Where the light is, and each thing clear. . . . / I drink the time

and touch whatever's near" ("The Beautiful American Word, Sure" SK 27); "The clear clay bottom, the white shell . . ." ("In the Slight Ripple, The Mind Perceives the Heart" SK 39); "Fog in stony December; it is well, / The season's character being clear" ("Sonnet 18" LLV 212); "Only your lucid brush could make her clear . . ." ("She Lives With the Furies of Hope and Despair" VP 77). The demand for clarity is inspired terminologically from Husserl's insistence on "clarification," or making objects evident to facilitate eidetic reduction. Pure self-givenness is absolute clarity: ". . . the intuitable over against the unintuitable, the clear over against the obscure, these are parallel oppositions. . . . clearness, intuitability, givenness" (Ideas 178). Apprehension of the essence "has its own grades of clearness" (177). For Husserl then, "the clarification of experience was the essential enterprise of first philosophy" (Imber 11). Schwartz shares this desire to make understandable that which presents itself as apparent to the senses: ". . . O fellow, follow, / See what is here and clear, one thing repeated . . ." ("All of Us Always Turning Away for Solace" SK 63). The essences sought by phenomenological clarification are characterized by their "fullness" and their "light": "the object referred to passes into the brightly lit circle of perfect presentation" (Ideas 181).

Outward light is indicative of an inward claritas, on the Joycean/Aquinian model: ". . . the mind behind / The surface, the radiance within / The radiance, within the shining radiance" (Narcissus LLP 69). Light is refracted from the "commonest object" (Stephen Hero 289), then personified, then reflected in Husserlian aspects (Abschattungen, as discussed above):

> I was for a long time, every kind
> Of shining angel: kind of angle,
> And kind of light: each point of view
> Drew up something new. . . . (70)

Schwartz marries epistemology and optics; here, a "critical angle" is the least angle of incidence at which a ray is reflected. He is a student of "the early-morning light" (Section 3, Sonnet Cycle VP) and also of "the absolute light, the dry light" (J 228). His poetry assumes chromatisms, luminosities and textures not dreamed of in anyone's philosophy: "Blue light, plum light, fading violet light, / And then the oyster light of the wool sky" ("The Morning Light for One with Too Much Luck" VP 91). A supernal glow -- "Transfigured, possessed by the blessedness of whiteness and light, / A whiteness which was light and which was more than light, / And the inner morning and meaning of all light" ("The First Morning of the Second World" SK 155) -- grows out of Husserlian inquiry.

Epistemological certainty was a hotly-debated issue in the 1930's, when Schwartz was a philosophy student. Schwartz's private papers and epistemological essays are replete with extrapolations from Russell's "private worlds" of objective "sense data" (Our Knowledge of the External World), Moore's "common sense" and "ordinary language" defense of the knowability of empirical propositions (Proof of an External World), and Wittgenstein's variations and meditations on the phrase "I know" in his tractate, On Certainty, Uber Gewissheit: "Knowledge and certainty belong to different categories. . . . (Here I assume that it is meaningful for me to say 'I know what (e.g.) the word 'doubt' means. . . .') what interests us now is not being sure but knowledge" (39). Schwartz's poetic engagement with the many and various senses of "I know," along with the putative knowledge claims of poetry, threw him into the forefront of the critical debate. His contending views on the reliability of the perceived world, thrashed out in Having Snow, is his understanding of Husserl's thesis of the indubitability of immanent experiences:

> It seems that we know only our sense impressions, the functioning of our eyes, ears, taste, touch, smell. This is called "the limitation to sense data" and it is the basis of Having Snow. . . . How can we know the things that cause our sense impressions, if they are not themselves sense impressions. . . . Do I love only my sense impressions, enacting the sin of Narcissus? All of this and what follows is to state clearly the trouble with which I am occupied.
> Really I do not know my sense impressions. I do not hear sound waves beating on my ear but I hear music. I do not see light waves impressing themselves on my eyes, but shapes and colors. . . . One might . . . admit that . . . the ordering of one's sense impressions was given because all scientific knowledge does not result from one's own will. (Beinecke)

