Université de Montréal

Polarized Partisanship in Turkey

par Mehmet Ali Semih Çakır

Département de science politique
Faculté des arts et des sciences
Directeurs: Patrick Fournier
                       Ruth Dassonneville

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Présenté par

Mehmet Ali Semih Çakır

A été évalué par un jury composé des personnes suivantes:

Laurie Beaudonnet
Présidente-rapporteuse

Patrick Fournier
Directeur de recherche

Ruth Dassonneville
Directrice de recherche

André Blais
Membre du jury

Résumé

Une vaste littérature démontre que la partisanerie, en diminuant la volatilité électorale, stabilise la politique. Les études récentes ont aussi établi un lien de causalité entre la polarisation et la partisanerie; plus les partis politiques se distinguent, plus ils deviennent visibles aux yeux des électeurs et ainsi ces derniers s'identifient plus facilement avec un parti politique. Donc, la polarisation entraîne la partisanerie et cette dernière stabilise la politique. Alors que plusieurs études ont été menées sur le concept d'identification partisane hors des États-Unis, peu d'entre elles ont analysé les implications de la partisanerie dans une démocratie polarisée et non-établie. En utilisant les données des modules 3 et 4 du Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, cette étude examine l'identification partisane dans un contexte très polarisé : la Turquie. Ce faisant, elle soulève certaines implications normatives à propos de la partisanerie à la lumière de la théorie démocratique. Les résultats suggèrent que la Turquie, qui a été aux prises avec de l'instabilité électorale pendant des décennies, a retrouvé la stabilité politique suite à un accroissement du niveau de partisanerie dans le pays. Néanmoins, cette recherche démontre également que la polarisation élevée en Turquie est associée à un biais partisan plus fort quant aux forces à court terme.

Mots clés : comportement électoral, partisanerie, polarisation, vote, Turquie.

Abstract

A vast literature demonstrates that partisanship has a stabilizing impact on politics, as it limits electoral volatility. Recent studies have also shown that polarization increases partisanship; as parties differ more in their policy positions, they become more visible and citizens identify themselves more with a political party. Polarization thus leads to partisanship, and partisanship stabilizes the politics. While multiple studies have already tested the application of party identification outside the US, less is known about the implications of party identification in polarized non-consolidated democracies. Focusing on Turkey, this study investigates partisanship in a highly polarized context by means of data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, modules 3 and 4. The results suggest that Turkey, after decades of electoral instability, has been stabilized with an increase in partisanship. However, this research also finds that high polarization in Turkey is associated with more biased perceptions of short-term factors. This study draws normative implications about partisanship in light of democratic theory.

Keywords: voting behavior, party identification, polarization, vote, Turkey

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List of Abbreviations

AKP	Justice and Development Party
ANAP	Motherland Party
ANES	American National Election Studies
BDP	Peace and Democracy Party
CHP	Republican People's Party
CSES	Comparative Study of Electoral Systems
DP	Democrat Party
DYP	True Path Party
ESS	European Social Survey
FP	Felicity Party
GDP	Gross domestic product
HDP	People's Democratic Party
MHP	National Action Party
MSP	National Salvation Party
PKK	Kurdistan Workers' Party
RP	Welfare Party
SHP	Social Democratic Populist Party
TNGA	Turkish National Grand Assembly

Acknowledgments

I am infinitely grateful to my precious mother and father who unquestionably supported me all the way with my academic journey, which has yet begun.

2017 Winter Session has been a turning point in my academic path. It is in this period that I had the chance to take Voting Behavior with Richard Nadeau, where I have met Michigan model of voting, and Political Psychology with Patrick Fournier, where I have gained stimulating insights and knowledge on the intersection of psychology and politics. These two classes with two knowledgeable scholars have allowed me to piece together my interests in our field, which has ultimately gave birth to this research. For that, I am deeply thankful to both of them.

I honestly consider myself very fortunate to have Ruth Dassonneville and Patrick Fournier as my supervisors. They have always encouraged me to improve my ideas, and have been very supportive during the entire process. They have never hesitated to spare more than enough time to me and share their wisdom. Thanks to their guidance and endless patience, I could overwhelm many obstacles that I have encountered during my research. I thank both of them for the confidence they have placed in me and in this research. My best wish for other graduate students would be to have such supervisors to both motivate and guide them.

As a research assistant at Canada Research Chair in Electoral Democracy, held by Ruth Dassonneville, I had the opportunity to improve my research competence, and be in a very stimulating environment. Sharing the office with my dynamic and enthusiastic colleagues who have various experiences in different political environments, with various interests has helped me broaden my horizon in political interpretations. They have always been very receptive to

I dedicate this MA thesis to all democracy lovers…

Introduction

Studies of voting behavior were largely restricted to the description and interpretation of election results before the 1940s and 1950s. They have taken a more quantitative form and have enormously increased in number after the behavioral revolution. Since then, election studies have gained pace, and many models explaining vote choice have been produced (Bartels 2010).

Political scientists have studied the determinants of voting behavior in developed, industrialized well-established Western democracies such as the United States, and have produced explicative theories (Akgün, 2000, 76). Among these models, the Columbia model presents a sociological approach. Berelson et al. (1954) suggest that vote choice is a reflection of social divisions and the voters' social identities. This model focuses on demographic variables. Namely, vote choice is considered to be a static reflection of social class, and the election results mainly represent the social cleavages in the country.

Later on, however, political scientists at the University of Michigan developed a model that is today known as the Michigan model. It is well described in Campbell and his colleagues' *The American Voter* (Campbell et al. 1960). It presents a socio-psychological approach, and suggests that both long-term and short-term variables are decisive for vote choice. Among the former, party identification exerts a big influence on vote choice and political attitudes, as it provides political shortcuts and cues for complex politics. The Michigan model has been very useful for studies of voting behavior after the 1960s. While the Columbia model highlighted voting as a group, the Michigan model focused more on the individual level of voting (Gidengil et al. 2012). This study will focus on the essential element

of the Michigan model: party identification.

While political scientists in established Western democracies were focusing on improving empirically the comprehension of voting behavior, those in Turkey have studied the phenomena that influence democratic participation from different perspectives than the determinants of voting behavior. In other words, Turkish political scientists have mostly studied political problems such as the process of democratization, internal security, terrorism, military coup d'état and so on rather than voting behavior (Akgün 2007). Political scientist thought these kinds of problems were more salient. Furthermore, when voting behavior grabbed the attention of academics, data availability restricted their research. Indeed, one of the problems of electoral studies in Turkey has been the lack of individual-level quantitative data on voting behavior. The lack of appropriate data is caused by both the aforementioned priorities of the scholars and the costs of data gathering with respect to public opinion (Akarca and Tansel 2007).

The Turkish political system—which suffered from several coup d'état, a lack of party institutionalization, and high electoral volatility—seems to have stabilized since 2002. Levels of volatility are indeed lower compared to the pre-2002 period. Despite the apparent stabilization, recent studies have produced mixed results until now. I suggest that the concept of party identification will bring a better understanding to Turkish voting behavior studies and help explain the stabilization of voting behavior in the recent period.

Why Expect Party Identification in Turkey?

Even though the literature on partisanship is vast for the United States, there is also a growing body of research that focuses on the concept's applicability to other established

democracies (Thomassen and Rosema 2009; Butler and Stokes 1969; Cain and Ferejohn 1981; Fleury and Lewis-Beck 1993; Huddy, Bankert and Davies 2018). However, the literature is far from suggesting whether party identification applies to non-consolidated democracies.

Recent studies reveal that the positive correlation between polarization and mass partisanship is indeed causal in that the former triggers the latter (Lupu 2013, 2015). Turkey's political context has always been very polarized, especially during the 1970s when the left-right discourse became dominantly present. Moreover, today Turkish politics seems more polarized than ever[1]. It is reasonable to assume that following the stabilization of Turkish politics since 2002, Turkish voters might have developed partisan attachments in time.

The literature also demonstrates that there is a link between compulsory voting and party identification in that the first triggers the latter (Singh and Thornton 2013). It is because "compulsory voting engenders and strengthens partisan attachments largely by forcing those who are disinterested, uneducated and unknowledgeable to consider politics each time an election approaches" (Singh and Thornton 2013, 204). The study of Dalton and Weldon (2007) also reveals supporting evidence that partisanship tends to be higher in countries where voting is compulsory. This is also in line with what Converse (1969) argues: the more one accumulates electoral experience, the more likely she is to become a stable partisan or develop partisan attachments. In Turkey, voting is compulsory. Therefore, both findings on the impact of polarization and compulsory voting on partisanship establish reasonable grounds to expect

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[1] A recent study (Lupu 2015) demonstrates that Turkey is one of the most polarized countries for which there are data in the CSES datasets. Lupu (2015) uses the data from Modules 1,2 and 3. Using the same formula, I have replicated the polarization index for Turkey for both of the datasets including Module 4. The results reveal that Turkey's polarization has increased from 7.86 in 2011 to 9.33 in 2015. Therefore, it is confirmed that Turkey in 2015 is even more polarized than it was in 2011. Note that the number for 2011 is a little bit higher than what Lupu found: The BDP/HDP—ethno Kurdish candidates-- used to run as independents, therefore the vote share of these independents is not coded in Lupu's analysis. The polarization rate without these independents is 7.29. However, in this study I have added the vote share of the independents, which is 6.57%, and recalculated the perceived polarization in Turkey.

that party identification should exist in Turkey.

Furthermore, less is known about whether the consequences of partisanship on voting behavior hold in polarized contexts outside the US. Hence, the literature on the impact of partisanship in polarized contexts is far from being complete. Most studies agree on the positive aspect of partisanship: it stabilizes the politics, and it is thus desirable for new democracies (Lupu 2016, 180; Almond and Verba 1963; Dalton and Weldon 2007). However, we do not know how the partisanship influences voting behavior in extremely polarized contexts. Is it still desirable in such contexts or in contrast is it harmful for those new democracies? Turkey seems to be a good case to investigate the influence of partisanship on political attitudes and the vote. This investigation will also enable us to evaluate the implication of partisanship for democratic theory in a highly polarized context.

Why is this research Important?

This study claims that the Turkish electorate has formed (after 2002) party identification as a psychological attachment, as defined by Campbell and his colleagues, and that vote choice is highly influenced by one's party identification. Regardless of whether this expectation is confirmed, the results will contribute to the literature. Should this research find confirming evidence, political scientists will be able to devote more attention to the role of party identification on party preferences and political attitudes in Turkey; thereby opening further research opportunities in electoral studies in Turkey. Should it find refuting evidence for the existence of party identification, then the study will bring us one step closer to understanding the electorate by clarifying the relevance of partisan attachment. Moreover, independent of the results, this study will contribute to the voting behavior literature by testing

the applicability of Michigan model of voting and the concept of party identification to a new democracy. Lastly, this study will also contribute to the literature by analyzing partisanship and its influence on the short-term factors in a highly polarized non-consolidated democracy and by drawing normative implications for the role of party identification in such contexts.

The Structure of the Study

The first chapter presents the literature review on Turkish voting behavior. The studies will be presented in an order following the proximity from the vote, as the funnel of causality suggests. First, the long-term determinants of vote choice such as religious voting, center-periphery theory, ideological and social values, and party identification will be presented, in that order. Next, short-term forces influencing vote preference such as issue voting and economic voting will be presented. Then, an overall evaluation of the literature will be carried out. At the end of the chapter, the research questions will be presented.

The second chapter will introduce the literature on party identification. The conceptualization of party identification by the Michigan researchers, which is also referred to as the traditional view, will be laid out in detail. Thereafter, the applicability of partisanship to other countries than the United States will be discussed. This will be followed by the presentation of the revisionist approach to party identification, where questions of endogeneity and the temporal nature of the concept will be discussed. At the end of the chapter, the theoretical approach of the study, the expected contributions, and the strategy of how to answer the research questions will be elaborated.

The third chapter will focus on the research design, the data selection process, and then the methodology of the study. Moreover, the operationalization of the analysis such as the

selection of indicators and measures, and the choice of regression models along with the justification of these choices will be introduced.

The fourth chapter presents the results of the analysis, where the findings will be interpreted in light of the study's question. It is in this chapter that a comparison concerning party identification and its role on vote choice between the Turkish case and other cases will be made.

The conclusion will follow the fourth chapter. It will discuss the implications of the findings for Turkish voting behavior and will present suggestions for further research. Moreover, implications of partisanship and polarization for new democracies will be elaborated on.

Chapter 1: Literature on Voting Behavior in Turkey

This chapter examines the literature on voter behavior in Turkey. It aims to present the main arguments and explanations. The chapter presents the studies according to their proximity from the vote starting from the most distant variables to the less distant ones. First, the studies that focus on the long-term determinants of voting such as religious and ethnic voting, center-periphery theory, ideology and social values, and party identification will be presented. Those will be followed by the studies that focus on the short-term drivers of vote choice such as issue voting and economic voting. At the end of the chapter, an overall evaluation of the extant literature will be presented.

Political scientists have proposed various explanations about the determinants of voting behavior in Turkey. Before tackling these explicative studies, I should note that electoral studies in Turkey have mostly been limited to aggregate-level analysis. However, with the expansion of survey techniques in the country, political scientists finally began to produce individual-level studies during the last twenty years.

As Sartori (1976, 27) suggests, representation is possible through and by political parties, as they represent the demands of the citizens. Further, according to Sartori, parties are the representations of all the segments of society, and they represent pluralism in public opinion. Randall and Svasand (2002) elaborate that political parties not only increase representation and contribute to democratization, but also they allow holding the incumbent accountable. Therefore, one could assume that a stable political system with institutionalized political parties, which Turkish democracy has failed to establish to a certain extent, is crucial for comprehension of voting behavior.

One should bear in mind that the particular features of Turkish democracy make it harder to draw conclusions on the voting determinants of the Turkish electorate. Akgün (2007) summarizes the factors that make Turkish democracy *sui generis*: military interventions, extreme social polarization, internal conflicts, terrorism, the constant closure of political parties, and the lack of democratic culture. Turkish democracy has faced many obstacles for the institutionalization of its party systems. Both the party system and the political paradigm have been repeatedly disturbed by military interventions, and the courts have often closed down political parties (Sayarı 2008). This has caused high electoral volatility (Sayarı 2008), and weak party affiliation of the Turkish electorate, which can also be considered the biggest challenge for the application of the Michigan model to the Turkish case. Secor (2001) enumerates the four sources of electoral volatility in Turkey. The first is the elitism in politics. The second is the leader-dominated parties that are internally not democratic themselves. The third is the dominant political culture that has privileged state building over democratic participation. Last but not least, the fourth reason is the military interventions, and the banning of political parties either by the military or by the Constitutional Court.

1.1. Long-term Forces

1.1.1. The Center-Periphery Theory

The literature on Turkish election studies has been greatly influenced by the seminal work of Serif Mardin, a political sociologist (Mardin 1973). His work has been the primary model that explained the voting behavior in Turkey until the 2000s (Bilecen 2015). Mardin's theory stipulates that voting behavior in Turkey is principally determined by the center-periphery cleavage. In this respect, his theory is in line with the Columbia model of voting in

that both of them focus on voting as a group.

Mardin (1973) traces this social division back to the democratic practice that was initiated toward the end of the Ottoman Empire in 1876 when the first constitution (Kanuni Esasi) was written and the parliament (Mebuslar Meclisi) was formed. In this quasi-democratic process, only the tax-paying men and the landlords were allowed to vote. Mardin (1973) advocates that the polarization between the center and periphery started in this period. The center includes those who are reformist, pro-modernization, and the military and civil elites. The periphery consists of the group that is more traditional, conservative, and non-reformist. Mardin (1973) suggests that this social cleavage was inherited by the new Republic, and persisted as a cleavage between an elitist, urban, educated center and a traditional, conservative, rural, and uneducated periphery (Bilecen 2015). The new Republic was established in 1923 by the center, and the country was run by the strong centralist administration. The periphery only gained political influence with the emergence of multi-party democracy after 1946. Çarkoğlu (2007, 255) defines the center and periphery as follows:

> It (the center) represents a state-run nationalist modernization program. The "periphery" reflects the salient features of a subject and parochial orientation, to use Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba's terminology.

According to the center-periphery theory, the relationship between the center and periphery dominated Turkish politics and served as the main determinant of Turkish voting behavior. This is true when the modern political history of Turkey is taken into account. Ever since the multiparty period started in 1946, the politics have been about the struggle between the periphery and the center. Since the 1950 elections, the center could not gain a majority government, and the country has been led mostly by peripheral parties that mostly came to

power alone, which are always the right-leaning conservative parties such as the Democrat Party (the DP) before the 1960 coup, the Justice Party (the continuation of the DP) after the 1960 coup, the Motherland Party (the ANAP) after the 1980 coup, the Justice and Development Party (the AKP) following the 1997 military memorandum period. Apart from them, the governments were formed by coalitions either only between the peripheral parties or between periphery and the central parties, and those periods have been marked by political instability especially during the 1990s (Sayari 2007).

