Université de Montréal

When Sisters Become Brothers: The Inclusion of Women in Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood, 1952-2005

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RÉSUMÉ

Depuis la création des Sœurs Musulmanes, le chapitre féminin des Frères Musulmans en Égypte, le rôle que l'organisation a accordé aux femmes a changé plusieurs fois. Pendant certaines périodes, les militantes ont été inclues dans les activités politiques de l'organisation, alors que pendant d'autres périodes, elles étaient forcées de s'occuper de différentes activités d'aide sociale au près de la population. Ce mémoire essaie d'expliquer les raisons qui expliquent les différents changements dans le niveau d'inclusion ou d'exclusion des militantes dans les Frères Musulmans. Cette étude utilise trois périodes pour illustrer ces différents changements : 1952-1967 (inclusion), 1970-1984 (exclusion) and 1984-2005 (inclusion).

Cette recherche conclue que, pendant des périodes où la survie des Frères Musulmans est remise en question, l'organisation sera forcée d'inclure les militantes dans leurs activités. Chaque changement dans l'inclusion des femmes est aussi marqué par un changement du contexte politique et des relations avec le gouvernement. Ces changements ne sont donc pas des produits de changement idéologique de l'organisation, mais plutôt causés par des raisons rationnelles.

Mots-clés : Frères Musulmans, Sœurs Musulmanes, inclusion/exclusion, Égypte, partis Islamistes, femmes

ABSTRACT

Since the creation of the Muslim Sisters, the female chapter of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the role that the organization gave women has been shifting. At times, female militants were included within the political activities of the organization, while during others; they were relegated to a role of care provider in various charity tasks. The thesis at hand attempts to explain the causes for those shifts in the level of inclusion and exclusion of female militants within the Muslim Brotherhood. For that purpose, this study will tackle three different periods: 1952-1967 (inclusion), 1970-1984 (exclusion) and 1984-2005 (inclusion).

The research concludes that in periods where the survival of the Muslim Brotherhood is at risk, they will be forced to include female militants in their activities. Each change in the inclusion of women is also marked by a change in the political context and the relations with the government. Therefore these changes, rather than being ideological changes, are caused by rational concerns of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Keywords: Muslim Brotherhood, Muslim Sisters, inclusion/exclusion, Egypt, Islamist parties, women

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ASU	Arab Socialist Union
IAF	Islamic Action Front
IIC	International Islamic Committee for Woman and Child
MB	Muslim Brotherhood
NDP	National Democratic Party
NFC	National Front for Change
NWP	New *Wafd* Party

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INTRODUCTION: THE PUZZLE

Studies have shown that Islamist parties have varied over time and across space in the extent to which they have included female activists in their organization. This has particularly been the case of the Islah party in Yemen, the Islamic Action Front (IAF) in Jordan and Hamas in the Palestinian Territories. At times, women were included in the organizational structure of those movements or parties, while at other times they were excluded, and essentially relegated to charity-related responsibilities. The Islah party's founding constitution, for instance, states that women's role mostly consists of carrying out social programs for women and children. Between 1993 and 1997, the Islah party forbade women from running in elections. Following 1997, however, women were included in consultative councils. Female activists also became crucial actors in mobilizing support during electoral periods (Clark & Schwedler 2003). In contrast, Jordan's IAF witnessed a reversed pattern of inclusion/exclusion. It was inclusive in the early 1990's before turning more exclusionary as the decade progressed. The IAF recognized the role of women as crucial both in the public and private sphere and encouraged them to hold political office. In 1992, the organization founded a distinct political party, where "female members were permitted to join any committee or department within the party" (Clark & Schwedler 2003, 301). However, since 1992, the party has not increased funding for women in the movement, and in 1999, they were excluded from public forums and seminars, such as the one discussing honor killings. As for Hamas, the involvement of female activists has varied between Gaza and the West Bank. In Gaza, women have been an integral part of the mainstream political organization

since 2003 (Jad 2011, 178-9). In the West Bank, they became involved in the organization through universities, but remained active in it only until they graduated. Outside of universities, women's only possibilities to retain ties to Hamas were through charitable organizations.

Like the Islah party, the IAF and the Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt underwent periods of inclusion and exclusion of female activists. Three periods are of particular interest in this study.

The first period is one of inclusion between 1952 and 1967. When Nasser came to power in 1952, the movement experienced a wave of repression, which placed many of its leaders and members in prison. During that time, women quickly filled the roles that men could no longer serve (Abdel-Latif 2008, 3). They were responsible for spreading the Islamist message both amongst the population and between lower ranked members of the Brotherhood. They acted as intermediaries between members in the prison and with members of the organization that were not in jail. They also provided both financial and emotional support for the family of imprisoned leaders. Women were active in keeping the organization together while leaders were imprisoned (Talhami 1996, 49). This period of inclusion ended in 1967 when the government increased pressure on the Muslim Brotherhood, including women this time.

The second period was one of exclusion between the 1970s and 1984. During this time, women were excluded from the political activities of the Brotherhood. The movement, which had regained most of its strength, kept female activists separated from the main organization. Therefore women worked mostly on an individual basis, on a variety of welfare programs (Abdel-Latif 2008, 4).

The third period was from the 1985 to 2005, and was one of greater inclusion than the first one. The Muslim Brotherhood increased female participation in the political activities and actions of the movement. As the organization became more

ambitious in their electoral demands, women also became involved in the election process. Female activists were especially key in the electoral victories of the organization. They came to play a crucial role in mobilizing voters, through door-to-door soliciting (Tadros 2011). The Brotherhood also presented female candidates starting in 2000 with a single woman and 2005 (Abdel-Latif 2008).

What accounts for variations in the Muslim Brotherhood's level of inclusion of women over time? Why have Muslim Brothers been more inclusive of female members from the 1950s to the 1960s and then again from the 1990s onwards? Why were they were more exclusionary between the 1970s and the 1980s?

CREATION AND EVOLUTION OF THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD

The Muslim Brotherhood, or *Jamai'yyat al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin* in arabic, was created by Hasan al-Banna in 1928 in the city of Ismailiyya as a response to the British presence in Egypt. The Brotherhood argued that Egypt was facing threats on two different fronts: external and internal. Foreign powers had corrupted Egyptian society and the Egyptian regime had committed treason by not defending the needs and pride of the people (Mitchell 1969, 217). Al-Banna argued that the best way to tackle Egypt's problem was to return to the teachings of Islam, which he felt could govern all aspects of life (Al-Abdin 1989).

The Brotherhood grew until 1952 when it began to face a high level of repression during Nasser's regime. This created a cleavage in the organization between a branch that advocated for a moderate approach and one that wanted a more confrontational and radical approach.

The main approach that the moderate strand of the Brotherhood has taken has been to work with the existing system. Al-Banna repeatedly stated that he had no

interest in ruling Egypt himself but rather he would support a government that will use Islamic tenets to guide its policy making (Al-Abdin 1989). He therefore adopted a gradualist approach that progressively gained support from the masses as well as a non-violent approach (Sattar 1995, 12). This changed at the end of the 1940's. With the increasing repression of the Brotherhood, the Secret Apparatus was created, which involved a series of assassination attempts and other violent acts (Soage 2009). The goal of the Brotherhood also became increasingly political and for the creation of an Islamic state. Al-Hudaybi, who followed al-Banna as General Guide, later stressed the importance of the collective duty when discussing the establishment of an Islamic order. If a government cannot be achieved at the time, it is the responsibility of the population to follow Islamic principles (Sattar 1995, 15). The main branch of the Muslim Brotherhood still follows this more moderate approach.

Sayyid Qutb, who was the spiritual leader of the more radical branch, agreed with al-Banna's emphasis on the blame of the West for the corruption of society and the idea that Western culture was on the brink of failure (Sattar 1995, 15). Contrary to al-Banna's moderate version of the Muslim Brotherhood, Qutb argued that society was living in a state of *jahiliyya*, or ignorance, "because they had replaced God's sharia with their own man-made laws" (Sullivan & Abed-Kotob 1999, 43). In order to enlighten Muslims, Qutb advocated for jihad. He was therefore more prone to encourage a violent approach. During the period of repression and torture under Nasser, Qutb felt that the only way to explain why the government would target fellow Muslims was because these were acts of apostates, *kafireen*. This brought disagreement with the majority of the organization because al-Hudaybi believed that whoever "judges that someone is no longer a Muslim...deviates from Islam and transgresses God's will by judging another person's faith" (Leiken & Brooke 2007, 110). This moment cause a major break within the organization between the mainstream members and the more radical members. Qutb and his

followers argued that the path of the rest of the organization was a sin.

EXTANT EXPLANATIONS: CHANGES IN ORGANIZATION AND IDEOLOGY

In order to understand the shifts between inclusion and exclusion of women in Islamist parties, three main arguments have been put forward. The first argument maintains that women have changed their own role within Islamist parties through their success and demands. The second argument explains that Islamist parties have undergone ideological changes towards a commitment to democracy, which has helped to liberalize their stance on women. Finally, the third argument, which will be presented in the next section, defends that Islamist parties are rational actors who will choose their position on different issues based on a cost benefit analysis.

Firstly, women's agency can help explain why women were included in Islamist parties' activities. Women's organizational skills have helped them to force their ways into the political activities of Islamist parties. Active in the provision of welfare, women have proven that they were able to reach out to a larger portion of the population. As Yadav (2010) argues, they have been able to create important networks. This gives women new bargaining power, which they have used to make increasingly important demands on the Islamist parties for more inclusion. Encouraged by their past successes, women have started to place more calls to Islamist parties to further include them in their activities. This was done especially through a redefinition of what it is to be a woman within the Islamist thought. Arat (2005) argues that women have been able to define Islamism in a way that is compatible with liberalism. However Islamist feminists emphasize the role of women as complimentary to that of men.[1]

The arguments explaining both inclusion and exclusion through women's

[1] In the definition of Islamist feminist, it is important to get away from the Western perspective of feminism. Islamic women have been able to develop their own understanding and demands.

networks and demands cannot fully explain what can be seen on the ground. Though women's agency can explain the move towards inclusion by Islamist parties, it cannot explain the return to exclusion, as can be seen in the case of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. This argument implies a linear evolution from exclusion towards inclusion because the demands that women make should be unidirectional. There are no theoretical explanations that could account for a retreatment of the role of women. Yet, empirically, we can observe that female members of the Muslim Brotherhood have been included from 1952 to 1967, then excluded until 1984 when women were once again included.

The second approach in the literature focuses on explaining inclusion of women based on ideological changes. Harnish and Mecham (2009) claim that generational changes in the Muslim Brotherhood caused transformations in its ideology. The younger generation within the Brotherhood consistently pushes for an ideology that is more liberal and democratic. Starting with the 1984 parliamentary elections, the Brotherhood emphasized its commitment to democracy and promoting civil liberties, which was also reiterated in its 2007 draft platform (Harnish & Mecham 2009). The Brotherhood now openly admits that democracy is the most appropriate political system for Egypt, and embraces some Western influences, such as some liberal democratic values. This is a sharp change from the early years of the Muslim Brotherhood's ideology, which strongly spoke out against the Western influences that corrupted Egyptian society. Azzam (2006) argues that the organization has moved towards a more moderate approach. She suggests that the Brotherhood not only underwent an ideological transformation, but it also distanced itself from the more radical Islamist branches in Egypt, who were losing popular support. In a similar vein, Esposito (2003) explains that contemporary Islamist movements have become more mainstream and institutionalized due to

societal pressure. The "new" Muslim Brotherhood is less critical of the government and more involved in the electoral process.

If the change in ideology is based on democratization and moderation, we should also expect the Brotherhood's position towards women to be more moderate and inclusive than previously. Their commitment to democracy would entail that they are dedicated to protecting civil liberties, and such liberties include a more egalitarian treatment of women. As the ideology of the movement liberalizes, it becomes more inclusive of female activists. The hypothesis emphasizing ideological changes is nevertheless problematic on two different fronts.

First, some studies maintain that there has not actually been a genuine change in the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood. Rather, according to Tadros (2011), the Brotherhood has gone through a reframing rather than a reforming process in recent years. Especially in the case of women's rights, Tadros claims that though the Muslim Brotherhood emphasizes the importance of women in both public and private spheres, the policies towards women have remained constant. The overall "ideological foundation of the Muslim Brotherhood's contemporary stance on gender issues has not changed: women and men have strictly defined social roles based on their sex" (Tadros 2011, 96). The movement emphasizes the role of men and women as being complementary rather than equal. Therefore though the Brotherhood's discourse on women might have been forced to change due to external pressures, the actual ideology has remained steady.

Second, even if it were true that the Muslim Brotherhood had indeed undergone a transformation in its ideology, ideological factors would remain unable to explain why the Brotherhood was inclusive of female activists between 1952 and the 1970s. Indeed the forced liberalization and moderation of the Brotherhood's

ideology only started to occur in the 1980s.[2] It therefore cannot explain the period of inclusion that female members benefited from during the first period, from 1952 to the late 1960s. This was a period where the Muslim Brotherhood's ideology remained conservative yet women were clearly more involved in the political activities of the organization

INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION DUE TO COST/BENEFIT CALCULATIONS

Rather than being driven by ideological change or women's agency, I argue that the Muslim Brotherhood's choices to be more inclusive of female activists (or not) have been primarily strategic, in circumstances where inclusion helped to maximize their interests. The Muslim Brotherhood has been more inclusive of women when it saw its organization as being politically compromised. Inclusion served the purpose of maximizing the survival of the organization. Conversely, when the Muslim Brotherhood as an organization was not politically compromised, the movement was more exclusionary of women, which represented the ideology of the Brotherhood. The organization therefore chose the strategy that best suited their needs at the time. In this study, inclusion is defined specifically as the political inclusion, or involvement, of a group within its political activities and organization.[3]

During the first period, the Brotherhood's existence was severely compromised, and its goals were therefore tied to securing its existence as a social movement. Many members of the Muslim Brotherhood were imprisoned as they were thought to be responsible for the assassination attempts on Nasser. The organization's survival was compromised as a result of state repression. It forced the Brotherhood to change the role they were willing to give women in order to survive

[2] The late 1970s and early 1980s was the beginning of a period of liberalization for Egypt. Sadat, who was president at the time, was developing policies that opened Egypt to the rest of the world, both economically and politically. It was therefore a period where the influence from the West was the greatest.

[3] This definition of inclusion, and exclusion, will be further discussed towards the end of this chapter.

(Tadros 2012). Women were therefore used to ensure that there was still a presence on the ground as well as helped in the propagation of ideas. To that extent, they were instrumental in maintaining the existing support base of the Brotherhood. They were also crucial in sharing the writings of Brotherhood leaders between prisons and with members that were still free (Tadros 2012). Women were ideal intermediaries for the Brotherhood because the state saw them as less threatening than men. The inclusion of women in the political activities of the Brotherhood was therefore a strategic survival mechanism to ensure that the organization would exist.