Hence Schwartz offers his own examples of Husserl's theory about the stream of sensations: "I do not see color-sensations, but colored things, I do not hear tone-sensations but the singer's song, etc." (Logical Investigations II, 559). Schwartz's deductions are Husserlian, without the Husserlian erasure to bracket sensory unknowability. Apodicticity is hence compromised by Schwartz's struggle with perceptual deceit. The stick-in-the-water is a paradigm for "all the knowledge which the sun distorts" ("Crude I Abide in This Society" VP 87): "I [begin] Having Snow with an error. Images in a looking glass, a stick curved in the water ['visual phantom' or 'visual illusion' (Ideas 120)] the pressed eye which sees double . . . are some occasions of error which lead to suspicion of the senses" (Beinecke). These must be adjusted by systematic "corrections" (Ideas 388). Elsewhere Schwartz confronts our compensatory provision of a fourth side of a square when only three are seen.

Yet phenomenology dictated an acceptance of the primacy of perception, along with the "egocentric predicament," as he explains it in his Eliot typescript, in the essay, "The Theme of Separation":

> When Eliot was a student of philosophy at Harvard, one of his teachers, Ralph Barton Perry, invented the phrase, "the egocentric predicament," to state the impossibility of knowing anything except through the medium of one's own perceptions (which is not the same as saying it is impossible to know anything but

> one's own perceptions). And this view is familiar in the history of philosophy from the time of Descartes, who was able to doubt everything but his own thought of doubt. (Beinecke)

This egocentric predicament defines Schwartz's own confrontation with real objects:

> Commanded reality, or uncommanded?
> .....
> ... what I see
> Is neither what I desire nor what is there:
> My grasping gaze seizes what is a blur
> And makes a hybrid of the blur and my desire. (Narcissus LLP 80)

The schemata for apperceiving the world are personal. The plain, brute fact, the epistemic given is at odds with its literary representation; the "figured and touched" sensory world ("The First Morning of the Second World" SK 153) is at variance with the "structures of reality" ("The Kingdom of Poetry" SK 187). Hence this unspecified quotation from Gide which serves as an epigraph to Having Snow, and indeed to his whole epistemological project: "I am beginning to catch sight of what I might call the deep-lying subject of my book. It is . . . the rivalry between the real world and the representation of it which we make to ourselves. The manner in which we try to impose on the outside world our own interpretation -- this is the drama of our lives" (Beinecke).

As intersubjectivity gives way to private universe and as objective fact gives way to idiosyncratically-perceived image, Schwartz seeks to justify his particularist vision of the world:

> Dr. Bergen:
> . . . the typical
> Ticking of the clock repeats its dry sound, while outside
> the bedroom window the great city squats,
>
> Silent and black beneath the ignorance of night.
> Be conscious thus. Be troubled by the shortcoming of all through which justification is assured. . . .

> Dr. Newman:
> . . . you provide no specific test of your assertion. The sky remains what it is for perception, no matter what is said about it, and almost anything can be said.
>
> Dr. Bergen:
> . . . You are blinded by scientific method which looks past and beneath the facts of direct experience and forgets them. Consider, for example the difference between the physicist's time -- readings on a clock, a machine's abstract numbers -- and felt time. . . . (DBB IDBR 151, 164)

The discrepancy between objective time and felt time[3] is reconciled by Husserl's brand of foundationalism which has it that intuition serves as the verification of all formal concepts. Merleau-Ponty has indirectly answered Schwartz's hesitations about certitude with his belief that since the same modality applies to both perceiver and perceived, both are equally assured: "We must not, therefore, wonder whether we really perceive a world, we must instead say: the world is what we perceive" (xvi). His further words lend legitimation to the first part of this dissertation: "To seek the essence of perception is to declare that perception is, not presumed true, but defined as access to truth" (xvi). Schwartz, in like manner, affirms the world while seeking accessibility to it.

