Université de Montréal

From Shakespeare's Globe to our Globe

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For my family

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RÉSUMÉ DE SYNTHÈSE

La pièce théâtrale de Shakespeare intitulée *Henry V* est à propos d'un projet de l'unification nationale. C'est grâce à la prouesse de rhétoricien et de commandant de l'héro éponyme de cette pièce que le projet précité est réalisé. *Henry V,* qui ne tarit pas d'éloges du nationalisme, s'est prêté parfaitement au projet de propagande du cinéaste anglais, Laurence Olivier, durant la Deuxième Guerre mondiale. En outre, ces éloges situent l'œuvre de Shakespeare, aussi bien que l'adaptation d'Olivier au sein du paradigme de la souveraineté moderne, que Hardt et Negri décrivent dans leur livre intitulé *Empire*. Cependant, l'utilisation de cette pièce comme propagande pour la guerre des États-Unis contre l'Iraq, durant l'ère impériale postmoderne demeure surprenante. En effet, la question qui se pose, dans cette situation, est la suivante : Comment est-ce qu'une pièce qui fait l'éloge du nationalisme peut-elle servir comme propagande dans une ère durant laquelle, si on prend le livre de Hardt et Negri en considération, le nationalisme est sur le déclin ?

Ma thèse est divisée en trois chapitres. Mes deux premiers chapitres traitent de la manière avec laquelle la pièce théâtrale de Shakespeare et le film d'Olivier portent leurs soutien à la nation bourgeonnante de l'Angleterre, aussi bien qu'à la Grande Bretagne, durant la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Par ailleurs, dans mon premier chapitre, je mets en exergue le plan d'unification nationale d'Henry V. J'examine également les stratégies aux quelles il a eu recourt, lors de l'exécution de son projet. Vers la fin de ce chapitre, j'analyse le rôle crucial que de la distorsion joue dans le processus de l'écriture d'*Henry V*, qui a pour but d'unifier les anglais à travers le théâtre, l'un des principaux composants de la machine idéologique de la Renaissance anglaise.

Dans mon deuxième chapitre, je propose une lecture des scènes majeures qui doivent être éliminer avant que l'héros éponyme de la pièce théâtrale de Shakespeare devienne acceptable pour le publique britannique des années quarante. Mon étude de ce processus se base sur l'adaptation cinématographique de cette pièce théâtrale par Laurence Olivier. Je vais aussi souligner le rôle qu'a joué la politique discriminatoire du Ministère de l'Information britannique, dans la production de ce film.

Dans mon dernier chapitre, mon attention se porte sur la comparaison que les médias américaines établissent souvent entre George W. Bush et l'héro de Shakespeare,

après les attaques terroristes du 11 Septembre. A travers une lecture d' *Henry V*, le livre de Hardt et Negri, aussi bien que l'article de Laffey et Weldes intitulé « La Représentation de l'International : La Souveraineté Après la Modernité » (ma traduction), je propose une étude de la nature complexe du nouvel ordre économique et politique, qui marque l'ère de la mondialisation. Dans cette étude que je propose, je ne favoris aucune lecture du nouvelle ordre, car ma lecture, dans ce cas, sera sans doute bornée. En effet, ce que je démontre, dans mon troisième chapitre, est qu'une juxtaposition de l'importance du passage de la souveraineté moderne à la souveraineté impériale sur laquelle Hardt et Negri mettent l'accent, d'une part, et l'internationalisation de l'état comme une structure de pouvoir, dont Laffey et Weldes nous parlent, dans leur article précité, est indispensable pour une meilleure compréhension du nouvel ordre mondial.

Shakespeare, mondialisation, Henry V, l'adaptation cinématographique d'Olivier, la formation de la nation

ABSTRACT

William Shakespeare's *Henry V* is about national unification brought about by a Machiavellian king through his rhetorical and military prowess. It also celebrates the unity of the ranks of the English and presents it as a *sine qua non* for their victory over the French. These aspects of the play made it suitable for propaganda purposes, during World War II. They also situate both Shakespeare's play and Olivier's adaptation of it well within the paradigm of modern sovereignty, as Hardt and Negri describe it in Empire. What is striking, however, is that this very play representing the quintessence of nationalism and modern sovereignty is used in the age of empire to portray George W. Bush and his war on Iraq. Indeed, Hardt and Negri contend that the contemporary world order is based primarily on the erosion of national sovereignty and that "the United States does not, and indeed no nation-state can today, form the center of an imperialist project" (xiv). Here, a question begs to be asked: how can *Henry V* be of any use in a world where national sovereignty is on the wane, if we are to believe Hardt and Negri? Answering this question is part of the task I set for myself in this thesis, which falls into three parts.

In my first and second chapters, I will examine the way Shakespeare's play and Olivier's adaptation of it reflect and serve the burgeoning English nation state and the fully developed British nation state of the 1940s respectively. In fact, in my first chapter, I will examine Henry V's Machiavellian scheme of national unification and will outline the major strategies to which he resorts in his historical task. Furthermore, I will examine the role strategies such as deletion and distortion played in the process of the writing of the play.

In my second chapter, I intend to explore the major instances of deletion and distortion the play has to undergo before Shakespeare's Henry V becomes a heroic figure that does not offend the sensibilities of the British viewers of the 1940s. I will also underscore the role played by the Ministry of Information's discriminatory policies in the production of the movie.

In my last chapter, I focus my attention on the commonly drawn parallel between George W. Bush and Shakespeare's Henry, in post 9/11 America. Through a juxtaposition of the play, Hardt and Negri's *Empire*, and Weldes's and Laffey's article "Representing the International: Sovereignty after Modernity," I will study the intricate nature of our globalizing world order. In this regard, I will not be favoring Weldes and Laffey's reading of the current world order over that of Hardt and Negri, as that will only lead us to see one side of this world order. Rather, I will show that bringing together Hardt and Negri's emphasis on the passage from modern sovereignty to empire, and Laffey and Weldes's focus on the internationalization of the state as a structure of rule is crucial to reaching a better understanding of our current world order.

Shakespeare, Globalization, *Henry V*, Olivier's cinematographic adapatation of *Henry V*, nation formation

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INTRODUCTION

As one wanders along Mcgill Avenue, in Montreal, and reaches the Paragraphe bookstore, one's attention is immediately attracted by the picture of a modernized Shakespeare—with earphones—advertising the books of the aforementioned bookstore as "THE RIGHT STUFF." This bookstore's recourse to Shakespeare is symptomatic of the extensive use of the cultural authority of the bard, nowadays. The bust of Shakespeare's head concealing the switch that controls the entrance to the 'Batcave' in the television series Batman the picture of a modernized Shakespeare on the bookmarks, bags, and windows of a Montreal bookstore, as well as the use of his work for propaganda purposes, at different periods of time, and in different places constitute what Graham Holderness calls "the real Shakespeare" (VS 93). Holderness's conception of the real Shakespeare refers to:

> A vast and enormously complex system of refracting prisms: the whole multifarious body of ideas, attitudes, assumptions, images, which have accrued over centuries of cultural activity centered on the literary productions of this Elizabethan dramatist, and which constitute at any given historical moment the ideological problematic in which Shakespeare is recognized. (93)

In my thesis, I intend to examine this "real Shakespeare" through the study of the odyssey of his *Henry V* from 1599, through its use as propaganda in Britain, during World War II, to its use again as propaganda in post 9/11 America. In order to do this, I will approach this play from a Cultural Materialist perspective (Holderness 93).

What is interesting about juxtaposing these three distant moments in the odyssey of *Henry V* is that it highlights the wide gap between early modernity, on the one hand, and postmodernity, on the other hand. Indeed, both the play and Olivier's adaptation of it present us with conceptions of the nation, identity, war and the enemy that are characteristic of the modern paradigm of sovereignty, as both Hardt and

Negri describe it, in *Empire*. Studying the specificities of the early modern and modern world orders make us all the more aware of the distinct nature of our contemporary world order, which Hardt and Negri call Empire. What is striking about the parallels drawn between Henry V and Bush and their respective wars is that they use a play which exemplifies the modern paradigm of sovereignty, to talk about the policies of the superpower that is presently leading our postmodern globalizing world order. A fundamental question I will try to answer in my thesis is: how can a play that anticipates the increasing sovereignty and importance of nation-states be used to qualify a world where, if we take Hardt and Negri's *Empire* into account, the sovereignty of nation-states is declining?

In the first chapter of my thesis, my reading of the play will underline a common aspect of both New Historicism and Cultural Materialism, namely "understand[ing] the literary text, in its socio-cultural field" (Kamps 6). That is, I will show that an exploration of the political and historical circumstances under which *Henry V* was written is a *sine qua non* for a good understanding of the play. The ambiguities that such critics as Norman Rabkin and Sara Munson Deats see in the play will dissolve through the "radical contextualizing of literature which eliminates the old division between literature and its 'background', text and context" (Dollimore and Sinfield PS 4). Juxtaposing Shakespeare's *Henry V*, Niccolo Machiavelli's *The Prince*, Erasmus's *The Complaint of Peace* and *The Education of a Christian Prince*, I intend to show that Shakespeare's Henry V is rather an exemplary Machiavellian prince. In this sense, I will diverge from Deats and Rabkin whose work does underline the richness of the play, but fails to find the logic behind the

coexistence of the Machiavellian and the Christian sides of the king. Here, I argue that Henry's masquerade as a pious Christian prince plays a central role in his success as a Machiavellian king. I will also emphasize this Machiavellian side of Henry V through an examination of the Machiavellian strategies he uses. Among these, I will focus mainly on his use of religious discourse, his recourse to international war, and his building of a citizen-army. Henry deploys this Machiavellian arsenal with a view to achieving national unification.

Then, I will move to the arsenal deployed by Shakespeare in his depiction of an ideal, unified England. Among the major components of the Shakespearean arsenal, in this respect, are the bard's recourse to religious discourse and distortion, as well as to his "aesthetic colonization" (Dollimore and Sinfield HI 221) of those sites of potential dissent in Elizabethan society. Indeed, the cohesion and unity of the English reflected in *Henry V* is the result of muting the dissenting voices of the Irish, the Scottish, and Welsh, as well as the voices of characters belonging to the category of masterless men, like Bardolph, Nym, and Pistol.

To end my first chapter, I will examine the ideological significance of the death of Falstaff, in *Henry V*. Indeed, I will show how he can stand metaphorically for the multitude, which, according to Hardt and Negri, had to be crushed by the counter-revolution to forge the people, in the Renaissance. I will approach this question through the insightful reading Hardt and Negri offer of the revolution and the counter-revolution that characterized the Renaissance.

In my second chapter, I will examine the use of *Henry V* in World War II, in Britain, through Laurence Olivier's cinematographic adaptation. Furthermore, I will

shed light on the circumstances under which the movie was produced, emphasizing the crucial role the Ministry of Information (MOI) played in shaping its propaganda message during World War II. Then, I will examine the aspects of the play Olivier had to delete or distort in order to present the British wartime audience with an acceptable heroic figure.

In the third chapter of my thesis, I will juxtapose Hardt and Negri's *Empire*, Shakespeare's *Henry V*, and Paul A. Passavant and Jodi Dean's *Empire's New Clothes: Reading Hardt and Negri,* in an attempt to articulate the complex nature of the current globalizing world order. Here, I argue that what makes *Henry V* relevant, in the postmodern context of the war on terror, is the crucial role the internationalization of the American state plays in the present configuration of global power. Comparing the conceptions of the enemy, the nation, and the war, characteristic of the world of Shakespeare's *Henry V*, or even that of Olivier's, on the one hand, and their mutations in our globalizing world order, I intend to show that the world, in the aftermath of 9/11, can be read as a postmodern version of the Polybian model. This is one of the elements I will deal with in my last chapter. I will also examine the internationalization of the American "band of brothers" and the American structure of rule, the postmodern nature of the ubiquitous terrorist enemy, and the different nature of the war (IV. 3. 291). All these elements, signal the difference of Shakespeare's England and Olivier's Britain from the postmodern configuration of global power in the twenty-first century.

Chapter I

Neither a Rabbit, Nor a Duck, It Is a Freak of Nature: Henry V's Machiavellian Project of National Unification

Though adaptations of Shakespeare's *Henry V* during the Second World War and in the Bush administration's campaign for the war on Iraq in 2003 celebrate the eponymous hero's courage, resolve and patriotism, a close reading of the bard's play makes us realize the reductiveness of such a reading. To put it in Rabkin's terms, the propagandist production of Olivier (1943), for instance, instead of providing a picture that can be seen either as a "duck" or as a "rabbit," categorically chooses an alternative and presents it as the only possible interpretation (246). Interestingly enough, a survey of the literature on *Henry V* reveals that a similar reductive interpretation marked the earlier works of criticism on the play. Indeed, most articles written before Karl P. Wentersdorf's "The Conspiracy of silence in *Henry V*" have seen Henry V either as an ideal monarch[1] or as "a Machiavellian militarist who professes Christianity but whose deeds reveal both hypocrisy and ruthlessness" (Rabkin 245).[2]

Through a juxtaposition of Shakespeare's *Henry V* and Erasmus's *The Education of a Christian Prince* and *The Complaint of Peace*, I intend to show that Henry V cannot be considered as an ideal Christian prince, but rather as an ideal model Machiavelli. Then, through a juxtaposition of Machiavelli's *The Prince* and Shakespeare's play, I will outline the different Machiavellian strategies to which Henry V resorts in his project of national unification.

The publication of Wentersdorf's article in 1976 marked the beginning of the second phase in the history of the scholarly criticism on *Henry V*. This phase is

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[1] See Sherman Hawkins, who represents the other end of the critical spectrum. He has discerned in Henry V the traits of "an exemplary Christian monarch" (Rabkin 259).

[2] See Harold C. Goddard, who "left us a devastating attack on Henry V as Shakespeare's model Machiavellian" (Rabkin 256).

characterized by the emphasis critics lay on the importance of discerning both the duck and the rabbit in Henry V. Underlining the ambivalence of the protagonist's character is—as Rabkin, a major representative of this critical trend, notes— one way of avoiding a reductive reading of the play. He points this out clearly, in "Rabbits, Ducks, and *Henry V,*" when he says "I hope that simply by juxtaposing the two readings I have shown that each of them, persuasive as it is, is reductive, requiring that we exclude too much to hold it" (260).[3]

Among the most recent articles written on *Henry V* is Deats' "Henry V at War: Christian King or Model Machiavel." In this insightful article, Deats acknowledges the role Rabkin's article played in revolutionizing the critical enterprise as far as *Henry V* is concerned. She states clearly, at the beginning of her work, that her

> [s]tudy supports and develops Rabkin's interpretation. Focusing on the much contested topic of war as it is examined in Shakespeare's epic drama, my essay argues that *Henry V* can be read as either a celebration of the eloquent, ebullient monarch and his astonishingly lopsided victory over the French or as probing deflation of both rhetoric and war, depending on the perspective from which the text is viewed and the elements foregrounded by the interpreter. (83-4)

Like Rabkin's article, Deats's acknowledges the different possible readings and juxtaposes them to underscore the wealth of the play.[4]

The juxtaposition of the different possible readings of *Henry V*, which both Rabkin and Deats undertake, clearly do more justice to the play than the reductive interpretations provided by the Manichaean critics referred to above. Indeed, they

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[3] "Them", here, refers to the Manichaean interpretations of the play that characterized the first phase of the history of the literature written on it.

[4] These different readings result from considering the play from the following perspectives: "*Henry V* as an exemplum of the 'functional ambiguity" identified by Patterson, the dramatic arguments on both

study not only the attributes that make Henry seem an ideal "Christian King," but also those that make him a "model Machiavelli" (Deats 83). However, the problem with both Rabkin's and Deats' readings is that they only succeed in enumerating the Christian and Machiavellian characteristics of Henry V, but do not attempt to explain the relationship between the two. Structurally speaking, their articles mark a certain schizophrenic division between the two facets of the king. This is more clearly the case of Rabkin, whose article is divided clearly into four parts. The second part of his article deals with the different traits of Henry V that warrant his characterization as an ideal Christian king, while the third presents us with those that won him the title of Machiavellian prince. Likewise, Deats contrasts Henry's Machiavellian side with his Christian one.

It is this relationship between the Machiavellian and Christian sides of Henry V that I will deal with, in this first chapter of my thesis. I will also to show that the very characteristics both Deats and Rabkin take as making up the Christian facet of the king are simply a *sine qua non* for a Machiavellian prince to succeed in his historical task. According to Rabkin, these characteristics are mainly to be discerned in Henry's St. Crispin's speech, in which he acknowledges a band of brotherhood between his soldiers and himself (IV. 3. 291). It is also apparent in "the king's ability to listen to the soldier Williams and to hear him which suggests like his subsequent fooling with Fluellen in the same fourth Act, a king who is fully a man" (Rabkin 253). As far as Deats is concerned, the Christian side of the king is communicated to

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sides of the question discussed by Altman, and the perspective puzzles examined by Gilman" (Deats 84-5).

the reader/ spectator through the interventions of the chorus and the laudatory accounts we get from the bishops at the beginning of the play (I. 1. 21-2).

Although Paul A.Cantor's "Christian and English Mercuries," as well as Rabkin's and Deats's articles, to mention but a few, refer to the two models of the Christian king and the model Machiavelli, they do not trace back the two models to their sources, mainly when it comes to the Christian King. Knowing these sources can only better our understanding of the play. The two models come down to us from a genre that was popular during the early decades of the sixteenth century, namely advice to princes manuals, or mirrors for princes. The books that are classified under this genre aim at presenting a "substantive discussion of political ideas [that] are organized around a narrative order—the transformation of the prince into an ideal king" (Jardine xvii). The Machiavellian model, which is more thoroughly discussed by critic, though not satisfactorily, is inspired from Niccolò Machiavelli's *The Prince* (1513). As far as the Christian model is concerned, it is derived from Erasmus's response to Machiavelli's manual, which came in the form of a book entitled *The Education of a Christian Prince* (1516). Ironically enough, when one reads Erasmus's book, one is surprised to find that even the Christian side of Henry pointed out by Deats and Rabkin does not qualify him as a Christian prince, from an Erasmian perspective.