Although center periphery theory is widely accepted in the literature, it has also been criticized. For instance, Wuthrich (2015) claims that many other factors can also influence the vote choice of the Turkish electorate such as economic voting, issue voting, strategic voting, party leader's image, and so on. Therefore, the center-periphery model, which he defines as an essentialist approach, is insufficient for understanding voting behavior. He suggests that studies of voting behavior should focus more on how parties compete and mobilize voters, as the voters are responsive and pragmatic. Wuthrich (2015, 264) explains the pragmatic nature of Turkish voters, especially the urban poor class, as follows:

> This class of voters supported the Justice Party (right) in the 1960s, shifted to the CHP (left) in the 1970s, largely supported ANAP (center-right) and the SHP (left) in the 1980s, switched again in favor of Welfare and Virtue Party (Islamist) in the 1990s, and have chosen to support the center-right AKP (and the Youth Party) in 2002.

On the other hand, Kalaycıoğlu's study in 1994 finds favorable evidence for Mardin's theory. He was one of the academics that tested the center-periphery voting by means of polling data, and his study constitutes one of the first individual-level analyses of voting

behavior in Turkey. Using data from the Turkish Value Survey[2], Kalaycıoğlu (1994) uses religiosity and secularism as the measures for center and periphery and attempts to see whether the center-periphery model still applies to the present day. The study demonstrates that secular education is negatively correlated with religiosity and voting for a conservative party. Furthermore, religiosity exerts a big influence on party preference. As religiosity increases, voters tend to vote for right-wing parties. Kalaycıoğlu (1994) also finds that social structures such as education, gender, and religiosity are the main determinants of vote choice. These findings confirm what Mardin proposed earlier, and Kalaycıoğlu (1994, 421) states:

> Center-periphery cleavage continues to be very important in spite of the fact that the center is no longer coherent, autonomous, and homogeneous in terms of its cultural orientations. However, as a cultural fact, values of the center and values of the periphery still clash and their conflict continues to influence political attitudes in Turkey.

Mardin's center-periphery approach stems from the historical context and the cultural differences before the individual-level quantitative data started to exist in Turkey. When this theory came into existence, the electoral and political analyses mostly focused on modernization theory. In spite of lack of data concerning the electoral choice, his theory succeeded in shedding light on the political analysis of the electorate, and brought a better understanding of existing political cleavages.

To sum up, the sociological approach of Mardin has been widely accepted in the literature, as it reflects the cultural differences determining the political dichotomy, which influences the vote choice of the Turkish electorate. However, this does not mean that vote choice is impervious to other variables and that it can only be explained by Mardin's model.

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[2] Turkish Value Survey was conducted by Boğaziçi University in 1990 with 1030 adult respondents.

Rather, it would be more suitable to consider the center-periphery relationships as a starting point for the funnel of causality to comprehend voting behavior in Turkey.

1.1.2. Religious and Ethnic Voting Model

Ethnicity and religion are quite stable factors. Therefore, studies that attempt to explain voting behavior based on such unmoved variables—which are long-term forces—consider the vote a stable outcome. One good example is Bilecen's study in 2015. Using individual-level nationwide data from a survey that was conducted in 2010 with 10,393 respondents, Bilecen (2015) finds that religiosity and ethnicity are the two main determinants of vote choice in Turkey. Like Kalaycıoğlu (1994), Bilecen (2015) modifies the social cleavage of Mardin and labels it secular-conservative and he distinguishes two ethnic groups: Turkish and Kurdish. Similarly, Çarkoğlu (2007, 258) states that a secular versus pro-Islamist cleavage overlaps with center versus periphery, and left versus right orientations.

According to Bilecen (2015), the periphery corresponds to the uneducated, the lower classes, and identities such as religious and Kurdish. He suggests that with the rise of the AKP, the centralist discourse of the state has weakened. His analysis concludes with several affirmations on ethnic voting and the influence of religiosity on vote choice. He finds evidence that the Kurds who are more religious and less educated are more susceptible to vote for the AKP, whereas the Kurds who are more educated and less religious are more susceptible to vote for the BDP (Peace and Democracy Party), namely the independent ethno-Kurdish candidates. Among Kurds, religiosity and education are decisive.

Başlevent and Kırmanoğlu (2016) also confirm that religiosity plays a significant role among Kurdish voters; the more a Kurdish participant is religious, the more she is likely to

vote for the AKP. For the Turkish respondents, as the importance given to ethnicity increases, the likelihood of voting for the AKP decreases, and the respondent is inclined to vote for either the CHP (Republican People's Party) or the MHP (National Action Party). As for religiosity, the CHP is the most popular party among the least religious participants, and as the religiosity increases, so does the inclination to support the AKP.

1.1.3. Ideology and Social Values

A number of studies have ideology as their focal point, and investigate the role of ideological positioning in the vote choice of voters. To begin with, Çarkoğlu (2007) has studied the composition of ideology in the Turkish context. He uses data of a survey conducted face to face with 1,856 Turkish respondents in 2006. This study is a very important one in that it analyzes the nature of ideology in Turkey: the ideology is used as the dependent variable rather than an independent variable.

Çarkoğlu (2007) concludes that the left seems to be associated with low religiosity, progressiveness, tolerance, and democratic attitudes. Leftists also seem to be more susceptible to make more critical evaluations of the government's economic performance. The right, on the other hand, is associated with the status quo, authoritarianism, less democratic attitudes, and low tolerance. Finally, participants that are in favor of Sharia rule tend to identify themselves with the right. Based on the results, Çarkoğlu also proposes that the Turkish voters are more comfortable with the terms "the left", "the center", and "the right" than a 10-point scale. Furthermore, he claims that the change in ideology from one side to another is very unlikely even when religiosity increases or decreases.

To continue, Toros (2014) finds evidence that ideology is one of the strongest variables

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that influence voting behavior. His study focuses on the impacts of variables such as education, ideology, conservatism as a personal value (resistance to change), religiosity, and membership in the EU. His results demonstrate that the ideological positioning is a good determinant of vote choice. The AKP and the MHP are on the right on the ideological scale, whereas the BDP and the CHP are on the left. It is also possible to differentiate the voters of the MHP and the AKP, in that the mean score of MHP voters is more on the right than that of AKP voters. As for conservatism as a personal value, the AKP and the BDP differ from the CHP and the MHP, since they demand change. And AKP voters differ from BDP voters by demanding more change. The result of conservatism / demand for change can also be considered as an indicator of the center-periphery division, as the AKP succeeds in mobilizing the periphery to counterbalance the power differentials of center and periphery. Additionally, Toros (2014) does not find a significant effect for opinions about EU membership. His findings on education confirm the existing literature. The less educated voters tend to vote for the AKP instead of the CHP and MHP. Toros's analysis produces an interesting result: gender plays an important role in the support for the MHP. Being a male boosts the chance of voting for the MHP. Lastly, contrary to the literature, Toros finds that Islamism does not have any explanatory power on vote choice.

Başlevent and Kırmanoğlu (2008) have analyzed the impact of personal values on party preference. In their study, they examine the personal values of the voters of the CHP and the AKP. The data used are provided by the European Social Survey, which aims to monitor attitude and value change over time in Europe. In the questionnaire, respondents also state to which party they feel the closest. The results indicate that the partisans of the two parties significantly differ in their basic personal values. Those who support the CHP have higher

scores on openness. On the other hand, those who support the AKP score higher on religiosity. The ideological positioning of the two groups is also very different. On the self-placement ideological scale (0-10), the mean for the CHP supporters is 3.1 whereas that of the AKP supporters is 7.7. Başlevent and Kırmanoğlu (2008) find evidence that the impact of ideology is around three times bigger than that of religiosity. According to the results, openness and religiosity are significantly associated with ideology, which reveals that the universally accepted ideological associations are also true for the Turkish electorate. Başlevent and Kırmanoğlu (2008) interpret these results as a demonstration and continuation of the center-periphery dichotomy. According to the authors, the AKP could be considered as a party that mobilizes the economically motivated conservative masses, and the CHP could be seen as a party that attracts those in favor of secularism, and modern life-style.

Finally, Kalaycıoğlu (1994) finds that around 75 percent of the voters have moderate ideological positions, and this proportion is no different from the studies of the 1970s. This could be interpreted as a sign that the Turkish electorate knows how to position themselves on the ideological spectrum and they are quite stable with respect to their ideological positioning. Moreover, even if political parties are not stable, voters succeed in finding the new political party that satisfies their ideological stands. This is astonishing given the electoral volatility and the lack of party institutionalization in Turkey. One can speculate that even if Turkish voters could not have strong party identification because of the interruptions of democracy that they experienced several times, they use ideological cues to find a political party that best replaces the old party they supported. In other words, the partisan cues are possibly replaced by ideological cues.

1.1.4. Party identification in Turkey

Even though the field of electoral studies in Turkey is progressively growing, there is still room for further research, especially on the role of party identification. Until today, party identification and its implications in Turkey have not grabbed the attention of many Turkish political scientists. Nonetheless, there have been several attempts to analyze the concept of partisanship. For instance, the study of Kalaycıoğlu and Şarıbay (1991) has revealed some favorable evidence concerning the formation of partisanship among students at an elementary school in Bursa. More precisely, their study revealed that among the boys, around 7 percent showed strong partisanship whereas around 35 percent showed some partisanship; among the girls, around 5 percent showed strong partisanship and around 29 percent showed some partisanship. Moreover, children's partisanship was correlated with having partisan parents that showed partisan attitudes at home. This correlation might indicate that the parental socialization is the main component of the formation of party identification in Turkey. This finding is actually in line with the extant literature on formation of party identification, which will be discussed in the following chapter.

Unfortunately, Kalaycıoğlu and Şarıbay's work did not inspire others to study partisanship in Turkey. In one of his analyses, Kalaycıoğlu (2008) himself has further investigated the components of partisanship in Turkey. In his 2008 paper, the dependent variable is the party preference, and the participants are asked if they are fan of a political party.[3] Even though the partisanship measure used in the study is not the appropriate measure used in the literature, he finds that around 75 percent of the respondents identified with a

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[3] Kalaycıoğlu decides to formulate the question as "being a fan" instead of "identifying with a political party" due to the linguistic reasons as he argues.

political party. For explaining partisanship, he relies on four independent variables: parental party identification, satisfaction with the government's management of the economy, religiosity (whether the respondent is in favor of political Islam or not), and ethnicity.

Kalaycıoğlu's (2008) results reveal that parental socialization is the most important factor for identification with the CHP. This is not surprising, as the party is the founding party of the Republic, and has been around since the establishment of the Republic, with the exception of the closure after the 1980 coup. Other determinants of an identification with the CHP are laicism and economic dissatisfaction. Kalaycıoğlu suggests that economic dissatisfaction among the CHP supporters probably results from the opposition to the privatization policies of the AKP. As for the AKP, Kalaycıoğlu does not find a strong impact of parental socialization. Political Islam and economic satisfaction are the main determinants of support for the AKP. The fathers of AKP supporters identified with the political Islamist MSP (National Salvation Party), RP (Welfare Party), and FP (Felicity Party). These three parties are the same parties led by Mr. Erbakan, which were closed either by the military or the Constitutional Court. Lastly, for the MHP identifiers, it seems that parental socialization and the importance given to the ethnic identity play a strong role.

In short, parental socialization is stronger for the CHP and the MHP, whereas it is not the main determinant of identification with the AKP. Therefore, Kalaycıoğlu (2008) claims that the AKP is not a continuation of any party, but a new right-wing conservative and pro-liberal economy party. This finding is however subject to debate because even though Kalaycıoğlu finds that the fathers of AKP identifiers used to support the political Islamist MSP, RP, and FP (who ceased to exist), he concludes that the AKP is not a continuation of any antecedent party. Yet, the main politicians that formed the AKP are mostly the political

actors coming from these parties (Bacik 2004). For instance, Mr. Gül, one of the founding fathers of the AKP, served as the president of Turkey under the AKP. Another example is Mr. Erdoğan, who was the mayor of İstanbul under the RP, served two terms as prime minister and is currently the president of Turkey under the AKP. Therefore, Kalaycıoğlu's reasoning on why the AKP is not a continuation of these parties remains unsatisfactory.

The main determinants of being an AKP partisan appear to be religiosity and perception of the good management of the economy. Kalaycıoğlu (2008) concludes that religiosity gives credence to the party, but the main determinant is economic voting. Last but not least, this study finds supporting evidence that party identification is mostly adopted through parental socialization in Turkey. This is suggested by the relation between parental socialization and party identification of the CHP and MHP voters, which are the only parties that have been around for a long time enabling the generations to develop ties of identification. However, Kalaycıoğlu does not find the same relationship for the AKP, as he considers it as a brand new party that came into being in 2001.

As the Turkish party system was disrupted mainly by military interventions, and many parties were banned from politics, Kalaycıoğlu (2008) suggests that these disruptions have limited the extent to which the electorate identifies with a political party. Consequently, he proposes that there may be many independent voters in Turkey.

Correspondingly, the electorate, lacking of party identification, supported the parties from which they expected economic gains. Moreover, if they are satisfied with the party's economic performance, they vote for it again. In other words, once economic expectations of the voters are met, the voters gradually start developing ties to the party that they supported

because of economic gains. Kalaycıoğlu (2008) claims that this could be the cycle of the party identification in Turkey. He implies that short-term factors influence and shape party attachments of the electorate in Turkey. His approach to party identification could be considered as a revisionist view of party identification, which will be further discussed in the next chapter. This study is the only research that analyzes the party identification in Turkey. However, Kalaycıoğlu's work suffers from a number of limitations; party identification is treated as a very endogenous variable, and the study overlooks the influence of party identification on short-term variables such as perceptions of the economy or the performance of the government. Moreover, when Kalaycıoğlu (2008) assumes that religiosity is not the main determinant of identifying with the AKP but the economy, the temporal sequence of forces—the causal mechanism as depicted in the funnel of causality—seems reversed. Unfortunately, there have not been other replications of the analysis, and the literature on party identification in Turkey is limited to the two aforementioned studies.

1.2. Short-term Forces

1.2.1. Issue Voting

There have not been many studies that focus on issue voting in Turkey. In general, voters' opinion about membership to the EU is considered to be an issue, and it forms the basis of questions of issue voting. However, previous studies do not find that voters' position on this issue explains voting for different political parties (Toros 2014, Başlevent et al. 2009). However, work that focuses on other issues finds indications of issue voting in Turkey. Kıbrıs (2011) examines the effect of terrorism, a very salient issue in Turkey, on the 1991 and 1995 national elections. To see the effect of PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party, denounced as a

terrorist organization) terrorism on vote choice, she uses the number and the district of military and police force terror casualties from 1987 to 1996. Data include information of 3,910 soldiers and police officers that died in the fight between 1987 and 1995. Her study demonstrates that PKK terrorism has a significant impact on the vote choice of the Turkish electorate. Voters turn out to be highly sensitive and responsive to terrorism as exposure to terrorism causes a decrease in the support for the incumbent government and an increase in the vote for right-wing parties. Kıbrıs's study is among the few studies that focus on issue voting in Turkey.

1.2.2. Economic Voting

There have also been studies on the economic determinants of voting behavior. A study by Akarca and Tansel (2006) questions the presence of economic voting in Turkey. They focus on the results of twenty-five elections, both parliamentary and local elections that took place between 1950 and 2004. This study is an aggregate-level analysis of election results and economic indicators. The authors claim that voters cast their ballot according to the economic evaluations; however, these evaluations are generally those concerning the past one-year before the election. Akarca and Tansel (2006) interpret this as a sign that the voters hold the incumbent responsible for the present economic situation. Especially income and inflation have an important role for economic evaluations. The importance given to income seems to be bigger than the importance given to inflation. As for coalition governments, the positive evaluation of economic growth is attributed to the major party in the coalition whereas the rise of inflation is attributed to every party in the coalition. Therefore, the results suggest that economic voting is an important determinant of voting behavior in Turkey, and the Turkish

electorate rewards or punishes the incumbent parties for the economic performance.