Schwartz's muse demands order, precision and exactness: ". . . the feelings surprise, / Spontaneous as rain, and they compel / Explicitness, embarrassed eyes -- " ("Father and Son" SK 29); "If we are / Unfinished (we are, unless hope is a bad dream), / You are exact . . ." (" At This Moment of Time" SK 26); "So many surround you, ringing your fate, / Caught in an anger exact as a machine!" ("Tired and Unhappy, You Think of Houses" SK 38). Yet while poetry is gay and exact" ("The Kingdom of Poetry" SK 187), if offers only "approximate images, imaginary parallels" (Narcissus LLP 67). According to David Levin,

> the most powerful, most insightful descriptions of phenomenology never truly fit "the experience": there is always a resonance, an ambiguity, a free elusiveness in

> the descriptive meaning. The description seems to straddle the experience, like a cowboy riding a wild horse. . . . phenomenological description must resonate with poetic freedom and even partake of ambiguity in order to remain true to the character of experience [which is] irremediably ambiguous and resonant with many tenses, voices and moods. ("The Poetic Function in Phenomenological Discourse" 220, 225)

Hence Schwartz peddles the speaker's paradoxical situation: "Assured in doubt and known in every chance" ("Sonnet 7" LLV 205). While the speaker in "Prothalamion" aspires to the "certainty / Of those who run downstairs and drive a car" (SK 48), it is ultimately those "who are uncertain" who "compel" Schwartz, those who are, like him, "tentative, hesitant, doubtful" ("At This Moment of Time" SK 26). A vocabulary of mastery and precision is undermined by a corollary lack of faith that our acts of perception can deliver anything but an incomplete access to the world. While it is the "sweet access of being which / The radiance of knowledge gives and gives" (Narcissus LLP 71), his is ultimately an obscured vision: "And I remember that we who move / Are moved by clouds that darken midnight" (SK 26).

His efforts to defeat textual obscurity notwithstanding, Schwartz's ultimate preference for vagueness over clarity, for "vague night" over "lucid day" (Coriolanus SK 123), is a controlled aesthetic choice and proceeds from his taking "doubt itself as a starting point." He continues in the Cartesian mode, in this second epigraph to Having Snow: "I may doubt the reality of everything but not the reality of doubt" (Beinecke). Such "succinctness" as there is resides in the "unknown unsettled trees" ("Cambridge, Spring 1937" SK 57). His vocabulary of indeterminacy -- "All's indeterminate except the moon" (Coriolanus SK 125); "The Volscians are / Indeterminate as to the blunted war" (140); "All of us go / To one indeterminate nothing" ("Father and Son" SK 30) -- foretell such a concern in phenomenological ontologies of literature as Ingarden's "spots of indeterminacy" which the reader must reconstruct and "fill out" with his

own "concreta" (The Literary Work of Art). Husserl's own demand for apodicticity is couched in a vague morphology of inexact descriptive essences: "notched, indented, lens-shaped, bell-shaped, umbelliform, and the like -- [these are] simple concepts which are essentially and not incidentally inexact" (Ideas 190).

Indeed Husserl wrestles with the absolute "once for allness," the "perfection" of apodictic evidence:

> Any evidence is a grasping of something itself that is . . . a grasping in the mode "it itself," with full certainty of its being, a certainty that accordingly excludes every doubt. But it does not follow that full certainty excludes the conceivability that what is evident could subsequently become doubtful . . . indeed, sensuous experience furnishes us with cases where that happens. (Cartesian Meditations 16, 15, 16)

It is, on closer "critical reflection," the "non-being" of the object which is indubitable (16), not the evidence of sensual data. For Schwartz "another being's being" has necessity and indubitability ("A Young Child and His Pregnant Mother" SK 43), while life's physical commitments remain doubtful: "The secret life of belly and bone, / Opaque, too near, my private, yet unknown" ("The Heavy Bear Who Goes With Me" SK 74). The "empty mist of dim indeterminacy" (Ideas 92), the dimly apprehended depth or fringe of indeterminate reality, part of the "horizon" of presumptions discussed above, is clearly anathema to intuitive clarity: "But if that itself which is vaguely known, the unclear floating image . . . of memory or fancy, produces its own essence, that which it produces can only be something imperfect . . ." (Ideas 177).