Henry V's St. Crispin's speech, his ability to listen to the common soldier Williams, as well as the laudatory accounts we get of him, are the major elements which, according to Deats (88) and Rabkin (252), win him the title of a Christian king. However, we know that the St. Crispin's speech—mainly its emphasis on the

fact that "[f]or he today that sheds his blood with me/ Shall be he ne'er so vile/ This day shall gentle his condition"—is simply a rhetorical stratagem to boost the morale of the soldiers (IV. 3.291). In fact, the bond of brotherhood that supposedly unites Henry and his soldiers dissolves when it comes to reading the list of the English casualties. At that point in the play, the vile is revealed to be vile. This can be clearly seen in the following lines "Edward the Duke of York; the Earl of Suffolk; / Sir Richard Keighley; Davy Gam, esquire;/ *None else of name, and of all other men/ But five-and-twenty*" (IV. 8.330, emphasis mine).

What Henry seems to have used, not to say abused, in the speech quoted above is his knowledge of the way of life of the common people he spent a lot of time studying before his accession to the throne. Indeed, his St. Crispin's speech with its description of the proud deeds of a veteran, belonging to the lower classes, stems from the king's understanding of the psychology of the commoners. To illustrate this, I may mention Henry's reference to the soldier who, on St. Crispin's day, "will…strip his sleeve and show his scars, / And say 'these wounds I had on Crispin's day'" (IV. 3. 290). These lines prove the fact that the king has put the archives of knowledge he compiled, during his "wilder days," to good use, as he informs the French ambassador, at the beginning of the play saying "we understand him well, / How he comes o'er us with our wilder days, / Not measuring what use we made of them" (I. 2. 149). The king's understanding of the commoners' psychology can more strikingly be seen through an examination of Pistol's final speech. Indeed, his plan to go to "England, and there I'll steal; / And patches will I get unto these cudgeled scars, / And swear I got them in the Gallia wars" show that Hal's apprenticeship in the

underworld of common people has enabled him not only to understand these people's way of thinking and habits, but also to anticipate their actions (V. 1. 344). Here, I do not mean that Henry anticipated the way Pistol would deceitfully use his scars, but rather that he anticipated the pride a lower class veteran would take in his war scars. This instance of the king's use of his past familiarity with this kind of people simply makes him unworthy of the title of Christian king, which Rabkin bestows upon him on account of the very speech considered above, from an Erasmian perspective (IV.3. 290). In fact, in his *The Education of a Christian Prince*, Erasmus contends:

> [i]t is the mark of the tyrant, indeed an underhand deception, to treat the people at large in the way that animal trainers customarily treat a wild beast; for their prime concern is to observe what pacifies it or what arouses it, and then they provoke or soothe it to suit their own convenience, Plato has forcibly remarked. For that is not to take popular feeling into consideration but to abuse it. (73)

Taking this Erasmian dictum into account, Henry's use of the archives of knowledge he has compiled, during his apprenticeship, in the lower class underworld in order "to make" the soldiers "fight cheerfully," as the dissenting soldier Williams puts it before the Battle of Agincourt, make it difficult to consider him a model Christian king (IV. 1. 269).

The other major element in the play that makes it even impossible for us to call Henry V a model Christian king is his waging a war on a Christian neighbor, namely the French, to fulfill his Machiavellian project of national unification. Juxtaposing Erasmus's *The Education of a Christian Prince*, *The Complaint of Peace*, and Shakespeare's *Henry V*, one cannot but consider Henry's war as unjust. In fact, in the last part of his *The Education of a Christian Prince*, entitled "On Starting War", as well as in his *The Complaint of Peace*, Erasmus makes it clear that

war is totally incompatible with the true spirit of Christianity, as "the whole philosophy of Christ argues against war" (ECP 105). Another relevant aspect of Erasmus's book *The Complaint of Peace* is its criticism of bishops and priests who preach, support, and even wage wars (like Pope Julius II). In this respect, he states:

> [n]either bishops, cardinals, nor Christ's own vicar blush to become the instigators, the very fire-brands of war, against which Christ, from whom they pretend to derive the only authority they can have, expressed his utter detestation. (CP 35-6)

An equally important aspect of *The Complaint of Peace* to take into account when considering the controversial issue of the causes that may "justify" war is Erasmus's remark: "but I blush to record, upon how infamously frivolous causes the world has been roused to arms by Christian kings. One of them has found, or forged, an obsolete musty parchment, on which he makes a claim to a neighboring territory" (Erasmus CP 31). Uncannily enough, this description of the common pretexts Christian kings presented in the early modern period to justify their wars is an adequate summary of the second scene of the first Act, in which the Archbishop of Canterbury delivers a perplexing account of the genealogical history justifying Henry V's claim to the French throne. The other pretext Shakespeare's Henry uses to justify his war is the insulting gift of tennis balls sent to him by the Dauphin. Taking into account the fact that Henry's war is justified by pretexts, it cannot be considered just, despite the king's seeming devotion to God and his claims that God fights with him against another Christian country. This is implied in the following lines, delivered by Henry after his victory in the Agincourt battle:

> [o]h God, thy arm was here;/ And not to us but to thy arm alone/ Ascribe we all. When, without stratagem, / But in plain shock and even play of battle, / Was ever known so great and little loss/ On one

> part and on th' other? Take it, God, / For it is none but thine. (IV. 8. 331)

In fact, Henry's assertion that "O God, thy arm was here, / And not to us but to thy arm alone/ Ascribe we all" insinuates that God is fighting on Henry's side against himself (IV. 8. 331). This is precisely what Henry asserts when he says that "in plain shock and even play of battle, / Was ever known so great and little loss/ On one part and on th' other? Take it, God, / For it is none but thine" (IV. 8. 331). This wholesale carnage of the French at the hands of the English is seen by Erasmus as parricide (Adams 103) because according to him "Christians are all brothers, and therefore between them war is parricide" (Adams 103). Thus, we can conclude that, from an Erasmian point of view, Henry's war on France is parricidal and unjust. Adams's contention that Erasmus's "basic premise is that war is a violation of uncorrupted Christian man's true nature, whose model must be Christ's own life. Therefore, war is virtually always unjust" (95) further backs up my argument. Consequently, he cannot, from an Erasmian perspective, be considered an ideal Christian king, as he fails to meet a major requirement a Christian king has to meet, namely avoiding war, which is the "abomination" of the Prince of Peace, Christ whose "dear delight is peace" (CP 16). This is the God Henry *accuses* of fighting on his behalf to kill other Christians.

Here, I contend that Henry V is well versed in masquerading as a Christian king and using religious discourse to achieve his ends. This qualifies him for the title of a Machiavellian prince rather than an Erasmian Christian monarch, mainly when we know the emphasis Machiavelli puts on the role the use of religion has to play in helping the prince keep a firm control over his state. In the following part of my

chapter, I will deal with the way Shakespeare's Henry V can be taken as an embodiment of Machiavelli's conception of the prince, through an examination of the strategies to which the king resorts in his project of nation unification. Among these, I will focus mainly on his recourse to international wars, the forging of a citizen-army, the importance of a reputation for cruelty, as well as the recourse to religious discourse. Although, as Rabkin asserts, the threatening speech Henry V delivers to the people of Harfleur and his order to kill the French prisoners (257), along with his unjust war on France make Henry qualify for the title of a Machiavellian prince, I find that the Machiavellian side of the play outlined by most Shakespearean critics remains very much reductive both of the bard's play and of Machiavelli's *The Prince.* Indeed, when one reads the work of the critics mentioned above, one can see that they equate the philosophy of Machiavelli with a lack of morality. This reductive reading of Machiavelli stems, to a large extent, from the fact that the critics do not give us an account of the similar political and historical contexts that produced Shakespeare's work and Machiavelli's.

Here, I argue that such a reductive understanding of Machiavelli can only produce works of criticism that see Henry V either as "a rabbit" or "a duck" (Rabkin 246). In the best of cases, it produces readings juxtaposing the two without the least attempt at finding a link between, what I would call, two sides of the same coin. Deats's and Rabkin's readings of the play can be safely classified under this category. In fact, as I have shown above, the devotion to Christianity, which some critics discern in the eponymous hero, is no more than a weapon in Henry's Machiavellian political arsenal. Had he been a truly devout Christian king, he would have followed

such principles as the ones outlined by Erasmus. He would not have waged an unjust war on a Christian neighbor, or issued the order to kill the French prisoners. Thus, what is Christian about Henry is merely skin-deep and utilitarian. This is exactly what Machiavelli recommends in the following passage:

> [a] prince, then, must be very careful not to say a word which does not seem inspired by the five qualities I mentioned earlier. To those seeing and hearing him, he should appear a man of compassion, a man of good faith, a man of integrity, a kind and a religious man. And there is nothing so important as to seem to have this last quality. Men in general judge by their eyes rather than by their hands; because everyone is in a position to watch, few are in a position to come in close touch with you. Everyone sees what you appear to be, few experience what you really are. (58)

Machiavelli's awareness of the importance people accord to the moral side of the king and of the fact that "the prince should…avoid anything which will make him hated and despised" lead him to stress the importance of seeming religious for the popularity and success of the prince (58). To use Rabkin's phraseology, I would say what we see in Henry is neither a rabbit, nor a duck, but probably a freak of nature we may call a rabbit-duck. In short, for the Machiavellian prince to succeed he has to don the attire of a Christian king, without necessarily being one.

What lends more support to my contention that Henry V is rather a model Machiavelli donning Christian apparel is the striking similarity between Machiavelli's and Shakespeare's works. The political circumstances under which both writers produced their works are marked by a clear instability. Moreover, both writers, as Tim Spiekerman puts it, share remarkably similar concerns (25). For instance, both deal extensively with "how political power is acquired and maintained" and "scrutinize the relation between morality, particularly Christian morality, and

political practice" (Spiekerman 25). Quoting Spiekerman at length further illustrates this resemblance:

> [t]hat Shakespeare knew of Machiavelli is certain: there are three references to him in his plays, two in the Histories. It is not certain, however, that Shakespeare knew Machiavelli's writings firsthand. The most critics and historians can establish is that he *could* have read him, that copies of *The Prince*, both in Latin and English, were available and read by educated sixteenth-century Englishmen. The most compelling evidence that Shakespeare knew Machiavelli's writings is also the most impressionistic: one needs only a casual acquaintance with *The Prince* and *The Discourses* to hear persistent echoes in Shakespeare's plays... It seems that one could illustrate almost any Machiavellian principle with an example from one of Shakespeare's plays. This may prove only that both men knew a lot about politics; but it also proves that Shakespeare knew what Machiavelli knew, whether or not he'd read him. (25)

Here, I argue that a juxtaposition and close reading of both works enable us to detect an affinity between the writers' responses to the issues with which they dealt. In this sense, Shakespeare's *Henry V* can be seen as the theatrical counterpart of Machiavelli's *The Prince*. Like Machiavelli, Shakespeare is aware of the importance people pay to the moral side of the king. This can be seen, for instance, through what the solider Michael Williams says about the king's war. He is also conscious of the fact that a prince "should do what is necessary under the circumstances, which sometimes demand virtue, other times vice" (Spiekerman 28). The ambiguity and duality critics like Deats and Rabkin detect and reflect in the way they present their arguments, dissolves when we take into account the bard's awareness of the expectations of the people and the exigencies of the prince's task—a prince faced with a country on the brink of chaos.

In this part of my chapter, I will deal with the way Shakespeare's Henry V can be taken as an embodiment of Machiavelli's conception of the prince through an

examination of the strategies to which the king resorts in his project of national unification. The Machiavellian strategy of recourse to international war, however, is not the only Machiavellian rule by which Henry V abides in the play. Indeed, taken as a whole, Shakespeare's work seems to be an enactment of Machiavelli's *The Prince,* through the theatrical medium. This can be explained by the similar historical conjunctures that produced both writers and by their similar concerns. Aware of the threats posed to the welfare and unity of England by her sworn enemy the Spaniards, the rebellion in Ireland, the conflict between the war party of the Earl of Essex and Sir Walter Raleigh and the peace party of Sir William Cecil, Elizabeth's Prime Minister, Shakespeare tries to subtly provide a solution by presenting Machiavellian strategies to which the Queen can resort in a time of national emergency (Deats 85). Machiavelli searches "in Rome and its history for the exemplary historical rehearsal of those laws of political practice to be observed to ensure the triumph of Italian unity" (Althusser 45). Likewise, Shakespeare searches English history "to ensure the triumph of [English] unity" (Althusser 45). He presents the reader/ spectator with a "Renaissance dream come true, the ideal monarch, in control of himself and his nation" through the figure of Henry V, the Lancastrian king (Cantor 82).

One important element that Machiavelli deems fundamental for the forging of a national whole under the prince consists of a recourse to international war waged by a specific type of army, namely a citizen-army (as mercenary, auxiliary, and composite armies can only lead to his ruin). Having witnessed the chaotic state of affairs that plagued his father's reign (Mowat 287-8) and remembering his father's dying advice to "busy giddy minds with foreign quarrels," Henry V wages a war on

France with his citizen-army (IV. 5. 213-4). In this way, he manages to turn all possible dissent or even hatred against a national common enemy, namely their "bad neighbor," the French (IV. 1. 257). Thus, in the very act of waging the war, he unifies English people from all walks of life—the clergy, noble men, and commoners—by bringing them together in one army faced with the same enemy. It is precisely this unifying power of a citizen-army that Althusser seems to underscore when he says, "[i]n these conditions we can appreciate why the army is the crucible of the people's political and ideological unity, the training school of the people, the becoming people of the people" (MU 102). This can be seen at work in Shakespeare's play through Henry's Harfleur speech, in which he rhetorically brings together all the English including "the noble English, / Whose blood is fet from fathers of war-proof" (III. 1. 202) and the "good yeomen, /whose limbs were made in England" (III. 1. 203). Then, in a sentence, he magically unites the soldiers belonging to these two classes, when he says "for there is none of you so mean and base/ That hath not noble lustre in your eyes" (III. 1. 204). It is probably the fact that Henry's army is a citizen-army that accounts, among other things, for its victory over the French army. The latter's recourse to "mercenaries" to whom Henry refers, when he reads the list of the "slaughtered French" is one of its weak points (IV. 8. 328). In fact, Machiavelli is categorical about the problems posed by this type of army when he says:

> Mercenaries and auxiliaries are useless and dangerous. If a prince bases the defense of his state on mercenaries he will never achieve stability or security. For mercenaries are disunited, thirsty for power, undisciplined, and disloyal; they are brave among their friends and cowards before the enemy. (40)

As if in response to this very Machiavellian dictum, the coherent body of Henry's citizen-army is made up of Englishmen from all walks of life, as well as of people from England's then belligerent neighbors, namely the Irish, the Welsh, and the Scottish.

This is where we can see the "aesthetic colonization," to which Dollimore and Sinfield refer, at work (HI 221). Indeed, when the play was performed Essex was sent to crush a rebellion in Ireland. Moreover, during the reign of Henry IV, Owen Glendower maintained open war in Wales and on the border of England and Wales for eight years (Mowat 287). Ireland was constantly rebelling against English domination. Here, of course, ideology plays a fundamental role in presenting these belligerent parties, mainly the Irish party, as parts that fit harmoniously in the English whole. This is brought about through their incorporation in the national army not as mercenaries—the way highlanders used to be deployed by the crown in its quelling rebellions in Ireland, at the time of the writing of *Henry V*—but as obedient and faithful national subjects. Although the Irish Scottish and Welsh captains do not "speak English in the native garb," as Gower puts it near the end of the play, and although Fluellen and Macmoris quarrel, they are wholeheartedly devoted to the English cause (V. 1. 342). When "the town sounds a parley" the Welsh and Irish captains forget their skirmish and go hurriedly to join the other soldiers (III. 3. 215). However, when we consult historical books dealing with the reign of Henry V, we can see that just the opposite happened.

The cohesion and integrity of this army, with its different social and regional categories, is only maintained through another Machiavellian strategy, namely a

necessary reputation for cruelty. Here, I will refer, for instance, to the much debated scene of the execution of Bardolph for stealing a "pax" (III. 6. 234). Most critics who deal with this scene, including Deats (92) and Rabkin (259), can only see through it the unfaithfulness of the king to a former companion, and his Machiavellian use of his friendship to people from the lower classes to know them better in order to control them more easily, once enthroned. This interpretation underscores an important aspect of the scene, namely the moral one. But, again this type of interpretation seems to reduce the Machiavellian doctrine to the strategic importance it gives to morality. This means that the prince abides by the dictates of morality as long as that does not threaten his status, power, and reputation as a prince. Bearing Machiavelli's teachings in mind, one can see that Henry's decision to "have all such offenders so cut off" is a necessary cruel act that enables him to keep the army disciplined and deter other soldiers from breaking the law (III. 6. 239). This decision on the part of Henry V would be, according to Machiavelli, an instance of the king's political *virtu*. Indeed, he contends that "a prince must not worry if he incurs reproach for his cruelty so long as he keeps his subjects united and loyal. By setting an example or two, he will prove "more compassionate than those who, being too compassionate, allow disorders which lead to murder and rapine. These nearly always harm the whole community, whereas executions ordered by a prince only affect individuals" (Machiavelli 54). Through the execution of Bardolph, Henry V will be able to set an example all the more deterring, as he did not spare even a former acquaintance, thus guaranteeing the reign of order, stability, and discipline over his army. This is one lesson Shakespeare implicitly teaches Elizabeth, as I will show later. This

understanding of cruel acts on the part of Henry V as an attempt to keep things under control, as far as his army is concerned, can also apply to whole societies. Here, it is important to remember the tight relationship between the people and the army for Machiavelli. Althusser hints at this when he says that the former is the "training school" of the latter (MU 102).