During the second period of inclusion, starting in the early 1990s, the strategies and objectives of the Muslim Brotherhood shifted, therefore leading to different rational calculations. The movement no longer focused on securing its continued existence, or keeping the organization together in a context of severe state repression. The system was more open, the Muslim Brotherhood was allowed some space to operate in the system and even to compete in elections. The priority of the Brotherhood then became to survive not so much as a social movement, but rather to extend its success as a competitive political organization. In this optic, women represented a key group to include because of their capacity of recruitment, mobilization as well as running for office. Women were especially effective at engaging with the population and encouraging voting because they have access to an important part of the electorate, which men could not reach as easily, namely female voters. Showing the public that the Muslim Brotherhood is inclusive of female activists and represents female voters helps the organization maximize votes. Indeed, women wearing veils around polling stations send a message to the public stating that the reach of the Muslim Brotherhood is important. Furthermore, it allowed the organization to show that they are evolving and liberalizing.

There was therefore clearly a shift in both the goals and the objectives of the Muslim Brotherhood. Both times, the organization had to rationally decide which

strategy would best help to achieve their goals. Within each of these articulations of the Muslim Brotherhood's objectives, women have an important strategic role to play.

A PERIOD OF EXCLUSION

In the 1970s and 1980s, the Muslim Brotherhood's survival was not compromised. Being in a phase of relative political openness, the organization was no longer the target of political repression and its existence as a social movement was therefore not undermined. Rather, this period was one of reconstruction for the Muslim Brotherhood. Because the organization's existence was no longer threatened, and the key male leaders who had been jailed were released, women no longer played a role that could not be filled by men. The Brotherhood focused on rebuilding its own structure and re-integrating male members/leaders who were in jail. According to Abdel-Latif (2008), women therefore took a backseat in the organization and were relegated to welfare activities. Because of its focus on rebuilding the movement, the Brotherhood also did not have any immediate political ambitions. The first emphasis was ensuring that the organization was strong and developed. Therefore having a large voting base and increasing public support was not relevant to the Muslim Brotherhood during that period. With no threat to its survival and without any electoral preoccupations to maximize votes, the Brotherhood had no strategic incentive to be inclusive of female members.

CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS

In this research, I define political inclusion as the deliberate involvement of a group in the political activities and organization of a movement. This can be the participation in electoral processes, either as candidates in elections or as recruiters/mobilizers to get out the vote and recruit members, in the decision-

making bodies of the organization itself or other activities in which movement is involved in order to spread its political message. Conversely, I define exclusion as the deliberate attempt to dismiss a particular group of individuals from taking active part in the core political activities of a movement. The role of a group in the political activities is an important distinction to make between the inclusion/exclusion.

In the case of this research, it is the inclusion/exclusion of women within the Muslim Brotherhood that will be pertinent. During periods of exclusion, women can remain active in the organization but only in what could be considered social activities, such as education of other women, aid to the poor or healthcare.

I intentionally distinguish between social and political activities. Indeed, since its creation, the Brotherhood has always emphasized the role of women as mothers and wives (Tadros 2011), regardless of the Brotherhood's degree of political inclusion and exclusion of women. In the case of Islamist parties specifically, such a distinction between political and social inclusion can be problematic. Islam is often considered a complete and universal faith that covers all aspects of life, including welfare.[4] It is true that to some extent, women's charity and welfare activities could be considered political by nature because it is religious. Indeed many social outreach programs are thought of as an integral part of the *da'wa*.[5]

However in that case, I maintain that this distinction is still important to make because, as will be discussed in the following empirical chapters, there is a deliberate exclusion of women, especially when it comes to the decision-making process. During periods of exclusion, the Muslim Sisters and Brothers were kept purposely and structurally separated. Even if welfare outreach could be considered political, the Brotherhood leadership still clearly separated the tasks of men and women during periods of exclusion. This separation combined with the lack of

[4] Islam is most notably not only a religion but also jurisprudence.
[5] Da'wa literally means "making an invitation" and usually refers to a call to God or prayer (Encyclopedia of Islam)

decision-making power leads me to argue that these were indeed periods of exclusion.

POSSIBLE CONTRIBUTIONS

This thesis seeks to make two main contributions. First, phases of inclusion and exclusion of women have not yet been consistently studied in the case of Egypt. Much of the research has emphasized women's place in Islamic welfare organizations[6] or the Muslim Brotherhood's policies towards women's rights.[7] However I wish to explore the conditions under which female activists come to play a proactive political role in the activities and lives of Islamist parties. Some authors have explored the strategic role that female members have come to play in the case of Jordan. But the factors that explain inclusion remain relatively untouched in the Egyptian literature. I also further intend on using a historical evolution of the 60 years since the retreat of the British from Egypt in order to give a more comprehensive understanding on the situation. It specifically allows me to pay particular attention to shifts from inclusion to exclusion (and vice versa).

This emphasis on the Brotherhood as a strategic actor leads to the other main contribution of this research. The assumptions that religious parties are not only unchanging but also irrational are common.[8] More specifically, Huntington's Clash of Civilization highlights this idea that religious ideology is more deeply rooted than other characteristics and is therefore longer lasting. However we cannot conclude that religious parties exclusively act on the basis of their ideology. Islamist party leaders are rational actors that commonly make decisions based on instrumental reasons. While observers might argue Islamist parties are exclusive of women based

[6] For more, see Clark (2004), Morsy (1988), Munson (2001), Sullivan (2009), Talhami (1996)
[7] For more on the rights of women, see Abdel-Latif (2008), El-Tawahy (2005), Tadros (2011)
[8] The link between religion and irrationality was most notably developed in the works of Freud and Marx who thought that religion jeopardizes the ability to act and think rationally. This literature also resonates in popular culture, through blogs especially, in the idea that Islam in particular is irrational. Paroz (1985) also attempts to apply Popper's critical rationalism to religion to the protestant faith.

on their ideology, it does not go very far in telling us how Islamist parties behave internally because of the important nuances between Islamist parties and their context. In the following case study of the Muslim Brotherhood, I intend on outlining the strategic interest of Islamist parties in their decision to include or exclude women.

METHODOLOGY

This comparative analysis is based on mostly secondary literature, both in English and French. The period I study is divided into three distinctive periods, which are all punctuated by a change in the level of inclusion/exclusion of female activists within the Muslim Brotherhood. There are two periods of inclusion: one between 1952 and the 1960s and the other between the 1980s and 2005. These periods are separated by a period of exclusion from the 1970s to the 1980s. Separating it into three different periods is crucial since the aim of this research is to understand the factors that explain the changes that occurred. It allows me to compare the underlying differences that occurred between the three periods, which is key since the phenomenon studied does not evolve linearly. Each period is marked by an important change in the goals of the organization; mostly surrounding the Brotherhood's relations with the government at the time.

STRUCTURE OF THE RESEARCH

This thesis is divided into a theoretical chapter and three empirical chapters. Chapter 1 develops the theoretical framework to explain why Islamist movements are at times more inclusive of female activists than at other times. It aims to explain the causes of changes within Islamist parties. This has been explained by some as a change in ideology, demands by women or changes due to rational concerns. This

last argument, based on rational issues, will be tested in the following three chapters by using the case of women within the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.

The empirical chapters are divided into three different chapters, chapter 2 through 4, which each correspond to one of the three periods studied. Each of these chapters is constructed similarly. The first part will explain the political context and how this context changes the goals and objectives of the Brotherhood during the period. The second part will outline how these new goals change the way female activists are involved within the Brotherhood's activities. Chapter 2 explores the period of female members' inclusion from 1952 to the late 1960s. In this, I outline the strategic need to include female activists in the Muslim Brotherhood because of the threats to survival caused by the state's repression. Chapter 3 explains the change to exclusion of women between the 1970s and the 1980s. In a period of reconstruction, the Brotherhood had no real need to include women in the organization. Finally chapter 4 argues that, from the 1980s to 2005, female activists were once again included in the political activities of the movement in order to increase the popular support of the movement in a period of political openness.

CHAPTER I: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The causes of the political inclusion or exclusion of female activists within Islamist parties have been studied, in the literature, through three different angles. The first group of authors (Harnish & Mecham 2009, al-Anani 2012, Wickham 2004, Mecham 2004, Yilmaz 2009) has been focusing their studies on deeply rooted ideological changes within Islamist parties. They argue that the recent inclusion of female members is due to an evolution in the ideology of the parties towards democracy, liberty and freedom. The second group of authors (Moghadam 1993, Taraki 2003, Jad 2011, Yadav 2010, Tonnessen 2010) has looked at the female actors themselves and the role they can play in their own destiny. Through their own personal efforts and success, they have been able to push for their inclusion. Finally the third group of authors (Cavdar 2012, Wiktorowicz and Kaltenthaler 2006, Iannaccone and Berman 2006, Pape 2005, Abdel-Latif 2008, Gurses 2012, Jaffrelot 2013, Clark & Schwedler 2003) focuses on using rationality in order to decide the strategy that Islamist parties undertake. The context forces the movements to adapt and change their strategy.

In the next sections of this chapter, the three different approaches will be developed and explained.[9] I will also explore the limits of these explanations. With that in mind, I will be able to develop my own argument, which aims to explain the reason behind the inclusion or exclusion of female activists in Islamist parties.

[9] These three approaches will be developed theoretically without differentiating between different Islamist parties and the context in which they reside. In reality, the large variety of these contexts and parties will mean that a single approach or explanation could hardly be applied across the board.

1.1 INCLUSION BASED ON CHANGES IN IDEOLOGY

The first set of authors that have studied the evolution of the role of women within Islamist parties has attempted to explain it by outlining that the changes in ideology of these movements. These types of changes involve an evolution, often in a single direction, from more conservative to less conservative, towards a commitment for democracy. Wickham (2004) highlights a quiet revolution that has occurred within certain Islamist movements, which attempted to adapt to modern times. Scholars have specifically focused on two different mechanisms to explain these changes. The first relies on changes within Islamist parties, while the second on changes in society.

In earlier literature, scholars emphasized "the traditional gender roles [as] second nature in fundamentalist religion" (Hawley 1994, 32). This traditional vision meant that women mostly focused on being wives and mothers, leaving little space for a role in the public sphere. This understanding of women was often developed in opposition to the idea of the modern women, born in nationalist secularist ideology.[10] It therefore left little space for the inclusion of women in political tasks.

The first cause for ideological changes involves internal transformations within Islamist parties.[11] In the past two decades, there has been a shift in Islamist parties, towards a larger commitment to democracy and liberalization (Harnish & Mecham 2009). Indeed, al-Anani (2012) argues that in the last decade, Islamist parties have seen a renewal in their membership. The older generation, who often were the founders of Islamist parties in the 1930s, slowly leaving the movements, a

[10] The debate over the compatibility of modernity with Islamist ideologies has been thoroughly discussed by many scholars. The argument was often made that religious ideology, because of its traditional basis is inherently reactionary and anti-modern (Roy 1999)

[11] These changes have not come without controversy within Islamist parties. Harnish and Mecham (2009) outline the difficulties that the younger generations have had to have their voices heard, while al-Anani (2012) warns that there might be internal schisms in the near future over the disagreement on where the parties are going.

new younger generation has taken the reigns. According to al-Anani, the new youth has different goals, which involve a push for integration in political life as well as reforming the movements. These reforms included allowing women to play a more present role within the movement. Such a role could potentially include a presence in the decision-making body of the parties or participation in elections. Harnish and Mecham (2009), further argue this change in ideology has not only reached the public statements of the leadership but also their private lives.

Other authors have concentrated on factors external to Islamist parties in order to explain the changes in ideology. These changes have been focused around the idea of moderation of the policies they proposed. Ideological moderation refers to:

> "The abandonment, postponement, or revision of radical goals that enables an opposition movement to accommodate itself to the give and take of 'normal' competitive politics. It entails a shift toward a substantive commitment to democratic principles, including the peaceful alternation of power, ideological and political pluralism and citizenship rights" (Wickham 2006, 206).

In order to explain this moderation, Wickham (2004) argues that Islamist parties have undergone a change in their goals and ideology because of political learning, which occurs at the individual level of the leaders. Yilmaz (2009) explains that political learning is a result of Islamist parties' need to compete for power and mass supports. To compete on the national scene, Islamist parties had to shift their policies in order to appeal to a broader spectrum of the population and therefore gain more votes. Further the "repeated interaction between Islamist leaders, their constituency and the state" allowed "Islamists to gather new information about voter preferences and state constraints" (Mecham 2004, 341). Following times of political learning, the leadership of Islamist parties has made decisions to transform their

movement into "politically sophisticated, progressive and moderate participant in normal politics" (Mecham 2004, 340).

Other authors have argued that the inclusion of Islamist parties within the political practices of the state (such as running in elections) have led to the moderation of said Islamist parties. Schwedler (2006, 2007) has found that inclusion is far more likely to lead to moderation than any other factors.[12] This hypothesis especially emphasizes the ways in which "institutions and political opportunities provide incentives for previously excluded groups to enter the system, abandon more radical tactics, and 'play by the rule'" (Schwedler 2011, 352). Tezcur (2009) argues that it is not simply inclusion that will determine the level of moderation of an Islamist party but also the institutional character of the state. Indeed Mecham (2004, 2005) highlights that the constraints, which can involve the judiciary, the military or civil society, that the government places on Islamist parties are important.

The two arguments previously mentioned, moderation through political learning and through inclusion of Islamist parties should lead to the same result for the role of female members. Schwedler (2006)[13] explains that moderation is "not only what a political actor does but also the meanings she ascribes to her actions and choices within her specific (and often changing) political context" (Schwedler 2006, 22). Moderation should open the way for women's advancement, such as through participation in both public and political life. It also stresses the respect of women's rights (Schwedler 2006, 164).

The argument that there has been a sustainable change in the ideology of Islamist parties cannot truly explain the inclusion or exclusion of women in Islamist

[12] The effects of inclusion and exclusion in the Middle East have been debated heavily; important contributions include Pateman (1970), Mouffe (1992) and Young (2002). Today this literature has been the center of the work of many Islamist parties, including El-Ghobashy (2005), Ashour (2007, 2009), Turam (2006), etc

[13] In her book "Faith in Moderation", Schwedler (2006) focuses mostly on the moderation of Islamist ideology towards a democratic approach and participation within the electoral system.

parties. The basic assumption is that moderation of ideology would mean a less conservative and a more tolerant approach towards women. This should, in theory, translate to an inclusion of female activists in Islamist parties.

However, studies have shown that the moderation of Islamist parties has not led to a change in women's positions. Scholars (Cavdar 2010, El-Said 1995) argue that moderation has occurred on issues pertaining to the economy, foreign policy or other domestic policy but when it comes to issues regarding women, there is a stricter adherence to an original conservative ideology. According to El-Said, both gender issues and issues pertaining to minorities show "the character of a possible 'Islamic government' can best be discerned" (El-Said 1995, 29). Indeed over the years, women have become one of the symbols of the fight for the islamization of society that many of these parties have led. According to Cavdar (2010), there are two main arguments that explain the resistance to change[14] when it comes to female inclusion. Firstly, structurally, Islamist parties are extremely patriarchal and place male values above those of females. And secondly, strategically, Islamist parties also have an interest in portraying themselves as resistant to change.

If the moderation of ideology argument holds true, then the new role or treatment of women would also be dependent on their existing role in the rest of the political establishment and society. The moderation of Islamist parties is a move towards the center of the political spectrum, which means that they cannot become more progressive than the prevailing political parties. If women are already marginal in society and politics, they could not, through the moderation argument, obtain any significant presence in an Islamist party. Consequently though, moderation of

[14] In this instance, change is defined as an evolution of the role that women are allowed to play. A special emphasis is placed on change as an actual shift rather than simply a rhetorical shift.