In his look at the poetics of the open work, Eco terms indeterminacy an appropriate "epistemological metaphor" for this age of open-endedness (87). As determined in the first chapter, modernism is a "tropism" which distinguishes itself by its indeterminateness, among

other things (Greenberg 171). Accordingly, Schwartz's imaginative struggle with the confronted world is defeated in such lines: "so distant from all knowledge / and all conclusion" ("Summer Knowledge" SK 157). While Schwartz decries the private uses of language ("Critical Method of R.P. Blackmur" SE 352), he proposes the eccentricities and the "privacy of sense perceptions" (Having Snow Beinecke), the lyrical assertions of the Ego, over both the naive postulates of idealism and the crude assumptions of positivism. The heading for Chapter 28 of Having Snow ensures that indeterminateness is the only assured epistemological yield of the poem: "From its roof, perspectivity. Knowledge wholly impossible" (Beinecke). That is, the mediated nature of Schwartz's reality offers resistance to the certain knowledge his poetry means to secure.

In his article, "The Hermeneutics of Literary Indeterminacy: A Dissent from the New Orthodoxy," Altieri determines that "indeterminacy" has supplanted "ambiguity" as a critical descriptor for modernistic texts, while pointing his finger at the New Critical feat of having "multiplied the semantical possibilities of the text . . . without providing adequate means for integrating and regulating these possibilities" (86). Determinacy and validity in interpretation are beside the point: "Critical thinking that gets bogged down in the hermeneutic determinability and indeterminability of statements ironically remains trapped in the last gasps of theological discourse and the theologizing of poetry those gaps produced" (93). For Schwartz, determinacy in interpretation is itself determined by the specificity of the poetic discourse. The concreteness of Yeats's image was arrived at, along with the possibility for, what Schwartz called, "serene belief and undivided certainty" ("May's Truth and May's Falsehood" SK 212), "only after many phases of vagueness, meandering through the long Celtic twilight" ("The Cunning and the Craft of the Unconscious and the Preconscious" SE 198). The "vagueness of every application" which

Schwartz records in Having Snow has its own proper purchase on his poetic imagination. Rimbaud's Illuminations defined an entire aesthetic of "undecidability" (Todorov's term) -- the horns which "boom vaguely" trumpet a similar aesthetic for Schwartz ("The Sin of Hamlet" SK 35) -- which he bequeathed to his post-Symbolist literary heirs (Perloff, Poetics of Indeterminacy 4). Indeterminacy has become its own organizing conceit. If postmodernism is a "radicalization" of the "epistemological doubts" that beset modernism (Bertens 20), then Schwartz pointed the way by acknowledging the "difficulty of knowledge" as "something perceived" (Having Snow Beinecke).

Stanley Cavell finds in Othello's "radical, consuming doubt" a trope (in the sense of a turning away from the world) for the modern disowning of knowledge: "It is . .. the position from which the skeptic's radical question demands to be raised. . . . the transformation of a scene of knowing for oneself into a sense that true knowledge is beyond the human self . . ." ("Introduction" Disowning Knowledge 8, 7). In his "bagatelle," "Iago, or the Lowdown on Life," Schwartz suggests that Shakespeare took up Othello's case because "he disliked his own suspicious nature" (VP 46). Schwartz's poems point to the suspicion of the senses as well as to poetry's responsibility to record that suspicion. Cavell speaks for Schwartz as he does for all poets who test the poem's unique way of knowing the world and creating significance within it:

> . . . the access of skepticism and poetry to one another means to me that a theory of referentiality or textuality designed to explain, say, our relation to Wallace Steven's jar in Tennessee or to Heidegger's jug in the Black Forest is of no use to me if it fails to explain my relation to the chipped mug from which I drank my coffee this morning, I mean explain its vulnerability to doubt, or say to imagination. ("The Politics of Interpretation" 47-48)

Schwartz, in equal measure, ponders his own uncertain relation to the "cut glass bowls on the buffet," other vessels, "other furniture" (S 8). Coleridge's "mariner who talked all night / Of

the real world, pure consciousness as such / As if he understood the world of light" ("The Masters of the Heart Touched the Unknown" VP 35) spoke in strains of more assured discourse than was available to Schwartz's speakers.