This necessary cruelty is also related to another fundamental Machiavellian principle stating that "it is far better to be feared than loved if you cannot both" (Machiavelli 54). One of the conspirators, Cambridge, sees that Henry V has achieved both when he says that there is "never [...] monarch better feared and loved / Than is your majesty" (II. 2. 168-9). As we know that Cambridge has taken part in the Southampton plot against Henry V, we are not to take his words at face value, but we become all the more aware of the importance of Machiavelli's work to a good understanding of Shakespeare's *Henry V*. However, the relevance of this Machiavellian principle can be seen at work more manifestly in the conspiracy plot, which seems to have taught the king not to rely solely on the love of his subjects. In fact, Lord Scroop—once the king's bedfellow who bore "the key to all [his] councils," and knew "the very bottom of [his] soul"—ended up conspiring against him (II. 2. 174). This very plot seems to have taught the king that "Men worry less about doing an injury to one who makes himself loved than to one who makes himself feared" (Machiavelli 54).

All these Machiavellian strategies, like forging a national whole by waging international war with a citizen-army and making good use of cruelty, when necessary, are meant to enable the ruler to achieve stability and cohesion in society.

A close reading of the play seems to indicate the way out for monarchs and to anticipate uncannily Louis Althusser's work on ideology. What Shakespeare seems to be doing in his *Henry V* is an illustration of the workings of the Cultural Ideological State Apparatus (Althusser TS 1489), *avant la lettre*. Indeed, according to Althusser the "State Apparatus" consists of two major parts, namely the "Repressive State Apparatus" and the "Ideological State Apparatus" (TS 1489). While the former includes the army, the police, and the government, the latter includes such institutions as the Church and schools. It is also under the latter that we find the Cultural Ideological State Apparatus, in which we may situate Shakespeare and his works (Althusser TS 1489). The most important characteristic of the Ideological State Apparatuses is that they function primarily by ideology and, to a lesser extent, by force. This can be seen at work through Shakespeare's play. Indeed, censorship which was a fundamental part of the proto-Renaissance Cultural Ideological State Apparatus (Althusser TS 1489) used to draw the boundaries that no playwright should cross, on pain of losing his work, if not his life. Bearing this factor and the close relationship between the Court and the theatre allow us to guess that the Ideological discourse with which we will be presented enhances the status of those in power, in one way or other. David Scott Kastan points this out when he says: "[d]ramatic production in Shakespeare's England was never an autonomous authorial achievement but a complex social and theatrical activity in which authorship was only one determinant" (102). This does not mean that plays staged on the Elizabethan stage were devoid of subversive content. However, as Kastan argues,

when dealing with Shakespeare's replacing the name of Oldcastle with that of Falstaff:

> [n]o doubt some form of interference from above led Shakespeare to change Oldcastle's name to 'Falstaff,' but scrutiny and regulation were among the determining circumstances of play making no less than boy actors in the theater or casting off copy in the printing house. Playwrights worked with and around censors to get their texts to the stage and into the shops. (104)

Furthermore, *Henry V* is a perfect example of what Jonathan Dollimore and Alan Sinfield call aesthetic colonization of all the rebellious quarters in Elizabethan England, as they find that the play is about:

> [n]ational unity: its obsessive preoccupation is insurrection. The king is faced with actual or threatened insurrection from almost every quarter: the Church, 'treacherous' faction within the ruling class, slanderous subjects, and soldiers who undermine the war effort, either by exploiting it or by skeptically interrogating the king's motives. All these areas of possible resistance in the play had their counterparts in Elizabethan England and the play seems, in one aspect, committed to the aesthetic colonization of such elements in Elizabethan culture, systematically antagonism is reworked as subordination or supportive alignment. (HI 221)

What Shakespeare does to bring about this aesthetic colonization of sites of resistance and to try to colonize the minds of the Elizabethan spectators is to represent

> [n]ot the system of the real relations which govern the existence of individuals to the real relations which govern the existence of individuals, but the imaginary relation of those individuals to the real relations in which they live. (Althusser OI 1499-1500)

In this sense, *Henry V* works the way ideology does. In fact, the bard distorts the Southampton plot, and resorts to religious discourse, as well as to the incorporation of a partisan chorus to present the spectators with an imaginary relation to their "conditions of existence" (Althusser OI 1499). It is worth noting that the imaginary

relations of the subjects to the king, the representative of the Althusserian Subject, is given particular importance, as I will show later.

Among the ideological arsenal with which Shakespeare provides Henry V, religion seems to occupy a key position. Indeed, it is thanks to his recourse to the religious discourse that Henry V succeeds in winning over characters in the play who "interrogate the king's motives" in his war on France (Dollimore and Sinfield 221). Inscribing his war on France from beginning to end in a supportive divine scheme is one of the major elements that enable him to do that. Through his speeches before and after the war, Henry makes it seem that he is fighting a holy war, or paradoxically as it may seem, a crusade, on behalf of a God whose "arm was here/ and not to us but to thy arm alone/ Ascribe we all" (IV. 8. 330). Ascribing the war to God, who cannot be accused of being unjust, along with the fact that "God so graciously hath brought to light" the "Southampton plot" sanctify Henry's war and make it seem legitimate and just (II. 2. 180). With a rhetorical sleight of hand, Henry V makes the viewer/ reader, in a way, unable to criticize or blame him without criticizing and blaming God, who has supported the war from beginning to end. It is the religious world outlook (Althusser OI 1498) in which Henry's scheme is inscribed that reinforces the Renaissance hierarchical ordering of society into "diverse functions" or classes (I. 2. 143).

This world outlook is presented as the natural order of things by the representative of this Religious Ideological State Apparatus, namely Archbishop Canterbury (Althusser TS 1489). Indeed, Canterbury's final honey bee speech makes unconditional obedience to the monarch, as well as the hierarchical structure of

society and all the injustice ensuing from it, as simply the natural order of things. In simplistic terms, that is the way God wants things to be. This, in turn, implies that whoever does not abide by the rules of this system, which is ordained by God and nature, is simply an "inhuman creature" (II. 2. 174) and an "English monster" (II. 2. 173). This is precisely what Dollimore and Sinfield allude to when they say:

> The principal strategy in ideology is to legitimate inequality and exploitation by representing the social order which perpetuates these things as immutable and unalterable—as decreed by God or simply natural. Since the Elizabethan period, the ideological appeal to God has tended to give way to the equally powerful appeal to the natural. But in the earlier period both were crucial: the laws of degree and order inferred from nature were further construed as having been put there by God. (HI 216)

Here, it is worth noting that the social hierarchy is respected throughout the play. Indeed, *Henry V* opens with the notorious honey bee speech with its reference to the heavenly division of "the state of man in diverse functions" (I. 2. 143). The Archbishop's speech calls upon the people belonging to different social classes and different guilds to respect their "diverse functions," the way their counterparts in the beehive do. In this hive, the Archbishop spots "a king, officers of sort, magistrates, merchants, soldiers and civil citizens," whose harmony and welfare are the result of the respect they show to their different functions (I. 2. 143-4).

The stability and unity of the nation depends on respecting this system. In fact, if the subjects belonging to the different social classes comply with the rules of the social structure they would "work contrariously, / As many arrows loosed several ways/ Come to one mark," (I. 2. 144) to help the monarch achieve his "one purpose" (I. 2. 145. The king's purpose, here, is national unification. As Althusser says, the Religious Ideological State Apparatus "forge[s] the Beautiful lies so that, in the belief

that they were obeying God, men would in fact obey the Priests and Despots, who are usually in alliance in their imposture, the priests acting in the interests of the Despots or vice versa" (OI 1499). *Henry V* clearly shows the intricately interrelated interests of the king and the Church. In fact, the latter not only sanctifies Henry's war on France, but also invests in it "a mighty sum/ As never did the clergy at one time/ Bring in to any of your ancestors" (I. 2. 139). In return, a bill of law that would take away "the better half" of the Church's possessions will not be implemented (I. 1. 123). It is such common interests bringing together monarchy and the Church that prompt the latter to provide the former with means to control and even dispose of dissenting subjects. This can be clearly seen through the way Shakespeare depicts the notorious Southampton plot. The conspiracy of Scroop, Cambridge and Grey against the life of an illegitimate king, namely Henry V, is seen by the latter as "another fall of man" (II. 2. 176).

What is also interesting about the representation of the Southampton plot is the distorted version Shakespeare gives us of it. We can see how it was meant to present the Elizabethan viewers with an imaginary relation to reality. Indeed, when we consider the way the Southampton plot is presented in Shakespeare's play, we do not learn about the real motives of the conspirators, namely the illegitimacy of Henry V as king, and the existence of a more legitimate claimant to the English throne, namely the Earl of March. Rather, what we get to know about the motives of the conspirators is that they were greedy for the gold of France, and that this evil plot was spurred by their "cruel," "ungrateful," "savage," and "inhuman" nature (II. 2. 174). This is what Peter Saccio highlights when he says: "Shakespeare omits to point out

that the conspiracy even had dynastic motives" (74). Though, here, we cannot say that the bard distorted his sources, as both "Hall and Holinshed [...] introduce the Cambridge plot as inspired by French bribery," we can safely say that he did not take their later discussion of "the dynastic motive" into consideration (Saccio 74). Shakespeare's description of the Southampton Plot along with the fact that all the conspirators end up acknowledging the greatness of the king and their own monstrous and unnatural intentions is one way the play aesthetically colonizes an antagonistic element in Elizabethan culture, namely the treacherous faction within the ruling class (Dollimore and Sinfield HI 221).

Another major component in the Shakespearean ideological arsenal consists in his providing the viewer/ reader with a positive representation of the monarch. In fact, according to Althusser's enlightening reading of Machiavelli's work, a prince can only succeed in his historical task, if he inscribes a positive portrait of himself in popular ideology. Though having good arms and a citizen-army are of paramount importance to the success of the king's national project, these two important elements in the prince's arsenal alone cannot lead to his success. To carry out his project successfully, he has to combine force and ideology. Taken along with the way the question of the legitimacy of Henry V is approached, this distorted representation of the Southampton plot allows Shakespeare to inscribe in popular ideology a positive representation of Henry V, in particular, and of the Althusserian Subject, in general (Althusser MU 99). In fact, if we leave out the king's prayer before the final battle of Agincourt, where he refers to his father's overthrow of Richard II—the only ancestor he refers to throughout the play is Edward III—his grandfather. Even the king of

France describes Henry's bravado in the following terms: "[t]hink we king Henry strong; / And, princes, look you strongly arm to meet him. / The kindered of him hath been fleshed upon us, / [...] Of that black name, Edward, Black Prince of Wales" (II. 4.190). This presentation of the king as descending not from a father who has transgressed the divine laws, but from his valiant grandfather aims at presenting the Elizabethan audience with a correct ideological relation between prince and people, via the positive "representation of the figure of the Prince" (Althusser MU 99). Rather than the negative attitudes the English people may have had towards the son of a usurper—who violated divine laws, *Henry V* imposes a positive imaginary relationship between the Elizabethan spectators and the protagonist.

Other elements contributing to this positive ideological representation of the monarch can be found in the latter's recourse to the Machiavellian strategy stating that "princes should delegate to others the enactment of unpopular measures and keep in their own hands the means of winning favors" (Machiavelli 61). The play abounds with illustrations of this Machiavellian principle. To give but a few examples, I will refer to the way the king cunningly makes the conspirators sentence themselves to death, at the end of Act II, scene ii. He does not start his meeting with the conspirators by accusing them. Rather, he devises a stratagem to delegate to others—here the conspirators—an unpopular measure consisting of causing him to show the "mercy that was quick in us but of late/ By your counsel is suppressed and killed" (II. 2. 173). Moreover, when his army is besieging Harfleur, he tells the Governor that the people of Harfleur will be responsible for all the barbarian and savage acts the English soldiers will undertake, if they do not yield. He states: "What is' t to me,

when you yourselves are cause, / If your pure maidens fall into the hand. / Of hot and forcing violation?" (III. 3. 217). Though he is the one who is going to tell the soldiers what to do, he puts the blame on the people of Harfleur who are defending their town from foreign invasion.

Another equally important element in the Shakespearean ideological arsenal is the chorus. A close reading of different interventions of the chorus makes us aware of the clear resemblance between the way it works and the way ideology works. That is certainly why Gunter Walch has referred to the chorus as the "working-house of ideology" (Walch 198). Through his constant appeals to the viewers to see what is not actually there, he wants them to have "an imaginary relationship to their real conditions" (Althusser OI 1498). Indeed, it is only through the chorus's reliance on the "imaginary forces" of the spectators (I. 0. 120) and thanks to the latter's "ek[ing] out our performance with your mind" (III. 1. 201) that the "unworthy scaffold" turns into "the vasty fields of France" (I. 0. 120). Here, I would say that what Shakespeare has done throughout his play, by analogy, is to take historical accounts from Hall and Holinshed, imagine the version that would present monarchy, in general, and Henry V, in particular, in the most positive of lights and present it as a ready-made seamless ideological fabric that can be passed for reality. This can be clearly seen in the way Shakespeare presents not only the Southampton plot, but also in the subtle way with which he contains and excludes potentially subversive subjects like the "three antics," namely Bardolph, Nym, and Pistol, and their late leader, Falstaff.[5]

[5] Here, I am concentrating rather on Shakespeare's treatment of these characters. I chose not establish a comparison between Shakespeare and Holinshed's *Chronicles* in this respect, as there no counterparts of the three antics in the latter.

The raison d'être of this ideological fabric is to present us with an ideal picture of English society "as a spurious unity" and to "efface conflict and contradiction" (Dollimore and Sinfield HI 219). This can be seen at work not only at the levels of social classes, but also at the geopolitical level. The English nation, which is symbolically represented by the English army is not only made up of the English yeoman and noblemen, but also of people from such belligerent neighboring nations as Wales, Scotland, and Ireland. This presentation of the English nation as a "band of brothers" (IV. 3. 291) depends on the repression of those who may cause "social instability" and threaten that unity (Dollimore and Sinfield HI 215). Instances of this abound in the play. In fact, all the elements that do not fit in are either literally disposed of, like Falstaff, or represented in such negative terms that they become not worthy of sympathy, like the "three antics," namely Nym, Bardolph, and Pistol (III. 2. 207). These four characters who stand for a residual ideological discourse, and who present a style of life opposed to the one opted for by the converted Hal, are all shown in a negative light. The three antics are shown to behave disgracefully in the Gallia war, during which they spend their time pillaging. To further legitimize the king's choice in turning his back on them, an apparently neutral character, the boy servant who accompanies them, depicts them negatively when he says:

> [a]s young as I am, I have observed these three swashers. / I am a boy to them all three, but all they three, / Though they would serve me, could not be man to me, / For indeed three such swashers do not amount to a man/ (III. 2. 206-7)…They will/ steal anything, and call it purchase. Bardolph stole a/ Lute-case, bore it twelve leagues, and sold it for three-/ Half pence. Nym, and Bardolph are sworn brothers in/ Filching, and in Calais they stole a fire-shovel I knew. / …Their villainy goes against my weak stomach, / And therefore I must cast it up. (III. 2. 207-8)

With this negative portrait of the three old companions of the king, no one will blame him for dissociating himself from such a bad and dishonorable company. A poorer and supposedly more neutral character, a boy, has dissociated himself from them without the least remorse. Likewise, Falstaff, Hal's best friend, is discarded by Henry because of the incompatibility of his philosophy of life with the strategic position Hal has to take to turn into a successful Machiavellian prince who can claim the support of religious authority. Hal's breaking his promise of remaining faithful to Falstaff has never failed to arouse the aversion of spectators/ readers. Henry V has to be understood against this background. Here, what has to be taken into account, however immoral it may sound, is that for a prince to be successful in his historical task, he has to bear in mind that:

> [e]veryone realizes how praiseworthy it is for a prince to honor his word and to be straightforward rather than crafty in his dealings; nonetheless contemporary experience shows that princes who have achieved great things have been those who have given their word lightly. (Machiavelli 59)

This is exactly what Henry V does when he breaks his promise to his former friend, someone who used to be in his favor, the way the Earl of Essex once was with Queen Elizabeth.

However, I would suggest that disposing of Falstaff can also be interpreted metaphorically as the defeat of the immanent forces that characterized the first mode of the Renaissance, at the hands of the counter-revolutionary mode. This second mode of the Renaissance aimed at controlling the first mode which "[posed] humanity and desire at the center of history" (Hardt and Negri 74). Defeating this first mode of the Renaissance plays a fundamental role in the constitution of a

coherent national whole, which, in turn, depends on crushing the spirit of freedom and non-conformity characterizing Falstaff. Indeed,

> [t]he latter's behavior, his drinking, carousing, stealing, and cowardice on the battlefield might strike one as an easy-going surrender to the low animal passions, a life of slothful indolence. But Falstaff is not at all easy-going. Unlike the run of the mill degenerate, who knows he is doing wrong but is too weak or too lazy to mend his ways, Falstaff is degenerate by choice. He has considered and rejected the arguments against his indulgent behavior. In his famous critique of honor on the battlefield, Falstaff shows himself to be a strident skeptic of ordinary opinion. (Spiekerman 143)

This description of Falstaff's choice of a path different from the one proscribed by religion, which has helped the counter-revolution to defeat the revolutionary first mode of the Renaissance, and his Dionysian celebration of life seem to allow for our reading him as representative of the multitude that has to be crushed in order for the homogeneous people, "a constituted synthesis that is prepared for sovereignty, to emerge" (Hardt and Negri 103). By metaphorically killing him, at the beginning of the play, Shakespeare seems to proclaim the victory of the Thermidor with Henry V's successful project of unification.