Turkey's economic conditions have always been turbulent. In 2002, the electorate punished all the parties in the coalition government because of the economic crisis. None of them could reach the 10 percent national threshold and obtain seats in parliament. Only the AKP and the CHP could garner enough votes to obtain seats in parliament (Baslevent et al. 2009; Gökçe et al. 2002). This election can be considered as an outlier, as it was an early election and was held right after the biggest economic crisis (Gökçe et al. 2002). Further, the coalition government was perceived as a collaborator with the military after the memorandum of 1997. These two reasons made the 2002 election an exception. The AKP was formed in 2001 and it received enough votes to have the majority in parliament; the CHP was the other party that could pass the threshold. It is an exceptional election because the AKP's vote share was 34.3%, and the CHP's vote share was 19.4%, this makes a total of only 53.7% of the votes (Cop 2016; Bacik 2004; Gökçe et al. 2002). The other half of the population that voted could not be represented in parliament because of the 10% national threshold, which also demonstrates to what extent the parliament was fragmented (Bacik 2004; Sayari 2007; Gumuscu 2013).

In another study of economic voting, Başlevent et al. (2009) make use of a survey data collected by a private research company[4] in 2003, one year after the AKP's arrival to power as a single-party government. The data were thus collected around two years after the worst economic crises in modern Turkish history. The participants were asked to state their

[4] Veri Araştırma

retrospective and prospective evaluations of the economy[5]. The author finds that positive evaluations of the economy are highly associated with the intention to vote for the incumbent party, namely the AKP (Başlevent et al. 2009, 388). The authors also find that economic voting is not egotropic, but sociotropic. In other words, the results show that support for the incumbent is stronger among those who believe the national economy is doing better but not among those who state an improvement of their personal economic situation. In an earlier study, Başlevent et al. (2005) also find evidence that people who were affected badly by the 2001 economic crisis tended to vote for the AKP, and punished the incumbent government in place during the crisis.

In a recent article, Başlevent and Kırmanoğlu (2016) make use of individual-level data to revisit the question of the economic determinants of voting behavior. The survey was conducted in 2014 with a nationwide representative sample. The study's objective was to test the economic theory and see the influence of economic evaluations on voting for the incumbent, namely the AKP. The survey data were collected during a period in which the unemployment rate increased, and the Turkish Lira's value decreased against the Euro and the US dollar. Therefore, the authors anticipate that if the electorate is influenced by the economic situation, support for the AKP should decrease compared to past elections, when unemployment was lower and the Turkish Lira was more valuable against the Euro and the US dollar.

Başlevent and Kırmanoğlu (2016) are aware of the possible endogeneity problem with economic perceptions, as they can be biased by party identification and ideology. In order to

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[5] While retrospective economic voting refers to the evaluation of the recent state of the economy under the incumbent government, prospective economic voting refers to future expectations concerning the state of the economy (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000).

avoid this bias, the authors estimate an alternative model in which they only include respondents who claim that there is no political party that they would vote for under all circumstances. In other words, in this second model that is created to serve as a control model, the respondents are not fans of a political party but they support a political party because they think it is the best fit to rule the country and be more beneficial.

The anticipations of the authors are confirmed by the results. The findings also demonstrate that economic voting is present in Turkey, as both retrospective and prospective evaluations of the economy influence support for the AKP. Those who think their family's economic condition worsened are less likely to vote for the incumbent, and those who think the economy will be better the following year are more likely to support the incumbent. Further, compared to the participants who do not need to borrow money to cover their expenses, those who need to borrow money are less likely to be in favor of the incumbent. All these results suggest that Turkish voters take into account the economic conditions, and hold accountable the incumbent government for both positive and negative changes. Last but not least, departing from the results, Başlevent and Kırmanoğlu (2016) think that the future of the AKP will be determined by economic conditions, as the electorate will punish the AKP if the economy gets worse.

1.3. Overall Evaluation of the Extant Literature

Until now, there have been studies that demonstrate the influence of ethnic voting, ideology, center-periphery voting, economic voting, and to some extent issue voting. Even though it is widely acknowledged that none of these variables are to be omitted from the explicative models, there is not a consensus among scholars on the role of determinants of

vote choice in Turkey. Erişen (2013) draws explicit attention to the lack of a robust model in the Turkish voting behaviour literature.

According to Gökçe and his colleagues (2002) the underlying reason for the limited number of studies of voting behaviour in Turkey can be explained by the fact that political scientists prefer to study the political parties rather than the voters. They argue that it is due to the present patron-client relationship of parties with their voters, where parties are not driven by the needs of the voters. The direction of influence is not bilateral, and elites have more influence over the voters than vice versa. Parties being the key player in Turkish democracy, therefore, led political scientists to prefer to study political parties rather than the electorate.

Knight and Marsh (2002, 170) state that in countries where there are national election studies, "research design and implementation are in the hands of academic social scientists who endeavour to provide a comprehensive inventory of variables that allow for testing alternative hypotheses and aid in theory building". The Turkish voting behaviour literature has been dependent on the limited amount of individual-level data. As there is not an established Turkish Election Study, on which academics collaborate and produce data gathering, studies have been limited to those provided either by foreign data-collecting collaborations or by private companies who try to predict the results of elections rather than to understand in detail the voting behaviour. This also constitutes one of the reasons that there is no theoretical consensus on how the Turkish electorate behaves. As a result, it should not come as a surprise that the literature produced mixed results.

Furthermore, the lack of consensus on the voting models should not come as a surprise because of the *sui generis* character of Turkish politics. The fact that the Turkish political

system has constantly been interrupted by the military has caused a lack of democratic experience among the electorate. These interventions have also confused voters, as almost every 20 years they had to look for new parties that correspond to their values because many political parties had been banned either by the military or the Constitutional Court. This has undermined the institutionalization of the political parties, which also slowed down the democratization process Kalaycıoğlu (2008).

The non-institutionalized party system, and the repeated interventions of the military in politics also led to the domination of politics by the leaders. It seems that the impact of the party leaders on the vote choice cannot be ignored. When Mr. Demirel resigned from the DYP to become the president, the vote share of the DYP dramatically decreased in the next election. Another example is the change of the CHP's leader from Mr. İnönü to Mr. Ecevit. The latter became the leader of the CHP in 1972, and the party's vote share rose from 27.4 in 1969 to 33.3 in 1973 and to 41.4 in 1977. Hence, the image of party leaders should be given more attention in the models. The leader-dominated politics are still present in Turkish politics. This can be seen with the rise of the AKP under Mr. Erdoğan. He is, without a doubt, one of the most charismatic leaders in modern Turkish history. Under his rule, the ruling party increased its vote share successively, and the AKP turned out to be the only incumbent party to increase its vote shares successively in three elections and to form a single-party government. However, after he resigned from the party when he was elected president because the constitution required a neutral president, the AKP's vote share under Mr. Davutoğlu decreased for the first time from 49.8 in 2011 to 40.8 in June 2015, and lost single-party power (Sözen 2016). This is another sign that the party leader's image, among the other factors, plays an important role in Turkish politics.

Also, issues haven't received the importance they deserve in voting behavior research in Turkey. The spatial theory of voting should be addressed in more details in future research. All we know from previous work is that Turkish voting behavior was unstable until 2002, and electoral volatility was very high (Sayarı 2008). This characteristic is attributed to the interruption of the system, to the lack of democratic experience and party institutionalization, and so on. Nevertheless, the Turkish electorate seems highly responsive to short-term variables, and the high level of electoral volatility could also be explained by the unstable and unsatisfying performance of the incumbents that might have led the electorate to switch their votes following issue and economic evaluations. It is observed that the electorate punished the parties that did not stand up to the military interventions, and the incumbents whose performance on internal security and the economy was bad (Kıbrıs 2011; Akarca and Tansel 2006; Baslevent et al. 2005). It is even more astonishing to see that the voters under the military regime in 1983 did not choose to vote for the political party that the military junta explicitly supported. Turkey's economic situation has always been very unstable with high inflation and unemployment, which can explain the unstable vote shares of the parties, as the voters kept sanctioning them.

Moreover, during the 1990s, the salient issues can be summarized as the terrorism by the Kurdish separatists (the PKK), and the rise of the Islamist rhetoric. These two issues have caused two important changes in voting behavior. First, the rise of terrorism has sparked the ultra-nationalist rhetoric, which paved the way to ethnic voting. Therefore, the sudden climb of the MHP can be explained by reaction to terrorism and the rising Kurdish identity (Carkoglu and Hinich 2006; Kıbrıs 2011). Second, the fear of Islamist *reactionism* has led to the intensification of the division of secular versus Islamist. These two changes in Turkish

voting behavior demonstrate the importance of the issues on party preferences.

To sum up, on the one hand, we know from previous work that long-term variables such as religiosity, ethnicity, and ideology are the core determinants in Turkey. These long-term variables also overlap with the center-periphery division. On the other hand, earlier studies also demonstrate that the short-term variables such as economic conditions, party leaders, evaluations of the incumbent's performance, and salient issues play an important role in the vote choice of the electorate.

I believe that today's Turkish politics show that the interpretation of the short-term variables, mainly that of the economy, depends on an antecedent variable: party identification. However, despite the vast literature on party identification outside Turkey, researchers in Turkey have not turned their attention to party identification. The reasons why political scientists haven't given enough attention to the role party identification in the literature overlaps with the abovementioned reasons. Moreover, the lack of appropriate data with party identification measure, lack of party institutionalization, and high electoral volatility must have led to the preconception that party identification could not exist in Turkey and discouraged researchers from considering the concept of party identification as defined by Campbell and his colleagues (1960). In short, the impact of partisanship on voting behavior has not been studied in Turkey. Thus, there is plenty of room for research on the relevance of party identification. I believe the concept should be systematically examined in the Turkish context.

This study aims to evaluate the role of party identification in voting behavior in Turkey. I hope to contribute to the literature by providing the first findings on party identification at

the individual level, therefore testing a very essential element of Michigan model in Turkish elections, which has not been attempted yet. Furthermore, I believe that a good understanding of party identification in Turkey will also shed light on the confusing image of the Turkish electorate and on the other determinants, as I assume that party identification could influence them as an antecedent variable. Therefore, this study intends to answer the following questions, whose answers will help better understand the causal mechanisms between vote choice and its determinants:

1-To what extent does party identification exist in Turkey?

2-Do partisans really behave like partisans?

Chapter 2: Michigan Model of Voting and Party Identification

After exploring the literature on Turkish voting behavior in the previous chapter, this chapter will focus on the theoretical framework of the study. As party identification is of interest in this study, this chapter will tackle the concept and its impacts on voter behavior. It is organized under ten sub-categories. First eight sections will establish the theoretical framework of the study. At the end of the chapter, the last two parts will elaborate the theoretical strategy of how to answer the research questions, and the expected contributions.

During 1950s, the election studies in the USA were dominated mainly by the Columbia model, which tried to explain the voting behavior on the basis of class voting (Gidengil et al. 2012). However, the outcome of 1952 presidential election, where the sociological variables failed to explain the Republican candidate Eisenhower's victory, led some scholars at the University of Michigan to search for a more inclusive theory that could possibly better explain American voting behavior. If sociological characteristics were the main drivers of vote choice, Republican Party's victory in 1952 would be an outcome of an increase in certain social groups that regularly voted Republican (Campbell et al. 1960, 65). However, this was not the case. Therefore, the Michigan researchers (Campbell et al. 1960, 37) believed that even though socio-demographic voting had an influence on the vote choice to some extent, voter behavior was not merely motivated by sociological variables, and that there needed to be other predispositions to voting patterns of the electorate:

> To attain a truly firm understanding, we must systematically unravel the motives that sustain the voting pattern, as well as the many other social, psychological, and political mechanisms which mediate the relationship.

Angus Campbell, Philip Converse, Warren Miller and Donald Stokes initiated a research program at the University of Michigan that has produced what we call today the American National Election Studies (ANES). Their quest that focused on individual-level data resulted in a new theory, now commonly referred to as the Michigan model, which is described in detail in their book *The American Voter*. Among other books written by Michigan researchers, *The American Voter* has become one of the landmarks of the voting behavior literature.

2.1. The Funnel of Causality

Campbell and his colleagues studied the voting behaviour from a socio-psychological axis. They aimed at seeking the causal mechanisms of voting behaviour rather than at predicting the election results. To do so, they used a metaphor that illustrates this causal paradigm: funnel of causality. This funnel categorizes the determinants of vote choice according to their temporal sequence. Moreover, it clarifies how these forces interact with each other, and how they lead voters to make up their minds and cast their ballots in favor of a candidate or a political party (Campbell et al. 1960, 24).

The factors' proximity from the vote in the causal chain makes up an important part of the metaphor. The funnel starts with distant forces and continues with less distant variables as we proceed toward the end. To illustrate, the mouth of funnel is wide and the funnel gets narrower as we proceed to the tip. The mouth accommodates socio-demographic forces, which are distant in time and mostly inert. Party identification, and ideology follow the socio-demographic forces in the middle of the funnel where it gets relatively narrower. Being less distant in time, party identification as a psychological attachment is relatively stable, but it is far from being constant. Moving along to the tip of the funnel, there are more volatile forces

that can be categorized as short-term forces. These consist of issue preferences, economic evaluations, candidate evaluations and so on. They are the most proximate factors before the vote. Finally, at the tip of the funnel, there is the vote choice, which is the accumulation of the anterior forces throughout the funnel.

2.2. Conceptualization of Party Identification

The Michigan model of voting has made many contributions of great importance. One of them is definitely the conceptualization of party identification. It is defined as a psychological attachment to a political party rather than a loyalty or regular votes in favor of a party. Campbell et al. (1960, 122) put an emphasis on the distinction that party identification occurs at the psychological state whereas the vote choice is a behavioral consequence. Therefore, party identification is treated as a psychological long-term affective attachment that motivates behavior by exerting influence on the short-term variables that follow party identification. This conceptualization makes it possible to treat identification with a party as a variable that is not the vote, which is a behavioral outcome, but rather as a variable that has explanatory power on the causal chain that shapes the outcome by influencing the subsequent forces. This is made clear by the Michigan researchers:

> We have not measured party attachments in terms of the vote or the evaluation of partisan issues because we are interested in exploring the influence of party identification on voting behavior and its immediate determinants (Campbell et al. 1960, 122).

When it comes to measuring party identification, James Campbell and his colleagues (Campbell et al. 1986, 100) underline the importance of self-definition:

> Partisans are partisans because they think they are partisan. They are not necessarily partisan because they vote like a partisan, or think like a partisan, or register like a partisan, or because someone else thinks they are a partisan. In the strict sense, they are not even partisan because they like one party more than another. Partisanship as party identification is entirely a matter of self-definition.

Therefore, a good measure of partisanship should focus on the psychological aspect of the identification, and should be formulated as to which political party one feels close to or one considers herself as close to (Campbell et al. 1986, 102).

2.3. How is Party Identification Formed?

Hyman (1959) suggested that individuals develop political orientations long before they attain voting age. The findings of *The American Voter* confirmed Hyman's conclusion. Along the same lines, Jennings et al. (1979) found evidence that children tend to adopt the political predispositions of their families before reaching the voting age. In brief, according to Michigan researchers, on the one hand, children who were brought up in families where at least one of the parents is politically active tend to adopt the views and political orientations of their parents. Those who grew up in politically inactive families, on the other hand, should have somewhat non-partisan orientations (Campbell et al. 1960, 147).

The Michigan scholars also mention that, when an individual establishes an attachment to a political party, this party identification is quite resistant to change although it is not immovable (Campbell et al. 1960, 148-149). Partisanship is thus thought of as an enduring

predisposition. Furthermore, as party identification is believed to develop during childhood through parental socialization, the authors highlight that partisanship is more a social-psychological phenomenon than a political one. At the same time, the attachment to a party is expected to get stronger with age (Campbell et al. 1960, 161). The likelihood that one defects from her party is expected to be lower among the older than the younger. Converse (1969, 143; 1976) has further developed the argument that age is strongly correlated with strength of party identification, and that partisanship tends to stabilize as one grows older and accumulates more electoral experience.

2.4. The Effects of Party Identification on Perceptions of Political Objects

As indicated before, psychology holds a central role within the causal chain of temporal events in the Michigan model of voting. Campbell et al. (1960, 43) stress the role of psychology when it comes to evaluations of political objects, in that partisans' perception of the reality is distorted by their party identification. That is to say, political objects are not always perceived as they are, but are perceived according to one's prior knowledge, orientations, and dispositions. Party identification is what alters the perception of these political objects such as economic conditions or candidates:

> Identification with a party raises a perceptual screen through which the individual tends to see what is favourable to his partisan orientation. The stronger the party bond, the more exaggerated the process of selection and perceptual distortion will be (Campbell et al. 1960,133).