Islamist parties might be possible,[15] it does not lead to a change in the role and treatment of women in Islamist parties.

Furthermore, as Schwedler (2007) points out, the inclusion of Islamist parties within the political framework only creates a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the moderation of Islamist parties. It is impossible to prove that these changes represent genuine changes in ideology and not an act (Schwedler 2007). Tadros (2011, 2012) further argues that what may appear, as an evolution of the ideology of Islamist parties is actually mostly a change in rhetoric. The role of female members has remained constant but the discourse that Islamist parties hold regarding women has adapted with time. Therefore the changes that have been observed are not due to a true evolution of the ideology of Islamist parties.

1.2. INCLUSION BASED ON WOMEN'S AGENCY

The majority of the literature has focused on the inclusion of women and the evolution in their role mostly as a result of the Islamist movements themselves. However part of the literature argues, that in order to understand changes in the treatment of women, it is necessary to look at what women are actually doing.

Early studies that looked at women's demands in Islamist parties have looked at socio-economic factors, such as an increase in education and employment for women. Moghadam (1993) argues that the increasing access to education[16] has actually helped to weaken the existing patriarchal structure of many Islamist parties.[17] She showed that families who had a higher education were more likely to

[15] There are however arguments regarding whether or not the inclusion-moderation hypothesis works within the context of Islamist parties. As Jaffrelot (2013) points out, the argument was created with the European context in mind. It is therefore unclear that this can be proven in the context of Islamist parties. Different empirical attempts include Cavatorta & Merone (2013),

[16] See Annex 1 for data on the increasing school enrolment in Egypt

[17] Moghadam points out in her extensive study that since the mid-1900's, there has been an important evolution in the family structure, especially with later marriages, smaller families, formal employment, etc. However she points out that the factor with the greatest impact have been the policies of mass schooling.

encourage their daughter to pursue a higher education.[18] In the same vein, in the past four decades, modernization has helped to break the barriers that existed to ensure that women would stay out of public life (Taraki 2003). The entry of women into the work force or the education system "began to challenge the traditional order, especially as men and women not related to one another were thrust into work and other societal situations far from the observant eyes of the family" (Jad 2011, 185).

Yadav (2010) argues that the increasing place that women have been taking within Islamist parties as well as their success has led to a profound impact on their status within the movements. Women have been mostly focused on gender-segregated space such as charity work, education or healthcare. Through this, they have created an important network and a large number of supporters. As a result, they were able to bargain a larger role. The argument of women's agency as a cause for their inclusion in Islamist movement can be seen as rational. Female activists took steps that helped them to consolidate their position in society. This argument still differs from a completely rational one, such as the one being made in the following section because of the intent. As Yadav (2010) describes, the consolidation of the role of women was more an accidental byproduct of women's agency rather than a deliberate choice. The intention to be included was therefore not a purely rational concern. There is also clearly a negotiation between women and the leadership of Islamist parties, which Tonnessen (2010) highlights. Female activists were able to propose their own definition and interpretation of what a women's role should be, which often contradicts the patriarchal interpretation of Islamist parties.[19] Arat (2005) also highlights this redefinition of the Islamic ideology. She

[18] A similar correlation exists between the profession of father and the education of daughters. 100% of the daughters of fathers who worked in a professional field wanted a university education. On the other hand, only 23% of daughters whose father was an unskilled laborer aspire to go to university, 20% for skilled laborers, 10% for small-businessmen and 12% for policemen and religious functionaries (Moghadam 1993, 124).

[19] The patriarchal interpretation emphasizes women as both mothers and wives, leaving little space for political activities. Their roles are therefore focused on providing for their family, on education, etc.

argues that women have helped to redefine Islamism in a way that is compatible with liberalism. When looking at women's agency as an explanation, its success has been mostly due to the fact that they were able to redefine Islamism in a way that included women in the public sphere. Therefore it is possible to talk of an ideological change within the movement, which this time was pushed by women's agency rather than a cost/benefit analysis.

In spite of the restructuration of the debate and the discourse, female member's successes within the party have not had the desired impact on an overall inclusion of women. Ayata and Tutuncu (2008) argue that though there are increasing demands being placed on Islamist parties by women, these demands have most often not translated into any real and genuine change. They have been able to infiltrate many of the political structure of the parties and "create a gender awareness and create changes towards the gender inequalities in the society" (Ayata & Tutuncu 2008, 365). However Islamist parties "rarely take structural precautions, such as affirmative action to integrate them into politics" (Ayata & Tutuncu 2008, 365). Rather the changes that do take place are mostly rhetoric and do not actually represent any real consolidation of women's role.

Furthermore it is important to note that the discourse of female activists is not significantly different than the ones of their male counterparts. Indeed when it comes to the role of women, Islamist feminists emphasize the complementarity of men and women, rather than their equality. There is an important weight placed on women as mothers and wives. The Islamist understanding and interpretation of feminism is quite different from a Westernized one. Therefore when studying women's agency, it is important to keep in mind that Islamist women's demands are

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Many Islamist movements emphasize the fact that women are educating future Muslims and members of these movements.

not and perhaps even should not match those that we have seen develop in feminist movements in the West.

Abdel-Latif and Ottaway (2007) state that women are not highly critical of their organizations. Rather they note that the main problem with the treatment of women is the types of regimes in which the Islamist parties are active. Furthermore the development of the Islamist feminist discourse is placed at the intersection of several different discourses such as Westernism, feminism, liberalism and Islamism that attempt to work together (Ayata & Tutuncu 2008). There is therefore a rejection of the Westernized and secularist feminist discourse and an emphasis on Islamist principles. With this understanding of Islamist feminism, it would not be correct to argue that women's agency pushed towards inclusion of women. It might not be the will of women to be fully included in the activities of Islamist parties.

1.3. INCLUSION BASED ON RATIONAL CONCERNS

Though part of the literature focuses on Islamist parties as inherently irrational actors, driven strictly by an unchanging religious ideology, some scholars have tried to understand their policies through rational strategies. This is especially pertinent because the positions of Islamist parties are often changing over times. Indeed, many Islamist parties have undergone important changes in their policies, depending on the context.

Cavdar (2012)[20] has attempted to apply rational choice theory to understand the changes in the policies and tactics of Islamist parties. He argues that there is no change in goals but rather changes in the means or methods that are used to achieve those goals. Indeed they are constant but will adjust the strategy they use in order to

[20] Cavdar had previously published an article on Turkey's JDP's resilience to change when it comes to the role of women. He argued that, though change in the policies of Islamist parties can happen, it is not the case when it comes to the role of women because of the patriarchal structure of the party and the desire to keep its more traditional base with the party.

attain those goals, which is done to maximize profits. The choice of strategy will depend on what is most profitable for them at the time. This provides an important basis to understand strategic choices of Islamist parties. However this argument makes abstraction of the individuals within Islamist parties, who may have certain interests of their own. Individuals may choose to drive the party in a specific direction. Indeed several different Islamist parties hold different ideologies, which could be more or less conservative based on the interpretation of the texts. Wiktorowicz and Kaltenthaler (2006), for example, have argued that not only are Islamist parties' decisions rational but the individuals that make up these groups also display rational thinking. Therefore the direct application of rational theory on Islamist parties, without taking the specificities of the individual or the context, would not be completely able to explain the actions and the changes within these parties.

This means, as Iannaccone and Berman (2006) argue, that Islamist parties "may substantially modify their religious choices and, hence, their religious activities [...] even if their tastes, norms, or beliefs do not change." Because change has been defined earlier as an evolution in the actions of the Islamist parties, rather than a shift in the discourse, it is possible to talk of a semblance of change rather than genuine change. As Cavdar (2012) argues, many of the studies that focus on rational choice attempt to explain changes in strategy, especially the use of violence. For example, Robert Pape (2005) explains that that the use of suicide bombings as a strategy has little to do with religious ideology but rather because it is a strategy that has proven to work. This can help to explain overall changes within Islamist parties but does not target the evolution of the role of women specifically.

Some scholars have turned to understanding the role of women within Islamist parties. Based on the political context, Islamist parties will use different strategies, such as a strict religious thought at times and a more moderate thought at

another. Jad (2011) argues that the shift that can be observed from exclusion to inclusion of women is based on the context set by secularity forces in the country. The ideology of Islamist parties stems "not from religious texts but from accommodation to contending positions" (Jad 2011, 177). Building on Hobsbawm's work (1983), she argues that the positions and traditions of Islamists are invented and a modern construct. Abdel-Latif (2008) argues that the exclusion or inclusion of women at specific times is one of the markers of the ways "Islamist movements 'use' their women activists to score political points" (Abdel-Latif 2008, 14). She goes on to say that this represents a survival tactic because it can help to guarantee the continuity of the parties, even in times of threats to the security. There is therefore no real commitment to democracy or women's rights but rather pragmatic concerns, which in some moments might demand to work within the existing political system, while in others, the parties poses themselves as the clear opposition (Gurses 2012).

There are various considerations that need to be taken into account when calculating the different strategies that will be most useful to Islamist parties. Baudner (2012) argues that the most important factor that parties will take into account is related to domestic power and interests. According to Gurses (2012), there are two political situations that can affect Islamist parties: their chances of winning seats and whether they are in the opposition or in the government. Jaffrelot (2013) further attests that the change from radical ethno-religious strategy to a more moderate strategy without changing its core ideology is possible. However he points to different mechanisms than those of Gurses. He explains that parties take into consideration the electoral strategy of the other parties running as well as public opinion in order to forge their own policies and strategies. There is therefore no clear mechanism or consensus within the literature that explain the reasoning of Islamist parties. Nevertheless the one point over which the literature agrees is that

these parties will respond to domestic issues, rather than changes in the international system.

Clark and Schwedler's argument (2003) differs with the previous pragmatic concerns that have been highlighted for two reasons. Firstly, Islamist parties do not respond to a change in context. Rather there are disagreements within the party, mostly based on the direction in which the party should go. These disagreements open the political space in which women can be active. Secondly, rather than the Islamist parties showcasing their rationality, female members do. Indeed, they argue that, at a time where the party is divided on certain issues, female activists take advantage of the open space to become more active and mobilize. This argument returns to the idea that female activists are in charge of their own inclusion and through their demands, changes are made. However this argument fails to explain what happens once Islamist parties get refocused. Does this inclusion of women lead to a consolidation of their position and therefore last past this moment of opportunity?

Because of the shifts that we can observe in the inclusion/exclusion of women, the argument proposing that Islamist parties take a rational decision is convincing. Nevertheless, as previously mentioned, the mechanism that leads to inclusion of female members within Islamist parties is not clear. In the following section, I attempt to explain, within this idea of rationality, the strategy that these parties can take in order to best achieve their goals.

1.4. THE ARGUMENT

Every movement, whether Islamist or not, whether religious or not, must make decisions regarding their policies and their activities. When facing external conflicts, either on the international scene or with changes in the government, they

must be prepared to take new actions. As new issues arise, the parties must decide where to place themselves.

For religious movements, especially Islamists, these decisions are often attributed to a conservative, traditional and unchanging ideology. The idea is that religious ideology is more deeply anchored than other markers of identity, such as political ideology.[21] It is therefore a long-lasting ideology that will not evolve. Many will emphasize a process where new issues are debated based on readings of the holy texts and their interpretations. This type of critique is especially pertinent in Islam, where religion is more of a type of law than necessarily a doctrine. Islam places an important emphasis on the idea of law and jurisprudence, as it attempts to regulate all aspects of daily life. Certain practices are therefore characterized as being "un-Islamic." These 'rules' are based mainly on two different texts: the *hadith,* which relay the life and stories of the Prophet and the *Qu'ran*, which is the revelation of the word of God. By using the same texts, it is understandable that some will see the Islamic ideology of Islamist parties as guiding all decisions of the parties.

However, in more recent years, scholars[22] have turned their attention to a more nuanced and developed understanding of what is an Islamist party or movement. It would be too simplistic to claim that all Islamist parties are the same, strictly based on the fact that they have an "Islamic ideology." It is important to note that there are a variety of different interpretations of the texts and therefore Islamist parties cannot be seen as a homogeneous group with the same beliefs. Rather, scholars are now treating Islamist parties based on the internal make up of the movement as well as the political context in which it operates. This would imply that not all Islamist parties are equal and that depending on the environment, the

[21] Samuel Huntington, in his theory of the Clash of Civilization, claims that future conflicts will occur, especially between the West and the Islamic civilization because of the inherently opposite identities. This identity, as Huntington states, is anchored strongly in religion, without being able to change or evolve.

[22] See the literature developed in the section above for different interpretation of changes in Islamist parties.

decisions and choices it would take will not be the same either. With this in mind, it is possible to conceive of Islamist parties as entities, not irrational and unchanging as some might argue, but as responsive to several factors around them.

Each context poses different constraints that Islamist parties must learn to adapt to and deal with. For many cases, this includes working within at least a partially authoritarian regime. Indeed, many Islamist parties operate in contexts where open political space is rare. The options that they can take are therefore much more restricted, as they will not be able to freely operate without reprisal from the regime. They may choose to obey the government, which would mean that their actions and choices depend on the will of the regime. This would take away the independence of the Islamist party. More importantly, this option would also cause the party to lose its grassroots support, who most often supports the opposition.[23] Therefore, most Islamist parties choose the second option that is open to them, which is to place themselves in opposition to the government. Then again this poses new challenges, especially in terms of security. Islamist parties must therefore ensure their survival in a relatively closed political system.

A rational decision will be based on two factors: the goals and means[24] of the Islamist party and the response of the government. Obviously these two factors cannot be completely separated from one another. Oftentimes, they vary together. The instruments that Islamist parties use will become more or less ambitious based on the level of repression they face from the state. These instruments will themselves be influenced by their objectives. At the same time, governments will increase or decrease their opposition to Islamist parties based on the level of threat that they

[23] Many Islamist parties rely on the support of the population as their base. They have been, since their creation, grassroots oriented movements because they were providing services to the population that the state did not. Furthermore, the governments enjoy limited support from their own population as their legitimacy is not based on the people but rather by force.

[24] An important distinction needs to be made between goals and means. The instruments that the Islamist parties will depend on the goals they want to achieve. They will have to do some calculations in order to see what are the best instruments to use if they would like to achieve their goals.

pose to the stability of the regime. Islamist parties therefore play a type of game with the government, that Wickham (2013) has called a dual game, where an Islamist party has to walk a line between accommodating the government enough to maintain access to the political space at the same as it puts pressure on the government in order to mobilize the population. Wickham emphasizes the very fine line between the two different positions Islamist parties need to take into consideration. If the balance tips to one side over the other, the survival of the party will be questioned.

This back and forth between the government and the Islamist parties shows how dependent one is on the other. It becomes difficult to see which is the cause and which is the effect since in many cases they affect each other. Even in this circular type of argument, it is still possible to define different key moments or periods that will demonstrate how they can affect each other. Specifically, each one of those periods is outlined by a change in the political context, whether it is a new leader or an opening/closing of the political space. In this empirical study, I outlined three moments where the changes in context provided an important enough incentive to cause a change in the strategy of Islamist parties. Studying the environment rather than changes within Islamist parties will help to show how they respond to changes, modeling their choices based on the context.[25] This once again emphasizes the rationality of the strategy that Islamist parties will adopt to achieve their goals, rather than look at its continuity.