At this juncture, I will shed light on the masked subversive potential of Falstaff in relation to what I have been referring to as the Machiavelli-like responsibility Shakespeare shoulders implicitly in *Henry V*. Here, I shift the focus of my reading from the potential effects of the Shakespearean ideological fabric on the Elizabethan viewers to one particular potential viewer, namely the queen. Not only was Queen Elizabeth interested in Shakespeare's plays, but she was also someone who could interfere with the decisions of the writer concerning his fictional creations. Indeed, it was even at her request that Falstaff, for instance, was kept in *The Merry*

Wives of Windsor, which was written to respond to "Elizabeth's demand to see Falstaff in love" (Dutton 103). But, then, in *Henry V*, he is depicted in a negative light as a "fat knight with the great-belly doublet: he was/ Full of jests, and gipes, and knaveries, and mocks" (IV. 7. 313). This negative portrait of the knight is, of course, meant to justify the king's "killing his heart" with ingratitude, as the hostess puts it, at the beginning of the play (II. 1. 163).

The history of the performance of this play gives us an insight into the potential reasons behind this representation of Falstaff, the name Shakespeare gives to Sir John Oldcastle in order to mask and contain his subversive potentials, and reduce them merely to Epicureanism. This can be clearly seen through a play that was performed by the rival company the Rose, in September 1599. This play, which was entitled *Sir John Oldcastle*, was designed as a corrective to the Globe company's use of Oldcastle. It certainly:

> [r]ubbed in the Chamberlain Men's hasty change of his name to Falstaff, for which they had apologized in the Epilogue to *2 Henry IV*. The prologue to the new play asserted that 'it is no pampered glutton we present, / A valiant Martyr Oldcastle is represented not as a clown but as the Lollard martyr, enemy of the Catholic Church.' (Gurr 21) [6]

This play reveals not only Shakespeare's intention to contain the knight's subversive potentials, but also the real reason behind the Southampton plot, mainly the fact that Mortimer is a more legitimate claimant to the English throne than Henry V, and not financial profit, as Shakespeare would have us believe.

Historical accounts of the knight's potential real counterpart, Sir John Oldcastle, tell us that he "had served the crown under Henry IV, had fought on the

Welsh March and in France, and had been attached in some capacity or other to the prince's household" (Mowat 96). At one point in his life, he was on good terms with Henry V. As a leader of the Lollards, Oldcastle led the rebellion against the abuses of the Catholic Church. Kastan describes him in the following terms: "[h]e held heterodox views. He was widely understood to be a protector of heretical preachers, and was himself in communication with Bohemian Hussites and possibly sent Wycliff literature to Prague" (97). What is important about the rebellion that the potential real counterpart of Falstaff led is that it further relates Oldcastle, as a major source of subversion, to a certain love of life, but also to a conception of the community of believers, that is close to Hardt and Negri's conception of the multitude. In fact, this movement advocated the individual response of believers to the Bible, which was then translated into English by John Wycliff, the founder of the Lollard movement. This, of course, leads to a community of singular believers with their individual interpretations of the Bible. This implicit celebration of the spirit of the multitude links Oldcastle and his fictional counterpart, Falstaff, to the first mode of the Renaissance, through the opening up of a space for singular interpretations of the Holy Scriptures. From a Machiavellian vantage point, given the fact that the new king was not thoroughly established, such a popular figure and hardy knight as Oldcastle was dangerous, and had, therefore, to be disposed of, if Henry V was to strengthen his hold on power.

Here, I argue that masking the subversive attributes of the real counterparts of Falstaff not only serves to contain him, but also to set a precedent for the queen who

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[6] The same attitude is adopted by Gary Taylor who is "committed to the original and the restored presence of Oldcastle in the play" and who "has argued that Oldcastle's notoriety as a proto-

is facing a similar problem. In fact, the relationship of Henry V to Falstaff is quite akin to that between Elizabeth and the Earl of Essex. The popularity of Essex, with his military prowess, like the military exploits and religious dissension of Oldcastle threatened the unique position of power occupied respectively by Queen Elizabeth, who could not rival the military feats of Essex, and by Henry V. Indeed, a close reading of Essex's commission in light of what was to happen to the Earl makes it clear that Elizabeth's appointing Essex to the office of Lieutenant-General and Governor of Ireland was a Machiavellian stratagem to which the queen resorted so as to get rid of her dangerous rival, the Earl of Essex (Cadwallader 31). The major articles involved in the commission text are so cunningly phrased that they can allow for a manipulative interpretation, if need be. Among these articles, I may refer to the one that eventually led to the beginning of Essex's end, and which states that:

> [a]s you would lose time by sending to us for instructions, in case he [Tyron] should refuse the above conditions, we give you further authority to take him in upon such conditions as you shall find good and necessary for our honor and safety of the kingdom. (Cadwallader 33)

According to this article, absolute power and freedom are given to the Earl of Essex to determine the appropriateness of the conditions upon which to grant pardon to Tyron, the leader of the rebellion in Ireland. But, there seems to be an implicit trap in this article consisting in the fact that Essex's interpretation has to be made in such a way as to guarantee the honor and safety of the queen. The problem, here, is that the safety of Essex actually depends not on his interpretation of things but on the queen's interpretation of that interpretation. Given the fact that Queen Elizabeth was suspicious of Essex when she sent him to Ireland, we can guess that if his Irish

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Prostestant hero is precisely that which demanded Shakespeare's travesty (Kastan 99).

mission increased her suspicion, the queen would easily dispose of her rival through a manipulation of the text of the commission. That is exactly what happens as the queen puts it in a letter to Sir Jeffrey Fenton, Secretary for Ireland:

> [w]e do find by the manner of Essex his report that he [Tyron] seemeth to have been much carried on to this cause of submission in respect of the opinion he had of him, and the confidence he had by his mediation to procure all his desire. Tyrone professing, as it seemed by Essex his words, that such was his affection to himself for his father's sake, as he would not draw his sword against him, but he would do that for him which he would not do for any, other. [If he]... would forbear to draw his sword against our lieutenant rather than against us, *we shall take ourself thereby much dishonored*, and neither could value anything that shall proceed from him. (Cadwallader 62, italics mine)

Here, I contend that Henry V can be seen as the dangerous rival into whom Essex may develop, if he is to "[bring] rebellion broached on his sword" (V. 0. 335). In this regard, the play provides, through the fate allotted to Falstaff, a Machiavellian solution that would help out the queen who was jealous of the popularity of Essex with the masses (Cadwallader Preface). If we are to go back to history and see how Essex's life ended, we can see, in a way that the queen may have benefited from Shakespeare's implicit lesson. Indeed, nowhere is the threat of such a figure as Essex more powerfully conveyed than in the last chorus but one, when the chorus says:

> [t]he Mayor and all his brethern in best sort, / Like to the senators of the antique Rome/ With the plebeians swarming at their heels, / Go forth and fetch their conquering Caesar in/ As, by a lower but as loving likelihood, / Were now the General of our gracious empress, / As in good time he may, from Ireland coming, / Bringing rebellion broached on his sword. (V. 0. 334-5)

Cadwallader's book on the career of the Earl of Essex, which includes a good number of quotations from Shakespeare's work, uncannily hints at the fact that Elizabeth was bearing in mind the dangers Shakespeare saw in the public welcoming of the Earl.

This may probably account for her not announcing the return of Essex, isolating him, confining him to the tower of London, and finally, refusing to grant his last wish, namely being hung in public. Commenting on the very lines I quoted above, Cadwallader says:

> [H]ow different was Essex's home-coming from that predicted by Shakespeare in the prologue of *Henry V*. Instead of a triumphal procession with throngs crowding the streets to welcome the conquering hero, Essex slipped into London, unannounced, and with few attendants. (57)

Thus, a certain on-going dialogue between the Court and Shakespeare can be discerned. On the one hand, the queen clearly influenced Shakespeare's output— her urging the bard to show Falstaff in love one more time is but one example, on the other hand, Shakespeare seems no matter how implicitly and indirectly, to influence the queen's strategies. This play can be seen as the equivalent of Machiavelli's *The Prince* and can earn the bard the title of the better Machiavelli.

Thus, in this first part of my thesis, I situated Shakespereare's *Henry V* in relation to two radically different Renaissance models of kingship, namely the Christian model and the Machiavellian one. Through juxtaposing Machiavelli's *The Prince*, Erasmus's *Education of a Christian Prince*, and Shakespeare's *Henry V*, I showed how Henry V is rather an ideal Machiavellian king, were it only for his successful masquerading as a Christian king. It is this Machiavellian character of the king that I examine, in the second part of my chapter. In this part, I underscore the importance of Shakespeare's *Henry V* not only as a work that presents the reader/ spectator with an ideal English king relying on Machiavellian strategies to achieve national unity, but also as a key element in a proto-Cultural Ideological State

Apparatus trying, itself, to achieve national unity (Althusser TS 1489). Indeed, Shakespeare presents Henry V as an ideal Machiavellian prince abiding faithfully by the rules of the Italian mentor to unite an England that was disintegrating. Henry V owes the success of his national project to his forging a national army with which he wages his war against France, thus turning away all dissension and hatred of his people towards a common national enemy. I also examined his cunning reliance on the religious discourse to legitimize his war. In the third part of my chapter, I focused on the bard's play as an ideological weapon trying to achieve the very goal we see Henry achieving by the end of the play, namely national unity and stability. Among the strategies to which Shakespeare resorts, in this regard, I may refer to the distortion of historical facts. In addition, I have examined the way Shakespeare's text, mainly the chorus interventions, work in a way that is akin to the way ideology works, in the sense that both present spectators and subjects respectively with an imaginary relation to the conditions of their existence.

Through juxtaposing historical accounts of the potential real counterparts of the characters we cross in the play, the play itself and Machiavelli's *The Prince*, in the last part of my chapter, I have come to the conclusion that *Henry V* can be taken as a letter from Shakespeare to queen Elizabeth, the way *The Prince* was "a letter from Niccolo Machiavelli to the Magnificent Lorenzo de Medici" (Machiavelli 3). The only difference is that Shakespeare delivers his Machiavellian message to the queen subtly, as I have shown.

Chapter II

Olivier's Sanitized Adaptation of Shakespeare's *Henry V*: The Use of Shakespeare for Propaganda Purposes During the Second World War

In my first chapter, I referred to two major groups of critics who marked the history of criticism of Shakespeare's *Henry V*. While the first group sees the play's eponymous hero, in Manichaean terms, either as a duck or as a rabbit, the second juxtaposes both sides of the king. Then, through establishing an intertextual dialogue between the bard's play and Niccolò Machiavelli's *The Prince*, I managed to show that the seemingly Christian side of the king is a sine qua non for his success as a Machiavellian prince. My analysis of the play so far has concerned itself solely with the historical and political circumstances under which it was produced in Elizabethan England. However, this way of approaching Shakespeare's work, as if it were sealed off in sixteenth-century England falls short of doing justice to what Holderness calls "the real Shakespeare" (VS 93). The "real Shakespeare" is "an enormously complex system of refracting prisms: the whole multifarious body of ideas, attitudes, assumptions, images, which have accrued over centuries of cultural activity centered on the literary productions of this Elizabethan dramatist" (Holderness VS 93). This cultural materialist approach to the study of Shakespeare does not confine itself to the historical moment that saw the production of the work in question, the way new historicists do.[7] Rather, it seeks to examine the bard's play and its subsequent productions through a wide range of media. Through juxtaposing and examining a Shakespearean play and a twentieth-century cinematographic adaptation of it, this cultural materialist approach also tries to understand the present. This is what Ivo Kamps emphasizes, when he says, "a pivotal and often recognized difference between American New Historicist and British Cultural Materialist practice is the latter's more

[7] Hayden White points this out, when he says: "it is now the "synchronic" rather than the "diachronic"aspects of the relationship between literature and the "cultural system" that become the

pressing interest in the 'uses to which an historical present puts its own version of the English past'" (6). Adopting this cultural materialist perspective, I will examine the way Olivier's cinematographic adaptation of Shakespeare's *Henry V* (1944) functions as a brilliant propaganda masterpiece in the Second World War "Cultural Ideological State Apparatus" (Althusser TS 1489). In this chapter, I will examine the circumstances surrounding the production of Olivier's *Henry V* and the way its status as a feature film supported by the Ministry of Information (MOI) shapes the propaganda message it delivers. Then, I will consider the film proper and examine the strategies resorted to by Olivier in his mission to boost the morale of the English people and their allies. More precisely, I will explore the usefulness of Shakespeare's play for propaganda purposes, as well as what has to be sacrificed in order to yield a movie presenting the viewer with "a rabbit," deleting every single trace of the "duck" we could have perceived in the play (Rabkin 246).

The Ministry of Information (MOI), commonly known among British people as the Ministry of Disinformation, was founded in 1936 when the Second World War was looming in the distance. Its mission consisted mainly in "present[ing] the national case to the public at home and abroad in time of war" (Chapman 16). Though, at the beginning of the Second World War, the MOI failed to fulfill its duty, it kept on improving throughout the war to reach its apex in 1944, with the release of Olivier's *Henry V*—a film it supported from start to finish. This is evidenced by the fact that the Agincourt sequence is filmed in Eire, something Olivier could not have done without the approval of the government and the intervention of the MOI (Chapman 244). Here, I want to go back to a key phrase in Chapman's conception of

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preferred focus of the New Historicists' attention" (293).

the mission of the MOI, namely "national case," and see, taking into account the history of the MOI and the different policies it adopted, whether the word national actually means national, i.e. representing all parties in the nation, or rather sectional.

During the early years of the Second World War, the MOI did not have a clear policy, nor did it have a constant favorite among the two major trends of film-making, namely documentary and feature film-making. However, as of 1940, the Program for Film Propaganda, as conceived by Sir Kenneth Clark, isolated the leftist documentary film-makers who were bent on "further[ing] the cause of social reform," even during the war (Chapman 52). In fact, they were confined to making documentaries about "how Britain fights" (Chapman 54).[8] They were craftily made to turn their attention from social issues underlining social inequity and discontent to covering the following list of themes: the British war effort, all the fighting services, and subsidiary services, i.e. merchant navy, munitions, shipbuilding, coastal command, and fishermen (Chapman 54). Furthermore, the MOI did not often interfere when documentary film-makers were called upon to serve in the military war effort. This is what Chapman underlines, when he says:

> [t]hey also felt that for most of the war they were fighting a rearguard action against a government which did not place sufficient value on their skills and expertise. For instance, in defending documentary film-makers against call-up by the Ministry of Labor and National Service in 1941, *Documentary News Letter* argued that documentary personnel were more valuable to the war effort in their present capacity. (51)

[8] "The themes outlined by Clark—'What Britain is fighting for', 'How Britain fights' and 'The need for sacrifice if the fight is to be won' were based on a Policy Committee paper written in December 1939 by Lord Macmillan." (26) The above-mentioned program refers to Clark's 'Progamme for Film Propaganda', which he "presented" as a "paper… to the Co-Ordinating Committee of the MOI" (Chapman 26).

Bearing this in mind, we can see in the fact that Olivier "had to be persuaded by the Ministry of Information to abandon his duties in the Fleet Air Arm," when he was going to star in his *Henry V* a clear attempt to isolate the leftist documentary film-makers (Holderness 102). This isolation of the latter is accounted for by the fact that they would not promote the glorious image of the nation the MOI wants them to promote. In fact, among the films documentary film-makers produced, I may refer to *Housing Problems* (1935) and *Enough to Eat* (1936), which "highlighted the problems of slum housing and poor nutrition among the British working classes" (Chapman 52). This was the kind of films the documentary film-makers intended to make even during the war, which explains their restriction by the MOI to the definite task of covering the war effort.