The perceptual bias accounts for the variation in citizens' attitudes toward political objects, and as identification with a political party increases in strength, the perceptual bias

increases correspondingly. Greene (1999) as well has studied the notion of biased perceptions, and he has done so in a framework of social identity theory. According to the theory, individuals tend to make self-categorizations and view the world in terms of "us" versus "them" (Greene 1999, 394). Once a person develops a self-perceived membership in a political party, she tends to maximize the difference between "us" and "them" (Greene, 1999, 395). Therefore, the person tends to evaluate in-groups more positively and out-groups more negatively.

Bartels (2002, 120) has empirically examined the impact of partisan bias on evaluations of objects, and found that "party identification is a pervasive dynamic force shaping citizen's perceptions of, and reactions to, the political world". Bartels offers supporting evidence that even objective facts such as unemployment or inflation are perceived differently depending on the party attachments. Therefore, Bartels's study provides strong evidence for the expectation that partisanship biases citizens' perceptions.

2.5. Party Identification as Political Shortcut and Cue

Campbell et al. (1960) also call attention to the role of party identification as a helpful source of political information. Namely, partisanship provides political shortcuts and cues for those who identify with a party, and citizens make use of these elites cues to form political opinions. In other words, party identification also serves as an opinion-forming agency (Campbell et al. 1960, 128). Party identification thus serves a simplifying and clarifying role for the complex politics so that voters with lower levels of political sophistication or interests can more easily participate in electoral democracy.

In spite of the fact that there is dissidence on when voters are most likely to resort to

partisan cues, there is a consensus that party identifiers make use of them. Some argue that the strength of bias and citizens' use of partisan cues depends on their level of political awareness (Kam 2005; Zaller 1992; Rahn 1993; Jessee 2010), political knowledge (Lupia 1994; Lodge et al. 1995; Althaus 1998; Slothuus 2016), or the strength of their partisan attachments (Campbell et al. 1960; Bartels 2002; Petersen et al. 2015). Slothuus (2016), and Slothuus and De Vreese (2010) argue that it is the more knowledgeable voters who are most likely to make use of shortcuts and partisan cues, whereas others (Lupia 1994; Lodge et al. 1995; Bullock 2011; and Kam 2005) believe that less knowledgeable citizens resort to them to compensate for their lack of knowledge before making a decision. Kam (2005) suggests that less informed citizens are more influenced by elite messages. In contrast to Kam, Zaller (1992) finds that more informed citizens react more to the messages from their own party, hence suggesting that partisan cues are taken up mostly by informed partisans. In contrast to both of these authors, Bullock (2011) argues that all voters, no matter how knowledgeable they are, rely on partisan cues before making a decision.

Cohen (2003) has studied partisan cues experimentally and found strong evidence that when partisan cues are available, partisans are inclined to assume their party's policy without rigorous evaluation of the policy. On the other hand, in the absence of partisan cues, partisans are more susceptible to evaluate the policy based on their knowledge and values.

Zaller (1992) as well has examined the role of elite cues in opinion formation among the electorate. He shows that political awareness plays a major role in receiving and accepting a message, resulting in attitude change. According to his findings, the moderately aware people are both more likely to be exposed to a message and to accept it. Thus, elite cues mostly exercise influence over moderately aware people. What's more, Zaller also shows partisan

resistance at the acceptance level when one is exposed to the message that is conveyed by the elites. Even if a highly aware partisan is very likely to receive the message, she will most probably refuse the message if it comes from another party. It is thus possible to assume that Zaller's findings are coherent with the partisan bias explained by the Michigan researchers.

In sum, even though their power of influence is debated, partisan cues are widely accepted as tools influencing opinion formation among partisans. Therefore, the role of party identification as an opinion-forming agency still remains an important aspect in voting behavior.

2.6. The Impact of Party Identification on Volatility and Voter Turnout

A large body of research shows very clearly that party identification also has a strong impact on the stabilization of politics and democracy. Almond and Verba (1963) underline the importance of moderate partisanship to maintain the stability of democracy. The more voters identify with a political party, the less they are expected to switch their vote, decreasing electoral volatility. Among partisans, vote switch tends to be lower as the strength of partisanship increases (Campbel et al. 1960). Thus, volatility is often linked to the absence of stabilized party identification among voters.

Furthermore, Dalton and Weldon (2007) find supporting evidence that when party systems are stable, partisan attachments grow, and the increase in partisanship in return decreases electoral volatility. They also confirm that voters in established democracies are more likely to identify with a party than those in new democracies (Dalton and Weldon 2007, 182). Söderlund (2008) shows that those who have a psychological attachment to a political

party are less likely to "react to short-term influences", which also signals the stabilizing effect of party identification on electoral politics. Focusing on the British case, Dassonneville (2016) analyzes the determinants of electoral volatility. By means of panel data, she focuses on both stable and volatile voters and demonstrates that the long-term forces, especially party identification, stabilize vote choice. The results reveal that while long-term forces contribute to vote stability among both groups, short-term forces do not actually lead to volatility. Finally, Dassonneville and Stiers (2018) analyze electoral volatility in Belgium, and find that even though its effect is smaller than it is for stable voters, partisan attachment among volatile voters is one of the key determinants of electoral stability in Belgium.

Besides, party identification also exerts an influence on political participation (Campbell et al.1960, 143) and therefore voter turnout:

> Turnout, as much as partisan preference, can be conceived as the end variable of a causal funnel extending backward in time and outward from the individual's orientation to the world of politics (Campbell et al. 1960, 90).

The literature offers considerable evidence of the influence of party identification on political participation. Among the many studies that have been published on this topic, the work by Greene (1999, 401) reveals that party identification as a social identity increases voter turnout. Green, Palmquist and Schickler (2002) demonstrate that levels of abstention are higher among independents in the American context:

> The relationship between voter turnout and political partisanship is among the most robust findings in social science, extending across a wide range of elections (Green et al. 2002, 49).

While recognizing the importance of political context and short-term forces on voter

turnout, Heath (2007) finds a correlation between partisanship and turnout levels. In countries where partisanship is low, turnout tends to be low; in countries where partisanship is high, turnout is high; in countries where partisanship is in decline, turnout rate is also in decline. Hence Heath argues that decreasing levels in party identification account for less participation in elections. Furthermore, Dalton (2016, 13) finds evidence of the influence of partisanship on voter turnout by showing that weak partisan attachments lead to decreased turnout.

2.7. Can Party Identification Travel Abroad?

The concept of party identification was developed in the United States, where a candidate-centered bipartisan system dominates the political scene. The conceptualization of party identification was therefore made based on American political institutions (Campbell et al. 1960). Many studies have put the concept into cross-national context to see whether the concept could travel abroad. Preeminently, could the concept's strong explicative power hold for multiparty systems as well? One of the main concerns in multi-party systems is whether the concept is distinct from the vote itself, as it is observed that the vote is highly correlated with the identification with a party. Namely, is it possible that voters indeed express their vote choice when they state their party identification? If this is the case, the concept of partisanship in multi-party systems cannot be considered as a long-term enduring variable. This would show the inability of the concept to travel outside the USA.

The concept of party identification may function differently in diverse political environments. For instance, Thomassen and Rosema (2009) find that party identification does not come before the vote in the Netherlands. Their study also reveals that party identification, as measured in the Netherlands, is less stable than the vote itself (2009, 49). Furthermore,

party identification in the Netherlands seems to be the reflection of vote choice (2009, 53), which challenges the concept that party identification serves as an enduring long-term anterior force that influences attitudes and vote preference.

Butler and Stokes (1969) found that party identification in the UK was not as stable as it is in the US, and that, compared to their American counterparts, British voters made less distinction between the self-conceived partisan image and their vote choice. Butler and Stokes' findings reveal skepticism for the utility of the concept for British elections

Cain and Ferejohn (1981) tested the applicability of party identification beyond the United States, and found that the concept is independent of the vote choice, thus concluding that it is meaningful to use for the British case. As for the stability of partisanship, contrary to what Butler and Stokes (1969) found, the study of Cain and Ferejohn (1981) produced some evidence that party identification is stable in the UK as well. However, Cain and Ferejohn based their comparison on the US congressional elections and UK general elections. As one can see, the salience of the two elections differs and can diminish the reliability of the results.

The study of Fleury and Lewis-Beck (1993) questions the usefulness of the concept of partisanship in the French case. They find that French voters have more ideological attachments than partisan attachments. When it comes to the explicative power of each variable, their results indicate that the force of ideological self-placement is much stronger than that of party identification. Hence, Fleury and Lewis-Beck also find that the partisanship has less explicative power in France than it has in the American context.

Using a panel data that covers 17 years, Schmitt-Beck, Weick, and Christoph (2006) examined the nature of party identification for West Germany. They found that around 70

percent of the voters changed their positions during the period examined. However, the majority of this change occurred between identification with a party and independence, rather than from one party to another. Furthermore, Schmitt-Beck et al.'s (2006) study reveals that the possibility of changing one's partisan attachment decreases as the length of adherence to the party increases.

Huddy, Bankert, and Davies (2018) focus on the applicability of the concept in the United Kingdom, Netherlands, Sweden, and Italy to compare the role of partisanship in European democracies to that in the US. The results of the study contribute to the literature by providing supporting evidence to the influence of partisanship in European democracies.

2.8. Revisionist Approach to Party Identification

The original conceptualization of party identification did not remain unchallenged. Even though scholars seem to agree on the influence of partisanship on the vote, there is more disagreement on the nature of party identification. The traditional view of party identification as formulated by Campbell and his colleagues presented the concept as a quite enduring, exogenous, but far from being an unmoved mover. Despite the fact that Campbell et al. (1960, 134-135) acknowledged that an individual's party identification could undergo a change if she develops political attitudes that contradict her party loyalty, most of the emphasis was put on the exogenous nature of the concept. The disagreement among the researchers concentrated mainly on whether the concept itself was exogenous from the short-term forces and therefore enduring, or endogenous and influenced by more proximate variables to the vote. In particular, the revisionist view calls into question the idea of party identification being exogenous to the vote, thus also doubting the stability of the concept. Revisionists have underlined that the

direction of influence did not only flow from party identification to short-term variables, but also the latter influenced partisanship. In this section of the study, the main arguments of the revisionists will be presented.

2.8.1. Running Tally Argument

Fiorina's *Retrospective Voting in American National Elections* is one of the works that has handsomely challenged the traditional view. Fiorina (1981) argues that party identification functions as a running tally. According to Fiorina, voters evaluate the past and current situation of the short-term political objects, and constantly update their attachments to a political party accordingly. According to the author, party identification is constantly upgraded, which "allows party ID to vary continuously" (Fiorina 1981, 90). In other words, Bayesian updating accounts for one's current partisanship: one has prior knowledge and party attachments, but these attachments are updated with new knowledge that can change one's attachment. Therefore, Fiorina considers party identification as a rational outcome instead of a psychological one, and he calls into question the role of party identification as a long-term variable that influences the short-term variables and biases the perception of political objects. That is to say that the concept is not exogenous as the traditionalist view suggests. Hence, Fiorina's conceptualization of party identification diverts from that of the Michigan researchers in that Fiorina considers partisanship as both a cause and an outcome of short-term forces (1981, 91). For instance, Fiorina (1981, 120) demonstrates that "economic performance evaluations reflect both an individual's prior store of political experience and evaluations and his or her directly experienced/perceived economic conditions".

Green and Palmsquist (1990) suggested that Fiorina's findings on partisan instability and

short-term forces' influence on altering one's party identification are due to measurement error. In contrast to Fiorina (1981), they argued that partisanship is highly stable and colors the perception of more proximate factors. In addition, Green and Palmsquist (1990) also test Fiorina's approach, which considers party identification as a running tally. They do this by looking at whether the Nixon Pardon—a very controversial issue of the time— led to change in party identification. The results indicate that there is a minor change in partisanship and the reactions of voters to the pardon were highly colored by one's partisanship.

The approach of Achen (2002) to partisanship, which is another challenge to the concept of partisanship, is also in line with that of Fiorina (1981). He evaluates party identification in a rational choice model framework. The author proposes that voters identify with a party because of their future benefits from that party or the candidate. From this point, Achen (2002) elaborates identification with a political party as an outcome of utility maximization rather than having psychological basis. As for the individuals that reach voting age, they may need prior experience and beliefs at first; therefore, they may resort to making use of parents' party identification, which is presented by Achen to be the reason why young voters partisan attachments resemble those of their parents.

2.8.2. Empirical Tests of the Running Tally Argument

The Impact of Short-term Attitudes on Partisanship are Short-lived

Green, Palmquist and Stickler (2002, 4) liken party identification to religious identification, thus underlying the enduring nature of the concept. While their study is in line with the conceptualization of Michigan researchers, the study of Green et al. (2002) differs from *The American Voter* in some respects. For instance, they are closer to the revisionist

view when it comes to whether partisans update their evaluations in front of new information (Green et al. 2002, 7). Nonetheless, they propose that those effects do not have an enduring impact to alter party identification except for new voters who have weak attachments or none (Green et al. 2002, 83-84).

More Exogenous than Endogenous

Cowden and McDermott (2000) propose that the difficulty in reaching a consensus on persistence of party identification and on whether it is exogenous or endogenous results from the quasi-experimental designs that fall short of drawing a clear conclusion. The reason why this sort of models fail to clarify the debate on party identification's being exogenous or endogenous is, as they suggest, because of the endogeneity problem in the direction of causality between partisanship and issues. They argue that if the instruments used to explain the causality is correlated with either the party identification or the issue, then the results would fall short of reliability. Therefore, Cowden and McDermott (2000) suggest that a fully experimental design could be a solution. In their study, they conducted two different experiments in which they tested the influence of vote choice and candidate evaluations on party identification. The results of their experiments offer supporting evidence for the traditional view of party identification in that partisanship is more exogenous than endogenous.

Both Exogenous and Endogenous

Carsey and Layman (2006) demonstrate that the relationship between issue positions and partisanship is bidirectional. Their study found consistent results with both the revisionist and traditional approach. While party identification mostly colors the perception of many voters on

issue positions, partisanship of some voters can be changed if the particular issue is salient to the voter and the voter has the knowledge of parties' different stands on this issue.

Kroh and Selb (2009), making use of panel data that extend over 25 years in Germany, demonstrated that voters who inherited their parent's partisan identity indicate a more stable and resistant partisanship as the traditionalist approach suggested whereas those who did not inherit their parents' party identification and developed their partisan identity independently from their parents tend to update their party affiliation as the revisionist approach suggested.

Lavine, Johnston, and Steenbergen (2012) present a different approach to partisanship. They conceptualize univalent and ambivalent partisanship. The first refers to the traditional partisanship, whereas the latter represents those whose identifications and evaluation of short-term political objects contradict each other (Lavine et al. 2012, 3). While Lavine et al. find supporting evidence for the traditional view of partisanship, they also note that they are valid for univalent partisans. Moreover, their findings for ambivalent partisans are concordant with the revisionist view, as their perceptions are less biased and "they are more responsive to their political environment" (Lavine et al. 2012, 5).

Endogenous: Cumulative Experience of Short-term Attitudes

The study of Franklin and Jackson (1983) produced some results in favor of the revisionist approach in that the results contradict the exogeneity of party identification. They found that even though past party identification strongly prevents voters from changing their partisanship, current evaluations and changes in individuals' political attitude or a change in party's position could still lead partisans to alter their party identification. Hence, they conclude that the partisans form their party identification with their cumulative experience of

politics and they are somewhat more responsive than the traditional approach assumes.

2.9. Theoretical Approach of the Study

This study focuses on the concept of party identification, defined as a psychological attachment to a political party that influences both political attitudes and the vote choice. As indicated in the chapter, there is disagreement about the conceptualization of party identification between the traditional approach and the revisionist approach. While the revisionists challenge the traditional conceptualization, the literature is still guided mainly by the traditional approach. This study will take the conceptualization of party identification by the Michigan researchers as a guideline, and question the existence of the concept in the Turkish case.

As the concept has never been tested for the Turkish case before, it should be acknowledged that respondents may simply not be familiar with the question of party identification. Survey respondents might be confused when being asked about their partisanship, and simply express their vote preference by indicating their party identification. To handle this possibility, apart from the self-expression of party identification, I put the electorate to several tests to investigate whether they behave like partisans as well.

This will be done by following the logic of the funnel of causality. I will first look at the direct effect of the party identification on the vote. For this purpose, this study will first analyze electoral volatility and defection rates, and then compare these levels with other countries. Next, it will analyze party identification's indirect influence on the vote through short-term forces such as economic evaluations, satisfaction with democracy, government approval, and leader/party evaluations. Thus, the study will focus on perceptions of political

objects that are theoretically shaped by the long-term partisan loyalties. Should the results confirm that the respondents who identify with a political party also act like partisans and show partisan bias in evaluation of short-term variables, this will help eliminate the possibility of conceptual confusion among Turkish voters.