Based on these two factors, the rational strategy to adopt will mean different things. In times of repression and opposition from the state, Islamist parties will focus their survival efforts on maintaining the movement alive. The state will attempt to dismantle the organizational structure of the party, to place its leadership in jail and to band the spread of ideological pamphlets. This represents the main goal

[25] In the following three chapters, I have outlined three periods that are each punctuated by a change in the context. The first period starts with the Egyptian revolution and the arrival of Nasser to power. The second period is the beginning of Sadat's presidency. Finally, the third period is an opening of the political space under Mubarak.

of the party at the time. Then Islamist parties will put in place strategies that ensure a chain of command, a spread of ideology and the existence of a support base. Their memberships, though lower during these periods, also have to be maintained. The strategies, or means, that will be used, are developed based on the maximization of the goals. They represent the most efficient and successful way to achieve their objectives.

On the other hand, when the political system opens, Islamist parties will often take advantage of this by shifting their goals to take part in this newly opened space. This means running in elections, campaigning during electoral periods and other methods that increase party membership. In being more ambitious, the goals of the party shift. Like any other party, they are now concerned with attracting as many voters and supporters to their cause. The survival of the party is therefore tied to its success in elections. Without enough supporters, they will not gain seats and will eventually disappear. Once again, in these cases, the Islamist parties will use instruments that are best able to achieve these goals.

Therefore Islamist parties do not strictly and clearly follow ideology. In times when other strategies are more profitable, ideology is put aside.[26] The reason for the choice of strategy could depend on several factors, especially practicality and ease. Women were already partly organized and also had a very extensive network, as a result of their charity work, that allowed them to maximize survival. The choice to include women as a strategy rather than another was therefore convenient for Islamist parties as well as guaranteed the highest success. They have a clear choice to make, which will be based on which strategy can help to maximize their survival.

[26] The choice of inclusion or exclusion of women is only one of the possible strategies that might be adopted by the Islamist movements in times where there are threats to survival. This thesis will however only focus on the inclusion of women. Other possible strategies will be discussed in the conclusion.

The argument that Islamist parties' policies and choices are based on a desire to achieve their goals has an important impact on the role that female activists play within the party. Ideologically speaking, women are typically excluded from the political activities of Islamist parties. Rather their roles are focused on providing social services to members of the party and the poorer in a country. As mentioned previously, women are typically seen as being complimentary to men, rather than equal. Their role as wives and mothers is extremely important to Islamist parties. Women must educate their children, especially boys, to be good Muslims and a good citizen. In the long term, this role as educators is key for Islamist parties, who look to evolve. However in times when their goals shift, they are willing to compromise on their original stand to include female activists as a strategy. The parties will therefore instrumentalize women in a way that is most profitable.

Some roles are better adapted for women because they possess both recruiting skills that are superior to those of men and lower constraints from the government. They have a large network of other women, which was developed through charity work. Women are also typically spared from the state's repression. They are therefore freer to act as they wish. As a result women can be extremely successful at ensuring the survival of Islamist parties in moments where they are most needed.

CHAPTER II: POLITICAL INCLUSION OF FEMALE ACTIVISTS IN TIMES OF REPRESSION – 1952 TO 1967

The period that unfolded between 1952 and 1967 was one during which the Muslim Brotherhood gave female activists an important role in the organization, compared to its earlier treatment. The organization faced sharp repression from the government, which placed many of its leaders in jail. The Brotherhood was forced to go underground and its survival was threatened. During this time, female members helped to keep the Brotherhood together in a context of severe regime repression.

2.1. CONTEXT OF REPRESSION

2.1.1. HONEYMOON PERIOD

Following the 1952 revolution, the Nasser government underwent a period of consolidation of power. On January 16th, 1953, just months following the revolution, the government "ordered the abolition of all existing parties and groups except for the Society of the Muslim Brothers" (Mitchell 1993, 109).[27] Therefore all groups related to Communist parties or the old regime, were disbanded.

During the first phase of repression, the Muslim Brotherhood was spared. It was at the time difficult to see exactly how close the connection was between Nasser's generals and the Brotherhood but they did have to rely on each other (Vatikiotis 1978, 135). With Nasser declaring all other organizations illegal, the

[27] The law of January 1953 stated that all political parties were to be disbanded. Since the Muslim Brotherhood was not officially registered as a political party at the time but rather as a social movement, it was allowed to exist.

Brotherhood was the only remaining tie between the government and the population and therefore played an important role as a civil protector. Nasser, recognizing the important function that the organization could play as a rallying factor, invited three members of the Muslim Brotherhood to join the government's cabinet (Mitchell 1993, 105). However the Guidance Council, the governing body of the Brotherhood, refused to be part of the government in order to remain independent.[28]

It quickly became apparent that the relationship between the government and the Muslim Brotherhood was mostly a facade for a bond that was beginning to erode (Vatikiotis 1978, 135). On the first anniversary of the revolution, the Brotherhood was noticeably absent from the celebrations. The organization also began to speak out against the government because of press restrictions especially by printing out newsletters and handing them out (Mitchell 1993, 111).

2.1.2. SHIFTING RELATIONS

Although in the early years the Nasser government was tolerant of the movement, the relationship between the Brotherhood and the regime quickly deteriorated. Nasser began to view the organization as a threat to the security of the regime because the organization was gaining in strength and numbers. Nasser "did not tolerate any strong, political organization outside of his control" (Rahman 2007, 27). The Brotherhood rejected the regime's attempt to place them under its control. The Nasser government therefore created the Liberation Rally[29] to provide that link with the population, which the organization previously filled (Mitchell 1993, 126). With this creation, the regime no longer needed the support of the Muslim

[28] This was one of the first articulations of an internal disagreement within the Brotherhood. Al-Hudaybi, a pragmatist, started being much closer to the government, which the rest of the leadership felt was problematic. Further, while the top leadership worked to appease Nasser, many members were becoming frustrated with the Brotherhood's approach (Mitchell 1993, 113).

[29] The Liberation Rally was created shortly following the new Constitution on February 10th 1953. It was one of the three political organization that was created. It was the official party of the state ran by Nasser.

Brotherhood, which could therefore be dismissed.

One of the major events that gave the regime an opportunity to shift the relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and the government was the negotiation attempt between al-Hudaybi, Supreme Guide of the Brotherhood at the time, and the British for the removal of British troops from Egyptian soil. The Nasser government had set preconditions to any type of negotiations with the British. Until their troops left Egyptian soil, Nasser would not meet with the British diplomats. On the other hand, al-Hudaybi did not believe that setting preconditions to a negotiation was helpful for the debate. For the Brotherhood, no solutions that came from these negotiations would force Egypt to agree to the terms set during these meetings (Mitchell 1993, 112). Al-Hudaybi therefore went ahead and met with the British diplomats.

This was used as a major reason by the government to discredit the organization. Al-Hudaybi was "charged with having accepted certain conditions to evacuation which had tied the hands of the Egyptian negotiators and made the British more obstinate in their stand" (Mitchell 1993, 113).[30] The instrumentalization of the meeting, along with a series of charges against al-Hudaybi, gave the government the opportunity to discredit the Brotherhood.

In January 1954, the Brotherhood was dissolved, according to the law of January 1953. This began the government's repression on two different fronts. The first was "a massive and continuing press campaign against al-Hudaybi and his gang and their policies" (Mitchell 1993, 138). There were a lot of misrepresentations of the facts in order to present the Brotherhood as an organization that attempted to overthrow the government. In October 1953, newspapers reported that al-Hudaybi and his supporters had attempted a coup within the organization to gain the

[30] It is, to this day, still unclear exactly what was discussed during this meeting. Al-Hudaybi did affirm that he maintained the government's stance of no negotiations as long as British troops were still present in Egypt. The government affirmed that this meeting provided leverage for the British in other negotiations.

leadership of the Brotherhood (Mitchell 1993, 146). The second front of repression was the "tighten[ing up of] security and introduc[tion of] stricter control, sometimes proactively, over what little activity of the Brothers was continuing" (Mitchell 1993, 141).

However it was not until October 1954, that the repression by the government reached an all-time high. Many Brotherhood leaders were arrested and put in jail on charges of conspiracy and treason. This was part of a larger campaign to discredit the organization in the eyes of the general population as well as in the eyes of members of the Brotherhood, who were receiving conflicting information. During this period of repression, the press played an important role in discrediting the organization. In 1957, 21 other Brotherhood leaders were accused of plotting to assassinate Nasser. While in jail, some of these members were tortured and killed (Abdel-Latif 2008, 4).

Against the repression of the state, some members of the Muslim Brotherhood began to recreate the Secret Apparatus, which had been an active violent part of the Brotherhood during the 1940s,[31] but with a new mission. Many believed that the main leaders, including al-Hudaybi, were not doing enough to fight the repression of the state. They believed that Nasser must be removed from office because of concerns over the freedom of press and the evacuation agreement with the British but al-Hudaybi argued "the Brothers should take no action on their own without a prior move from the army" (Mitchell 1993, 150). Nevertheless, the Secret Apparatus went ahead and Mahmud Abd al-Latif[32] was tasked with assassinating Nasser. During a rally in Alexandria, al-Latif fired eight shots at the Egyptian

[31] The Secret Apparatus was put in place during al-Banna's leadership in the late 1940s. They were credited with several assassination attempts and bombings, especially in 1948.
[32] The Secret Apparatus leadership chose Mahmud Abd al-Latif, a tinsmith. Once notified, he was given three days to decide whether or not he was interested. Originally, plans were made to do it on the day when Nasser signed the evacuation treaty with Britain. However the circumstances "were not conducive to the successful execution of the plan". The plan was therefore postponed (Mitchell 1993, 150).

president, which all missed. The day after the Brotherhood became the major target of the government (Mitchell 1993, 151).

2.1.3. SECOND PHASE OF REPRESSION

Within days of the assassination attempt on Nasser, al-Hudaybi and many leading members of the Brotherhood were arrested and jailed (Zollner 2007, 413). In Cairo, the organization's headquarters were destroyed, along with everything that was in it (Mitchell 1993, 152). The government claimed that the organization was part of a conspiracy that attempted to destroy Cairo and Alexandria in an attempt to take over the country.

The government's repression mechanisms also ensured that the Brotherhood could no longer develop ideologically or operate within the prison cells. The organization's leaders and other members were separated into different prisons in order to prevent the spread of ideas (Zollner 2007, 413). Most often those who were arrested were either put to death or sent in exile.

In 1957, Nasser started to relax the grip on the Brotherhood and released some of the members with lesser sentences. With some newfound freedoms, some of the Brothers reorganized themselves in a new organization called Nizam 1965 with Qutb as a leader. However as soon as it became an important tool for mobilization, the government started another wave of repression (Zollner 2007, 418). This time the government targeted people, who were more or less associated with the movement. The simple fact of owning Qutb's book could be ground for detainment (Zollner 2007, 419). The goal of the state during this period was clearly to eliminate the Brotherhood as an organization as it posed a threat to the state's capacity to keep the population in line. In 1965, "the government accused the Brothers of plotting a coup, and the organization estimates that arrests of its members reached 18,000. The crisis reached its peak in August 1966" (Abdel-Latif 2008, 4).

2.2. THREATS TO THE BROTHERHOOD'S SURVIVAL

Prior to the revolution, the Brotherhood felt little threat to its survival. During the 1930s, the organization underwent its strongest growth and development. Not only did they have "tens of thousands of members" but also "a strong base in the police and in the army" (Rubin 2002, 10). They were even involved in "raising funds, purchasing weapons, running military training camps, and sending hundreds of volunteers to fight in Palestine" (Rubin 2002, 11). With a strong foothold in the security apparatus, the Brotherhood felt little threats to its security.

During the period of the repression, Muslim Brotherhood leadership never went on record stating that the organization was breaking down or in jeopardy. To the remaining members, the message remained that they were martyrs against an unfair repression (Zollner 2007, 420). However much of the actual steps taken by the Brotherhood demonstrated that they were struggling to maintain an organizational structure that could survive past this period of repression.

Al-Hudaybi, a leader more pragmatic than ideologist, started to implement changes that would maximize their chances of survival and appease the government. Starting at the end of al-Banna's role as General Guide, and then continuing with al-Hudaybi, the Brotherhood "was becoming more of a bureaucracy than a revolutionary vanguard. Its aspiration to be a mass organization [...] required government tolerance to permit legal activities" (Rubin 2002, 13). With the understanding that the survival of the organization relied on good relations with the government, al-Hudaybi attempted to moderate the organization's policies. One of the first decisions taken was the destruction of the Special Apparatus, which al-Hudaybi described "an act of extravagation and prodigality and deviation from the original duty of the Brotherhood organization" (Khatab 2001, 455).

The relations between al-Hudaybi and the government worsened when al-

Hudaybi became more outspoken.[33] As a result, the rest of the Muslim Brotherhood leadership took over the role of appeasement. There were also talks of a strategic removal of al-Hudaybi as General Guide and allow for a reform of the organization (Khatab 2001, 458).

One of the clearest signs that the Brotherhood was both paralyzed and breaking down came from its own members. Al-Hudaybi's sudden disappearance left members perplexed and confused. As a testament to the failings of the organization, its communication structure fell apart. There were various "rumors and beliefs in both the secret and open organization concerning what this or that person among the leaders said, believed, did or wanted" (Mitchell 1993, 159). Most of the information that was spread came mostly from government propaganda pamphlets, which therefore posed a certain bias for many Brothers. This information was therefore not necessarily accurate and did not represent the beliefs of the Brotherhood leadership. Without a clear vision of what the organization's next steps were, the members were unable to organize and mobilize. This further served as a threat to the organization's survival. With the plea for al-Hudaybi's help and leadership unheard, the "dislocation of the Society at membership level was most dramatically pictured by one of the participants" (Mitchell 1993, 160). Hindawi Duwayr, a Brotherhood member, stated, that "except for the secret apparatus, we found that the administrative apparatus from the Society was crippled" (Mitchell 1993, 160).

The period of repression was quite detrimental to the Brotherhood's membership and especially leadership:

[33] Al-Hudaybi disappeared and went into hidings in order to escape the government's repression as well as protect the organization. He felt that his presence was more detrimental than helpful at the time.

> *"Selon les écrits et déclarations des Frères, notamment lors des procès de quelques tortionnaires des Frères devant le tribunal de Tanta en 1972 and 1980, il y eut en 1965-1966: 3 pendus, 38 tués en prison pendant l'instruction ou au-delà, de 100 à 200 incarcérés, et 18,000 interpellés, arrêtés et torturés tout au long de l'instruction" (Carré 1983, 81)*

The numbers of Brotherhood members who were tried and put in prison during this period was quite unprecedented. However as Mitchell (1993) notes, the crimes they had committed were mostly being a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, rather than major crimes, as can be noted by the fact that many of those received reduced sentences when Sadat came to power later. By 1964, Harris states that there was "no attempt [...] made by the dispersed members of the Brotherhood to rally their forces. They were in no position to organize themselves anew against the Government of the Revolution" (Harris 1964, 224).