As far as the crucial question "What Britain is fighting for" is concerned, another major question in Sir Kenneth Clark's above-mentioned program, it was left for feature film-makers to tackle (Chapman 26). Here, it becomes obvious that the national case the MOI is supposed to present is simply sectional (Chapman 16). The national case the MOI is supposed to present through wartime films is, thus, revealed to be sectional, as the Ministry's discriminatory treatment of feature film-makers and documentary film-makers privileges the version the former provide. It wants to keep the status quo, which serves the interests of those who are already in power, along with those who hold privileged positions, such as the trade press and commercial film-makers. Holderness refers to this, when he says:

> [a]t this point 'Shakespeare,' as the visible, concrete embodiment (literature) of a lost social harmony, was brought into direct complicity with that ideology of national unity which the leading sections of British society—government, press and broadcasting media, trades

> union leadership—were fighting to forge and perpetuate throughout the war. (96)

This explains, to a large extent, why Clark's Program is "more inclined to the viewpoint of the trade press" than to that of the documentary movement (Chapman 55). Likewise, the similar views and common interests of the MOI and the war government, on the one hand, and the trade press and commercial feature film-makers, on the other hand, explains the MOI's reliance on feature film-makers to present their sectional interests as national interests. Emphasizing the greater entertainment value of feature film, when compared with that of documentary films, Kenneth Clark's program "was more inclined to the viewpoint of the trade press [and consequently of feature film-makers] than the documentary movement" (Chapman 55). It also explains why the MOI saw "that feature films were the best medium for the presentation of 'what Britain is fighting for'" (Chapman 53). Chapman points this out, when he says:

> [t]he film being a popular medium must be good entertainment if it is to be good propaganda. A film which induces boredom antagonizes the audience to the cause which it advocates. For this reason, an amusing American film with a few hits at the Nazi regime is probably better propaganda than any number of documentaries showing the making of bullets. (55)

Again, the topics that are to be covered, by feature film-makers, are highly selective and aim, as any propaganda, to present the object in question in the best of lights. A clear emphasis is put on presenting such British ideals as "freedom," "the history of British liberty," and the use of historical parallels (Chapman 54). Olivier's *Henry V* is one of the most famous feature films produced along these lines. His film not only aims at boosting the morale of the British by showing them that their ancestors once

did defeat a stronger enemy, but also by projecting a romantic picture of the ideal English nation— a nation characterized by its unity and cohesion. Olivier's *Henry V* (1944) was, by no means, the only wartime propaganda film that drew its inspiration from the English heritage to boost the morale of the British. Among these, I will refer to *This England* (1941), *The Young Mr. Pitt* (1942), and *A Canterbury Tale* (1944). However, the special status of *Henry V*, among wartime British propaganda films, can be explained by its "great popular success" (Chapman 245). It is worth noting, however, that this ideal picture of the English nation is a mere construct. Indeed, as Baucom contends, "nationalist discourse, as Benedict Anderson suggests, expresses a will to synchronic and diachronic coincidences of identity, a will to homogenize the present by submitting it to the sovereignty of the past" (4).

Here, a question begs to be asked: what are the reasons that may have led to the exclusion of the documentary film-makers from the above-mentioned propaganda field, reserved for the partisan feature film-makers? At the beginning, we might be tempted to attribute their exclusion to the fact that feature films, which evolve around a narrative, are better suited to tell the story of the glorious wars waged by the ideal English king Henry V, for instance. Chapman talks about this, when he says:

> [d]ocumentary, as an essentially factual mode of film practice, was therefore not regarded as a good form for dramatizing stories of British institutions and ideas of liberty [...] However, the factual nature of documentary made it more appropriate for the presentation of 'How Britain Fights.' (54)

In addition to their greater entertainment value, feature films have the merit of addressing a broader audience. However, when we look at a book like *The New Propaganda*, written by the Marxist writer Amber Blanco White in 1939, which

outlines the left-wing conception of propaganda adopted by the documentary film-makers, we reach a far more satisfactory answer.[9] In fact, White argued that left-wing propaganda in democracy should be based on promoting social change: "[w]e want the electorate to feel, and feel passionately, that they deserve a better order than the present social system and are prepared to make sacrifices in order to get it" (Chapman 53). Upon reading this key principle by which documentary film-makers abide, we can easily understand why they were confined to the production of factual movies presenting the British war effort. Feature film-makers, like Olivier, go back to the glorious English past and get their inspiration from Shakespeare, who "in many ways has come to stand for England's past greatness" (Howard 9), to present the viewer with an ideal picture of the English as a "band of brothers" (IV. 3. 291). In contrast, documentary film-makers would not only foreground their vision of the better social system the English people deserve, but also point out what is wrong with the present social system (Chapman 53). In this sense, we can guess that the content of their wartime movies would be akin to the content of such books as the one written by Angus Calder on British society during World War II. Calder is among the many historians who question the myth of a People's War, and "his evidence and arguments emphasize the discontent as well as the heroism, the persistence of social divisions and conflicts from the 1930's" (Holderness VS 96). This concern of documentary film-makers with "dissent," "social divisions and conflicts," and their advocacy of social change certainly led to their being "left out in the cold by the MOI" (Chapman 51) and their being confined to responding to the question "How Britain fights"

[9] Though I do not claim that White is the spokesman of documentary film-makers, the relevance of his quote stems from the affinity between the ideas he expresses in his above-mentioned book and those

(Chapman 53). This ideologically significant discriminatory attitude of the MOI towards documentary film-makers and the grounds on which this discrimination is premised anticipates the ideas and the propaganda message we will be getting from such a feature-film as Olivier's *Henry V*.

Here, I intend to examine the strategies to which Olivier resorts in his mission to boost the morale of the English people and the allies, concentrating mainly on what makes it possible to invest the cultural capital of the bard for propaganda purposes. I will also consider the importance of the deletion and distortion of certain scenes from Shakespeare's play to Olivier's presenting the viewer with a positive and heroic picture of Henry V. To put it in Howard's words, I want to highlight what Olivier muted to produce the "celebratory and sanitized version of the play" we get in the movie (7).

Being a feature film that uses the "historical parallels" suggested by the MOI and relying on the cultural capital of the English bard, Olivier's *Henry V* is considered to be among the most "prestigious British feature films" (Chapman 54). Critics like Graham Holderness, Jean E. Howard, and Anthony Davies agree that Olivier's adaptation of Shakespeare's *Henry V* was produced with a view to boosting the morale of the English and their allies. "Enlist[ing] the cultural authority of Shakespeare in the Allied cause" reflects the status of Shakespeare as a "British cultural icon" (Howard 7). Indeed, Shakespeare's work and name have simply come to be associated with an ideal picture of a prosperous and glorious England, as well as with an ideal conception of Englishness. Nonetheless, what is worth noting, here, is that the use of Shakespeare's authority seems to be almost totally divorced from a full

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by which documentary film-makers abide.

grasp of the Shakespearean material in question. This is pointed out by Graham Holderness, when he talks about the speech John of Gaunt delivers in the first Act of the second scene of *Richard II*, saying that "certainly outside the play his famous patriotic speech has invariably been employed to endorse absolute authority, to support the autocratic will of many subsequent British kings and governments" (WIMN 221). However, if we see the speech in its textual context, we become aware of the fact that it is "[a] diatribe of criticism against the ruling monarch: Gaunt is not even depicting the England of the present, but expressing a nostalgic regret for an England which has long since vanished into the historical past" (Holderness WIMN221). Olivier's adaptation of *Henry V* seems to be doing exactly the same thing to the bard's play. Indeed, his film takes the aspects relating Henry V to the model of the ideal Christian king and amplifies them. It also deletes all the scenes that cast the king in the role of the Machiavellian prince par excellence. The use of these strategies allows Olivier to present his viewers among the English and the allies with a moral and heroic "Churchullian" commander (Holderness VS 102).

The presentation of the English king/ commander who is portrayed by Olivier, who places him "in the frame next to the flag of St. George," during the Battle of Agincourt, as "a powerful signifier of Englishness" is contrasted with the snobbish French, mainly the Dauphin (Chapman 246).[10] Here, it is worth noting that this concept of Englishness, like that of the ideal English nation, is a construct. In fact, as Baucom puts it:

> [f]or the identifications of Englishness with the locale—and with the local knowledges, local dialects, local traditions, and local memories that are held to emerge from the locale—would have forced many self-

> appointed defenders of an authentic, pure, and settled way of being English to address a sufficiently complex set of problems (of canon formation and preservation, of determining which of England's many localities were most English, of defining their perfect moment, of definitively differentiating them from their corrupting neighbors, of guarding them against the vicissitudes of history)." (5)

Moreover, the portrait we get of the French can also be taken as allegorically applying to the Nazis and the ruthlessness they stood for in the minds of the British during the Second World War. In this part of my chapter, I intend to explore the strategies Olivier uses to boost the morale of the English and their allies through an examination of his transformation of a Machiavellian prince into a moral and heroic "powerful signifier of Englishness" (Chapman 246). I will also examine his negative depiction of the French and the constant parallels Olivier draws throughout his movie between Henry's war on France and Britain and the allies' war on Nazi Germany, suggesting that the English can win again.

In order to turn Shakespeare's Henry V who, as I have shown in my first chapter can be taken as an exemplum of the Machiavellian prince, into a model Christian king, Olivier has to sacrifice a lot of key scenes. In fact, all those elements and scenes in the play hinting at the Machiavellian side of the king, or having the potential to tarnish his portrait are either deleted or distorted. Among these I may refer to Henry's Harfleur speech and his order to kill the French prisoners when he knew that the French reinforced their ranks. The deletion of the Harfleur speech not only allow Olivier to portray the French and their metaphorical counterparts, the Nazis, as savage, ruthless, and blood-thirsty soldiers, but also gives us the impression that the virtuous English king does not even think of inflicting such a violence, as he did not even threaten to use it. Had Henry V been filmed delivering the following

lines: "And the fleshed soldier, rough and hard of heart, / In liberty of bloody hand shall range/ With conscience wide as hell, mowing like grass/ Your fresh fair virgins and your flowering infants," it would have been less likely for the viewers to have a positive attitude towards him (III. 3. 216). Thus, one can see that Olivier had to delete these two scenes to make Henry V a "signifier of Englishness" worthy of that name, and to meet the expectations of an audience whose knowledge of Shakespeare's *Henry V* was already framed by Dallas Bower, the pioneer television producer (Chapman 246). In 1942, Bower presented a wartime radio program entitled "Into Battle," which aimed at boosting the morale of the English troops (Chapman 244). This program featured Olivier reciting Henry's "Once more into the breach" (III. 1. 201) and "Crispin's Day" speeches (Chapman 244). This implies that, to a large extent, British radio listeners had already a good idea of Henry V. With its deletions, Olivier's movie serves only to further anchor that positive image of Henry V in the minds of British viewers.

The other scene strategically omitted by Olivier is the one about the Southampton plot. This scene is probably the most dangerous of all, as it puts the legitimacy of the king into question. As I have shown in my first chapter, even Shakespeare does not tell us about the dynastic motives of Cambridge, nor does he tell us about the existence of an even more legitimate claimant to the English throne, namely the Earl of March. Taking his cue from Shakespeare and aware of the fact that incorporating such a scene in his film would be detrimental to the popularity and positive portrait he wants to give us of Henry V, Olivier opts for omitting the Southampton plot from his movie.

The other strategy to which Olivier resorts in his film to produce "a celebrating and sanitized version of the play" is distortion (Howard 7). This can be seen at work, for instance, in Olivier's choice to film the conspiracy scene between the Archbishop of Canterbury and the Bishop of Ely, as well as the tortuous legalistic legitimization of Henry V's claim to the French throne as a farce. Indeed, the documents that are supposed to back up the Archbishop's demonstration are scattered by the angry Bishop on the stage, which causes the laughter of the Elizabethan audience. What makes the scenes all the more farcical is that the Archbishop who walks on a stage bestrewn with historical documents has to rely on the bishop's haphazard and clownish picking of documents. This farcical treatment of the scene distracts the audience's attention from Henry's Machiavellian scheme. However, reading the corresponding scenes in Shakespeare's play, one cannot help but be aware of the king's calculations. Indeed, the king makes it known that he intends to implement a law that would make the bishops "lose the better half of their possession" (I. 1.123). At the same time, the bishops learn of the king's intention to wage a war on France, and that if they do not support it, the law Henry V threatens to implement will simply be implemented. The implications of these scenes, namely the unjustness of Henry's war, as well as his clear Machiavellian character are lost on the viewer, as they are played in a clownish fashion. The film viewers are also incited not to be bothered by the scenes, and join in the laughter of the Globe audience at the beginning of the movie. The way Olivier deals with this scene again enables him to cleanse his film from the Machiavellian aspect of the king, thus enabling him to consolidate the positive portrait of a virtuous, Christian Henry V.

Distorting the scene with the bishops and omitting such scenes as the threatening Harfleur speech, Henry's order to kill the French soldiers, and the Southampton plot make us see that Olivier's film operates in a way that reminds us of the way the above-mentioned John of Gaunt's speech works. In fact, in order to make his movie work as propaganda, and to present the English commander in a positive and heroic light, Olivier has to do away with so much of the play. Here, one can't help but remember Rabkin's conclusion that "simply by juxtaposing the two readings, I have shown that each of them, persuasive as it is, is reductive, requiring that we exclude too much to hold it" (260).

However, Olivier's farcical treatment of the scene with the clergymen cannot be accounted for solely by the director's intention to present Henry V in a positive light. Indeed, a full understanding of the comic aspect Olivier gives the scene can be reached through an examination of one of the major principles of the MOI, namely their insistence on the importance of avoiding "direct propaganda" (Chapman 46), as well as the fusion of propaganda and entertainment in film. P. C. Mannock puts this succinctly when he says that "if the history of screen propaganda tells us anything at all, it tells us that the less blatant it is, the more effective the result. The one guide, of course, is that of genuine entertainment, in which anything can be put over" (Chapman 49). Mannock summarizes an important shift in the MOI policy during the pivotal year 1943. In fact, the Films Division of the MOI declared that it wanted high quality entertainment films (Chapman 80). This shift in the policy of the MOI came as a response to the film viewers' resentment of direct propaganda and war films. As the Second World War went on, British people increasingly adopted an escapist

attitude. This means that when they went to the movies they wanted to forget about the atrocities and bleak realities of the war they were living.[11] Filming the scene with the clergymen as farce, thus, allows Olivier to respond to the taste of his potential viewers, as well as to their need for something entertaining and amusing, something that makes them forget even temporarily the grim face of war.

Had Olivier opted for giving this scene the sad aspect Branagh gave it, it would have been really difficult for his movie to succeed as propaganda. Indeed, Branagh does not blame the war on Henry, who is, according to him, a "genuinely holy man" (Hatchuel 48). This explains why he films the above-mentioned scene as a conspiracy of the clergy and the nobility, who want to lead Henry to wage the war on France. In the Branagh adaptation, this conspiracy can be discerned in the signal Exeter gives the archbishop of Canterbury prompting the latter to the conclusion that Henry's war is just. The grim and tense atmosphere marking the "establishing scene" (Weiss 63) mainly the private conversation of the Bishop and the Archbishop would have certainly reminded the British wartime viewer of war spies and intelligence services. A similar treatment of the scene with the clergymen would have only won the resentment of the war audience who "go to the cinema, [and]...expect to be amused and distracted from everyday life, and ... leave worries behind for two or three hours" (Chapman 46). This gives us a fuller understanding of Olivier's choice to film the second scene of the first Act in a farcical fashion.

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[11] This is pointed out by Chapman, when he says, " There is a feeling that when you go to the cinema, you expect to be amused and distracted from everyday life, and you leave worries behind of two or three hours. If, while you are in that mood, someone on the screen lectures at you, you are inclined to resent it" (46).

Furthermore, another strategy that seems to have helped Olivier in his cleansing of Henry V's portrait audience consists in his relegation of such a scene as the justification of the war to the first part of the movie which comes in the form of a reconstruction of an Elizabethan stage performance of Shakespeare's *Henry V*. In fact, not only is it played as farce, but it is also denied the realistic treatment it would have received had it not been filmed as a theatrical performance. It is worth noting, here, that the scenes with which viewers tend to associate the movie are those portraying the glorious battle of Agincourt through the use of the cinematic medium with all its realistic effects. Holderness, in his study of Olivier's film, enumerates these scenes, in the following passage:

> [t]hose scenes of the film which seem to have made the maximum impact and to have lingered most strongly in the popular imagination … are those which belong to its patriotic application of the play to the current national crisis: Henry's Churchullian speeches before Harfleur and Agincourt (clearly recalling the mood of 1940); the inserted battle scenes, filmed with all the resources of modern film technology—depicting what Shakespeare's chorus despaired of depicting: the colorful panoply of chivalry, the glamour of historical pageant, the thrill of victory; the confident militaristic emotions of 1944. (VS 102)

The special impact of these scenes can be explained by two major factors. First, these scenes are of immediate relevance to the British viewers who were fighting World War II, which was also pointed out by Davies (27).

Olivier clearly explores the plausible historical parallelism between Henry V's England and England in 1943-4 to fulfill his mission of boosting the morale of the British and their allies. This parallelism is foregrounded by James Chapman: "*Henry V* was released in the autumn of 1944, and its stirring account of an English army crossing the channel and routing a continental adversary had obvious contemporary

parallels in the aftermath of D-Day" (245). Drawing this parallel between the situation of Second World War Britain and a similar situation drawn from the glorious past of "this scepter'd isle" seems to make good use of the viewers' association of that glorious past with the ideal state of the English nation; a past for which they are nostalgic (II. 1. 40).

What is important to note, here, is that the chosen episode from the glorious past ends with the totally unexpected victory of the English over their mightier foes. Bearing in mind the associations British people are prone to make between Henry's war on France and the allies war on Germany, Olivier subtly presents the French allegorically as the Nazi foes. This can be seen mainly through his depiction of the military might and superior numbers of the French. Indeed, the scene preceding the Battle of Agincourt shows the French nobility mounted on their horses. One striking detail in this scene is the huge armor of the French, which makes it necessary for them to be mounted on their horses by means of drills. This detail would not fail to remind the wartime British viewer of the "Nazi war machine," as Chapman puts it (246). The heaviness of German weaponry is conveyed through the heavy armors of the French knights. Indeed, their armor is so heavy that the knights have to be placed on their horses by means of drills. Furthermore, the ruthlessness with which the Nazi character is associated in the minds of the British is rendered vividly through the filming of the atrocious act of the killing the luggage boys, carried out by the French. The scene with the children slaughtered and drowned in their blood evokes the massacres the Nazis were capable of undertaking.