2.10. Expected Contributions

The contributions of this research can be divided into two categories. First, this study contributes to the Turkish voting behavior literature by providing answers to following questions: Have Turkish voters developed party identification as a psychological attachment? Is party identification a reflection of vote choice among Turkish voters, or does it raise a perceptual screen influencing the evaluation of political objects? What are the implications of party identification in Turkey?

The second category includes several contributions to the voting behavior and party identification literature in general. Firstly, it will show whether the concept also travels to non-consolidated democracies such as Turkey. Secondly, it will help explore the links found between partisanship, polarization, and compulsory voting. Thirdly, this research will present the first analysis of party identification in Turkish voting behavior. Fourthly, it will help illuminate the role of party identification in new democracies where polarization is high. Finally, the results of this work will also add to normative arguments in light of democratic theory and partisanship's impact on the functioning of electoral democracies.

Chapter 3: Research Design

It is very often claimed that parties in Turkey are not institutionalized enough and the party system has been artificially shaped and disrupted constantly since the beginning of the multiparty period. This instability of political parties has caused inherent high electoral volatility, which is also attributed to the unstable party system and to the lack of partisan affiliation. Hence, it is assumed that as the parties have repeatedly been banned, partisanship would not exist. However, this image has changed. One can easily observe the political parties' stable presence in the Turkish Grand National Assembly since 2002 (Gumuscu 2013). I argue that this stabilization has created an opportunity for the voters to develop party identification.

Turkey has conducted five general elections in this period since 2002: November 2002, July 2007, June 2011, June 2015, and November 2015. To analyze the formation of party identification in Turkey after 2002, I have sought appropriate data covering different elections so that I could put the concept into a cross-time context.

3.1. Data

Even though the data on Turkish voting behavior are growing day by day, one problem persists: the measurement of party identification. For this research, I have found two data sources that have measured party identification. The first is the European Social Survey[6] (ESS) that has conducted two surveys in 2005 and 2008. The ESS surveys were neither pre-election nor post-election surveys, but were administered between two general elections. The

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[6] ESS Round 2 is supported by Ministry for EU Affairs of Republic of Turkey, The Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (TUBITAK), and European Science Foundation. ESS Round 4 is supported by The Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (TUBITAK), and the survey is conducted by University of Bahcesehir.

second is the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) that has conducted two surveys in 2011 (Module 3) and 2015 (Module 4).[7] The CSES surveys were administered as post-election surveys in the months following the election.

First, the measurement of party identification has to be evaluated. As I make use of two different surveys, I need to examine the measurement of the concept one by one. I seek four conditions for correct measurement of party identification. First of all, the identification should be a matter of self-definition. Therefore, in the question I would like to have a reference to self-expression or self-image of the individual. For instance, the phrases such as "think of yourself", "consider yourself" would emphasize the psychological aspect of the concept. Secondly, the question should underline the concept's enduring feature. For example, the emphasis such as "usually", "generally" or "generally speaking" would articulate the enduring character of the concept. Thirdly, I seek a follow-up question regarding the force of the identification, as I will not treat the identification as a dichotomous variable, but as a continuum (Campbell et al. 1960, 123). This criterion is not only satisfied by the follow-up question, but also by "feeling close to one party". Therefore, I would like to see "feeling close to" in the question. Lastly, I would like to have another follow-up question that enables us to distinguish pure independents from leaners.

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[7] CSES Module 3 data collection is done by Infakto Research Workshop with funding of The Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (TUBITAK) under the supervision of Ali Çarkoğlu and Ersin Kalaycıoğlu. It is a face-to-face post-election survey. CSES Module 4 data collection is done by Frekans Araştırma with funding of Open Society Foundation under the supervision of Ali Çarkoğlu and Selim Erdem Aytaç. It is a face-to-face post-election survey.

The available party identification measures in the CSES and the ESS are as follow:

ESS Round 2: Is there a particular political party you feel closer to than all the other parties?

ESS Round 4: Is there a political party you feel closer to than all other parties?

CSES Module 3: Do you usually think of yourself as close to any particular party?

CSES Module 4: Do you usually think of yourself as close to any particular party?

The measurement in the CSES survey incorporates closeness to a party, self-description, and the enduring nature of the concept at the same time. All criteria kept in mind, it is seen that the measurement in the CSES survey, which is the same measure for both of the modules, satisfies the requirements I demand. As for the measurement in the ESS, the question is slightly different in the second and the fourth round, in that the former differs by the word "particular". The measurement fails to meet the conditions I have set. The reference to the concept as a long-term and persisting force is omitted. Furthermore, the question does not indicate the psychological feature of the concept, since the reference to self-classification is absent. The word choice of "closer" instead of "close to" may not be the best way to define party identification, and it also prevents any differentiation between pure independents and leaners. I would expect the question to ask if the respondent considers herself as close to a political party. It is only after, if the respondent's answer is no, then I would expect the follow-up question to ask whether the respondent feels closer to any political party. Precisely, the word "closer" does not refer to party identification as a psychological attachment like the Michigan researchers, but it may rather refer to defining the leaning independents. At the same time, the absence of the psychological nature of party identification can rather measure the

partisanship as an endogenous party identification according to rational choice model. For all these reasons, I do not utilize the data from the ESS. This study hence focuses on the CSES data for 2011 and 2015.

3.2. Variables of Interest

3.2.1. Party Identification

In the CSES data, there are two follow-up questions for party identification. First, those who indicate that they feel close to a political party are also asked to indicate how close they feel. This allows us to differentiate between strong and weak identifiers. Those who indicate their degree of closeness to be "very close" are coded as strong partisans, whereas those who indicated that their closeness is either "somewhat close" or "not very close" are coded as weak partisans. Second, those who express non-identification are asked whether they feel a little closer to a party. This follow up question serves to determine the leaner independents and pure independents.

Do you usually think of yourself as close to any particular party?[8]
Do you feel yourself a little closer to one of the political parties than the others?
Do you feel very close to this party, somewhat close, or not very close?

Greene (1999, 401) showed that leaners indeed differ from independents in that "leaners are indistinguishable from weak partisans". Their support for a political party helps develop social identity towards that party to some extent. However, Greene argues that this identity is not strong enough to overshadow their independent identity. Petrocik (2009) finds that even

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[8] Those who answered "don't know" to the question of party identification are coded as non-identifiers. Moreover, those who refused to provide an answer are excluded from the analysis. As the number of respondents that refused to answer the question is below 2% of the sample, the impact of excluding these participants should not significantly affect the results.

though at first they claim to be independents, leaners manifest partisan attitudes and they are mostly indistinguishable from weak partisans. Departing from the assumption that party identification leads to attitude consistency, Lewis-Beck et al. (2008) analyze the difference between independents and partisans. They as well find that leaners indeed do not differ from weak independents. Hence, following the literature, this study makes a distinction among independents, in that leaners and pure independents are coded in different categories. While those who indicate that they feel a little closer to a political party are coded as leaners, those who express that there is not a party they feel a little closer to are coded as pure independents. Therefore, this study operationalizes partisanship on a four-point scale:

1-Strong Partisans
2-Weak Partisans
3-Leaners
4-Pure Independent

The leaner category is thus treated as a different category than pure independents and weak partisans. However, even though it will be treated as a separate category for the descriptive statistical results, they will be included in the weak partisan category in the regression models. There are two reasons for this methodological choice. Firstly, they manifest partisan attitudes, and they are different from pure independents. Secondly, there are not enough observations of leaners to treat them as a distinct category in regression models.

3.2.2. Volatility and Defection

CSES surveys are administered as a post-election survey, and include both the vote

choice of respondents in the current election and the previous election[9]. This study makes a distinction between volatility and defection. Volatility is when previous vote is different from the current vote independent from being partisan or not. It is coded as a dummy variable: it is 0 if the previous and current vote choices are the same, and 1 if they are not.

On the other hand, defection is used only for partisans. When a partisan votes against her partisan identity, she defects from her party. The defection rates are calculated using the current vote choice and the party identification of the respondent. It is a dummy variable: it is 0 if the respondent voted in the current election for the party she currently identifies with, and 1 if she voted for another party than the one she identifies with.

There is a possibility that the question order of party identification and the current vote choice can alter the results for defection. For instance, if the vote choice is asked before party identification, the respondents may be tempted to modify their party identification in accordance with their vote choice. In such a case, I would expect to see less defection rate than there actually is. In Module 3, the party identification measure comes before the vote choice; however, it comes after in Module 4. If the order of question does influence the results, I should expect to find less defection in Module 4.[10]

3.2.3. Never vote for

The CSES 3 dataset also provides a question that allows measuring polarization towards political parties. The respondents are asked whether there is a political party that they would never consider voting for. They are also asked to name these political parties in an order.

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[9] Recall questions can be subject to misreporting due to social desirability bias, cognitive dissonance or recollection difficulties (Presser 1990; Abelson, Loftus, and Greenwald 1992; Waldahl and Aardal 2000; Dassonneville and Hooghe 2017).

[10] While it is not possible to know the real effect of question order without an experimental design, the results reveal that the order does not cause an expected bias in the expected order. Defection rates for the dataset, where vote choice is asked before party identification, is higher than the other dataset.

And are there any party or parties that you would never vote for? [11]

Which ones?

3.2.4. Economic Evaluations

According to the funnel of causality, economic evaluations are considered as a short-term determinant of vote choice, and party identification is causally anterior to economic evaluations. This study will investigate whether one's party identification influences the way she perceives the economy. I expect to find that incumbent party identifiers evaluate the economy more positively than independents. I also expect to find that opposition identifiers' perceptions of economy will be more negative than those of independents. Even though it is only available in CSES Module 4, the dataset provides the appropriate measure for economic evaluations. The participants are asked the following two questions:

Would you say that over the past twelve months, the state of the economy has gotten better, stayed about the same, or gotten worse?
Would you say much better/worse or somewhat better/worse?

The variable is coded as a five-point continuous variable:

0. Gotten much worse
1. Gotten somewhat worse
2. Stayed the same
3. Gotten somewhat better
4. Gotten much better

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[11] Even though the question is asked in past tense in the original English survey, the Turkish survey was conducted with a simple tense.

3.2.5. Government Approval

In line with the funnel of causality, one's approval of the government is expected to be influenced by the causally anterior factors — notably party identification. Incumbent party identifiers should have a tendency to positively evaluate government's performance, whereas those identifying with one of the opposition parties should have a tendency to negatively evaluate the government's job. As for independents, they should be free from partisan bias. The questionnaire in CSES3 asks the respondents to evaluate performance of the government during the last four years with the following question:

> Now thinking about the performance of the government in Ankara in general, how good or bad a job do you think the government has done over the past 4 years? Has it done a very good job? A good job? A bad job? A very bad job?

This question helps show the approval rate of the incumbent party's governance. The variable is coded as a continuous variable:

0. Very bad job
1. Bad job
2. Good job
3. Very good job

3.2.6. Satisfaction with Democracy

Being satisfied with how democracy works can be considered as an evaluation of the current functioning of democracy. Moreover, the literature shows that there is a winner-loser gap with evaluations of the state of democracy. Therefore, there are reasonable grounds to expect a partisan gap when it comes to evaluating democracy. The expectation is that those who identify with a party that is in government should have a tendency to be more satisfied

with how democracy works compared to those who identify with one of the parties that is not in government. Both Modules 3 and 4 datasets have a measure for satisfaction with democracy:

On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in Turkey?

The variable is coded as a continuous variable:

0. Not at all satisfied
1. Fairly satisfied
2. Not very satisfied
3. Not at all satisfied

3.2.7. Feeling Thermometer

Basing on the Michigan model of voting, leader and party evaluations are also classified as short-term determinants. Hence, I expect that evaluations of parties and leaders are influenced by partisan identities. As social identity theory suggests, partisans will try to maximize the difference between in-groups and out-groups. For instance, I expect a partisan to evaluate more positively her party and its leader, more negatively other parties and their leaders. At the same time, independents should be free of this type of partisan bias; therefore, their evaluations should be more closer to the average. In both of the datasets, the respondents are asked to evaluate each party leader and party itself on a scale from 0 to 10:

I'd like to know what you think about each of our political parties/party leaders. After I read the name of a political party, please rate it on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means you strongly dislike that party and 10 means that you strongly like

that party. If I come to a party you haven't heard of or you feel you do not know enough about, just say so.

Feeling thermometers are important because they also signal the affective evaluation of political objects. When voters are asked to evaluate a political party, the like-dislike measure can be an indicator of which political party is affectively closer to or further from the voter. If the distance between political parties is quite large, this could also be interpreted in light of polarization, which I expect to negatively influence volatility and defection rates (less volatility and less defection associated with greater polarization).

3.3. Control Variables

3.3.1. Socio-demographic Controls

Age

The age of respondents are organized into six categories:

1. 18-20

2. 20-30

3. 30-40

4. 40-50

5. 50-60

6. 60+

Education

Education is among the social-demographic determinants of the vote; therefore, it is a long-term factor and temporally anterior to partisanship. The education level of each

respondent in the CSES 3 dataset is determined based on the highest level of education attained or completed. The scale includes no formal education, primary school dropout, primary school graduate, secondary school dropout, secondary school graduate, high school dropout, high school graduate, university dropout, and university graduate. As for the CSES 4 dataset, education scale consists of no formal education, primary school graduate, secondary school graduate, high school graduate, university dropout, university degree, master's degree, and doctoral degree. The variable is coded as a continuous variable varying from 0 (no formal education) to 8 (the highest level of education) in CSES 3, and from 0 (no formal education) to 7 (the highest level of education) in CSES 4.

Income

Income constitutes one of the long-term determinants of the vote as well. It is measured by the total household income per month. The variable is organized into five categories: the lowest quintile, second quintile, third quintile, fourth quintile, and the highest quintile.

Religiosity

Religiosity is considered as a long-term determinant of vote choice, and it is causally anterior to party identification. Both of the datasets have a measure for religiosity, which is a highly important issue in the Turkish context. First, respondents are asked if they have a religion, and if so which one. Then, they are asked to indicate how religious they are. The variable is coded on a four-point scale, and it includes "not religious at all", "not very religious", "somewhat religious", and "very religious".

Ideology

Both ideology and party identification are classified as long-term forces in the funnel of causality. However, the Michigan researchers did not put a strong emphasis on the temporal sequence between the two. There is room for considering that one's ideological predispositions are decisive in determining the party identification. On the other hand, it is still logical to think that party identification can alter one's ideology to some extent as well. There are mixed results concerning whether ideology comes before party identification. Miller (1999) analyzed the direction of causality between party identification and ideology and found repeating evidence that party identification is more stable than ideology, and that voters align their ideological positions according to their partisanship. However, for the young, ideological position can also influence party identification. Therefore, even though party identification mostly seems to be causal anterior to ideology, this study will control for ideology. In both of the datasets, respondents are asked to place themselves on a left-right spectrum of 0 to 10. They are also asked to place each political party on the same scale, which allows operationalizing the perceived polarization among the electorate.

3.3.2. Current Vote Choice

Methodologically, it is important to control for antecedent variables. Defining what is antecedent depends on the theory. When investigating the impact of partisanship, one should control for the variables that come before partisanship. The Michigan researchers have handsomely established the causal temporal sequence of the determinants of vote choice. According to this sequence, social-demographic variables come before party identification. These are standard control variables such as income, age, sex, education and religion. As for

the vote choice, it is the outcome. However, there is disagreement between the traditional approach and the revisionist view concerning the temporal sequence of party identification.

According to revisionist approach, party identification is more endogenous than exogenous: it is influenced by the short-term forces and by the vote itself. Therefore, if the vote choice influences party identification, that also suggests that party identification is not causally anterior to the vote choice. Hence, it suggests that party identification is preceded by the vote.

As the results will demonstrate in the next chapter, very few voters vote against their party identification in Turkey. This casts a doubt that maybe partisanship is not different from the vote choice, or party identification comes after the vote. If the first assumption were true, that would mean that partisanship does not have an explanatory power in Turkey, and it is merely a reflection of the vote choice. If the second assumption were true, then this would mean that one's party identification is updated after each election; therefore, partisanship would not be exogenous, on the contrary, it would be endogenous. As there is no panel study concerning party identification in Turkey, it becomes more difficult to know whether partisanship is different from the vote. The main argument would be made about the defection rate: if voters align their partisanship along with their vote, that would explain the low levels of partisans who vote for a party that they do not identify with. Hence, in order to have a conclusive idea of party identification's nature in Turkey, the vote choice will also be controlled for in certain analyses.