As a testament to the survival threat during this period, the Brotherhood put in place several organizational mechanisms that would allow its survival. For example, the location of the organization's leadership was able to change on a moment's notice if the prior headquarter was destroyed. In the event that the national leadership "is uprooted [by the police], [it] is passed on to another province according to a planned random pattern" (Munson 2001, 498). A list of where the leadership would move was known only to a few of the leaders within each chapters in order to maximize the possibility of survival. This was one of the many attempts by the Brotherhood to ensure that their organization could survive the steps that the state took against them.

2.3. FEMALE ACTIVISTS DURING THE TIME OF REPRESSION

2.3.1. SOCIAL INCLUSION YET POLITICAL EXCLUSION PRIOR TO THE REVOLUTION

Before 1952, the role of women within the Muslim Brotherhood was restricted to very few specific tasks such as providing social services to the population. The Muslim Sisters, composed mostly of the wives and daughters of Brotherhood members, was created by Hassan al-Banna in 1932, four years after the creation of the Muslim Brotherhood. The movement was never fully integrated within the Muslim Brotherhood and its organization was kept separate and subordinate. It was done in an attempt to appease some of the tensions and demands for more women's activism (Abdel-Latif 2008,2).

Women's place in the movement during their first 20 years was focused on welfare and charity work. They were responsible for other women's education, especially Islamic education. Tadros (2012) notes "the choice of curriculum material for the Muslim Sisters was clearly marked by a gendered perspective underpinned by a deep belief in patriarchal gender roles and division of labor" (Tadros 2012, 119). This emphasis on education was important to the Muslim Brothers because women would then raise their children following religious teachings. They were preparing future members of society, who had to follow Islamic ideals. Education on matters of religion was also the key for the true emancipation of women, according to some of them (Baron 2001, 238).[34]

Women also needed to learn how to sew, process and can food, etc (Abdel-Latif 2008, 2). This focus on household tasks was not uncommon amongst women at the time. During the first period of growth for both the Brotherhood and the

[34] This was part of the development of Islamic feminism, which contrary to other feminist movements at the time, believed that Islam provides the key to show women their true purpose and role.

Sisterhood, the creation of a Muslim Sisters chapter was key for the organization. These women would for example be responsible for overseeing girls' schools, orphanages, etc (Tadros 2012, 119).

It is important to note that this focus on the role of women as a vehicle for charity and social work was in no way unique to the Muslim Brotherhood at the time. Woodsmall's study (1956) shows that the majority of women's groups in Egypt were actually focused on providing assistance to the needy, bettering health and education, which was the case for both Islamic and secular organizations.

The Muslim Sisters remained the most popular Islamic women's organization prior to the revolution. The number of branches spread quickly. By the 1950s, there was 50 Muslim Sisters branches and membership was estimated at about 5,000 women (Baron 2001, 238). Though these numbers pale compared to the mobilization of men in the Brotherhood, Baron (2001) still emphasizes that these were impressive numbers considering that they represented only four years of mobilization. It therefore "points to the success of Islamist organizations in mobilizing women in this period" (Baron 2001, 238). However, though it may be right to point to this notable mobilization of women, it is also important to point to the fact that this mobilization and inclusion was strictly limited to social activities and welfare.

Female activists were purposefully kept out of the political structure. Organizationally, the Muslim Sisters were completely subordinate to the Brotherhood and female members were not included in the decision making process. For al-Banna, women had an important role to play with the Brotherhood. He envisioned a role that would "extend beyond the classroom and encompass *da'wa* among women in the households of Muslim Brotherhood members and society more widely" (Tadros 2012, 116). However the application of such a thought remains mixed.

> "The new structure blocked any possibility for women assuming leadership positions. In effect, other than the leader, his deputy and one woman who would serve as the liaison between the leader and the women members, the new Muslim Sisters division had no positions, committees, task forces, or any other organizational mechanism for delegating responsibilities and authorities" (Tadros 2012, 117)

The organizational separation between the Brothers and Sisters is telling of the type of policies that existed towards the inclusion of women at the time. As Abdel-Latif (2008) argues, in order for women to be included in the movement, the "Sisters' division must be integrated into the main structure of the movement" (Abdel-Latif 2008, 10).

Because of the resistance from many male members of the Brotherhood, women "continued [...] to form separate organizations" (Baron 2001, 238). Labiba Ahmad[35] is considered the 'mother' of different women's organizations such as the Muslim Ladies' Association founded in 1973 (Baron 2001, 237). This was only one of the many different women's organizations that existed at the time, though many of them were small and worked on an individual basis. There were demands for greater inclusion, which at the time, they could not attain within the Brotherhood.

Beyond their exclusion from political activities of the Brotherhood, al-Banna also limited their involvement in the political life of Egypt as a whole. When in 1944, an MP proposed a bill that would allow women to vote, al-Banna stated that these politicians "do not see with us that a woman's primary place is at home and that her most noble mission is to form a family and raise the young people and the building of the Ummah" (Tadros 2012, 148).

[35] Labiba Ahmad, often considered to be the female leader of the Muslim Sisters, was prior a part of many other women oriented organizations.

2.3.2. POLITICAL INCLUSION BETWEEN 1952 TO THE LATE 1960S

WOMEN WERE SPARED REPRESSION

Abdel-Latif states that the Brotherhood and the state had "an implicit agreement to put women activists outside of the repressive policy of detention and police harassment" (Abdel-Latif 2008, 13). Therefore according to the Brothers, the exclusion of women from political activities was done on purpose in order to protect women from the repressive apparatus of the state.

The exclusion of women from the Muslim Brotherhood before 1952 proved to be useful for the organization. Women were perceived as less threatening to the regime; during Nasser's crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood, the Muslim Sisters were therefore relatively unbothered by the government. They could go about their business without fearing harm from the government. The Brotherhood therefore took advantage of this situation to ensure that the organization would not collapse during periods of repression, while female activists used this opportunity to increase their participation in the organization.

POLITICAL INCLUSION OF THE MUSLIM SISTERS

During the post-revolutionary period of repression, the Muslim Sisters "which had a lower profile, started playing a more important role" than in the pre-revolutionary period (Abdel-Latif 2008, 4). The turn from the social to the political role happened fairly quickly, which is what helped the organization survive. Abdel-Latif (2008) refers to the Sisters as 'the Shadow Brothers', that she describes as "the second line of defense that ensures the movement will survive times of crisis" (Abdel-Latif 2008, 14).

The key responsibility that female activists took during this period was to

care for the Brothers in jail and their families outside. This started at first more as social inclusion. Women "provided moral and financial support to the families of the detainees" (Abdel-Latif 2008, 4). Wafa Hefny, one of al-Banna's granddaughters, recalls her mother and aunts taking to the streets in order to receive as much information on the Brothers who were arrested (Di Giovanni, 2013). The wife of al-Hudaybi was also involved in organizing meetings with other members of the Muslim Sisters, whose husbands had been placed in jail (Al-Ghazali 1996, 67). With the impression that the Brotherhood was disappearing and the Brothers were arrested, this moral support, which remained one of the most important tasks that female activists undertook during the entire repressive era, was crucial. Without any information, it was difficult for the families and members to know where the movement stood. Their inclusion helped to prepare the organization for a possible post-repressive future.

Female members were for example used to deliver news of the outside world to prisoners inside. The Brotherhood leadership, in jail at the time, was then able to gage the survival threat of the organization. Furthermore the access that women were given to the Brothers in jail meant that they could also be the lines of communications between the prisoners and others who were out (Tadros 2012, 122). Female activists were therefore able to smuggle messages, including most of Qutb's work out the jails and share them with the rest of the Brotherhood. Sayyid Qutb[36] spent much of his time in jail writing, especially his political manifesto entitled *Ma'alim fi-I-Tariq* (Milestones). His texts, which gave an ideological orientation for the organization, were shared with Brotherhood members through women's help. Hamida Qutb, Qutb's wife, gave him a list of the books and texts that the Brothers were studying at the time (al-Ghazali 1996, 81). With this, Qutb returned

[36] Sayyid Qutb is one of the most important leaders of the more radical branches of the Muslim Brotherhood. He believed that the Egyptian society was ignorant because they did not follow the principles of Shari'a. Though a member of the Brotherhood at first, he felt that they were not doing enough. Qutb advocated for a revolutionary vanguard against the regime.

commentaries on some of the texts including recommendations of his own. Qutb's sisters, Amina and Hamida, al-Hudaybi's wife and daughters, Khalida, 'Aliyya and Tahiyya were also considered to be important messengers because they would visit their family members often (Zollner 2007, 417). It was especially important for women to be the "connectors between Qutb and the official leadership" because Qutb's ideology did not always match that of the leadership (Zollner 2007, 417). Such a role was key for the survival of the movement, especially at a time when there was confusion on where the Brotherhood should go. It provided an ideological foundation for the renewal of the movement, which would not have been possible without female activists.

With all the different drafts and pamphlets that Qutb was providing to his wife, the Muslim Sisters were also capable of publishing his work. This work was then sent to young Muslim Brothers across Egypt as a way of advancing their cause (al-Ghazali 1996, 82).

Female members were also involved in fundraising for the Brotherhood. These funds were especially meant for the families of Brotherhood members who were in jail. Women collected money that was then distributed to members' families, in order to replace the income that was lost when the husband was arrested (Tadros 2012, 122).[37] However with the government's repression, fundraising within Egypt became difficult. The Egyptian population was reluctant to be associated with the Muslim Brotherhood because of risks of reprisal from the government. The natural ally of the Brotherhood at the time was Saudi Arabia for two reasons. First the important place that Islam played in the Saudi regime meant that they were more likely to help the Brotherhood in their endeavor to Islamize Egypt. Second, Saudi

[37] At the time, men were the sole providers for the family since women were often times not allowed to work. With the husbands in jail, many families were left in a precarious financial situation.

Arabia was particularly afraid of the spread of Nasser's pan-Arab socialism[38] to the Gulf region. They were afraid that it would compromise the Saudi regime's stronghold in its own country (Talhami 2001, 262). Female activists were coordinating efforts with the government of Saudi Arabia to be better equipped for militating in Egypt. In 1957, a group of all-female members went to Saudi Arabia for a pilgrimage. Not only did female activists receive financial resources to help relieve the Brothers' families, but it also provided an ideological foundation for the organization. This was the first tie that was created between the Saudi state and the Brotherhood. Beyond fundraising efforts, this was also an opportunity for women to ask for the relocation of some male members to Saudi Arabia in order to escape the wrath of the government (Talhami 2001, 263).

By the end of the trip, several women also took this opportunity to stay in Saudi Arabia and gain an Islamic education, which would benefit the organization in the long run. The trip to Saudi Arabia was especially surprising because, within the Brotherhood's ideology, women are typically not allowed to travel without a male relative. However these trips were necessary because the Sisters, contrary to the Brothers, still had freedom of movement at the time and could therefore find outside support for the movement that imprisoned men could not get (Abdel-Latif 2008, 4). This trip was even further key because the relationship between the Brothers and Saudi Arabia is one that continued well past this period of repression in Egypt. The state was an important ally for the education of the organization as well as providing jobs, in the oil industry of Saudi Arabia, in times of poor socio-economic conditions in Egypt, especially during the later era of economic liberalization (Talhami 2001, 263).

Female activists were also holding meetings between different Brotherhood

[38] Nasser felt that the arabicity of many countries in North Africa, the Middle East and the Gulf should unite around their common identity in order to fight the rise of Israel as well as counter the European influence in the region (Little 1988, Karsh 2001, Choueiri 2001).

and Sisterhood members. Because their homes were safe from government reprisal, they were able to organize meetings, which would mostly be run by Zaynab al-Ghazali. Part of the goal of these meetings was to educate other women in the Islamic message. Azza al-Gharf was one of these women. She later became a member of parliament on behalf of the Muslim Brotherhood. She recalls taking parts in meetings and studying under al-Ghazali (Khalaf 2012).

By the second wave of repression in 1965-1966, female members' activism "was so essential for the survival of the movement that the Nasserite government imprisoned fifty Muslim Sisters" (Tadros 2012, 122). Women's activities lost their success rate as well as their efficiency. As a result, there was an important reduction in the activities of the female members. The Muslim Sisters as an organization, seized to exist but a few women chose to conduct the work on an individual basis and mostly underground (Abdel-Latif 2008, 4). Because inclusion of women as a strategy to maximize survival was no longer the best tactic, their inclusion was jeopardized.

INCLUSION IN LEADING THE MOVEMENT: THE CASE OF ZAYNAB AL-GHAZALI

It is only once the state's repression started that Zaynab al-Ghazali[39] agreed to join the Muslim Brotherhood.[40] Prior to that, she had refused al-Banna's offer to join because she feared that she would lose her independence and equality as well as the independence of the Muslim Women's Association, which was ran by al-Ghazali (Sullivan & Abed-Kotob 1999, 105). In her memoir, she states that very few

[39] Zaynab al-Ghazali formed her own organization, called Muslim Women's Association prior to joining the Muslim Brotherhood. Much like the Muslim Sisters, it was focused on helping women become more pious and carry out social programs (Abed-Kotob & Sullivan 1999, 104).
[40] Prior to the repression, al-Ghazali had preferred to maintain her organization separate in order to retain independence. She therefore worked in looser cooperation with the Brotherhood at certain times (Baron 2001, 237).

understood her need to keep herself separate from the Brotherhood prior to 1952. However she speaks of the sheikh Muhammad Ouden. He understood that the Muslim Sisters could be much more useful to the Brotherhood as a separate entity (Al-Ghazali 1996, 66). Any attempt to join prior to the revolution would have led to "complementarity at best, subordination at worst" (Cooke 2001, 89).

During the time of repression, al-Ghazali[41] stood out as the leader of both the Muslim Sisters and even at times the Muslim Brotherhood. After al-Banna and al-Hudaybi, many consider her the third most important leader of the Muslim Brotherhood because of the key role she played during this period of repression. In her memoir, al-Ghazali recalls her fears towards her new role as part of the Muslim Brotherhood:

> *«Je suis revenu à la charge pour lui clarifier ma position envers l'organisation des Frères Musulmans et la confiance absolue dont je jouissais auprès de toutes les dames membres de l'association des Femmes Musulmanes. [Sheikh Muhammad Ouden] me dit alors 'Il est désormais impératif que vous n'épargnez aucun effort dans ce sens, et tout ce que vous ferez et apportez considérez le comme un service pour la cause de l'islam'» (Al-Ghazali 1996, 67)*

Her change in position speaks to both the need for survival as well as the change of position of the Brotherhood on female members' abilities to be politically active. While many Brothers felt that women were not fit to lead because of their preoccupation at home, al-Ghazali was embraced as one of the organization's leader.

Contrary to the majority of female activists, whose role remained grassroots oriented, al-Ghazali provided "integral leadership to the remaining members and helped to ensure that the organization survived" (Halverson & Way 2011, 515). This shift from serving, not only a role in the political activities of the movement, but also

[41] Al-Ghazali argued "that the Brotherhood considers women a fundamental part of the Islamic call. They are the ones who are most active because men have to work. They are the ones who build the kind of men that we need to fill the ranks of the Islamic call [...] Islam does not forbid women to actively participate in public life" (Cooke 1994, 3)

a role as a leader of the entire organization is significant for the political inclusion of women. Their activities within the movement passed from education and healthcare, to active members in the fight against the government to then one of the important leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood at the time.