Moreover, Olivier suggests the Second World War implicitly through an allegorical representation of the non-English components of Henry's army, namely the Welsh, Irish and Scottish captains, as allies. Unlike Branagh, who makes the non-English captains "speak English in the native garb," Olivier stresses their belonging to different regions both through their different accents and the emblems embroidered on their costumes (V. 1. 342). For instance, the Irishman has St. Patrick's cloverleaf, the Scottish captain a thistle, and the Welshman the picture of the famous leak. Taken in the context of World War II, and taking into account the fact that propaganda movies were produced to boost the morale not only of the English but also of their allies, Olivier's emphasizing the different components of the English army can possibly be considered as an implicit hint at Britain's allies, namely France and the United States. In this sense, we can see the victory scored by the English, when united with the Irish, Welsh, and Scottish, as allegorically projecting a potential victory of Britain and its allies over the Nazis. Indeed, it is basically by appealing to Shakespeare's English past, mainly through the incorporation of the reconstruction of the Elizabethan stage performance at the beginning of the film, that Olivier assures the British of a potential victory over the German. Put bluntly, the message Olivier wants to communicate is that the British can defeat their mightier German enemy, the way their ancestors defeated the bigger French army.

The victory of the British and their allies is made to appear immanent not only through the defeat of the French in the movie, but also through the depiction of the French—the allegorical counterparts of the Nazis—in such a way as to make their defeat inevitable. Likewise, the chances of the potential victory of the British and

their allies are enhanced by portraying them as having all the virtues the French lack. Here, in order to achieve this, Olivier takes a lot of historical license. This can be seen at work throughout the movie. From the very first scene in which we encounter the French in the royal court, Olivier seems bent on depicting them in the most negative of lights. This scene show us the arrogance of the Dauphin, who belittles the English king, when he says: "For, my good liege, she is so idly kinged,/ Her sceptre so fantastically borne/ By a vain, giddy, shallow, humorous youth,/ That fear attends her not" (II. 4. 189). It also foregrounds the discord and disunity among the ranks of the French in all the scenes that bring together the Dauphin and the nobility. The scene filmed in the tent on the eve of the battle of Agincourt conveys the lack of unity between the French Dauphin and his nobles in various ways. Even before we consider what they say, the isolation of the Dauphin is made clear through the singular posture he takes. Indeed, while all the nobles are sitting around the table, he is shown to be standing apart from them. By the same token, the unity of the nobility, which is implicitly communicated through their adoption of the same physical posture—sitting around the same table—is confirmed through their clear despising of the Dauphin. This attitude of the nobility towards the Dauphin, which Shakespeare himself conveyed through the words the noble men say, is accentuated by the expressions of contempt and mockery we can read on their faces in Olivier's movie. Through this depiction of the French, Olivier tries to allegorically project a negative picture of a defeatable Nazi foe. However, were we to go back to historical accounts of the Nazis, we would discover a totally different picture. In fact, the Nazis were

rather known for their unity and the cohesion of their ranks. The description of a major component of the Nazi military machine, namely the

> Wehrmacht, the strongest spot of the German military machine was its frontline men, both officers and soldiers is insightful. As many recent studies have demonstrated, in comparison with its opponents, throughout most of the war the Wehrmacht had, by and large, a superior morale and unit cohesion. (Dziewanowiski 353)

Though this quote does not give us an idea about the state of the whole German army, its description of the cohesion characterizing one of its key units cannot fail to remind us of the license Olivier takes with history. Likewise, it does not fail to evoke the nickname the MOI earned at the beginning of the Second World War, the "Ministry of Disinformation" (Chapman 40).

Another major subtle element in Olivier's negative portrayal of the French consists in the fact that most backgrounds of the French scenes are inspired from the two-dimensional medieval paintings of the Duke of Berry's *Book of Hours*. These two-dimensional paintings are characterized by their flat backgrounds, which give the viewer no feeling of perspective. This lack of perspective characterizing most French scenes can be taken as a metaphorical hint at the shallowness of the French. The first scene that introduces the viewer to the French court is a perfect illustration of this. Most English scenes, on the other hand, are scarcely filmed with the fixed two-dimensional pictures from the *Book of Hours*, to guarantee the positive depiction of the English. To further reinforce his negative depiction of the French, Olivier opts for a music with a very slow rhythm for the first French court scene. This music is clearly contrasted with the crescendo accompanying the landing of the English soldiers on French soil. The strength of the latter is forcefully communicated through

the fact that the viewer is simultaneously presented with an angry wave and a herd of English soldiers moving, with the same resolve and strength, towards the French shores.

But, we can safely say that through this strategy Olivier's goal to boost the morale of the English can be seen as fulfilled, mainly when we take into account the glorious picture he gives us of the "band of English brothers" (IV. 3. 291). In this respect, the English are portrayed as the opposite of the French as far as the unity and cohesion of their ranks are concerned. Indeed, while the arrogant French nobility and the Dauphin are not shown even once in touch with their soldiers, Henry V is shown touring his camp, talking to his soldiers and doing his best to encourage them. On the rhetorical level, the unity, equality, and brotherhood among the English and their allies are communicated through Olivier's Churchullian delivery of the St. Crispin's speech.

Thus, I underlined different aspects that made of Olivier's propaganda movie a major success. This success underlines, on the one hand, Olivier's prowess as director and actor, and the maturing of the MOI and its policies, on the other hand. Indeed, with *Henry V*, the MOI seems to have reached its apotheosis. Nowhere can we find a trace of those blunders that characterized its early years. Indeed, unlike many of those feature films, released at the beginning of the war—which are marked by the bluntness of their propaganda message—Olivier's movie subtly fulfills its duty as propaganda. When we watch the movie with the history of the MOI in mind, we are well aware of the fact that the time of the "old-fashioned thriller[s] incorporating odd irrelevant lines of dialogue about freedom, persecution, fascism" is over

(Chapman 52). Rather, the propaganda message of *Henry V* is filtered through Olivier's crafty use of the authority of Shakespeare, as well as through his implicit drawing of parallels between the glorious past of medieval England and Britain in 1943-4.

This parallelism and the stunning success of Olivier's film depend on omitting a lot of aspects that are incompatible with the propaganda message the MOI wants to communicate to the masses. Here, Olivier's *Henry V* functions in a way similar to the way ideology works. In my first chapter, I showed how Shakespeare's play works the way ideology does. As far as Olivier's movie is concerned, the work it performs, as ideology, is far more difficult to discern, as it goes beyond the movie per se. Indeed, understanding the ideological task a film like Olivier's *Henry V* performs depends on seeing it as part of the bigger ideological British war machine, namely the MOI and its Films Division.

Jonathan Dollimore and Alan Sinfield's definition of ideology as "composed of those beliefs, practices and institutions which work to legitimate the social order—especially by the process of representing sectional or class interests as universal ones" is a good summary of what Olivier's *Henry V*, as part of the MOI, does (HI 215). In fact, the special status of this trend of film-making under which Olivier's movie can be classified, as well as the isolation of the leftist documentary film-makers make of the national case, the MOI is supposed to represent, a rather sectional one. Being supported by the MOI, which is part of the government, the film depicts the interests of the government as national, and its view of things as universal.

This is reflected, first, as I noted earlier, through the isolation of the leftist documentary film-makers which means that their way of perceiving the national case is not given voice. This silencing of one party in the film-making industry because of its concern for "social progress," and the representation of the national case the prerogative of the feature film-makers who share the concerns, views, and interests of the government means that any feature film sponsored by the MOI inevitably represents the government interests, to a large extent (Chapman 52). That is to say, it represents sectional interests as national. Consequently, the much celebrated promise of equity and brotherhood, which is at the heart of the St. Crispin speech, remains a mere promise to make the British "fight cheerfully" (IV. 1. 269).

Here, one is reminded of a controversial issue that was raised at the beginning of the Second World War in Britain around the compatibility of propaganda and the democratic nature of Britain—as opposed to the Fascist German regime, for instance. According to Frederick Barlett, a major distinction between the propaganda of dictatorship and that of democracy consists in the fact that the latter acknowledges the existence of different shades of opinion, which of course can never be allowed in the dictator states (Chapman 44). The ideologically significant process of selection that led to the empowerment of feature film-makers at the expense of documentary film-makers and the sanitization of the bard's play Olivier undertakes allow us to classify the film under Bartlett's category of the propaganda of dictatorship. In fact, the MOI's exclusion of the documentary "different shade of opinion" (Chapman 44) and its fostering feature film-making, on the one hand, and Olivier's effacing of all the traces of a potential "duck" and presenting the viewer only with a "rabbit" (Rabkin

246), on the other hand, lend support to classifying the film under the propaganda of dictatorship, rather than that of democracy.

Here, it is worth noting that although critics like Davies and Chapman do not miss the striking parallels between Olivier's *Henry V* and Eisenstein's *Alexander Nevsky*, none of them goes so far as to explore the implications of the fact that Eisenstein's movie was the product of the propaganda machine of the Stalinist dictatorship. Cubitt points out the category of propaganda under which Nevsky can be classified, when he says:

> [i]t is not an 'Eisenstein' film, product of genius, but a film by a master craftsman shot under the discipline of Soviet realism and subordinated to the propaganda aims of Stalin's state bureaucracy... It is so compromised by its production under conditions of systemic duress. (102)

The common point Davies and Chapman discern between *Nevsky* and *Henry V* is mainly the resemblance between the battle of Agincourt in the latter and the battle of Ice in the former. However, they miss a far clearer and more fundamental resemblance consisting in the fact that both films can be classified under what Cubitt calls "total film." The latter defines total film as follows:

> [w]hat these films share is the attempt to deploy maximal rhetorical control over cinematic effects, removing the extraneous and filling the aural and visual wavebands of the film with a single theme, so minimizing the possibility of the audience creating its own meanings, becoming distracted, or missing the point of the film. (101)

The concept of total film is very close to the definition Bartlett gives of the propaganda produced in dictatorships, Cubitt actually notes that "total film is by no means the exclusive property of Stalinism" (101). The preceding definition of total film undermines all those statements British propagandists made about the radically

different nature of propaganda in a democracy, at the beginning of the Second World War. This definition seems to be an adequate description of what Olivier does in his *Henry V*. In fact, the duality of the Shakespearean character pointed out by Rabkin and Deats is "extraneous" and the "aural and visual wavebands of the film" are filled with a single meaning that serves the purposes of the government (Cubitt 101). What Olivier does to the optical game so much cherished by Rabkin is to irrevocably fix its parameters to the picture of the rabbit, for instance. The rabbit, here, would allegorically stand for the virtuous Henry V, the ideal England and the band of brotherhood among the English. Not the least element of discord is allowed to undermine Olivier's and, by proxy, the MOI's and the government's ideologically visible single meaning. This makes it even clearer that the use of propaganda in such a democracy as Britain, as exemplified by Olivier's *Henry V* cannot be used to "counter totalitarian ideologies" (Chapman 44). At best, the propaganda of democracy cannot be qualitatively different from that of dictatorship. It is simply in the nature of propaganda to manipulate and reduce the richness of the object-to-be to suit the interests of those promoting or sponsoring the propaganda, be it the Stalinist regime, or the British democratic government during World War II.

In my second chapter, I situated the moment of the production of Olivier's propaganda feature film *Henry V* in the history of the MOI emphasizing the whole process of selection that has led to the fact that feature-films have come to single-handedly represent the "national case" (Chapman 16). Then, I showed how British actor and director Olivier used the cultural authority of Shakespeare to contribute to the war effort through the cinematic medium. In my analysis of the film, I pointed

out the different strategies to which Olivier resorts in his metamorphosing of the Shakespearean Henry V into an acceptable heroic figure for the British audience of the 1940s. Among these strategies, I examined Olivier's omission of certain scenes and his recourse to the distortion of others. Furthermore, my examination of the film, in light of the conclusions I reached concerning the historical and the political circumstances that led to its production, led me to conclude that after all Olivier's *Henry V* can be seen as representing the sectional interests of those in power, rather than national interests.

Chapter III

Our Empire Has a Rome: Reading the current world order through Shakespeare's *Henry V*

In my first chapter, I examined Henry V's project to forge the English nation through his reliance on Machiavellian strategies such as the use of religion, and the recourse to international war. It is on this embryonic unified English nation and the ideal English king, Henry V, that Olivier bases his adaptation of Shakespeare's play with a view to boosting the morale of British cinemagoers during World War II. Shakespeare's play, as well as the use to which Olivier puts it gives us an insight into the nature of the world that produced them. Indeed, they testify to the fact that the burgeoning Early Modern English state and the World War II British nation-state can be situated safely within the modern paradigm of sovereignty, as it is described by Hardt and Negri in the section entitled "Sovereignty of the Nation State" of their book *Empire*. Binary oppositions between inside and outside as far as the national territory is concerned, and self and Other, as far as the identity question is concerned, are of paramount importance to both states. For instance, it is against the French and the Nazis that the identities of the English and the British are defined respectively. In this chapter, I contend that a good understanding of the nature of our contemporary world can be reached through a reading of the same Shakespearean play in the aftermath of 9/11, in light of the parallel drawn between George W. Bush and Henry V, by such an authority in public leadership as David Gergen—professor in public leadership at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. Moreover, I intend to describe the nature of our globalizing world through a juxtaposition of the following texts: Shakespeare's *Henry V*, Hardt and Negri's *Empire*, and A. Passavant and Jodi Dean's *Empire's New Clothes: Reading Hardt and Negri*. My reading of these texts will be taking account of the occurrences that

marked the international scene in the aftermath of 9/11, mainly the American war on Iraq, which broke out on March 22, 2003.

Reading George W. Bush's war on terror through *Henry V* elucidates the nature of the contemporary world through the paradigm of modern sovereignty. It also makes it clear that we cannot conceive of the present globalizing world order as an anonymous decentered empire, the way Hardt and Negri contend in their *Empire*. Rather, examining the present world order, with the parallels drawn between Bush's war on terror and Henry's war on France in mind, is significant in so far as it elucidates the process of the internationalization of the state, or more precisely of the US-state, the way Laffey and Weldes present it in their "Representing the International: Sovereignty after Modernity?" Here, I do not mean to assess the present world order by favoring Laffey and Weldes's theorization of it, and discarding that of Hardt and Negri. Instead, I contend that the present world order can be accounted for more satisfactorily when we take into account both Hardt and Negri's emphasis on the passage from the modern paradigm of sovereignty to the postmodern one, and Laffey and Weldes's focus on the internationalization of the state as a structure of governance and rule (133). Bringing together these aspects of two conceptions of the globalizing world order, which might seem contradictory because of the importance of the nation state for one and its decline for the other, can give us an insight into the way globalization works. In this sense, the role played by the USA, as the leading superpower in the process of globalization, can be seen as a result not only of the internationalization of the American "structure of rule" (Laffey

and Weldes 133), and American-style policing apparatuses, but also of a number of discourses that were confined to the national realm.

The first part of this chapter explores the aspects of Shakespeare's *Henry V* that have caused a large number of American TV presenters, [12] contributing editors to the *National Review Online*, and authorities in public leadership such as David Gergen to draw a parallel between Henry V and George W. Bush, and their respective wars.[13] Then, I will rethink the present globalizing world through an exploration of the parallel drawn between Shakespeare's Henry V and Bush. In my second chapter, I studied the use of Olivier's cinematographic adaptation of *Henry V* for propaganda purposes during World War II. Though the early modern Elizabethan state cannot be taken as the equivalent of the fully developed British nation-state of the 1940s, the conception of the war, the enemy, and the nation we find both in Shakespeare's play and in Olivier's allegorical depiction of the war of the allies against the Nazis situate both works of art within the paradigm of modernity. Interestingly enough, the same play is called upon in the aftermath of 9/11 to depict George W. Bush's war on terror. Though our globalizing world order is clearly postmodern, as Hardt and Negri argue, the war on terror is marketed through the deployment of discourses that are characteristic of the modern paradigm of sovereignty. It is the resemblance between the discourses used by both Bush and Henry V that explains the parallel that is commonly drawn between the Shakespearean character and his twenty-first century counterpart in US media. Among these discourses, I will refer to the discourse of

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[12] This parallel between Henry V and George W. Bush was drawn by American TV presenters, like senior CNN analyst Jeff Greenfield.

[13] Among the contributing editors to the *National Review Online* who mention this parallel, I may refer to Mackubin Thomas Owens, Peter Robinson, and Rich Lowry.

good versus evil, and "us" versus "them" through which they try to unify their respective peoples against the enemy.

Indeed, Bush and Henry V constantly refer to the dichotomy between "us" and "them". Henry V keeps on opposing we – noble English (III. 1. 202)—to they, namely the French—"our bad neighbors" (IV. 1. 257). This rhetorical strategy resorted to by king Henry reaches its climax in his sixteen-line speech, on the day of the Agincourt Battle. In this speech, Henry uses the personal pronoun we three times, the pronoun "us" three times, and the possessive "our" two times (IV. 1. 256-8). As far as the French are concerned, they are referred to as "they," "things evil," "the weed," and "the devil himself" (IV. 1. 257). Bearing this in mind while examining the eighteen speeches delivered by George W. Bush, on different occasions between September 14, 2001 and April 9, 2002—almost a year before the Second Gulf War (March 22, 2003), one cannot fail to note the striking resemblance between the rhetorical strategies used by Henry V and George W. Bush. Indeed, in all of those speeches, the "we," Americans defending the cause of good, is constantly pitted against "them," evil-doers. It is worth noting that in these speeches, the word "evil-doers" is mentioned 29 times, and the word "evil" 33 times. A far more striking resemblance between George W. Bush's speeches and Henry V's is their foregrounding of the possibility that good can come from evil. Indeed, Henry V says "[t]hus may we gather honey from the weed/ And make a moral from the devil himself" (IV. 1. 251). The same idea is expressed by Bush differently when he says "the evildoers have struck our nation, but out of evil comes good". This very last instance of resemblance between Bush's speeches and Henry's makes us wonder

whether the president speechwriters have not drawn their inspiration from *Henry V*. Bush's recourse to the binary opposition between the good American and the evil terrorist enables him to unite the ranks of Americans by emphasizing their homogeneity, which he achieves through positing the evil terrorist as the Other of the American. Here, one is reminded of Hardt and Negri's articulation of the notion of the people within the paradigm of modern sovereignty, when they say "the people [...] tends towards identity and homogeneity internally while posing its difference from and excluding what remains outside" (103). In the aftermath of 9/11, the terrorist clearly plays the role of the outside in the American identitarian equation.