Even though this study focuses on the traditional approach to party identification, it will run the models based on both of the theories. For instance, when investigating the impact of

partisanship on economic evaluations, three different models will be run: one regression without any control variable, another with standard control variables, and another one that controls for vote choice. If partisanship is different from the vote itself, then its impact should persist when controlling for vote choice. This would also ensure that party identification comes before the vote choice in Turkey. If the influence of partisanship disappears once the vote choice is introduced to the model, this would simply mean that party identification is not different from the vote. However, if the party identification continues to have impact that is still statistically significant, it will demonstrate that party identification is not a reflection of the vote, and it is a force that has an explanatory power, as described in the funnel of causality, in the Turkish context.

Chapter 4: Results

Having established the research design, and the methodology in the previous chapter, this chapter focuses on the empirical findings of the study. This chapter is organized into four parts. The first part will address the question of presence of partisanship in Turkey, which will allow us to respond to the first research question "Does party identification exist in Turkey?". The second part will discuss the results concerning the influence of party identification on vote choice, volatility and defection. The third part will present the findings on the impact of partisanship on political attitudes such as economic evaluations, satisfaction with democracy, government approval, and party/leader evaluations. Hence, the second and third part will explore answers to the second research question about whether those who indicate identifying with a political party behave like partisan. In other words, they will shed light onto whether a partisan bias exists concerning perceptions and evaluations of short-term forces. Finally, the last part constitutes the conclusion section of the chapter.

4.1. Does Party Identification Exist in Turkey?

As the goal of this study is to analyze party identification in Turkey, a logical first step is to look at how much of the electorate indicate that they are partisans. Figure 1 reports the proportion of participants who claim to be partisans in Turkey in 2011 and 2015 respectively. In the CSES module 3 dataset, 79.2% of the respondents reveal to be partisans. 40.2% of the participants indicate that they are strong identifiers, 34.1% of them state to be weak partisans, and 4.3% of the respondents are leaning toward a political party. In the CSES module 4

dataset, the results are quite similar. 77.6%[12] of Turkish voters indicate to be partisans in 2015. 45.5% of the participants are strong identifiers, 27.4% of them are weak identifiers, and 4% of the respondents are leaners. As for the pure independents, one can observe that quite a large portion of the electorate states that they do not identify with a political party. In 2011, 21.5% of the Turkish electorate is constituted of pure independents among Turkish voters. This number is again quite similar in 2015, when 23.1% of the participants is made up of pure independents.

Figure 1: Party identification in Turkey (%)

The preliminary findings show supporting evidence for party identification in Turkey. Based on the extant literature in Turkish voter behavior, these findings are remarkable because they reveal that more than 70% of Turkish voters identify with a political party. Moreover, it is observed that during two elections, the aggregate partisanship seems stable, which is another

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[12] This number is slightly different (78.4% in Module 3, 76.9% in Module 4) if the percentage of strength categories is added together because there are 35 respondents who answered the first party identification question, but did not answer to the strength question.

indication that Turkish voters seem to have developed partisan attachment following the stabilization of the politics since 2002.

4.1.1. Party Identification Stability at Party Level

At the aggregate level, partisanship seems stable over time. However, now, I turn to partisanship at the party level, and look at the proportion of partisans for each party in 2011 and 2015. If partisan ranks among these two elections are similar, then it is suggestive evidence that partisanship for each party is stable over time. If there is change across parties, it should suggest partisan instability to some extent, even though overall partisanship remains stable.

Figure 2: Partisanship among political parties (%)

Figure 2 presents partisanship for each party in 2011 and 2015. It is plausible to assume that around 27% of the voters who identify with the AKP in 2011 changed their partisan affiliations in 2015. Even though there is not a considerable change in the aggregate

partisanship between the two datasets, there is a change of partisanship for each party. The AKP seems to have lost a noticeable portion of its identifiers, and all other parties seem to have attracted some of those switchers. The data that this study uses do not come from a panel study; therefore, the inferences that could be drawn from this figure are limited. However, from these results, it could be interpreted that there is some level of partisan instability between 2011 and 2015.

4.1.2. Partisanship in Turkey in a Comparative Context

The previous two sections demonstrate that party identification exist in Turkey. In both of the modules, more than 75 percent indicate identifying with a political party. Should this number be interpreted as low, moderate or high? In order to contextualize partisanship in Turkey, I compare the level of partisanship in Turkey to other CSES countries.

Figure 3 shows the partisanship level of 46 countries. The mean partisanship is 46.1%. While partisanship is the highest in Australia and Uruguay, Turkey is the third country where partisanship is the highest. France, South Africa, Spain and United States follow Turkey in declining order. Thailand, Belarus and Serbia are the three countries where party identification is the lowest. The findings suggest that the concept that was developed for the American context applies to other countries as well. Furthermore, Turkish voters seem more partisan than their American counterparts. Hence, not only do the findings confirm that partisanship exists in Turkey, but they also show that Turkish voters are more partisans than most of their counterparts.

Figure 3: Partisanship in CSES participating countries in Modules 3 and 4

Notes: There are several elections for a single country in the data. The mean of total observations for each country is calculated. Leaners are not included.

4.2. The Impact of Party Identification on the Vote

As the Michigan model of voting suggests, party identification is a long-term affective psychological force that influences political attitudes, evaluations of the economy, parties and leaders, and the vote. Following the logic of the funnel of causality, this study ascertains whether party identification exerts an influence on the vote.

4.2.1. The Impact of Party Identification on Polarization

Do partisans have more polarized attitudes when it comes to voting behavior? Does identifying with a political party sway voters further away from other parties? In the CSES Module 3, the questionnaire includes a question that asks whether there is a political party that

the respondent would never vote. The participants respond by either "yes" or "no". Those who respond "yes" are also asked which political party or parties they would never vote for. The participants can name up to four political parties. If respondents indicate that there is a party she would never vote for, this could be a direct indication that voters perceive party polarization. Furthermore, I expect to find that partisans are more likely to perceive polarization than independents.

Figure 4: Existence of parties people would never vote for – CSES 3 (%)

Figure 4 shows the proportion of the electorate that names a political party or parties for which they would never vote. The fact that 67% of the electorate names a political party that they would never support indicates the existence of high polarization in Turkey. What is really surprising is that 53.8% of pure independents indicate that there is at least one political party that they would never vote for. All in all, the finding that half of the sample mentions two political parties is supporting evidence that Turkish voters, including both partisans and independents, perceive very negatively some political parties.

The following figure shows polarization among partisan categories. In line with the literature, polarization is stronger among partisans than pure independents. Moreover, the effect of partisan strength is positive and linear. The stronger one identifies with a political party, the more polarized she is.

Figure 5: Distribution of perceived polarization – CSES 3 (%)

Notes: CSES3- The distribution of those who indicate that there is at least one political party that they would never vote for by partisan strength.

Turkey seems to be extremely polarized. In 2011, almost 70% of the participants indicate that there is one political party that they would never vote for, nearly 50% indicate that there are two political parties they would support, and around 17% name three political parties. Unfortunately, the same question is not available in the 2015 datasets.

4.2.2. The Impact of Party Identification on Electoral Volatility

Figure 6: Electoral volatility by partisan category (%)

Figure 6 reveals electoral volatility rates[13] for each partisan category including pure independents. The overall rates of electoral volatility in the samples are 10.7 in 2011 and 8.7 in 2015. These results suggest that independents and leaners are more likely to switch votes between elections. Should these rates be interpreted as low, moderate or high? The below figure puts Turkey's electoral volatility in a comparative context by examining the volatility rates among 39 CSES participating countries in Modules 3 and 4.

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[13] Electoral volatility is 1 if previous vote is different from current vote independent from being a partisan or not, 0 if previous and current vote choices are the same.

Figure 7: Volatility in CSES participating countries in Modules 3 and 4

The mean volatility is slightly higher than 30%. While Serbia, Peru and Belarus constitute the top three countries where vote switching occurs the most, Turkey is the country where volatility is the lowest, followed by the United States, Uruguay and Portugal. The comparative context confirms that volatility in Turkey is the lowest among 39 participating countries. Therefore, the impact of partisanship on stabilizing the electoral politics is evident for the Turkish case.

4.2.3. The Impact of Party Identification on Defection

Until now, the chapter demonstrates that high levels of partisanship exist in Turkey, and the voters switch their votes a lot less than their counterparts in other countries. The electoral

system hence seems stable. Do partisans keep their party identification despite switching their vote against their partisan attachments? As party identification is a psychological attachment to a political party, it also makes it possible for partisans to hold on to their partisan identity even when they vote for a party with which they do not identify. A partisan may defect from her party due to evaluations of short-term factors; however, she is expected to come back to her party later (Campbell et al. 1960). In light of this approach, this study examines defection rates among partisans. Defection occurs when a partisan votes against the party she identifies with. Figure 8 shows defection rates by partisan strength for 2011 and 2015 in Turkey.

Figure 8: Defection by partisan strength (%)

The total defection rate for 2011 and 2015 is 0.4% and 3.8% respectively. The figure also shows among which group defections tend to occur, they concentrated mostly among the leaners. As one identifies more strongly with a political party, she is less susceptible to vote for another party, whereas as the strength of partisanship decreases, the likelihood of defecting

gets higher. While defection occurs the most among the leaners, it occurs the least among the strong partisans. This finding is in line with the literature (Campbel et al. 1960; Lewis-Beck et al. 2008).

How should one interpret these defection rates in Turkey? At the first glance, they seem quite low; however, it is more sound to place the defection rates of Turkey in a comparative context. Figure 9 presents the mean defection rate for each CSES participating country.

Figure 9: Defection in CSES participating countries in Modules 3 and 4

Notes: There are several elections for a single country in the data. The mean of total observations for each country is calculated.

According to Figure 9, the mean defection in the sample is 21%. While Belarus, Montenegro, Mexico and Chile are the countries where defection occurs the most, Turkey, Bulgaria, South Africa and United States are the countries where defection occurs the least. When put in a comparative context, this study confirms that partisans in Turkey seem to be so attached to their party that they rarely vote against their party. Among 41 countries, Turkey is the country where partisans defect from their party the least. The literature leads to the expectation that the polarization of the political parties leads to a decrease in vote switching (Roberts and Wibbels 1999; Smidt 2017). From this point of view, it is not surprising to find low defection rates in Turkey, given that polarization in Turkey is very high.

4.2.4. Summary of Party Identification's Impact on Vote Choice

Up to this point, this chapter has uncovered that party identification as a psychological attachment seems to exist in Turkey. Partisans have more polarized perceptions than independents. Moreover, partisanship affects electoral volatility and defection. As the high aggregate partisanship and the low volatility and defection rates during the 2011 and 2015 elections suggest, Turkish electoral politics seems to be quite stable. This is partly due to high levels of party identification. While vote switching occurs mostly among the independents and leaners, partisans rarely switch their votes. It can be inferred that many Turkish electors not only declare themselves to be partisan, but they also vote in accordance with partisan attachments.

4.3. The Impact of Party Identification on Political Attitudes

Party identification is categorized as a stable and long-term psychological force in the funnel of causality, and it is expected to affect short-term variables that are located between

party identification and vote choice in the causal sequence. The previous sections have established that party identification influences the way one votes. This part will focus on party identification's influence on government approval, satisfaction with how democracy works, economic evaluations, leader evaluations and party evaluations. The second research question of this research focuses on whether those who identify with a political party behave like partisans. The findings that explore the answer to this question will be presented in this part of the chapter. Doing so will let us examine whether partisanship as a psychological attachment raises a perceptual screen when it comes to evaluations of political objects.

4.3.1. The Impact of Party Identification on Satisfaction with Democracy

Some studies show that those who vote for the winning party tend to be more satisfied with democracy, whereas those voting for the losing parties tend to be less satisfied with democracy "because they dislike and/or distrust those who have been chosen to govern" (Blais and Gélineau 2007, 426).

In both Modules 3 and 4, the question "On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in Turkey?" is asked. The literature shows a winner-loser gap in satisfaction with democracy. This research tests whether party identification has an impact on satisfaction with how democracy works in the country.

Figure 10 exhibits levels of satisfaction with how democracy works in Turkey by partisan categories. In 2011, 87 % of those who identify with the incumbent party are satisfied with the democracy, whereas only 14.2% of those who identify with one of the opposition parties are satisfied. Differently from partisans, the independents seem to be in between the

incumbent and opposition identifiers. One can observe that in 2011 independents are more satisfied than the opposition identifiers, the incumbent party's identifiers are very satisfied, and the opposition parties' identifiers are very unsatisfied with how the democracy works. On the other hand, the satisfaction in each category considerably drops in 2015. Overall the incumbent identifiers are still satisfied with democracy despite a decrease of 12 percentage points. Moreover, independents become almost as unsatisfied as the opposition identifiers in 2015.

Figure 10: Satisfaction with how democracy works (%)

Notes: The variable is dichotomized. The figure shows the percentage of those who are satisfied with democracy. "Very satisfied" and "fairly satisfied" are coded as satisfied; "not very satisfied" and "not at all satisfied" are coded as not satisfied.

Party identification seems to partly determine to what extent one is satisfied with democracy. Evidently, opposition parties' partisans are not satisfied with democracy. Only the incumbent party's partisans tend to be satisfied with democracy. It can be inferred from Figure 10 that only the incumbent party's partisans tend to be satisfied with how democracy works in

the country, and the rest of the electorate seems quite unsatisfied. Voters' evaluations of democracy correlate with partisanship, as the results indicate that identifiers are satisfied only if the party they identify with is the incumbent party.

Table 1: Linear regression of satisfaction with democracy

	(2011-1)	(2011-2)	(2015-1)	(2015-2)
Party ID				
Independent (ref.)				
Strong Incumbent	0.947***	0.542***	0.847***	0.519**
	(0.069)	(0.089)	(0.112)	(0.182)
Weak Incumbent	0.643***	0.219*	0.726***	0.424*
	(0.070)	(0.091)	(0.121)	(0.186)
Weak Opposition	-0.456***	-0.028	-0.071	0.173
	(0.081)	(0.116)	(0.121)	(0.156)
Strong Opposition	-0.405***	0.035	-0.740***	-0.491***
	(0.078)	(0.114)	(0.106)	(0.145)
Vote (for incumbent)		0.827***		0.606**
		(0.123)		(0.186)
Constant	1.277***	0.873***	1.466***	1.190***
	(0.051)	(0.098)	(0.077)	(0.126)
Observations	941	826	1009	810
R^2	0.373	0.424	0.210	0.260

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. See Appendix 1 for the regression with standard control variables and without control for the vote

Table 1 presents the results of a linear regression of two different models for 2011 and 2015. The first models include only the partisan categories to explain the dependent variable— satisfaction with democracy. The second models control for the vote choice of the last election

in order to make sure that partisanship is still meaningful even when controlling for vote choice. The results demonstrate that identifying with the incumbent party or one of the opposition parties has a statistically significant impact on satisfaction with democracy in 2011. Even though when controlling for vote choice, the coefficients of party categories become weaker and the impact of the vote surpasses that of partisanship, the impact of being an incumbent identifier persists. However, the opposition identifiers do not significantly differ from independents with respect to satisfaction with democracy. As for 2015, except for weak opposition identifiers, the impact of partisan categories is statistically significant in the first model. When vote choice is integrated into the model, the impact of partisan categories still persists, albeit in a weaker way.

As the findings show, being satisfied with how democracy works in Turkey is not only an issue of election winning-losing, but is also influenced by one's partisan identity. Party identification is causally anterior to the vote, therefore if the influence of party identification exists even when the vote is controlled, then this is supportive evidence that party identification rather than the vote influences to what extent voters are satisfied with democracy.

4.3.2. The Impact of Party Identification on Government Approval

As Figure 11 shows, there is a clear partisan gap when it comes to approval of the incumbent government's performance. AKP identifiers are highly satisfied with the government (96%). In contrast, partisans of all opposition parties seem to be very unsatisfied. As for independents, around 60% of them seem to approve the government's handling the job; however, as they do not have any partisan attachments, their evaluations and perceptions

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should be the most neutral. The difference between the independents and the identifiers suggests that as one identifies with a political party, her perception is possibly distorted by partisan attachments (Campbell et al. 1960; Bartels 2002). This finding is in line with the traditional approach to the party identification. The partisans evidently try to maximize the difference between the in-group and out-group, whereas the independents, who lack such belongings or attachments to a party, do not do so (Greene 1999).