While, very broadly, "literature is being restored to its pristine position as a central cognitive resource in society" ("Introduction," Barricelli and Gibaldi iv), we read Schwartz today when "postcognitivism" (Higgins 71) has defeated the ability of poetic truth to confer "evidence" on knowledge claims. Because of the postmodern crisis of "legitimation," knowledge can be confirmed only in provisional and local récits. Metanarratives, such as the speculative unity of all knowledge as philosophical system, no longer stand us in good stead. Yet, according to Lyotard, "postmodern knowledge . . . refines our sensitivity to differences and reinforces our ability to tolerate the incommensurable." As such, it is a "stranger to disenchantment" (xxv, xxiv). Schwartz then, is modern in his aspiration to order and postmodern in his subversion of it and tolerance of subsidiary orders. However, this world so clearly charted, has its own turbulences, agitations, collisions and instabilities. Finally, Schwartz entertains the rival demands of both obscurity and clarity, freedom and containment. Landlocked images are insufficient as a breakwater of order and elegance against a tide of epistemological disturbance. A mapping of Schwartz's epistemological topography has turned up terrain mined with secretly explosive issues.

Schwartz's attempt to take stock of the kind of relations which obtain between knower and known often fails in the poetic transformation which renders it articulate; indeed the articulation of both knowledge and order is often deferred due to the aporia which lie in ambush in Schwartz's phenomenal field. Aporia, "barred passage, no pasaran," as Derrida terms it

("Shibboleth" 399), defines the postmodern hermeneutic. De Man traced it to the very mendacity of language itself: "All great literature, de Man tells us, returns to the basic aporia of thought" (Hagenbuchle 7). Schwartz retrieves grace from ignorance, in yet another epigraph to Having Snow from the work of R.P. Blackmur:

> ". . . the predicament of the consciousness that knows. Consciousness seems always to stop short of its object, and is defined by its limitations. There is a gap, a chasm all round it, which is the gap between what we know and our knowing. As our knowing shifts, grows, diminishes . . . we proceed through disillusion. . . . Ignorance is a condition to be achieved, like grace, and is not a weapon; the weapon is knowledge, . . . the pursuit is full of victory and assertion. . . . In our ends are our beginnings. Between times we are conscious of more or less." (Beinecke)

In the end is also Schwartz's beginning. Arche and telos describe a circle: "the mystery of beginning / Again and again . . ." ("In the Naked Bed, in Plato's Cave" SK 25). Both Husserl and Schwartz viewed their work as foundational in some way, the necessary undergirding to further acts of cognition. The first Cartesian Meditation includes this meditation on "the systematic order of cognitions," or, "the question of the beginning": "the inquiry for those cognitions . . . [which] are first in themselves and can support the whole storied edifice of universal knowledge" (14). Quentin Lauer singles out Husserl's "messianic responsibility to assure this beginning," as philosophy begins with the "programme" of phenomenology: "Only when the object of consciousness has been intentionally constituted does the philosophical object . . . begin to be. In these terms, returning to the beginning means returning to the beginning of philosophy" ("Introduction," Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy 35). Husserl's Prolegomena to Pure Logic isolated and "founded" the necessary logical exercises before ideal structures could be mastered.

In his study of the "lore" and epistemology of beginnings, Edward Said singles out Husserl as the "epitome of the modern mind in search of absolute beginning, purged of any doubt, fully convinced of itself, intransitive, and yet . . . thoroughly aloof . . ." (Beginnings 48, 49). He felt that a science concerned with what is radical must itself be radical in procedure: it was a science of "true beginnings," of "origins," furnishing a "mother-ground" for all basic concepts and principles of science, a "first philosophy." For Schwartz, too, poetry has all the life-giving energies of maternity: it is "an omnibus, bearing and begetting all the mind's animals" ("The Kingdom of Poetry" SK 188). We return, in this conclusion, to Schwartz's inception as a poet, to this cryptic citation from Marx which serves as an epigraph to the collection IDBR, and which is oddly phenomenological in sentiment: "To be radical is to get to the root of things. The root of the individual, however, is the individual himself."