Bush's reliance on this Manichaean discourse of good versus evil explains, to a large extent, the fact that most people who draw the parallel between the American president and Henry V imagine the former delivering the St. Crispin's Day speech and calling the American people a "band of brothers" (IV. 3. 291). To illustrate this, I may quote Rich Lowry, when he says, "I thought that last Friday, as Bush stood atop part of the rubble of the World Trade Center, he came as close as he ever will to delivering a St. Crispin's Day speech. That spirit and resolve carried over into the House chamber last night, and it was something to behold" (Newstrom, par. 17).[14] Indeed, the homogeneity and cohesion of the ranks of Americans depend on their difference from the terrorist Other. However, this brotherhood seems to leave out all those Americans, described by Passavant and Dean, as "the 'sleeper' or 'dormant' terrorists who live among us, adopting western practices of life, working, going to school, and generally disguising themselves as good neighbors" (321). These

Americans are excluded because they happen to share the cultural background of the terrorists, despite their condemnation of the terrorist acts and their being, as Americans, in the "us" camp. Though most people who refer to the parallel between Bush and Henry V underscore their unification of their respective peoples through rhetoric, none of them refers to the party excluded from the American "band of brothers," none of them tries to address the nature of the racism at work in the exclusion (IV. 3. 291).

Here, I argue that addressing the nature of this racism can guide our steps towards a better understanding of the nature of our contemporary world order. In fact, this kind of racism can be classified under the category of imperial racism, as Hardt and Negri articulate it in *Empire* (190). According to them, the shift from the modern paradigm of sovereignty to the postmodern paradigm is accompanied not by a recession of racism, but by its mutation and its taking a postmodern form. This postmodern model of racism is characterized by its being based on culture, rather than on biology. Hardt and Negri put this more eloquently when they say, "the dominant modern racist theory and the concomitant practices of segregation are centered on essential biological differences among races," while "with the passage to empire [...], biological differences have been replaced by sociological and cultural signifiers as the key representation of racial hatred and fear" (191).

The distinctive nature of the racism and exclusion resulting from Bush's use of the Manichaean discourse of civilization versus barbarism, or good versus evil, at the domestic level, allows us to see that Bush's constant use of the "us" versus

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[14] Rich Lowry is a contributing editor to the *National Review Online.* Another contributing editor who imagines George W. Bush delivering a St. Crispin's Day speech, and calling the American people a

"them" does not situate the USA within the modern paradigm of sovereignty, the way Henry's use of them situates his England. Rather, it broadens the American "band of brothers" (IV. 3. 291), if we are to exclude the category of Americans described above, to include subject states that would stand side by side with the USA—our postmodern Empire's Rome, to contradict Hardt and Negri (317). It is the world's only superpower in the "world's fight or 'civilization's fight'" (Passavant and Dean 316), as Bush put it in his speech of September 20, 2001. The postmodern nature of the enemy posited by the USA in its war on terror, and the universal appeal of a just war of good versus evil accounts for the explosion of US boundaries. It is also explained by the fact that the USA reached a point at which politics has come to be "completely integrated into the system of transnational command" (Hardt and Negri 307), and the shift of US foreign policy from defense to security.

What is interesting about the parallel between Bush's and Henry's wars, and their use of similar rhetorical strategies, is that when we read them in light of Empire's symptoms of passage from modern sovereignty to imperial sovereignty, we can come to a better understanding of the most powerful state-- in military, economic, and cultural terms-- in our globalizing world, and of the new world order resulting, to a large extent, from the latter's policies. The only problem with Hardt and Negri's theorization of the contemporary world order is that it is based on the fact that "the United States does not, and indeed, no nation-state can today, form the center of an imperialist project" (xiv). Likewise, when seen in light of the war on Iraq (March 2003), their conception of the relationship between the USA, as the defender of global right (180), and the United Nations proves to be erroneous. However, to do

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« band of brothers » is Balint Vazsonyi (Newstrom, par. 17).

justice to Hardt and Negri, we must take into account the historical circumstances under which *Empire* was written. Indeed, as both writers state in their preface, *Empire* "was begun well after the end of the Persian Gulf War" (xvii). This means that at the time of the production of the book, the USA was still abiding by the rulings of the UN, which explains the way Hardt and Negri conceive of the relationship between the USA and the UN. Before examining Bush's postmodern version of Henry's strategies and wars, I want to say that I will be relying on Laffey and Weldes's notion of the internationalization of the state as a structure of rule and governance, and David Harvey's explanation of the war on Iraq to fill the gaps left in Hardt and Negri's theorization of Empire.

Thus, Bush's use of the discourse of good versus evil broadens the notion of the American "band of brothers" to include not only Americans, but also subject nation-states willing to engage in America's crusade on terror (IV. 3. 291). This internationalization of America's war on a postmodern, ubiquitous and elusive enemy is secured through depicting the latter as the enemy of civilization and good, which are universally cherished (Hardt and Negri 151). This is put clearly by George W. Bush, when he says in his speech of September 20, 2001, describing his war on terror, that "this is the world's fight" (Passavant and Dean 316). Though Henry V refers similarly to the war of the English against the French as a war of good versus evil, the enemy in question is material and locatable. This goes back to the fact that Henry's war on France can be situated within the paradigm of modern sovereignty, as it is a war between "two national sovereigns involved in a boundary dispute" (Passavant and Dean 321). It is a war between two bounded territories conveyed

rhetorically through the opposition between the French, our "bad neighbors" (IV. 1. 257), and the "noble English" (III. 1. 202). Like the modern territory of England and France, the modern identities of the English and the French are clearly marked by closure, homogeneity, and exclusion of the Other. Though the ideal English army, which allegorically stands for a unified England, includes people from England's insurgent Scottish, Welsh, and Irish neighbors, along with such masterless men as Bardolph, Nym, and Pistol, who were considered subversive subjects during the Renaissance, Henry's St. Crispin's speech succeeds in unifying them all against their common French enemy, leaving none out. This homogeneous national identity finds its most eloquent—though jingoistic—expression, in Henry's phrase "band of brothers," which leaves no section of the English society out. Taking this into account, one can see that America's "band of brothers" is of a postmodern nature, as the American territory producing it is characterized by porous boundaries. Moreover, the dividing line between its inside and outside is blurred. The terrorist Other can be within American boundaries; and subject nation-states that share America's conception of the war on terror as civilization's fight against barbarism, and thus make up part of its "coalition of the willing, or to put it in Shakespearean parlance, its "band of brothers," can be beyond those boundaries.

What is interesting about reading the coalition of the willing as an instance of the internationalization of the American "band of brothers" is that it gives us an insight into the international community resulting from America's war on terror. Here, it is important to remember the fact that the war on Iraq was waged against the decision of the United Nations. In this sense, the war on Iraq debunks Hardt and

Negri's theorization of our globalizing world order, mainly as far as their conception of the relationship between the USA and the United Nations is concerned. Indeed, they see the USA as contributing to the international community through its use of its military prowess to defend global right (180). Hardt and Negri put this clearly when they say: "the United States is the peace police, but only in the final instance, when the supranational organizations of peace call for organizational activity and an articulated complex of juridical and organizational initiative" (181). This conception of an international community governed by "a legitimate supranational motor of juridical action" like the UN, and defended by the USA, which would abide by and defend international law, is not a good assessment of the relation between the United Nations and the United States, if we are to take into account the fact that the USA went against the decision of the UN not to wage war on Iraq in 2003 (Hardt and Negri E 181). However, what is worth noting about Gulf War II is not its being fought against the decision of the UN, but rather that it enabled the USA to constitute an international community outside the jurisdiction of the UN. Though this international community does not have the legal weight or the sanction of such powerful countries as France and Germany—temporary as that may be, it evidences the matchless power of the USA, on the international level. In this sense, like Henry's war on France, Bush's war on terror enables the latter to forge a community. However, the two communities resulting from these wars are different, as the community brought about by the war on terror includes subjects who are beyond the geographical boundaries of the USA.

Here, I will move to examining another important rhetorical element that unites this new international community, namely Bush's presentation of the war on terror as a just war. This is what explains, for instance, the emphasis Bush places on the justice the coalition's war on Iraq will bring about, when he asserts that "whether we bring our enemies to justice or justice to our enemies, justice will be done" (Zaraefsky 145). Like the Manichaean discourse of good versus evil, reading Bush's use of the concept of just war, which is also used by Henry V, also gives us an insight into the nature of the contemporary world order. In both cases, Henry V and Bush seem to hark back to one of Machiavelli's basic lessons, namely the importance of appearing religious for a good prince. Indeed, the following passage from *The Prince* seems uncannily to guide the steps of both Henry V and Bush in their war campaign:

> [t]o those seeing and hearing him, he should appear a man of compassion, a man of good faith, a man of integrity, a kind and religious man. And there is nothing so important as to seem to have this last quality. Men in general judge by their eyes rather than by their hands; because everyone is in a position to watch, few are in a position to come in close touch with you. Everyone sees what you appear to be, few experience what you really are. (58)

As I have shown in my first chapter, among the Machiavellian strategies that Henry V adopts is the use of religion. In fact, not only does he masquerade as a Christian king, but he also presents his war on France as a just war, or to put it in Hardt and Negri's terms, as an ethical instrument to solve the territorial dispute between England and France (12). The religiosity of the king, which is reflected through his religious conversion and abundant references to God, his donning of the cloak of justice on his war, and his depiction of it as a war of good versus evil represent the king's efforts to meet the need of his people to have a religious and virtuous king. They also express

his awareness of the importance of the justness of a war—or at least the apparent justness of a war—is a *sine qua non* for marketing it successfully to the people. This is what explains the long and tortuous demonstration of the justice of Henry's war by the Archbishop, which extends over the second scene of the first Act. Depicting the cause of England as a just cause sanctioned by religious authorities and blessed by God, a blessing that Henry discovers at the end of the play with the victory of the English, when he says "O God—Thy arm was here; / And not to us, but to thy arm alone, ascribe we all!" further unites the ranks of the English (IV. 8. 330).

Before exploring the outlines of the new world order that a comparison of Bush's depiction of his war on terror as a just war with that of Henry's enables us to see, I want to underscore the fact that there can be no just war, be it from Erasmus's point of view, as I have clearly shown in my first chapter, or from the point of view Immanuel Kant presents in his *Perpetual Peace*. In fact, Kant sees that no war can be just, were it only for the fact that there are no courts to judge the justness of a war, or lack thereof. Kant puts this clearly when he says that:

> [w]ar, however, is only the sad recourse in the state of nature (where there is no tribunal which could judge with force of law) by which each state asserts its right by violence and in which neither party can be adjudged unjust (for that would presuppose a juridical decision; in light of such a decision the issue of the conflict (as if given by a so-called judgement of God) decides on which side justice lives. (8)

This means that even representing the war as necessary and just in the case of Henry V's war on France, or Bush's war on terror can, in no way, make their wars ethical instruments (Hardt and Negri 12). A war, thus, by nature has nothing to do with morality or justice. In the case of Bush's, and Henry's war campaigns, the concept of

just war is used to win the people's support for the wars, and further unite their peoples.

Here, it is worth noting that the big lines of the project for the formation of a league of nations, which Kant outlines near the end of his Perpetual Peace provides the blue print for the United Nations, as we know it. This league, as Kant conceives of it, will guarantee international peace. What is important about the Kantian project is not the fact that it predicts the foundation of the UN, which is actually made up of independent nation-states and aims at resolving disputes arising between them; rather, this project, when read in light of what happened on the international scene in the aftermath of 9/11, is significant because it reminds us that the UN was founded to solve problems arising among independent nation-states. In other words, it is not conceived to deal with problems posed by the postmodern terrorist enemy that cannot be identified with a single nation-state. This enemy anticipates the USA's flouting the decision of the UN. More precisely, it anticipates the defeat of the UN as the international referee when it comes to the implementation of UN resolutions the USA rejects.

Furthermore, it signals the passage from modern sovereignty to postmodern sovereignty. Indeed, the enemy against whom the war on terror is waged is the diffuse networks of Muslim fundamentalists connected to, or like, Al-Qaeda. The rise of such a network is a symptom of passage to postmodern sovereignty. Hardt and Negri put this clearly, when they say "[a]nother symptom of the historical passage already in process in the final decades of the twentieth century is the rise of so-called fundamentalisms" (146). Being postmodern, elusive, and ubiquitous, this

enemy is portrayed in the war on terror campaigns as endangering the interests of the USA. The fact that these terrorists can have cells anywhere in the world, and more precisely the fact that this can endanger the interests of the USA, makes us aware of the extent to which US capitalist and geopolitical interests have expanded beyond the boundaries of the USA. This expansion of the USA and of its interests led, after the attacks of 9/11, to the shift in US foreign policy from defense to security, as Hardt and Negri contend in their *Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire.* To defend the integrity of its territory and its interests, which span almost the whole globe, the USA has opted for a preemptive war on terror in the case of Iraq, without the sanction of the UN.

Here, I contend that US violation of the UN's resolution signals the birth of the new international community I described above. Like Henry V, George W. Bush unites this international community through depicting his war on terror not only as a war of good versus evil, but also as a just war. In fact, nothing is more universally appreciated than justice and the prevention of more terrorist attacks that may lead to the death of innocent people. The justice the USA thinks the UN was unable to bring about is the very concept around which the former rhetorically builds its international community. Bush states this clearly when he stresses the centrality of justice to his war on terror, in his speech of September 20, 2003 saying "whether we bring our enemies to justice or justice to our enemies justice will be done" (Zaraefsky 145). Moreover, the unity of the new international community is made stronger through the internationalization of the American state as a structure of rule and crime control. Weldes and Laffey show this clearly when they say that "the solution to this

internationlized security threat is, of course, enhanced international coordination and increased policing at all levels" (136). This coordination, according to them, can only be reached through "the fact that [US] borders too are being extraterritorialized: policing of organized crime extends the US state—its organizing principles and institutional-legal structures—into the territories of myriad other states" (Passavant and Dean 137). This can be seen at work through an examination of the transformed structures of rule in such a country as Afghanistan, after America's war on the terrorist Taliban regime there. After that war, Afghanistan adopted the institutional structures the USA deems necessary for the construction of a democracy. This is pointed out by a report published on the official site of the White House, which states that:

> Historic Days in Afghanistan: On October 9, 2004, the Afghan people made history by holding their first direct presidential election, with both men and women voting. They also adopted a constitution that protects the rights of all, while honoring their nation's most cherished traditions. The Afghan people have proven to the world that there is a yearning among people everywhere for democracy and freedom. Working Cooperatively with Nations around the World: America continues to work tirelessly with our many counterterrorism partners overseas to deny al-Qaida any safe harbor and to disrupt their terrorist plots. The President also continues to strengthen America 's defenses in the War on Terror. (White House, par. 22)

The same thing applies to Iraq, in the aftermath of the Coalition's war on it. The USA, for instance, has taken charge of training the new Iraqi police forces and the Iraqi government presently in power has adopted the views of the USA, thus making Iraq part of America's international "band of brothers," and may, in the future, contribute to America's on-going war on terror, as part of the aforementioned brotherhood, the way Afghanistan contributed to the war on Iraq (IV. 3. 291).

Exploring the forging of this international community with Machiavelli's *The Prince* in mind, mainly his emphasizing the importance of the forging of a citizen-army for the unification and security of a country, as I have shown in my first chapter, enables us to see the different subject nation-states involved in the coalition of the willing as the postmodern counterparts of the soldiers making up Henry's citizen-army. Indeed, the current internationalization of the security issue of the USA, the American structure of rule, and the importance of the American capital in Transnational Corporations have led to the fact that the surface of the globe has become smooth for US and transnational capital. As a consequence, the open imperial American space has no longer any outside, and all the subject nation-states beyond its geographical boundaries have to be absorbed into the American military machine to further protect the USA and the interests of global capital and the world. Though there have always been military alliances even back in the world of ancient empires, the American imperial military machine is different from these alliances as the subject nation-states that contribute to it either have common capitalist interests with the states, or have been structurally transformed by America's war on terror, as it is the case with Afghanistan.

Here, I suggest that reading the present globalizing world order through the Polybian model of imperial Rome, which we can see at work in Shakespeare's *Henry V,* can help us understand American expansionism. Polybius's concept of the perfect form of power is "structured by a mixed constitution that combines monarchic power, aristocratic power, and democratic power" (Hardt and Negri 163). Furthermore, tracing the Polybian model in Shakespeare's *Henry V* allows us to see the present

world order as an "evolution beyond the modern, liberal model of a mixed constitution" (Hardt and Negri 316-7). In fact, when we read *Henry V,* we can see that it is an embodiment of the Polybian model in the sense that Henry's England is based on bringing together three good forms of power, namely monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy. In this play, monarchic power is wielded by an ideal king who brings together military and rhetorical prowess respectively through his victory in the battle of Agincourt and his St. Crispin's speech. This king is helped financially and militarily by his noblemen, who are richer than the noblemen any other English king had (I. 2. 138). These noblemen along with the businessmen bishops, who promised the king to "raise your highness such a mighty sum/ As never did the clergy at one time/ Bring in to any of your ancestors" contribute to the war effort and make up the aristocratic power (I. 2. 139). As far as the democratic power is concerned, it is constituted by the soldiers—who make up the citizen-army.