Figure 11: Approval of government's job handling by partisanship – CSES 3 (%)

Note: In the survey, there are four options to indicate approval or disapproval: very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, not at all satisfied. However, the variable is coded as a dichotomous variable. The first two responses are coded as approval whereas the last two are coded as disapproval.

Table 2 presents the results of two linear regression models of approval of the government's the job handling by partisanship. While the first model does not include a control variable, the second model has the vote choice as a control variable so as to isolate the impact of partisanship from that of vote choice. Both models confirm that partisanship is a determinant of government approval. Only the significance of weak incumbent identifiers does not persist in the second model. Those who identify with the incumbent party tend to approve

of the government. Even though voting for the incumbent party boosts satisfaction with the government, partisan identities still play a role as determinants. As for the three opposition parties' identifiers, they tend to disapprove of the government.

Table 2: Linear regression of satisfaction with the government

	2011-1	2011-2
Party ID		
Independent (ref.)		
Strong Incumbent	0.888***	0.464***
	(0.067)	(0.083)
Weak Incumbent	0.565***	0.115
	(0.067)	(0.084)
Weak Opposition	-0.585***	-0.249*
	(0.079)	(0.114)
Strong Opposition	-0.699***	-0.393***
	(0.076)	(0.112)
Vote (for incumbent)		0.762***
		(0.120)
Constant	1.577***	1.257***
	(0.051)	(0.098)
Observations	942	841
R^2	0.447	0.505

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. See Appendix 1 for the regression with standard control variables and without control for the vote

### 4.3.3. The Impact of Party Identification on Economic Evaluations

Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2000, 211) argue that economic evaluations can change often, whereas party identification remains stable; therefore the fate of the incumbent party

can be decided by economic satisfaction or dissatisfaction rather than a change in partisan affiliations. On the other hand, as suggested by the funnel of causality, party identification is causally anterior to economic evaluations. Hence, being satisfied or dissatisfied with the economy is expected to be influenced by partisan attachments. If one identifies with the incumbent party, I expect her economic evaluation to be more likely to be positively biased regardless of the state of economy. By the same token, evaluation of a voter that identifies with one of the opposition parties is expected to be negatively biased. Differently from the incumbent and opposition identifiers, the independents' evaluations of the state of economy should not be subject to the same bias caused by partisanship. Therefore, I should expect to see more neutral evaluations of economy among independents.

According to economic indicators, Turkey's economy was doing worse in the last year before the general elections in 2015. For instance, GDP annual growth dropped from 4.2% in 2013 to 2.9% in 2014; GDP per capita dropped from 10975$ to 10515$ in 2014; inflation increased to 8.3% in 2014 from 6.2% in 2013; unemployment rose to 9.2% in 2014 from 8.7% in 2013. Turkish Lira's value against the American dollar was around 1.5 in June 2011, and 2.6 in June 2015.

Figure 12 shows that while independents and opposition identifiers evaluate the economy negatively, incumbent party's identifiers seem to have more positive evaluations of economy. Being pure independent means that the voter is not biased by her partisan attachment, which she does not have. Therefore, I would assume the independents to evaluate the economy free of partisan bias. The fact that opposition identifiers and independents seem to converge when it comes to economic perceptions suggests that it is rather the perceptions of incumbent partisans which are positively biased.

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Figure 12: Economic evaluations by partisan category – CSES 4 (%)

The above figure shows that voters are in general not satisfied with the economic situation. This includes even the partisans of the incumbent party. Even though AKP identifiers are more optimistic about the economy, almost half of them were neutral, around a quarter of them indicated that the economy was doing worse. These results are promising in that voters register economic situations despite their partisan affiliations, though party identification still distorts the evaluations of AKP identifiers to some extent. However, the defection rate of 2.9% among the incumbent party's partisans is suggestive evidence that economic dissatisfaction does not cause vote switching. This is in line with what Bisgaard (2015) argued. He demonstrated for the British case that even though partisans register economic realities, they can still find good excuses to support their party. In Turkish case, it seems that even though the

incumbent party's partisans indicate to be relatively more satisfied with the economy, they do register the direction of the state of the economy. Not holding the government in place responsible for the bad economy could be explained either by Bisgaard's explanation or by the priority that AKP identifiers give to the economy, which the data nonetheless do not let us make further inferences. Table 3 presents the results of linear regression of economic assessments by partisan categories.

Table 3: Linear regression of economic evaluations

	2015-1	2015-2
Party ID		
Independents (ref.)		
Strong Incumbent	0.833^{***}	0.616^{***}
	(0.092)	(0.152)
Weak Incumbent	0.701^{***}	0.507^{**}
	(0.099)	(0.155)
Weak Opposition	-0.105	0.110
	(0.099)	(0.132)
Strong Opposition	-0.394^{***}	-0.214
	(0.088)	(0.123)
Vote (for incumbent)		0.463^{**}
		(0.155)
Constant	1.206^{***}	0.989^{***}
	(0.063)	(0.107)
Observation	1009	813
R^2	0.202	0.248

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses $^{*}p < 0.05,$ $^{**}p < 0.01,$ $^{***}p < 0.001$. See Appendix 1 for the regression with standard control variables and without control for the vote

In the first model, it is observed that identifying with one of the opposition parties or with the incumbent party has a considerable impact on economic perceptions. Only the evaluations of weak opposition identifiers seem not to differ from those of independents. Citizens' perceptions of the state of the economy do seem to be influenced by partisan attachments. In this case, even though the economic evaluations can change often, it is more or less stabilized by the partisan attachments as well. As Bisgaard (2015) argues, incumbent partisans find a reason to justify that it is not the fault of the incumbent that the economy is doing worse. This is possibly due to psychological attachment to the party. In the second model, when controlling for vote choice, the impact of identifying with the incumbent party persists, which is suggestive evidence that a gap between non-partisans and incumbent identifiers exists.

4.3.4. The Impact of Party Identification on Party and Leader Evaluations

According to the Michigan model of voting, evaluations of parties and leaders are categorized as short-term factors that are more susceptible to be volatile than long-term factors such as party identification and ideology. Anterior long-term variables such as party identification can therefore be expected to influence these evaluations. This study will focus on the partisanship's influence on party and leader evaluations in this section. I expect to find that one's partisan attachment colors her perceptions of party leaders and parties themselves.

Table 4: Linear regression of incumbent party and incumbent leader evaluations – CSES 3

	Incumbent Party	Incumbent Party	Incumbent Party Leader	Incumbent Party Leader
Party ID				
Independent (ref.)				
Strong Incumbent	4.276***	1.852***	4.186***	1.745***
	(0.216)	(0.258)	(0.216)	(0.250)
Weak Incumbent	3.795***	1.353***	3.635***	1.157***
	(0.218)	(0.262)	(0.218)	(0.253)
Weak Opposition	-3.012***	-1.731***	-2.887***	-1.505***
	(0.253)	(0.344)	(0.255)	(0.332)
Strong Opposition	-3.167***	-1.929***	-3.528***	-2.115***
	(0.244)	(0.338)	(0.245)	(0.326)
Vote (for incumbent)		3.680***		3.885***
		(0.365)		(0.351)
Constant	5.042***	3.811***	5.278***	3.865***
	(0.162)	(0.295)	(0.161)	(0.282)
Observation	966	858	971	862
R^2	0.663	0.728	0.656	0.740

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. See Appendix 1 for the regression with standard control variables and without control for the vote.

Table 4 and 5 demonstrate the results of linear regressions of evaluations of the incumbent party and the incumbent party leader by partisan categories. In both tables, the first models are run without any control variables. The second models include vote choice in the current election. The reason why vote choice is added as a control variable is to be able to isolate the impact of partisanship from that of the vote. This way, if party identification persists to be statistically significant despite the presence of vote choice, that would mean that party identification itself is different from the vote, and has an explanatory power as a variable.

Table 5: Linear regression of incumbent party and incumbent leader evaluations – CSES4

	Incumbent Party	Incumbent Party	Incumbent Party Leader	Incumbent Party Leader
Party ID				
Independents (ref.)				
Strong Incumbent	5.556***	2.880***	4.971***	2.791***
	(0.199)	(0.292)	(0.219)	(0.337)
Weak Incumbent	4.762***	2.230***	4.553***	2.401***
	(0.213)	(0.298)	(0.235)	(0.343)
Weak Opposition	-2.215***	-1.470***	-2.063***	-1.487***
	(0.214)	(0.255)	(0.236)	(0.289)
Strong Opposition	-2.800***	-1.939***	-2.440***	-1.744***
	(0.189)	(0.238)	(0.209)	(0.270)
Vote (for incumbent)		3.639***		2.984***
		(0.299)		(0.343)
Constant	3.781***	2.839***	3.691***	2.929***
	(0.138)	(0.208)	(0.153)	(0.236)
Observation	1019	826	1013	824
R^2	0.737	0.807	0.658	0.727

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. See Appendix 1 for the regression with standard control variables and without control for the vote.

Both of the models show that party identification influences party and leader evaluations. Identifying with the incumbent party or with one of the opposition parties is statistically significant in both models. Adding vote choice into the model decreases the impact of party identification by around half and voting for the incumbent party has a positive significant impact on both the incumbent leader evaluations and the incumbent party evaluations. However, party identification's impact does not vanish and still persists in being statistically significant. Moreover, the impact of partisanship when controlling for the vote both

in 2011 and 2015, it is observed that the influence of partisanship is bigger in 2015. This is in line with the findings on polarization in Turkey in that it became more polarized in 2015; therefore, the partisan attachments possibly play an even bigger role in 2015.

Even though leader evaluations can have a direct effect on the vote choice, the findings suggest that party identification exerts an influence on leader and party evaluations as well. Therefore, the findings show that party identification is a determinant that shapes one's evaluations of parties and leaders.

This part of the chapter has presented the results concerning whether party identification influences on short-term variables such as evaluations of economy, satisfaction with democracy, government approval, affective leader and party evaluations. The findings show evidence for partisan bias even when controlling for vote choice. Party identification as a long-term affective variable "raises a perceptual screen through which the individual tends to see what is favourable to his partisan orientation" (Campbell et al. 1960, 133).

Conclusion

This research has identified the shortcomings of the extant literature on voter behavior in Turkey. Until recently, the literature has been more or less limited to descriptive analysis of party support, and to analysis of certain variables of interest such as ideology, ethnicity, religiosity, economic evaluations, and issues. However, not only they have fallen short of establishing a comprehension of the causal mechanisms that result in vote choice, but also they have produced mixed conclusions. Hence, the voting behavior literature in Turkey could not produce a profound understanding of Turkish voting behavior. Unlike earlier research, this study has adapted a psycho-sociological approach by following the Michigan model of voting. Making use of the temporal sequence of causality established by Campbell and his colleagues, this research has shown that the interpretation of short-term variables is indeed influenced by party identification, which is an omitted stable long-term factor in the extant literature.

To begin with, this research has used the CSES Modules 3 and 4 datasets to show that party identification as a psychological attachment to a political party exists in Turkey. In both of the datasets, more than 70% of the respondents indicate to identify with a political party. Around 4% percent of the respondents reveal to be leaning toward a party, and more than 20% turn out to be pure independents by indicating not to feel closer to a political party. I have compared the partisanship level in Turkey to the other 46 countries in CSES Modules 3 and 4. In the comparative context, Turkey is the third country where partisanship is the highest. Therefore, this study concludes that Turkey is a highly partisan country.

Next, this study has focused on whether partisans behave like partisans with respect to their vote. To do so, I have analyzed partisanship's direct impact on the vote. I have focused

on electoral volatility, and showed that partisans rarely switch their votes, and the volatility in Turkey is mainly due to independents and leaners. When compared to other participating countries, electoral volatility is the lowest in Turkey. This shows party identification's stabilizing effect on the vote. Moreover, the defection rates among partisans show that partisans in Turkey rarely vote against their partisan attachments. Among 41 countries, the defection rate is the lowest in Turkey. Furthermore, almost 70% of the sample name at least one political party that they would never vote for, and around 50% of them name at least two parties that they would never vote for. Partisans perceive party polarization more than independents, and strong partisans have a stronger tendency to perceive polarization than weak partisans and leaners. All in all, those who indicate to be partisans manifest partisan attitudes when it comes to voting. Turkey has a high level of partisanship, and low levels of electoral volatility and defection rate. The results show that electoral volatility in Turkey, which was high for a long time, has largely decreased in the last general elections. The findings also suggest that this is linked to partisanship. While vote switchers are mainly concentrated among the independents, those who switch their votes among partisans are generally the leaners and weak partisans.

Furthermore, I have analyzed partisanship's indirect impact on the vote through political attitudes. To do so, this work has focused on whether party identification shapes the way voters evaluate satisfaction with democracy, government approval, state of economy, and parties and leaders. The analyses have produced results that show strong evidence for a partisan gap while evaluating volatile short-term political objects, and sentiments towards parties and leaders. Therefore, this study concludes that partisans in Turkey do behave like partisans both concerning their votes and their political attitudes. Party identification not only

affects the vote, but also evaluations of political objects.

All in all, this research has demonstrated that party identification has explanatory power both on the vote and the political attitudes in Turkey. For a better comprehension of voting behavior in Turkey, further research should hence incorporate party identification. However, the implications of this study are not limited to the Turkish context. Firstly, there are studies that tested the applicability of Michigan model of voting to other Western democracies. However, the literature is scarce when it comes to the utility of party identification in new democracies. This study provides evidence that the concept applies to Turkey—an unconsolidated democracy. Secondly, scholars mostly focused on one side of the coin: partisanship stabilizes politics, thus desirable in new democracies. However, partisanship has not been studied with a framework of polarization. The findings suggest that partisanship in an extremely polarized context can have implications for democratic theory in new democracies. Polarization boosts partisanship, and in return partisanship in such a context freezes partisan votes. When voters behave and cast their ballots only in accordance with their partisan attachment, the electorate becomes less responsive and responsible in that the incumbent does not face electoral sanctions, which undermines party competition. Electoral volatility can foster party competition in that political elites – especially the incumbent, fearing electoral sanctions – are encouraged to be more responsive to the demands of the electorate (Bischoff 2013; Bartolini 1999). In the Turkish case, political parties do not have the incentive to compete over policy preferences because the partisans do not defect from their parties. Therefore, in light of democratic theory, partisanship may not always be desirable. While moderate polarization and partisanship can be useful to maintain a stable electoral democracy, high levels of the two can harm the functioning of representative democracies by decreasing

the importance of short-term factors, hence the responsibility of the government, especially in new democracies.

Limitations of the Study

There are limitations to the findings of this study. Ideally, an analysis on party identification should be based on panel data where the same respondents are tracked over time, if possible for successive elections. Another option could be a pre-election survey with a post-election follow-up survey, which allows tracking changes in time. These types of analyses should give us a more detailed nature of party identification. As I do not have access to panel data that include a party identification measure in Turkey, this study could not track the evolution of party identification through time. Hence, I acknowledge that the findings are rather suggestive evidence. As respondents may have resorted to rationalization after the election, that can alter the reality. For instance, it is not possible to overrule the possibility that whether partisans align their party identification with their vote choice between elections or after the last election. If this is the case, the defection rate may differ from reality. Moreover, volatility is calculated based on the previous vote choice, which is a recall question. However, it is important to keep in mind that these limitations remain valid for each participating country in the datasets, and therefore should not bias the comparative analyses.

Future Research

Now that this research has provided initial findings that the funnel of causality applies to the Turkish case, future research on Turkish voting behavior should consider party identification. The scholars should also collaborate on conducting panel surveys to investigate more profoundly the causality of the concept and its evolution and stability over time. This

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study also encourages future research on the relationship between polarization and partisanship, compulsory voting and partisanship. Having found that the Michigan model travels to Turkey, this research also encourages scholars to test whether the model can also be applied to other democracies or even authoritarian regimes.