Al-Ghazali was in charge of the 1957 trip to Mecca for the pilgrimage. During this trip she met Abdul Fattah Ismael,[42] a Brotherhood member who had studied extensively under al-Banna. In her memoir, she recalls him reaching out to her in order to discuss her new role within the Brotherhood. They discussed at length the state of the Brotherhood at the time and the possibilities for a revival and reconstruction (Al-Ghazali 1996, 71). They agreed to meet with al-Hudaybi to receive his thought and approval on how to proceed. With this received, al-Ghazali began the organization and spread of the new message of the Brotherhood through different channels.

Al-Ghazali considered that "a core component of this struggle was the education of Muslims in 'correct' Islamic teachings and responsibilities, such as the obligation to fully implement *shariah*" (Halverson & Way 2011, 513).[43] As a leader of the movement, her primary role during this period of repression was therefore to organize meetings to teach women how to spread the *da'wa*. She focused on how to preach and propagate the message during a time when men could no longer take part in these activities. These women would then be responsible for taking actions on a more individual basis. She describes, in her memoir, this time as being fruitful and calm. Female activists would come together and discuss different verses of the *Qur'an* or texts that Brotherhood members provided from jail (al-Gahzali 1996, 82). Their goal was to not only keep the *da'wa* alive right now but also to train the next

[42] Al-Ghazali was introduced to him by her brother in the Suez port before boarding for Saudi Arabia. She recalls that he seek her out while on the trip because al-Banna had told him that she had pledged her alliance to the cause.

[43] Al-Ghazali developed a comprehensive plan for education during this time, which was based on the integration and application of the fundamental principles of Islam. This program was based on 13 years of teachings (al-ghazali 1996, 83).

generations.

She was also responsible more largely for the educational programs of the organization, for both men and women (Zollner 2007, 418). Her home first became a meeting place for the Muslim Brothers. The new generations of Brothers came from different parts of Egypt in order to learn how to rebuild the organization and to maintain the pressure on the government (Halverson & Way 2011, 515). In her memoir, al-Ghazali describes how young men would come into her home in order to seek council and hide in the middle of the night. Without children of her own, she was referred to, and often called herself "the mother of the faithful" (Cooke 2001, 102).

During these meetings, she was further able to guide the Brothers in their political decision due to the unique access female members had to the other leading members of the Brotherhood in jail. Al-Ghazali had asked female relatives of Qutb to visit him in prison and received information on the important texts that would help rebuild the organization. She described this as a phase of surveying and explorations to have a solid base of teachings to pass along (al-Ghazali 1996, 74). With this information, she could prepare her teachings and conferences for male members of the Brotherhood (Talhami 1996, 50). She was responsible for disseminating the information that other female members received from family members. Al-Ghazali also later "began the arduous task of tracing the location of recently released brothers and passing them Sayyid Qutb's articles in order to rebuild the brotherhood" (Talhami 1996, 51). She would also be responsible for publishing these writings so that more of the Brothers could have access to them (Abdel-Latif 2008, 4).

The role of reconstructing the Brotherhood's Islamic thought/call was key, especially with the confusion around what members should do with their leaders in jail. She argued, "jihad is obligatory as it is on any Muslim community which wants

the establishment of God's rule and its firm implementation" (Halverson & Way 2011, 513). Al-Ghazali therefore took on that role of keeping the jihad alive while the Brothers could not do it.

Al-Ghazali was eventually arrested and tortured in 1965, during the second wave of repression, which even women could not escape. By that time, al-Ghazali had become indispensable to the Brotherhood. She was "an organizer, a treasurer, a dispenser of welfare assistance, a teacher, and a recruiter of men and women" (Talhami 1996, 51). As a testament to the role she had during this period, a role that was equal to those of any Brothers in the organization at the time, al-Ghazali was sent to a men's military prison where she was tortured for a year. Nasser is reported to have said that al-Ghazali was to be tortured more harshly than the men (Halverson & Way 2001, 515).

During her time in jail, she emphasized her vision for the role of women. For al-Ghazali, "Muslim women would retreat to their natural domain as nurturers of the nation's men" (Talhami 1996, 52). She emphasized the temporality of the inclusion of women in the political life of the Brotherhood. The inclusion of women, even in the mind of al-Ghazali was therefore a strategic inclusion rather than a change in ideology.

NO SHIFT IN THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

It could be argued that the change from exclusion to inclusion starting in 1952 is attributable to the organizational structure of the Muslim Sisters. Women were now part of the Brotherhood leadership with Zaynab al-Ghazali. She was not only instrumental in organizing the Sisters and their activities but remained important in the movement even past this period of inclusion (Hatem 1998).

However this does not necessarily mean that there was a real change in the organizational structure of the Muslim Sisters. As highlighted above, this effort

occurred on a more grassroots level, where individual women received Brothers in their home, or distributed messages to Brothers in jail. When al-Ghazali's involvement in the organization started, it was not much more than a group of women who had come together to help their husbands (Al-Ghazali 1996, 67). Therefore even during the period of inclusion, there was no real structure of the Muslim Sisters.

As will be highlighted in the following chapter, this period of inclusion did not lead to a consolidation of female activists' position in the organization. Many members of the Brotherhood, including al-Ghazali, emphasized the fact that this role is only temporary until the Brotherhood is capable of push forward its own goals (Abdel-Latif 2008). The internal by-laws did not change after this period of inclusion, in a way that would allow women's role to be cemented until the 1980s (Amin 2005).

CHAPTER III: POLITICAL EXCLUSION OF FEMALE ACTIVISTS IN A TIME OF REBUILDING – 1970S-1985

The period between the early 1970s and 1985 was a period during which female activists were excluded from the political activities of the Muslim Brotherhood. The organization, at that time, was more focused on rebuilding and rebranding itself after a period of fierce repression from the government. This change was due to a changing political context, which was punctuated with increasing liberalization on both the economic and political front. As a result, the Muslim Brotherhood no longer faced threats to its survival. Their goals shifted towards reconstruction and the involvement of female members was therefore no longer a priority.

3.1. CONTEXT OF RELATIVE LIBERALIZATION

This period, which started with Sadat's coming to power in 1970, was one marked by a new wave of liberalization on both the economic and political fronts. These changes to the regime type of Egypt were necessary for the development of the country.

> "At Nasser's death, Egypt was a socialist-dominated, single-party police state, politically paralyzed by a pervasive and abusive security apparatus that was encouraged by Nasser's suspicious nature. Censorship was in force. Travel was restricted. Economic activity was calcified by restraints on currency, restrictions on international trade, fear of war and the government's record on nationalizing private assets" (Lippman 1989, 6).

Economically, Sadat put in place a series of economic liberalization measures, called *Infitah*. These measures were meant to "encourage the private investment sector through free trade, joint ventures, free ports, and higher amounts of foreign participation in the economy" (Zuhur 1992, 52).[44] The goal was to reintegrate Egypt in the capitalist world in order to raise living standards, reduce poverty and encourage foreign investment in the country. However *Infitah* did not provide enough growth and investment to counteract the increase in population.[45] The government was therefore unable to meet the demands of the population. There were increasing food shortages, a deterioration of public services, along with an inflation rate of about 30%. Sadat faced protests and food riots, especially the food riots of January 1977,[46] which was some of the largest protests since the revolution of 1952 (Hinnebush 1988, 71).

Sadat took part in Sinai I and Sinai II in 1975, which were agreements with Israel to end military actions (Hinnebush 1988, 54). In 1977, he also traveled to Jerusalem, marking the first time an Egyptian president traveled to Israel. Setting up diplomatic relations with both the United States and Israel marked this political liberalization. This provided a change from Nasser's dealing with Israel, which was mostly focused on military actions (Hinnebush 1988, 74).

At the same time, this period was also undergoing political liberalization after a very closed political context under Nasser's governance.[47] This was first done through a purge of all of Nasser's associates (Lippman 1989, 32). Sadat believed that

[44] These new policies of liberalization were a sharp change from what Egypt had seen during the Nasser regime, which had been punctuated by large efforts to nationalize industries.
[45] Only about 20,000 new jobs were created and only one tenth of the investments made in the 1970s could be attributed to the economic liberalization measures (Hinnebush 1988, 272).
[46] These riots were spontaneous uprisings of protests from the lower class against the end of government subsidies of basic foods. These changes were part of the IMF and World Bank recommendations.
[47] It would however not be correct to classify Sadat's rule as a democratic one. As Lippman (1989) describes, it "was a democracy of the family, and he was the father. When his children were unruly, he was quick to discipline them" (189). His rule was later on referred to as a pharaonic rule, a father to the nation in a very personal rule.

he "could not do things the way Nasser did, simply because [they] were different men" (Sadat 1978, 206). Sadat also announced the creation of three different electoral groupings (right, left and center) within ASU, Egypt's single-party.[48] Though these were in no way independent, they provided new legal outlets for the population, with candidates who could run in four parliamentary elections that were held during Sadat's regime and the beginning of Mubarak's regime in 1976, 1979, 1984 and 1987 (Lippman 1989, 204). "Sadat opened the door to opposition and political dialogue, and he died when he attempted to reclose it" (Lippman 1989, 186). Though this was an important change from the situation under Nasser, it cannot be seen as a complete opening of the political space. As will be seen below, these changes were punctuated with closing political space when the opposition, including the Muslim Brotherhood, became too popular.

These changes continued during the first part of Mubarak's regime. Mubarak had been vice-president under Sadat since 1975 and was especially involved in Egypt's foreign policy (the closer relationship between Egypt and the United States). With the assassination of Sadat in October of 1981 led by Khalid Ahmed Showky Al-Islambouli further showing people's dissent,[49] Mubarak believed that the only alternative was to re-stabilize the country (Osman 2010, 141). He chose to tolerate the opposition in order to emphasize stability and development. Lippman (1989) describes Mubarak's first term, from 1981-1987 as "a series of balancing acts" (221). He held onto most of the reforms that Sadat had put in place including the peace agreements with Israel and *Infitah*.

[48] These groupings played a role similar to political party, where they would be able to run in elections separately. However each of these groupings fell under the leadership of the ASU.
[49] Al-Islambouli stated that one of the biggest drivers towards the assassination was the fact that Sadat had signed the Camp David Accords with Israel in 1978. He was tried in a military tribunal and found guilty. He received the death penalty

3.1.1. IMPLICATIONS OF LIBERALIZATION FOR THE BROTHERHOOD

Sadat's wave of liberalization meant that the Muslim Brotherhood had much more freedom than they had during Nasser's regime. Many of the Brothers who were previously imprisoned were released and amnestied by Sadat (Talhami 2001, 75). Some members even received financial compensation for the time they spent in jail in order to help in their rehabilitation (Talhami 2001, 75).

In 1976, Sadat also allowed the publication of the Islamic magazine, which then became associated with the Brotherhood, *Al-Da'wa*[50] (Kepel 1993, 109). This was done in exchange for the organization's support in the parliamentary elections of 1976 (Rubin 2002, 17). For the Brotherhood, this magazine was a way to expose to the Egyptian public at large, their positions on several social, political, economic and religious issues, as well as how this could be applied to diverse parts of the movement (Kepel 1993, 109). They advocated, through this media, for the creation of a welfare state through full-employment policies and the enforcement of *zakat*[51] (Rubin 2002, 17).

Sadat's openness to the Brotherhood was also apparent when "constitutional amendments were adopted that declared *Shari'ah* to be one of the main sources of Egyptian law" (Abdel-Latif 2008, 5). Some of the Brotherhood leadership was even involved with the drafting of this new constitution (Rubin 2002, 17). This served to appease the organization for a while (Abdel-Latif 2008, 5).

This new approach to dealings with the Muslim Brotherhood was a strategic decision for Sadat, who "sought to use the Islamists as a pawn against his other, more staunch Nasserist and leftist opponents" (Abdel-Latif 2008, 4). After Nasser's death, he was facing sharp opposition, especially from leftists and old Nasserist supporters.

[50] Al-Dawa's editor-in-chief, Oman Tilmisani, became the unofficial head of the Muslim Brotherhood during this period

[51] Zakat is the practice of giving alms based on someone's accumulated wealth. This is one of the five pillars of Islam, and therefore mandatory for all Muslims.

The organization therefore became a way to counteract that opposition as well as gain a new legitimacy, based on religion, which Nasser had completely rejected.[52] He came to call himself 'the guardian of the faith' as well as emphasize that his name was indeed 'Mohamed' (Osman 2010, 90). During this period, the Brotherhood was also more willing to compromise in order not to face the same repression than during Nasser's regime (Abd el-Monein & Wenner 1982, 353). Tactically speaking, it made sense for the organization to rethink their level of opposition to the state this time.

This overall relaxation of Sadat's policies meant that the Brotherhood had the freedom to rebuild the organization and therefore "sought only to find its niche in the new Sadat regime" (Talhami 2001, 82). The organization's strategy could be resumed in two points: "[1] to gain full legal status, [2] increase its leverage in parliament through its own party or alliance with other forces and implement *Shari'a*" (Rubin 2002, 125). As exhibited by these goals, the Brotherhood did not formulate clear demands for the government but rather sought to increase the influence that the organization once had on both the government and on society, in a sense to return to its former glory.

1. As the first goal of the organization, Tilmisani, new leader of the Brotherhood, asked the government to legalize the Brotherhood as a legal political party in the early 1970s. In private meetings between the two leaders, Sadat indicated that though the organization would not be recognized as a political party, it would be given the status as "a religious charitable association under the auspices of the Ministry of Social Welfare" (Talhami 2001, 83).
2. For the second goal of the organization, once the organization started meeting some resistance from the Sadat regime in 1979, the Brotherhood

[52] Nasser used Arab nationalism, and an emphasis on this arabicity as a way to legitimate its decisions and create a new Egyptian identity. With the failures of pan-Arabism, most notably with the dismantlement of the UAR, Sadat turned to a religious identity.

> allied itself with opposition parties, regardless of the type of ideology that they had. Tilmisani struck an "agreement [with] Fu'ad Sirah-al-Din, leader of the Wafd party, that Muslim Brothers would be put onto Wafd's list in exchange for the votes of their supporters" (Rubin 2002, 21).

The organization developed goals and strategies that helped them work towards this idea of reconstruction and rebuilding.

As part of the rebuilding of the organization, the Brotherhood also re-organized the social services that they were previously providing. They were able to "create exclusive Islamic investments and a social-welfare structure alongside those of the state" (Talhami 2001, 264). It became the center of the rebuilding efforts of the Brotherhood, which helped to increase their support base (Osman 2010, 93). The organization focused on clinics, youth clubs, daycares and schools. These were mostly targeted for Egypt's lower middle-class and the urban poor. Clinics specifically became important for the Brotherhood because they often provided better salaries for the staff, more hygienic conditions than the government could provide as well as more motivated staff (Talhami 2001, 264). The organization also offered practical help in finding jobs as well as open non-corrupt food distribution centers in poorer neighborhoods (Osman 2010, 84). Its overall goal was to develop different social services that the Egyptian government was simply not able to provide anymore due to the failings of the liberalization efforts. This was the main claim that the Brotherhood made to legitimacy (Osman 2010, 84).