Schwartz's poetic office is equally radical in that it proceeds to the genetic source. "Standing on thresholds" ("Sonnet 2" LLV 204), Schwartz's speaker is genealogist extraordinaire. In "Song 6," "privacy" is located primordially and cosmogonically in the "dark sea where the first things turn" (LLV 207-8). This comparison of privacy to a deep sea diver is a radical metaphorical procedure. The unspoken prime mover which animates his text is Aristotle's Nous, or Divine Intelligence. This concern with the causes of things, the experiential foundations of knowledge, was first sounded in G: "Felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas": "Happy is he who can know the causes of things" (Virgil, Georgics Bk. 2, l. 490, p. 93).[4] It proves its iterability by reverberating as a refrain throughout the play (30, 31, 55): "It is impossible to know at all / Until one knows causes and principles: Felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas" (55). Cause is, reflexively, itself a necessary and sufficient cause. The

aesthete/hero confronts himself, "gazing upon the old life's vaudeville, / Viewing the motions of the struggling will / Seeking the causes of each fresh event" (30).

In his journal Schwartz offers up this circular meditation: "Plato saw structures as the cause of things / Because they were the cause of knowledge" (49). What is more, poetry is a science of origins: "Consider your nature and your origin" (J 33). The temporal is superseded by the causal, this a lesson learnt at the feet of Proust: "A moment when Proust made me see your works to come -- not Time, but Cause" (J 187). In his poetry this attention to beginnings and cosmogony is thematized as morning, -- "the travail / Of early morning," most commonly ("In the Naked Bed, in Plato's Cave" (SK 25) -- as befits the poet of the "early morning light" (Sonnet Cycle, Part III VP). Genealogy becomes polemical assertion: "The morning blooming on the windowpane / Asserts the theme, Columbian . . ." ("Sonnet 9" LLV 206).

Finally, what other response can this philosophical poet have in a post-philosophical age, faced with the unlamented demise of epistemology, but this bit of wisdom delivered by Dr. Bergen: "I have the will to know and nothing else" (DBB IDBR 170). Hence although Schwartz's poetic propositions address the issue of how we know ourselves and our world, phenomenologically, nothing is assumed -- not the spatio-temporal world or the world of existence or the idealizations of theoretical knowledge: "there is only the self-validating cognitive experience itself" ["the will to know"] (Marvin Farber, qtd. in Stewart and Mickunas 6). The poetics of determinate control must defer to an aesthetics of the radically contingent, so that each poetic statement subverts its own claim to cognitive power, challenges its own assumption of epistemological certainty. The questions posed by his aesthetics, "What is known in a poem?" (PI 5) and his poems, "What is there to be known?" ("Father and Son" SK 31) --

which are, not altogether incidentally, similar to the question posed by Brian McHale's "poetics of the epistemological dominant" (58), as we remember from the introduction -- are not so much definitively answered as shown merely to converge.

As I opened this dissertation with the promise of the details of Schwartz's "programmatic" epistemology, I feel rather like the alter ego of Mendele Moykher Sforim -- referred to in my chapter on lists -- who, after long and disputatious digressions, corrects himself, "Nit dos bin ikh oisn," "but that is not what I meant to say." Wellek and Warren's "bi-modal" assessment of various "ways of knowing" (35), that is, discursive and presentational, seem an inadequate tally of Schwartz's acts of cognition as explained in this thesis. These acts, Schwartz attests, with his acknowledgement of various intellectual systems, are always relational, no matter how isolating the quest to poetically reify the act of perception. Poetry, which is seen in the earnest exclusions of PI to be "neither philosophy nor sense experience" (4), is finally shown to be both.