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Appendices

Appendix 1: Additional Tables

Table 6. Linear regression of satisfaction with democracy

	2011	2015
Party ID		
Independents (ref.)		
Strong Incumbent	0.715***	0.618***
	(0.089)	(0.139)
Weak Incumbent	0.495***	0.522***
	(0.084)	(0.142)
Weak Opposition	-0.506***	-0.193
	(0.099)	(0.141)
Strong Opposition	-0.467***	-0.631***
	(0.093)	(0.131)
Sex	-0.046	-0.019
	(0.055)	(0.085)
Age	0.025	-0.050
	(0.019)	(0.033)
Income	0.023	0.028
	(0.021)	(0.032)
Ideology	0.034**	0.069***
	(0.012)	(0.016)
Education	-0.016	-0.104*
	(0.018)	(0.043)
Religiosity	0.078	0.007
	(0.041)	(0.065)
Constant	0.898***	1.429***
	(0.190)	(0.296)
Observations	675	742
R^2	0.429	0.260

Standard errors in parentheses $^*\,p < 0.05$, $^{**}\,p < 0.01$, $^{***}\,p < 0.001$

Table 7. Linear regression of satisfaction with the government

	2011
Party ID	
Independent (ref.)	
Strong Incumbent	0.769***
	(0.085)
Weak Incumbent	0.471***
	(0.081)
Weak Opposition	-0.540***
	(0.095)
Strong Opposition	-0.666***
	(0.090)
Sex	-0.030
	(0.052)
Age	-0.021
	(0.018)
Income	-0.040*
	(0.020)
Ideology	0.043***
	(0.011)
Education	0.000
	(0.017)
Religiosity	0.014
	(0.039)
Constant	1.544***
	(0.179)
Observations	667
R^2	0.512

Standard errors in parentheses * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 8. Linear regression of economic evaluations

	2015
Party ID	
Independents (ref.)	
Strong Incumbent	0.751***
	(0.118)
Weak Incumbent	0.668***
	(0.121)
Weak Opposition	-0.104
	(0.120)
Strong Opposition	-0.238*
	(0.112)
Sex	-0.004
	(0.072)
Age	-0.010
	(0.028)
Income	0.068*
	(0.028)
Ideology	0.032*
	(0.014)
Education	0.028
	(0.037)
Religiosity	0.018
	(0.056)
Constant	0.717**
	(0.250)
Observations	737
R^2	0.214

Standard errors in parentheses $^*p < 0.05$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{***}p < 0.001$

Table 9. Linear regression of incumbent party and incumbent leader evaluations

Party ID	2011 Incumbent Leader	2011 Incumbent Party	2015 Incumbent Leader	2015 Incumbent Party
Independents (ref.)				
Strong Incumbent	3.238***	3.332***	4.285***	4.983***
	(0.268)	(0.262)	(0.278)	(0.242)
Weak Incumbent	2.939***	3.161***	4.063***	4.433***
	(0.254)	(0.249)	(0.283)	(0.246)
Weak Opposition	-2.718***	-2.696***	-1.967***	-2.088***
	(0.300)	(0.293)	(0.280)	(0.245)
Strong Opposition	-3.374***	-2.850***	-2.161***	-2.588***
	(0.283)	(0.277)	(0.263)	(0.229)
Sex	-0.401*	-0.249	0.217	0.013
	(0.168)	(0.164)	(0.169)	(0.148)
Age	-0.129*	-0.083	0.035	0.043
	(0.057)	(0.056)	(0.066)	(0.058)
Income	-0.080	-0.086	-0.028	-0.072
	(0.064)	(0.062)	(0.064)	(0.056)
Ideology	0.179***	0.208***	0.186***	0.164***
	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.032)	(0.028)
Education	-0.233***	-0.203***	-0.077	-0.056
	(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.086)	(0.075)
Religiosity	0.221	0.243*	-0.016	-0.156
	(0.126)	(0.123)	(0.130)	(0.114)
Constant	5.672***	4.863***	2.840***	3.599***
	(0.575)	(0.563)	(0.588)	(0.513)
Observations	688	683	744	746
R^2	0.707	0.721	0.686	0.773

Standard errors in parentheses * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Appendix 2: Coding

Module 3

keep in 72880/73988

replace C3020_4 = . if (C3020_2==1)

Partisans including leaners:

generate pid =.

replace pid = 0 if (C3020_2==8)

replace pid = 0 if (C3020_2==5)

replace pid = . if (C3020_1==7)

replace pid = 1 if (C3020_1==1)

replace pid = 1 if (C3020_2==1)

Partisans excluding leaners:

generate pidd =.

replace pidd = 0 if (C3020_1==8)

replace pidd = 0 if (C3020_1==5)

replace pidd = . if (C3020_1==7)

replace pidd = 1 if (C3020_1==1)

Strength of Partisanship:

generate strength=.

replace strength = 0 if ((C3020_2==5) | (C3020_2==8)) //pure ind

replace strength = 1 if (C3020_2==1) //leaners

replace strength = 2 if (C3020_4==2) | (C3020_4==3) //weak

replace strength = 3 if (C3020_4==1)   //strong

label define strengthcat 0"pure independent" 1"leaners" 2"weak partisans" 3"strong partisans"

label values strength strengthcat

Partisan Categories:

gen groups=.

replace groups = 1 if ((C3020_2==5) | (C3020_2==8)) //independents

replace groups = 2 if (C3020_3==1) & (C3020_4==1) // strong incumbent

replace groups = 3 if (C3020_3==1) & ((C3020_4==2) | (C3020_2==1) | (C3020_4==3)) // weak and leaner incumbent

replace groups = 5 if (C3020_3==2 | C3020_3==3 | C3020_3==4) & C3020_4==1 //strong opposition

replace groups = 4 if ((C3020_3==2) | (C3020_3==3) | (C3020_3==4)) & ((C3020_4==2) | (C3020_2==1) | (C3020_4==3)) // leaner and weak opposition

label define groupscat 1"independent" 3"weak incumbent" 2"strong incumbent" 4"weak opposition" 5"strong opposition"

label values groups groupscat

Party to never vote for:

generate nevervote=.

replace nevervote = 0 if (C3029_LH==5)

replace nevervote = 0 if (C3029_LH==8)

replace nevervote = 1 if (C3029_LH==1)

1st party:

generate nevervote2 =.

replace nevervote2 = 1 if C3030_LH_1<5 & C3030_LH_2<5

replace nevervote2 = 0 if (C3029_LH==8) | (C3029_LH==5)

2nd party:

generate nevervote3 =.

replace nevervote3 = 1 if C3030_LH_1<5 & C3030_LH_2<5 & C3030_LH_3<5

replace nevervote3 = 0 if (C3029_LH==8) | (C3029_LH==5)

3rd party:

generate nevervote4 =.

replace nevervote4 = 1 if C3030_LH_1<5 & C3030_LH_2<5 & C3030_LH_3<5 &

C3030_LH_4<5

replace nevervote4 = 0 if (C3029_LH==8) | (C3029_LH==5)

Voted for incumbent:

gen votecast=.

replace votecast= 1 if C3023_LH_PL==1 //incumbent

replace votecast= 0 if C3023_LH_PL==2 | C3023_LH_PL==3 | C3023_LH_PL==4 //opposition

label define votecategory 1"incumbent" 0"opposition"

label values votecast votecategory

Age:

generate age=C2001

replace age = 1 if (age<=20)

replace age = 2 if (age>20) & (age<=30)

replace age = 3 if (age>30) & (age<=40)

replace age = 4 if (age>40) & (age<=50)

replace age = 5 if (age>50) & (age<=60)

replace age = 6 if (age>60) & (age<=70)

replace age = 7 if (age>70) & (age<=86) //80-86 arasnda sadece 7 kişi var o yüzden birleştirdim.

replace age = . if (age==999)

label define agecategory 1 "18-20" 2 "20-30" 3 "30-40" 4 "40-50" 5 "50-60" 6 "60-70" 7 "70-86"

label values age agecategory

Sex:

generate sex = C2002

replace sex = 0 if (sex==1) //male

replace sex = 1 if (sex==2) //female

label define sexcategory 0"male" 1"female"

label values sex sexcategory

Urban/rural:

rename C2030 rural_urban

Income:

rename C2020 income

replace income = . if (income==7)

replace income = . if (income==8)

replace income = . if (income==9)

Education:

rename C2003 education

replace education = . if (education==99)

Religiosity:

rename C2024 religiosity

replace religiosity = . if (religiosity==7)

replace religiosity = . if (religiosity==9)

Ideology:

rename C3013 ideology

replace ideology =. if (ideology==99)

replace ideology =. if (ideology==95)

Satisfaction with democracy:

gen stfdem1 = .

replace stfdem1 = 0 if C3019==5

replace stfdem1 = 1 if C3019==4

replace stfdem1 = 2 if C3019==2

replace stfdem1 = 3 if C3019==1

Government approval/satisfaction with the performance of the government:

generate stfperf = .

replace stfperf = 0 if (C3006==4)

replace stfperf = 1 if (C3006==3)

replace stfperf = 2 if (C3006==2)

replace stfperf = 3 if (C3006==1)

Leader and Party like-dislike:

generate akplike = C3009_A if C3009_A<11

generate chplike = C3009_B if C3009_B<11

generate mhplike = C3009_C if C3009_C<11

generate hdplike = C3009_D if C3009_D<11

generate erdoganlike = C3010_A if C3010_A<11

generate kklike = C3010_B if C3010_B<11

generate bahcelilike = C3010_C if C3010_C<11

generate demirtaslike = C3010_D if C3010_D<11

Defection:

gen defect=.

replace defect = 0 if C3020_3==C3023_LH_PL

replace defect = 1 if C3020_3!=C3023_LH_PL

replace defect = . if C3020_3==90 | C3020_3==97 | C3020_3==99

replace defect = . if C3023_LH_PL==90 | C3023_LH_PL==93 | C3023_LH_PL==97 | C3023_LH_PL==99

replace defect = . if C3023_LH_PL==.

replace defect = . if C3020_3==.

Volatility:

generate volatility = .

replace volatility = 0 if C3032_LH_PL==C3023_LH_PL

replace volatility = 1 if C3032_LH_PL!=C3023_LH_PL

replace volatility = . if C3023_LH_PL==93 | C3023_LH_PL==97 | C3023_LH_PL==99 | C3023_LH_PL==90

replace volatility = . if C3032_LH_PL==90 | C3032_LH_PL==97 | C3032_LH_PL==98 | C3032_LH_PL==99

replace volatility = 1 if C3032_LH_PL==89 & C3023_LH_PL!=4 & C3023_LH_PL<90

replace volatility = . if C3023_LH_PL==.

replace volatility = . if C3032_LH_PL==.

replace volatility = 0 if (C3032_LH_PL==89) & (C3023_LH_PL==4)

Regressions

Satisfaction with democracy:

regress stfdem1 i.groups

regress stfdem1 i.groups votecast

regress stfdem1 i.groups sex age income ideology education religiosity

Government approval:

regress stfperf i.groups

regress stfperf i.groups votecast

regress stfperf i.groups sex age income ideology education religiosity

Incumbent leader like-dislike:

regress erdoganlike i.groups

regress erdoganlike i.groups votecast

regress erdoganlike i.groups sex age income ideology education religiosity

Incumbent party like-dislike:

regress akplike i.groups

regress akplike i.groups votecast

regress akplike i.groups sex age income ideology education religiosity

Module 4

keep in 59637/60722

replace D3018_4 =. if (D3018_2==1)

Strength of Partisanship:

generate strength=.

replace strength = 0 if (D3018_2==5) | (D3018_2==8) //pure independents

replace strength = 2 if ((D3018_4==2) | (D3018_4==3)) //weak

replace strength = 3 if (D3018_4==1) //strong

replace strength = 1 if (D3018_2==1) //leaners

Partisans including leaners:

gen pid = .

replace pid = 1 if D3018_1==1 | D3018_2==1

replace pid = 0 if D3018_2==5 | D3018_2==8

Partisans excluding leaners:

gen pidd = .

replace pidd = 1 if D3018_1==1

replace pidd = 0 if D3018_1==5 | D3018_1==8

Strength of Partisanship:

generate strength=.

replace strength = 0 if (D3018_2==5) | (D3018_2==8) //pure independents

replace strength = 2 if ((D3018_4==2) | (D3018_4==3)) //weak

replace strength = 3 if (D3018_4==1) //strong

replace strength = 1 if (D3018_2==1) //leaners

Partisan Categories:

gen groups=.

replace groups = 2 if (D3018_3==1) & (D3018_4==1) // strong incumbent

replace groups = 3 if (D3018_3==1) & ((D3018_4==2) | (D3018_4==3) | (D3018_2==1)) // weak and leaner incumbent

replace groups = 5 if ((D3018_3==2) | (D3018_3==3) | (D3018_3==4)) & (D3018_4==1) // strong opposition identifiers

replace groups = 4 if ((D3018_3==2) | (D3018_3==3) | (D3018_3==4)) & ((D3018_4==2) | (D3018_4==3) | (D3018_2==1)) //weak and leaner opppositon identifiers

replace groups = 1 if ((D3018_2==5) | (D3018_2==8)) // pure independents

label define groupscat 1"independents" 3"weak incumbent" 2"strong incumbent" 4"weak opposition" 5"strong opposition"

label values groups groupscat

Age:

gen age =.

replace age = 1 if D2001_Y==1997

replace age = 2 if D2001_Y<1997 & D2001_Y>=1987

replace age = 3 if D2001_Y<1987 & D2001_Y>=1977

replace age = 4 if D2001_Y<1977 & D2001_Y>=1967

replace age = 5 if D2001_Y<1967 & D2001_Y>=1957

replace age = 6 if D2001_Y<1957

label define agecategory 1"20" 2"20-30" 3"30-40" 4"40-50" 5"50-60" 6"60+"

label values age agecategory

Income:

gen income = D2020

replace income=. if income==9

Sex:

gen sex = .

replace sex = 0 if D2002==1

replace sex = 1 if D2002==2

Rural/Urban:

rename D2031 rural_urban

Education:

gen education= D2003

replace education = 0 if education==96

replace education = . if education==97

replace education = 1 if education==2

replace education = 2 if education==3

replace education = 3 if education==4

replace education = 4 if education==7 | education==8 | education==9

Religiosity:

generate religiosity= D2025 if D2025<5

Ideology:

gen ideology = D3014 if D3014<11

Party/leader like-dislike:

generate akplike = D3011_A if D3011_A<11

generate chplike = D3011_B if D3011_B<11

generate mhplike = D3011_C if D3011_B<11

generate hdplike = D3011_D if D3011_B<11

generate erdoganlike = D3012_A if D3012_A<11

generate kklike = D3012_B if D3012_B<11

generate bahcelilike = D3012_C if D3012_C<11

generate demirtaslike = D3012_D if D3012_D<11

Economic evaluation:

gen economy =.

replace economy = 0 if D3003_3==5

replace economy = 1 if D3003_3==4

replace economy = 2 if D3003_1==3

replace economy = 3 if D3003_2==2

replace economy = 4 if D3003_2==1

Satisfaction with democracy:

gen stfdem1 = D3017 if D3017<6

replace stfdem1 = 0 if stfdem1==5

replace stfdem1 = 1 if stfdem1==4

replace stfdem1 = 2 if stfdem1==2

replace stfdem1 = 3 if stfdem1==1

Voted for incumbent:

gen votecast =.

replace votecast= 1 if D3006_LH_PL==1 //incumbent

replace votecast= 0 if D3006_LH_PL==2 | D3006_LH_PL==3 | D3006_LH_PL==4 //opposition

Defection:

gen defect = .

replace defect = 0 if D3018_3==D3006_LH_PL

replace defect = 1 if D3018_3!=D3006_LH_PL

replace defect = . if D3018_3==90 | D3018_3==97 | D3018_3==98 | D3018_3==99

replace defect = . if D3006_LH_PL==90 | D3006_LH_PL==92 | D3006_LH_PL==97 | D3006_LH_PL==98 | D3006_LH_PL==99

replace defect = . if D3006_LH_PL==.

replace defect = . if D3018_3==.

Volatility:

generate volatility = .

replace volatility = 0 if D3008_LH_PL==D3006_LH_PL

replace volatility = 1 if D3008_LH_PL!=D3006_LH_PL

replace volatility = 0 if (D3008_LH_PL==89) & (D3006_LH_PL==4)

replace volatility = . if D3008_LH_PL==90 | D3008_LH_PL==92 | D3008_LH_PL==97 | D3008_LH_PL==98 | D3008_LH_PL==99

replace volatility = . if D3006_LH_PL==90 | D3006_LH_PL==92 | D3006_LH_PL==97 | D3006_LH_PL==98 | D3006_LH_PL==99

Regressions:

Satisfaction with democracy:

regress stfdem1 i.groups

regress stfdem1 i.groups votecast

regress stfdem1 i.groups sex age income ideology education religiosity

Economic evaluation:

regress economy i.groups

regress economy i.groups votecast

regress economy i.groups sex age income ideology education religiosity

Incumbent leader like-dislike:

regress erdoganlike i.groups

regress erdoganlike i.groups votecast

regress erdoganlike i.groups sex age income ideology education religiosity

Incumbent party like-dislike:

regress akplike i.groups

regress akplike i.groups votecast

regress akplike i.groups sex age income ideology education religiosity