The Brotherhood was also involved with rebuilding its membership. The organization focused on recruiting first in mosques. The government administered only 30,000 of the 170,000 mosques in Egypt (Wickham 1997, 124). The rest were independent mosques where the Brotherhood had key access. Though at first the social base of the Muslim Brotherhood was mostly focused on the urban lower-middle class (Hinnebush 1988, 204), during the 1970s, recruitment also occurred in

campuses. By the 1980s, the Brotherhood was able to organize large rallies and meetings for young university students by working with student organizations. They advertised openly in buses and mosques (Lippman 1989, 247). Students therefore became a larger part of the organization in the reconstructing period. Recruitment also occurred through professional syndicates, starting in 1985. Between mid-1980s, when the Brotherhood started to run in these elections, and 1995, participation in syndicates election passed from 10% to 46% (Wickham 1997, 126). By the end of this period, the organization had made considerable advancements, including elections in different syndicates, which opened ways onto the next period where electoral successes were pushed forward as the number one goal. They had been able to get their feet into the door.

Table 1: Year of entry of the Brotherhood into various syndicates

Syndicate	Year of Entry into Elections
The Doctors Syndicate	1984
The Engineers Syndicate	1985
The Journalists Syndicate	1985
The Lawyers Syndicate	1992

Source: Fahmy (1998)

The goals of the Brotherhood shifted from survival in the first period to restoration of its membership and ideology during this second period. With a different objective at play, the organization had to reconsider the strategies they were using. The idea was that they needed to maximize their success rate, which could be done by using the most cost efficient strategy. The inclusion of women was no longer the most appropriate means to reach their goals.

The strategy that was used by the Brotherhood, as was highlighted in the above section, was focused on non-violence and non-confrontation with the Sadat regime. The organization used their participation in syndicates and their involvement in social outreach in order to attain its goals.

3.2. POLITICAL EXCLUSION OF FEMALE ACTIVISTS

3.2.1. FEMALE ACTIVIST'S FOCUS

Starting in the early 1970's, female members began to once again have a role within the Muslim Brotherhood. However that role was very much constrained to charitable activities, similarly to the pre-1952 era. At the time, the view of the Brotherhood was that "women can best serve the cause through their traditional roles as mothers and wives but not as political actors or peers in the movement" (Tadros 2011, 95). Therefore, while the 1950s and early 1960s forced the Brotherhood to include women because of survival threats, this new era of consolidation meant that female activists could undertake the role that they had traditionally played in the Brotherhood ideology. That role is focused on charity work, educating women and children as well as providing health care.

The rationale for not enabling women to be active political actors was that they had different temperaments than men (Hatem 1994, 673). Margot Badran (1995) also argued that during this second wave of Islamist between the 1970s and 1980s, previous gender trends were reversed. The presence of women in the public sphere was slowing down and a discourse of modesty resurfaced. In the idea of rebuilding, the Brotherhood focused on re-Islamizing society. The use of this particular strategy during this second period meant that the role of women as political actors was no longer desirable. Therefore, with that in mind, the activism of female members was refocused to what could be called a more appropriate role for them, in the Brotherhood's eyes. This new role better reflected their objective of re-Islamization of society.

During the reconstruction process of the Muslim Brotherhood, universities had become an important recruitment ground for the organization in the 1970s, in

order to rebuild their structure and membership.[53] The organization attempted to Islamize campuses, especially through the segregation of classes and public spaces. It was also a time when the veil was becoming the norm for female members of the Muslim Brotherhood. The organization was also running campaigns to make Islamic attire mandatory for both men and women that were attending Al-Azhar (Talhami 2001, 265). Student unions and other associations were integrated into the organization's structure (Talhami 2001, 52). However these opportunities were strictly reserved for male students. Female activists were given the task to organize bus services for women only as well as find space for separate lecture halls for men and women (Talhami 2001, 265).

Furthermore, with the increasing liberalization and privatization of some of the state's industries, there were also growing pockets of the population that were no longer receiving social services from the state. Therefore these policies opened the ways for female activists to "play a more active part in society, not to mention picking up some of the pieces of social welfare" (Abu-Lughod 2010, 3). Though women quickly became the center of these charitable organizations, it was still started as a male initiative to answer to the state's failures (Hafez 2001, 32). This once again shows the extent to which female members' activities were subordinate to the will of the Brothers. Much like in the pre-1952 period, female activists focused on providing services such as Islamic clinics or education facilities for women, which had become popular. The main goals of these activities were the "Islamization of Egyptian society and the replacement of alien corrupt and immoral practices with Islamic values and norms" (Hafez 2001, 32). The provision of these services took off rapidly and often became more successful than the state.

[53] Many of the leaders who were involved in the campus groups later became a new generation of leaders of the movement.

3.2.2. BROTHERHOOD'S RESTRICTIVE POLICIES

In the 1970s, the *Mufti*[54] of the Brotherhood, Sheikh Abd Allah el Khattib produced a *fatwa*[55] in response to questions that were sent to *Al Da'wa* regarding women's ability to hold positions of public authority. The debate had been part of a larger discussion over the place of women in society. El-Khattib answered by stating that women are indeed prevented from holding positions of power over men, both inside and outside of the political realm (Tadros 2012, 148). He stated:

> "If God did not make her [a woman] leader in her home over one family, will He allow her to be a leader over the state compromising millions of homes? No doubt leadership over the state is a more serious matter" (Tadros 2012, 148).

Sheikh Abd Allah el Khattib specifically stated that a woman holding office is problematic on three different fronts: waging wars (both leading and ending battles), leading Muslims in prayers and having public interests override emotions. Therefore female activists were not encouraged from playing a leadership role within the Muslim Brotherhood.[56] This policy was also extended to women's inability to be part of the military (Talhami 2001, 65). The idea of political leadership was a new one for the Brotherhood, who had not previously been able to consider running in elections. With the decision to participate in the political process, due to the opening of the political space, it opened new ideas for the organization. It became a possibility during this time of reconstruction. It was therefore important to take a decision regarding the leadership of women outside of the home. However, the Brotherhood did not consider the inclusion of women as being an efficient strategy for them to use.

[54] An Islamic scholar who is able to interpret Islamic law
[55] Islamic term referring to a legal opinion
[56] This position was not necessarily different from the first period. Indeed, the Muslim Brotherhood did not address this during the period of inclusion. This is specifically what differs from the first period. Because this is part of an exclusionary period for women, the organization specifically specifies and states its position towards women. The Brotherhood therefore attempted to constrain the activities that female activitists were allowed to perform.

The end of Sadat era also marked a sharp debate about possible amendments to the Personal Status Law of 1929[57] with the Presidential Decree 44 of 1979 (Guenena & Wassef 1999, 6). Guenena and Wassef (1999) argue that the state in which the Personal Status Law was at the time had "a tremendous impact on gender and power hierarchies within the family" (20) through policies including polygamy, restrictive divorce rights and custody. The main amendment was to revoke a husband's unilateral and arbitrary right to divorce and marry (Hussein 1985, 230). The Muslim Brotherhood, along with other conservative factions, spoke out strongly against the amendments. They felt that this was an attack against Islam and *Shari'ah*. Using *Al-Da'wa* as a platform, they rejected each article that was being discussed, as there was nothing in Islam that would make these changes necessary (Tadros 2012, 124). Though it does not exactly define the political role of female activists, or lack there-of, during this period, it does give a sense of the role and place of women more generally for the Brotherhood. This shows a return to a more conservative ideology that had been pushed aside previously because of the strategic needs of the organization. With a goal revolving around the re-Islamization of society and the reconstruction of the organization, policies on women was guided towards more ideologically defined roles.

These denote the type of restrictive positions that were given to female members during this period, positions which targeted women in both their public and private lives. While the Brotherhood emphasized their role as active members of the organization's political life in previous periods, this time, they were given a much more contained role that emphasized the biological differences between men and women that must be maintained for the well-being of society as well as the Brotherhood. The organization argued that these biological differences prevented

[57] When drafting the Personal Status Law in 1929, the decision was made that secular law was used in the civil, commercial and penal codes while the governance of personal life and family life was under Islamic law (Guenena & Wassef, 1999, 20).

female activists from being part of an effective strategy for them. These differences defined women's capacities to act in the political sphere.

3.2.3. ZAYNAB AL-GHAZALI'S CALL TO RETURN HOME

Zaynab al-Ghazali had played an important role in the involvement of female activists during the first period of inclusion. As a leader of both men's and women's movement, she encouraged women's activism in the political activities both through her discourse as well as her actions. However, with the liberalization of the political space and the acceptance of the Muslim Brotherhood by the regime, her discourse changed sharply.

Because of her role as a leader during the period of political activism, her words carried a particular importance. In her memoir, al-Ghazali explains that following the dissolution of the Muslim Sisters, women came one after the other to visit her in her home. They were looking and waiting to see what would happen to the organization as well as what their role would be now (al-Ghazali 1996, 40). This time, contrary to the previous period, her tone was much different.

This time "Zaynab al-Ghazali suggested a return to domesticity" (Hatem 1998, 92). In a long analysis of women's responsibilities by Hatem, al-Ghazali described women's role "to earn love and respect, [women] should look after her house and take care of her responsibilities, which include cooking, child rearing, cleaning and creating a beautiful environment. A wife was also responsible for her husband's comfort, serenity, and the good financial management of his income" (Hatem 1998, 95). This described a new and different role that al-Ghazali had not advocated during her time as an activist. This advice "represented a serious attempt to preach the return to the old patriarchal family of al-Ghazali's youth in the 1930s" (Hatem 1998, 96). The issue of the place of women was the focus of her work for much of the 1970s. As a writer of a column called 'Toward a Muslim Home', she

focused on encouraging Islamic principles for women and children (Hoffman 1985, 233).

Al-Ghazali also blamed many of society and the state's problem on the fact that women were working and involved in society. In a column written in *al-Da'wah*, al-Ghazali is appalled at women's behavior (Lewis 2007, 30):

> "Is it for her to raise up her house, her children, and her husband to the peak of understanding and to a better social standing? Or, is this movement dissolving the Muslim woman in her imitation of the western woman who is lost and who has become an object of pleasure, unprotected, and whose home is unguarded, and whose privacy has been violated!" (Al-Ghazali in Al-Da'wa)

She therefore stressed that the ideal position for women at the time was to return home (Hatem 1994, 673). This was the place where they would be most helpful to the movement. It was a return to the natural place of women for many of the Brotherhood members as well as al-Ghazali, a place that women had walked away from during the 1950s and the early 1960s for strategic purposes. Indeed al-Ghazali saw the role of female members as multifaceted, depending on the situation at hand and the need of the Brothers. They can be mothers or in some cases play a prominent role in the political public space (Uthman 2010, 74).

This change in her rhetoric and in her style of leadership was an important marker of the change in the activities of women. In the 1950s and 1960s, she repeatedly stated that women's current role, as active political activists for the Brotherhood was only temporary (Talhami 2001, 52) because of the Islamist feminists understanding of the role of women. Therefore this return to the more traditional and conservative exclusion of women was due to the change in the political context. Once the Brotherhood no longer needed female members, their role would return to what it traditionally was.

However al-Ghazali's own role and activities did not fit what she was preaching for other women. Contrary to her call for women to regain their place in the home, al-Ghazali continued to be active in the political scene of the Brotherhood. In 1974, she "pledged to work with the Sadat regime to create a Muslim Egypt" (Hatem 1994, 671). In 1981, al-Ghazali also became the editor of the women's column of *Al-Da'wa*, an outlet she used to write "articles on the domestic nature of females and on the importance of motherhood and wifedom for Muslim women" (Lewis 2007, 1). There is therefore clearly a dichotomy between what she preached female activists and women should do during this period of reconstruction and the roles that she took on herself. Hatem (1994) attributed this to the fact that she was and still is the only true female leader of the Muslim Brotherhood and therefore gained a special status within the organization (Hatem 1994, 673).

As a further testament to her importance to the Brotherhood as well as her importance in the eyes of the government, al-Ghazali was released from prison on August 9th, 1971. In her memoir, she recalls her surprise, as she was the only female activist to be released, even though she had been sentenced for life while others had only been sentenced for 10 or 25 years (al-Ghazali 1996, 375). However, Brotherhood members did not meet al-Ghazali. Her political inclusion was therefore limited, even for someone as important to the movement. She was the only one to be released. Female members in jail were therefore no longer a key part of the Brotherhood. There were no special attempts to release women from jails, in the same way that they were lobbying for some Brothers.

3.2.4. DISMEMBERMENT IN 1967

The argument can be made that this exclusion of the Muslim Sisters during this period is not due to a lack of threat to its survival and the reconstruction of the Brotherhood, but rather due to the organizational incapacity of the Muslim Sisters

after facing repression in 1967. In her memoir, Zaynab al-Ghazali recalls the moment she learns of the dissolution of the Muslim Sisters:

> *"Il s'agissait purement et simplement de la décision prise par les autorités de dissoudre l'organe central de cette association. [...] elle répliqua: 'personne ne peut s'opposer au gouvernement. Nous avons déployé des efforts considerable pour ce faire mais Nasser a résolu de dissoudre l'association" (Al-Ghazali 1996, 28).*

Indeed, while female activists were an important part of the movement during the 1950s and early 1960s, it did not help to consolidate their position within the movement in the long-term (Abdel-Latif 2008, 7). Even after a decade of political activism for the organization, their positions and activities remained informal and fairly unorganized within the Brotherhood. With the inability to survive a second wave of repression under Nasser's regime, which targeted both women and men, the Muslim Sisters between 1967 and 1970, were but gone:

> "The dissolution of the Muslim Sisters division [...] signified the death of the Sisterhood organizationally. The Muslim Sisters division never regained the same organizational strength and ambitious public role" (Tadros 2012, 122).

Because of the lack of Muslim Sisters' organizational structure[58] female members had a tougher time recovering from state repression. Therefore while the Brotherhood was reconstructing ideologically and organizationally, the women's movement was "was hurt by the period of hibernation following the 1970s" (Abdel-Latif 2008, 5).

The organization often blamed the state's repression for the destruction of the women's movement in the late 1960s. They "constantly referred to the political oppression in Egypt as the main reason why the politics and organizational structures of the movement, including that of the women's organization, are not more progressive" (Abdel-Latif & Ottaway 2007, 10). This lack of organizational structure

[58] See discussion in the first chapter

in the previous periods meant that the Sisters could not overcome the obstacles that they faced with the state's repression.

Therefore during the phase where they were forced 'underground', much of the activities of the Sisterhood were done on an individual basis (Abdel-Latif 2008, 4). This did not require the same level of organization and was therefore easier for women to do.

Nevertheless this argument does not take into consideration the fact that it was in fact the Brotherhood, who did not make the rebuilding of the Muslim Sisters a priority. Al-Ghazali argued that the participation in the political activities of the Brotherhood in the 1950s and early-1960s had only been temporary because of the political context at the time. At the end of the period of repression, female members were then expected to fall back into their typical role of mothers and wives first (Talhami 2001, 52). There was thus a real emphasis on the temporality of the activities of women. When interviewed in 2006, "members of the Muslim Brotherhood said that they did not feel the need for a 'sisterhood' to represent their interests" (Tadros 2012, 122). Therefore though the lack of organizational structure of the Muslim Sisters played a role in the exclusion of women during this period, the decision behind this lack of organization came from the Brotherhood themselves, who had from the beginning, viewed the Sisterhood as a subordinate branch of the organization.