Jonathan B. Imber's thoughts on Stevens and Husserl apply with equal force to Schwartz, the philosophical poet:

> The ideal-typical speakers of metaphorical languages are poets; of eidetic languages, philosophers. In the modern division of intellectual labor, poetry is typically thought to transform the ordinary meanings of words and everyday life. Philosophy, on the other hand, aims to know that life, ordinary and extraordinary, with as great a certainty as possible. (3)

Two passages from Stevens' canon can speak, then, for Schwartz's epistemological programme:

> A longer, deeper breath sustains
> This eloquence of right, since knowing
> And being are one -- the right to know
> Is equal to the right to be.
> The great Omnium descends on me,
> Like an absolute out of this eloquence.
> "Presence of an External Master of Knowledge"
> (Opus Posthumous 105)

> The eye's plain version is a thing apart
> The vulgate of experience. . . .
> "An Ordinary Evening in New Haven"
> (Collected Poems 465)

The absolute, the vulgate, and all the hesitations, affirmations, indeterminacies and poetic epistemologies in between -- this is Schwartz's "sense of the world."

Finally, I will leave you, brave reader, with an excerpt from an unpublished poem, sent to his friend and publisher, James Laughlin and included in the Schwartz-Laughlin Letters (37-38). The poem addresses some of the issues I have discussed here, as it defends the "working process and the secret scene" I have aimed to disclose. It demonstrates the motivating conviction of this dissertation, that we are enjoined by Schwartz's poetry itself, not by any graduate project or critical agenda, to reflect on the epistemological commitments of Schwartz's images, themes and figures:

> "Ode on the Study of Philosophy"
>
> . . . And I have separated every white page,
> Black print, refluent breath, my body's tone,
> From the mind's noumenal act alone.
> . . . . . .
> Here where no flesh can breathe, where no moist lip
> Is bitten in pride and fear, where verbal play,
> Mere syllables, mere repetition, rote,
> Erects, essence by essence in the abstract light,
> Monad and entity, the metaphysical day.
> . . . . . .
> The mind alone can grasp the moving world,
> Instruct all voices and correct the sea,
> The mind examines hearts, the mind unseen
> Responds, creates, judges the unjust, shows
> The working process and the secret scene,
> . . . . . .
> Nor power, nor belief ruins him who knows
> And studies the light in which all things seem.

Footnotes to Conclusion

[1] As recorded by Diogenes Laertius in his Lives of Eminent Philosophers (qtd. in Bartlett 78). Jo Brans finds a closer match: "Socrates claimed in his Defense, according to Plato, that "I do not think that I know what I do not know" (Apology 21d qtd. in Brans 509-10). For a discussion of the legitimacy of ignorance in the Bible, to the Renaissance and beyond, see Andrew Martin's study, The Knowledge of Ignorance, where he makes the case for the "anepistemological text" which "articulate[s] the hyperbolic desiderata of nescience and omniscience" (7). He cites Nicholas of Cusa's Of Learned Ignorance, Erasmus' Praise of Folly and Eckhardt's The Cloud of Unknowing, and laments: "Theologically, epistemology stands condemned as irredeemably sinful because . . . indistinguishable from vanity. What philosophy lacks . . . is humility or . . . a systematic anepistemology: a theory of ignorance" (10).

[2] For a discussion of the evolution of Husserl's idea of apodicticity which often admits shades of doubt and acknowledges perceptual fallibility, see David Levin's discussion in his essay, "Husserlian Essences Reconsidered." Dr. Newman's stance (DBB IDBR) is exactly replicated: "Suppose here, a conflict between A's 'apodictic' insight P and B's 'apodictic' insight Q; and assume, further, that A and B are each respected phenomenological authorities and that they appear to be working from the same corpus of evidence. . . . So Husserlian insight is arbitrary and whimsical in precisely the sense, and to precisely the degree that it cannot help us to know which of the two insights is properly certified" (175).

[3] The subject of Plinlimmon's pamphlet in Melville's Pierre, or the Ambiguities, termed there "chronometrical" and "horological" time.

[4] Translated by L.P. Wilkinson as, "Blessed is he whose mind had power to probe / The causes of things. . . ."

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N.B. All uncollected poems are from Valenti's article "The Apprenticeship of Delmore Schwartz," his journal, Portrait of Delmore, and the manuscripts at the Beinecke Library. For a comprehensive bibliography of Schwartz's uncollected writing, see McDougall's biography (143-52) and Valenti's dissertation, The Poetic Achievement (458-79). The latter lists the first appearance of poems, short stories, and reviews.

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