Another fundamental aspect of this model is its being based on the transcendence of limits through expansion, hence the parallel Hardt and Negri draw between the imperial Roman constitution and the crucial role of the frontier movement in the building of an American democracy. This second aspect of the Polybian model can also be seen at work through Henry's war on France. The "democratic foundations led to both the continuous production of conflicts and the appropriation of new territories," in Henry's England (Hardt and Negri 166). Indeed, Henry V, the representative of the monarchic form of power, was faced with the necessity of dealing not only with conflicts at the level of the democratic form of power, but also at the level of the aristocratic one. The representatives of the former

are the people among whom there were lots of disbanded soldiers [and] hardy vagabonds," who were the cause of many disturbances (Mowat 287). Moreover, a section of the aristocratic form conspired to overthrow the king and enthrone the Earl of March, the legitimate claimant to the throne, according to the architects of the Southampton Plot. Confronted with these problems at the domestic level, being aware of the necessity of strengthening his hold on a usurped throne and of unifying his kingdom, Henry V resorts to the Machiavellian strategy of waging international war, as I showed at length in my first chapter. This war, along with Henry's recourse to his discursive weapons, displace the domestic problems with which he was faced beyond the boundaries of his kingdom, thus expanding the territory under his control.

In the section of "Network Power: US Sovereignty," Hardt and Negri conceive of the Polybian model of the perfect Roman empire as being "structured by a mixed constitution that combines monarchic power, aristocratic power, and democratic power" (163). I showed above how Henry's England provides a good example of this model. This imperial model is well situated within the paradigm of modern sovereignty, as it is constituted by a mixture of different and separate forms of power. In their section of "Mixed Constitution," Hardt and Negri try to use this model in an effort to articulate the current globalizing world order, and they reach the conclusion that the modern version of the Polybian model cannot be an appropriate tool for the task they set for themselves, and that only a postmodern version of the Polybian model can be helpful. They put this clearly when they say:

> [t]he empire that is emerging today, however, is not really a throwback to the ancient Polybian model, even in its negative 'bad' form. The contemporary arrangement is better understood in postmodern terms,

> that is, as an evolution beyond the modern, liberal model of a mixed constitution. (316-7)

What characterizes the postmodern version of the Polybian model, and makes it different from the modern version, is the fact that instead of having a "mixtum of separate forms of power," we have a hybridization of those forms of powers (Hardt and Negri 309).

Rethinking the Polybian model in postmodern terms, Hardt and Negri end up seeing the three tiers of the "pyramid of global constitution" as the postmodern version of the three forms of power outlined above. In fact, they see that the first tier of the pyramid which "holds hegemony over the global use of force," with the USA at its pinnacle, represents the monarchic form of power (309). The aristocratic form of power is represented by the second tier of the pyramid, and "is structured primarily by the networks that transnational capitalist corporations have extended throughout the world market—networks of capital flows, technology flows, population flows, and the like" (Hardt and Negri 310). The nation-states, non-governmental organizations and such institutions as religion and the media contribute to the third and biggest tier of the pyramid of global constitution, and are the components of the postmodern Polybian democratic form of power. Though Hardt and Negri provide us with a postmodern imperial, and globalized version of the Polybian model, which is an interesting reading of our globalizing world order, they fail to tackle a fundamental aspect of that order, and of the Polybian model, namely expansion. To put it more clearly, they do talk about exapansionism throughout their book, but do not talk about it as the result of the conflicts or disturbances at the level of the democratic form of power.

As I have already said in other sections of this chapter, the internationalization of the American state and the peerless importance of the USA in the global configuration of power are facts to be taken into account if we are to reach a good understanding of our globalizing world order. Here, I contend that the parallels drawn between Bush and Henry V can be very enlightening, if we read the expansionism of the USA with its war on terror in terms of a postmodern version of the Polybian democratic form of English power. "The democratic foundations" of the USA before the war on Iraq, for instance, "led to the [...] continuous production of discontent" among Americans (Hardt and Negri 166). A quick glance at the Gallup poll during the period leading to the Second Gulf War shows the discontent of the American people with the economic state of affairs. More significantly, those polls demonstrate the increasing anxiety of Americans related to a possible energy shortage. This discontent at the level of democratic power increased the possibility of conflicts between the democratic power and the other modes of power. In order to transcend those limits at the domestic level, the war on Iraq was undertaken. This war, as I argued earlier on, has so far succeeded in Americanizing the legal and policing Iraqi institutions.

What is different about the expansionism of the USA, when compared to that of England's, is the fact that it can be taken as a new phase of the frontier movement. Though the frontier movement that expanded the American territory from the Atlantic to the Pacific came to an end in the late 1890s, it kept on mutating ever since to take the form of landing on the moon in the 1960s, and the internationalization of the American state, which is presently underway. The other factor that makes US

expansionism different from the expansionism of England is the fact that it evidences the hybridization of government that is characteristic of the postmodern version of the Polybian model, as Hardt and Negri conceive of it. Indeed, the monarchic power is no longer totally separate from the aristocratic power. To illustrate this, I may refer to the fact that both Bush and his vice-president, Dick Cheney, had business careers before entering the world of politics, and make defending transnational interests a priority.

This hybridization is even clearer, when we see the war on Iraq from David Harvey's perspective. According to Harvey, the war on Iraq was fought to further the interests of transnational capital, in general, and American capital, in particular, and not to rid the world of Saddam's weapons of mass destruction, which after all proved to be non-existent. He contends that since oil is of paramount importance to the global economy, it makes sense that if the United States controls the "Global oil spigot," it will, at least temporarily keep its position as a superpower. Harvey puts this eloquently when he says, "there is, however, an even grander perspective from which to understand the oil question. It can be captured in the following proposition: whoever controls the Middle East controls the global oil spigot and whoever controls the global oil spigot can control the global economy, at least for the near future" (19).

Furthermore, we can see the hybridization of government through the way changes and tendencies at the level of the democratic form of power influence or actually produce discourse at the level of the monarchic form of power. An examination of the importance of religion in the decisions American people make, and of its influence on the discourses of Bush since the 2000 elections, and on his

campaign of the war on terror is very helpful. Here, I want to go back to one aspect of Bush's life that has constantly been referred to by most of those who draw a parallel between him and Henry V, namely his religious conversion. Among these, I may refer to David Gergen, who holds that:

> [w]hen trouble hit, how rapidly we left behind the pages of Henry the 4th and suddenly we seem to be into the pages of Henry the 5th. There had been a transformation as young George W. Bush stepped up to. Now, to be sure, he has not won his Agincourt, but he has set sail, and for that the country can be grateful. (Newstrom, par. 17)[15]

As I showed in my first chapter, being aware of the importance his people give to having a virtuous and religious king, Henry V skillfully masquerades as one. Here, I do not mean to debate the authenticity of Bush's conversion, for that would be beside the point. Rather, what is worth noting about Bush's conversion and use of the religious discourse, in his war campaign is that they reveal the fact that the postmodern monarchic form of power is no longer totally separate from the democratic one. Marketing policies that a certain administration chooses to carry out can only be successfully achieved, if these policies speak to the convictions of the representatives of the democratic form of power. From 2000 to the present day, morality and religion, in the USA play an increasing role in the lives of Americans and in the decisions they make. To illustrate this, I may refer to Gallup poll nation-wide survey of likely voters in the summer of 2000:

> [t]he question asked to the people interviewed in the survey is '[H]ow important will your own personal religious beliefs and faith be in deciding your vote for president this year?' 54 percent responded with 'extremely important', 'very important', or 'somewhat important.' (Medhurst 126)

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[15] *National Review Online* contributing editor Peter Robinson, MSNBC presenter Chris Mathews, and CNN senior analyst Jeff Greenfield also refer to the religious conversion of George W. Bush, when they draw the parallel between the latter and Henry V.

However, the conversion of George W. Bush along with his anti-abortion attitude and his encouragement of faith-based initiatives, in his 2000 presidential campaign, intelligently target a section of the electorate that is known for its conservative political stance, namely the evangelicals. The connection between Bush's choosing Evangelicalism, in particular, is articulated clearly by Sam Allis, when he says:

> [t]he connection between his religious conversion [Bush's] and his politics is huge. In the 2000 election, almost half of his nearly 50 million votes—about 23 million—came from evangelicals. [...] At that time, more than 40 percent of Americans described themselves as evangelicals, and 70 percent of those evangelicals who voted were politically conservative. This bloc, quite simply, was and is Bush's most important base. (Allis, par.2)

Bush's appeal to the religious side of the lives of his people, in general, and to the conservative attitudes of evangelicals in particular, during 2000 presidential elections was also adopted in the aftermath of 9/11. In this sense, the importance of religion and morality in the lives of Americans—at the domestic level, and the universal appeal of the discourse of good versus evil and defending justice—at the international level, have determined indirectly the form of the presidential discourses, during America's war on terror. As Medhurst put it, the language Bush spoke during his 2000 presidential election campaign, like the language spoken in the aftermath of 9/11, "resonated with large segments of the public because it was based on values widely held and attitudes toward religion and morality broadly shared" (121).

So far I have examined the way we can understand the current globalizing world order through a hybrid reading of the configuration of global power. Hybrid reading, here, refers to bringing together Hardt and Negri's emphasis on the passage from the paradigm of modern sovereignty to the paradigm of postmodern

sovereignty, and the internationalization of the state as a structure of rule, the way their detractors Weldes and Laffey conceive of it. It is only such a hybrid reading that can do justice to a hybrid world, where the importance of the postmodern paradigm of sovereignty does not mean the end of the nation state. To be more precise, the new configuration of power is based on the continuing, and increasing sovereignty of powerful states like the USA, France, and Germany, on the one hand, and the decline of the sovereignty of those states belonging to the underdeveloped world. In this sense, the openess of the postmodern imperial American space outlined above means the porous boundaries of other countries—mainly underdeveloped ones—and the openess of their spaces to American capital, and American military forces. What is worth noting about this openess of the American imperial space is that it is one way only, which means that underdeveloped countries are always faced with the reality of rigid boundaries. The ever increasing rigid boundaries of powerful states, and the porous boundaries of underdeveloped nation states, which are characteristic of the current globalizing world order, accounts, in part, for its hybridity, but can, in no way, mean that we have reached the demise of the nation-state. This hybridity is also pointed out clearly by Laffey and Weldes, when they say:

> [b]ut contrary to Hardt and Negri's claim, the international is not characterized by "smooth space": borders, while transformed, remain significant. They are in some instances becoming thinner and in others thicker. European union borders within Shengen area, for instance, are being eliminated for some purposes, but not for others. Within Shengen, despite the elimination of border controls, the movements of "football hooligans" are being surveilled and policed; at the same time borders around Shengen are being strengthened to keep out undesirable migrants. (129)

Laffey and Weldes are right to underscore the fact that Hardt and Negri's conception of empire as "smooth space" cannot be taken in absolute terms. They are also right to emphasize the closure of the Shengen area to people from the outside. Here, again, we go back to the modern conception of a sovereign territory, which is based on closure and on positing an Other to its citizens.

Weldes and Laffey's mentioning the Shengen area is reminiscent of another element that evidences the strong relation between the power of a state and its sovereignty, or lack thereof: the passport. Depending on the country where a traveler's passport was issued, barriers are either eroded or strengthened. That is to say, if a traveler is from North America, or the European Union, no visas are required to go as a tourist to places like Jamaica Kincaid's Antigua. However, when a traveler is from places like Antigua, he or she will feel the rigidity of the American frontier, for instance, when applying for an entry visa. A passage from Kincaid's *A Small Place* renders this beautifully:

> [y]ou disembark from your plane. You go through customs. Since you are a tourist, a North American or European—to be frank, white—and not an Antiguan black returning to Antigua from Europe or North Europe with cardboard boxes of much needed cheap clothes and food for relatives, you move through customs swiftly, you move through customs with ease. Your bags are not searched. (4-5)

Here, a question begs to be asked: can we consider that the strong boundaries that characterize the territories of "developed" countries situate the latter within the paradigm of modern sovereignty? Answering the question in the positive is not incorrect, but it leaves a substantial side of the global configuration of power unaccounted for. In fact, what characterizes powerful nation-states presently is their straddling the modern and postmodern paradigms of sovereignty, rather than

inhabiting one of them, hence their hybridity. This can be seen clearly through the example of the USA, which is presently the world's only superpower. Bush's use of the discourse of good versus evil and his depiction of the war on terror as a just are even more important, as they show the hybrid nature of the American state. Indeed, on the one hand, Bush's discourses target an American people whose Other is the ubiquitous terrorist network, and whose territory is threatened from a hostile outside, which situate the USA within the paradigm of modern sovereignty. On the other hand, the same discourses target the new international community, which came into existence with Bush's war on terror. The special status of the USA among other developed countries goes back to its internationalization of its structure of rule through the on-going war on terror. It is through positing a postmodern enemy and through the internationalization of the American "band of brothers" that the USA can be situated within the postmodern paradigm of sovereignty, as well (IV. 3. 291). In this sense, the USA straddles the modern and postmodern paradigms of sovereignty.

I approached the current globalizing world order with a view to articulating its intricacies, through exploring the parallel US TV presenters, contributing editors to the National Review Online, and authorities in public leadership draw between Henry V and Bush. What I emphasized throughout my reading of the contemporary world order is the fact that reading it only through Hardt and Negri's *Empire*, or through Passavant and *Dean's Empire's New Clothes: Reading Hardt and Negri* can, in no way, lead us to a full understanding of that world order. Only a hybrid reading that would bring together what is apparently two opposite ends of a spectrum, namely the

internationalization of the American state and postmodern sovereignty, can do justice to its complicated nature.

Bush's discourse of good versus evil, and his packaging the war on terror as a just war enable him to target a postmodern American "band of brothers" that is both within the USA and beyond its boundaries. The first discourse mentioned above testifies to the persistence of the modern nation-state, which defines its sovereign territory and its citizens respectively against an outside and a threatening Other, and situates the USA within the modern paradigm of sovereignty. The second discourse explodes the boundaries this modern American national community, the way the war on terror and transnational capital have exploded the American geographical space, to include subject nation-states contributing to America's war on terror.

Furthermore, in my last chapter, I examined how we can understand the specificities of the nature of our contemporary world through tracing the outlines of a postmodern imperial Polybian model in that world. The outcome of this reading was a tripartite, hybrid, and postmodern empire. In this respect, the hybridity of this empire stems from the fact that the three different forms of power, which constitute it—monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy—are no longer separate functions, the way we can see them in Henry V's early modern England, or in Olivier's modern Britain. Rather, they are hybrid and no longer totally separate the one from the other. The postmodern versions of the Polybian model, which we can trace in Shakespeare's *Henry V*, along with Henry's war on France, enemy, and "band of brothers" make the parallel drawn between Bush and his Shakespearean counterpart very insightful, when it comes to understanding the nature of the contemporary world order.

Conclusion

Examining three moments in Shakespeare's *Henry V*'s odyssey from 1599 to the opening years of the twenty-first century gives us an insight into what Holderness calls "the real Shakespeare" (VS 93). It also reveals the nature of the world order in which early modern England, Britain of the 1940s, and post 9/ 11 America are situated. In fact, both Shakespeare's play and Olivier's adaptation of it can be situated within what Hardt and Negri call the paradigm of modern sovereignty (137). As far as the parallel drawn between Henry V and Bush is concerned, it rather situates twenty-first-century America within the paradigm of postmodern sovereignty. In this sense, studying these three moments in the history of *Henry V* uncannily enables us to stage the second part of Hardt and Negri's *Empire*, namely "Passages of Sovereignty," through a Cultural Materialist reading of those moments. More precisely, my study of the first two moments in that history examines the outlines a modern sovereignty, mainly its emphasis on the binary oppositions between Self and Other, the closure of the national territory, and the totalizing national identity it imposes on its subjects. However, my reading of the play in light of Weldes's and Laffey's article "Representing the International: Sovereignty after Modernity?," Hardt and Negri's *Empire*, and the ongoing war on terror, allows us to see the mutation of the modern version of the Shakespearean "band of brothers," and the Polybian model. The mutation of these aspects of the play, as I showed at length in my third chapter, characterize the current globalizing world order and underscore the passage from modern sovereignty to imperial sovereignty.

In my first chapter, I examined Shakespeare's Henry V and his plan of national unification in relation to the two modes of kingship, namely the

Machiavellian model and the Erasminan model of the Christian prince. Contrary to what scholars such as Norman Rabkin and Sara Munson Deats argue, I showed that Henry V is a Machiavellian prince, par excellence, rather than an ambivalent king with both Christian and Machiavellian attributes. Indeed, in order to carry out his historical task, Henry V relies on such as international war, religion, and a citizen-army. Furthermore, I considered Shakespeare's recourse to deletion and distortion, along with his aesthetic colonization of potential sites of dissent in Elizabethan society and their centrality to the ideal picture of a unified England we see in *Henry V*.

In my second chapter, I studied a number of scenes Olivier deleted or distorted in order to present British viewers, in the 1940s, with an acceptable heroic figure. The other aspect that played a key role in Olivier's trimming of Shakespeare's play is the fact that the Ministry of Information sponsored his movie. Moreover, I pointed out the importance of reading this adaptation as the culminating point of the history of the MOI's development and the significance of its being a feature film rather than a documentary.

As far as the last chapter is concerned, I read the contemporary world order and the centrality of the USA to it through an examination of the parallel between Bush and Shakespeare's Henry V. The conclusion I reached, in this respect, is the fact that our contemporary world is characterized by the internationalization not only of the American state, as a structure of rule, but also of such aspects of Shakespeare's play as the "band of brothers" and the Polybian model.

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