CHAPTER IV: POLITICAL INCLUSION OF FEMALE ACTIVISTS IN ELECTORAL PERIOD – 1984 TO 2005

The third period studied in this research represents a change in the political context with a relative opening of the political space from 1984 to 2005. With this new space, the Muslim Brotherhood became increasingly ambitious. It no longer saw its role strictly as a social movement but more as an active member of the Egyptian political scene. It therefore began to compete in elections and struck alliances with political parties whose ideology was not Islamist. This clearly shows changes in the Muslim Brother's goals and objectives. The new goals revolved around increasing its electoral support. Therefore it focused on gaining a larger electorate, carving a bigger space in the political landscape and being more competitive in elections.

During this period, female activists once again had a very important role to play for the electoral needs of the organization, to recruit, to run as candidates or to spread the political message of the Brotherhood.

4.1. CONTEXT WITHIN THE PERIOD

4.1.1. GOALS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE BROTHERHOOD

During this period, the Muslim Brotherhood remained constant in its goals as well as in the methods it was employing. The organization was fundamentally different from many Islamist groups as well as different from itself in previous periods (Osman 2010, 100). For the first time, they proposed a political manifesto,

discussed political reforms as well as participated in elections. They also focused on developing tactics that were non-confrontational (Osman 2010, 102).

The Brotherhood's first participation in an election was in the 1984 parliamentary elections, in alliance with the secular Wafd party.[59] This served as a turning point for the organization because it showed "the group's desire to achieve its political goals, through the process of normal Egyptian politics" (Harnish & Mecham 2009, 190). The alliance won 59 seats out of 454 possible seats, eight of which belonged to the Brotherhood exclusively.

In 1987, the Brotherhood was part of a tripartite alliance along with the socialist Labor Party and the Liberal Party, the single largest opposition bloc in the parliament (Wickham 2013, 53). The alliance won 60 seats in the legislative assembly, 37 of which went to the Brotherhood (Harnish & Mecham 2009, 191). This was the first election where the organization proposed the slogan 'Islam is the Solution', which clearly indicated to the Egyptian population the type of policies they would pursue.

In the 2000 and 2005 parliamentary elections, the Brotherhood started to face repression from the state because of their increasing electoral successes. For example, the state arrested 1,300 Brothers between the first and second round of the 2005 elections. However, in spite of this, the organization kept its candidates in place and was able to win 17 seats in the 2000 elections and 88 seats in the 2005 elections (Harnish & Mecham 2009, 193). The 2005 elections[60] were the most successful for the Brotherhood, who ran as the only opposition to the NDP and won about 1/5th of the available seats (Osman 2010, 100).

[59] The alliance was mutually helpful. The Wafd party provided a legal channel for the Brotherhood, while the organization gave the Wafd the popular support it needed to start winning elections (Wickham 2013, 47).

[60] The Brotherhood stated that they did not field as many candidates in the elections as they could have. They had 161 candidates that were ready to run and expected 128 seats out of these members. However the organization stated that they "did not want to shock the system" (International Crisis Group 2008).

These participations in elections were part of what many scholars have called a commitment to democracy by the Brotherhood. Harnish and Mecham (2009) argue that the "democracy was a system that the group publicly claimed to support for ideological reasons and to fully commit itself to upholding" (190). In 1989, General Guide, Muhammad Ma'mun al-Houdaybi wrote:

> "In Egypt, there is a certain degree of democracy; we [i.e. the Brotherhood] guard and hold on to it. We work to confirm and develop it until rights are complete. It is important to confirm the democratic pursuit in practice." (Harnish & Mecham 2009, 191)

However, since the first elections in 1984, al-Tilmisani, the Brotherhood's third General Guide after al-Banna and al-Houdaybi, emphasized, in an interview, the fact that entering in parliamentary politics "is not a goal in and of itself but rather a means, and if one strategy does not succeed, we will abandon it and seek out another strategy" (Wickham 2013, 48). This once again emphasizes the fact that this participation in electoral politics is a way to bring about fundamental change in Egyptian society, that is to islamicize it. Then in 1991, the Brotherhood, along with nine other opposition parties issued a 10-point consensus that would be the basis of all political reforms in Egypt.[61] These different statements show that the organization has committed itself to achieve its political goals through electoral methods.

In order to increase their influence on society, the Brotherhood also attempted to gain power through participation in professional syndicates. In 1986, the organization was able to secure two thirds of the seats on the Board Council in the teacher's syndicates (Al-Awadi 2005, 65). By the mid-1990s, members of the organization were leaders in every major professional union (Harnish & Mecham 2009, 193), including the majority of seats (14 out of 25) in the bar association in 1992

[61] The full consensus proposal appears in Annex 3

(Campagna 1996, 290). By 2002, the organization won elections in the syndicates for lawyers, journalists, doctors and engineers (Osman 2010, 97). This provided a new vehicle to spread their message and gain influence, especially with judges and legislators. This was the first time the Brotherhood gained control of legitimate channels to advance its political agenda (Campagna 1996, 284). Through this, the Brotherhood gained social recognition, which they would try to turn into political recognition.

Table 2: Brotherhood members in Syndicates by 1995

Syndicate	Number of Brotherhood Seats	Total Number of Council Members
The Doctors Syndicate	20	23
The Engineers Syndicate	45	61
The Pharmacists Syndicate	17	25
The Scientists Syndicate	17	25
The Lawyers Syndicate	18	25

Source: Fahmy (1998)

As mentioned in the idea of the 'dual games' brought forward by Wickham (2013),[62] the Brotherhood only mobilized against the state in a very contained manner. Rather the organization attempted to enter more formal institutions within the state. In 2007, the Brotherhood formally expressed its desire to form a political party for the first time (International Crisis Group 2008).[63]

During this time, the goals of the Brotherhood changed to attempting to gain access to the political system as well as increase its electoral base. While the organization focused on overcoming the state's repression in the first period, this time, they focused rather on pushing its legality as a political party and increasing popular support. With periods of opening and closing of the political space, the

[62] The notion of "dual games" that Wickham proposes attempts to explain that the Brotherhood must on one hand push its own agenda in order to increase support from the general population but at the same time, it must also ensure that it does not confront the government too much.
[63] This request was never accepted by the state and the Brotherhood remained an illegal organization, presenting independent candidates with affiliation with the organization.

Muslim Brotherhood focused on maximizing their popularity and on taking advantage of the opportunity provided to them. This period allowed a way for leaders to "suggest that the organization, while legally unrecognized at present, wished to transform itself into a civil political party with a fully legal status" (Brown & Hamzawy 2008, 12).

> "They continue to demand more political rights, reinforce their institutional base and to win support, among the army, intellectuals, and professionals. Islamic banks and financial institutions, with the Brotherhood's support, offer interest-free financial services. A network of medical, charitable and social welfare organizations is spread throughout the country. It gives the impression of being committed to a peaceful and legal struggle to achieve its goals" (Sattar 1995, 21).

The organization became significantly more ambitious in the demands that they made to the government. Gone were the days where the Brotherhood focused on its social agenda. This clearly shows a change in the tactics and goals of the Brotherhood,[64] which will have real implications for female activists' inclusion within the organization.

4.1.2. THE BROTHERHOOD AS A THREAT

Though this period provided a significant political opening for the Brotherhood, compared to previous periods, it still remained difficult for the organization to act as it wished. Indeed, the achievement of its goals was very much tied to the regime's perception of the Brotherhood. At first, the organization focused on electoral victories. However as they increasingly became perceived as a threat to the government, their survival was at risk.

[64] According to Brown, Hamzawy and Ottaway (2007), the Brotherhood seems to have stepped away from their original goal of establishing an Islamic state and rather focuses on changing the current Egyptian society and politics.

The 1984 parliamentary elections, which marked the beginning of this new period, were held under a new proportional electoral rule, which helped to consolidate Mubarak's power (Ayubi 1980, 13). It also represented the return of the opposition parties[65] and the freedom of the press (Hendricks 1985, 11). Mubarak also reformed the justice system by placing an independent judge at the head of the Supreme Court. Compared to Sadat and Nasser's regimes, the decisions of the courts were respected by the government (Al-Awadi 2005, 63). This was a way for Mubarak to buy the support of the moderates and to signal a more peaceful regime, which was key for him because he did not have the same charisma that Nasser or Sadat had (Al-Awadi 2005, 64).

In the mid 1980s, the Mubarak regime had a cautious tolerance towards the Muslim Brotherhood. This type of balancing act allowed the regime to use the more moderate Islamist faction to counteract the rise of Salafist groups (Campagna 1996, 281). The state believed that the Brotherhood posed little threat to the government and therefore the political activities of the organization were tolerated by the regime. During this first phase, the organization faced little pressures from the regime and therefore, the focus was on increasing their support base.

Starting in 1990, the Mubarak government started to fear that the Muslim Brotherhood was becoming too confrontational because of their alliances and participation in syndicates election. Therefore the regime developed "a longer-term strategy [...] designed to severely curtail the Brotherhood's gains within civil society and weaken its ability to garner increased grassroots support" (Campagna 1996, 280). Following protests around the Madrid peace talks between Israel and the Arab

[65] With the new Law 114 of 1983, a party-list system was implemented rather than running on an individual basis. Independent candidates were not allowed to run and a threshold of 8% was set. Any votes for parties who received less than 8% were automatically given to the leading party, which greatly favored the NDP (Wickham 2013, 47).

states,[66] the regime made a series of arrests in 1991 and then later in 1995, where the arrested Brothers were prosecuted in military courts (Campagna 1996, 287). Then in 1993, the regime passed a new law that attempted to curb the success of the Brotherhood in syndicates by demanding at least 50% attendance for the election to be valid, which was often not the case (Al-Awadi 2005, 74). Brotherhood members on campus also felt that they were being closely monitored by the security apparatus. Their names were removed from the candidates list in student elections (Al-Awadi 2005, 74). There was a clear attempt by the government to push the Muslim Brotherhood underground, even though it had tacitly permitted the organization to exist previously. This was the first step that clearly compromised the organization's survival. With some repression from the state, the Brotherhood had to create tactics that would lessen the threatening image they posed to the government.

In theory, the survival of the Brotherhood was not at risk. Following questionable elections in 2000, Mubarak recalled the parliament and passed new electoral laws. Mubarak then stated "the People's Assembly elections will mark a new departure, affirming that Egypt is a democratic state" (Wickham 2002, 223). Another wave of political reforms starting in 2003 allowed for the direct election of the President. This was once again reinforced with Article 76 in 2005, which allowed for the first time several candidates to run for directly president (Antar 2006, 8). Mubarak also created independent commissions to monitor both the presidential and the parliamentary elections.

However Al-Awadi argues that these steps towards political pluralism were mostly rhetorical (Al-Awadi 2005, 54). It is still important to note that these opposition parties did not represent the entirety of the political spectrum because parties formed on the basis of religion or class were not allowed to run under their

[66] Madrid Peace Talks of 1991 were an attempt by the international community to reach a settlement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which now included Israel, Palestine as well as other Arab countries such as Egypt.

own name. Amin (2011) described the state of Egypt as a 'soft state', where rules were meant to be broken and laws that were passed were not effectively enforced (Amin 2011, 8). Many of the reforms, including those on presidential candidates were short-lived (Antar 2006, 9). Egypt was therefore disguised as a political pluralist state, in order to please the Western allies it depended on (Wickham 2002, 223). Egypt's image was crucial for the economic investments that the country needed.

Once the Mubarak regime realized the level of success that the Brotherhood was having, especially with the 2005 parliamentary elections, the government "[took] a confrontational stance with the Brotherhood, using a two-pronged strategy to restrict the movement's freedom of maneuver" (Brown & Hamzawy 2008, 10). The government first periodically arrested Brotherhood members, including second deputy General Guide Khayrat al-Shatir. The regime also used legal countermeasures to close the political sphere to the Brotherhood. This closing political space, starting in 2005-2007, created new challenges for the organization. They were no longer able to function freely as a political entity. From 2005 onwards, the Brotherhood therefore once again faced repression from the government. As the state attempted to re-tighten the organization, the Brotherhood was once again officially described as 'illegal' (Wickham 2013, 121). Different security measures were employed against the organization such as restriction in participation in polls and in the parliament, arrests and prosecutions (International Crisis Group 2008).

During this period, the Muslim Brotherhood therefore played in what Wickham (2013) calls the 'dual games' with the state:

> "Brotherhood [...] had to walk a fine line: accommodating enough to retain some access to the system under existing political constraints on the one hand while bold enough to mobilize effective pressure to lift those constraints on the other" (Wickham 2013, 57).

The survival of the Brotherhood was tied to this concept, where on the one hand, they pushed forward their electoral agenda but on the other hand, they began to

mobilize against the state, in what will eventually lead to the 2011 revolution. The period following 2005 involved increasing repressive measures from the regime, forcing the Brotherhood to change its behavior, objectives and even strategies.

4.2. FEMALE ACTIVISTS' INCLUSION

During this period, inclusion of female members occurred in a variety of different political sectors, from activists, to recruiters and candidates. These new activities that were added to what women were used to doing reflected the change of objective for the Brotherhood, which is now related to the idea of electoral survival. This inclusion occurred in stages, based on the level of the threat the government posed from the Muslim Brotherhood.

4.2.1. INCLUSION AS ACTIVISTS

The first type of political activities that women undertook during this period was working as activists in various projects, such as campaigns for female rights and protests with the Muslim Brotherhood. This was the first form of inclusion that female members faced at the beginning of the period, which continued, not only until the end of this period in 2005, but also well into the 2011 revolution.[67]

In 1994, during the International Conference for Population and Development, the Brotherhood and Sisterhood worked together to send a delegation (Tadros 2012, 124). Camillia Helmy, an engineer, led a group of other Sisters in an alliance with pro-family right-wing American lobbies to "present the Muslim perspective on proposed agendas and campaigning against the use of international women's treatises as the basis for reforming national family legislation in Egypt and other Arab countries" (Tadros 2012, 125). This marked the first time that women

[67] Female activists were key actors for the Muslim Brotherhood during the revolution, especially in their large participation in the protests.

were able to represent their own interests within the Muslim Brotherhood. The organization's goals were to advance its cause and interest, not simply locally but also internationally. The organization was able to advance their goals with this alliance with the international community, especially some American groups with whom they allied. It was important for the Brotherhood to send the message that it was not only willing to work with non-Islamist forces but also that its position towards women was not entirely exclusive. To do this, female activists were not only included within the movement but actually led the alliance with US lobbies.

It also further helped to advance the goals of the Brotherhood because it led to the creation of the International Islamic Committee for Woman and Child (IIC), which was set up in Al Azhar, an important Islamic university in Cairo. This new organization gave the Brotherhood an important access to the leadership of Al Azhar. The IIC was an official organizational body, which then lobbied the Egyptian government against constitutional family reforms, such as women's right to divorce (Tadros 2012, 125). The participation of the Muslim Sisters in these events was key in legitimizing the opposition of the Brotherhood against the government.

In 2005, with the increasing pressure from the government, the Muslim Brotherhood became more active in speaking against the Mubarak regime, along with other factions. Street protests were popular, especially in the form of campus protests and sit-ins for causes such as the advancement of the Palestinian's freedom or in opposition to the US occupation of Iraq. It is estimated that female activists accounted for almost half of the Brotherhood demonstrators (Abdel-Latif 2008, 18). Following the arrests of 22 senior Brotherhood figures in December 2006, female members "launched a campaign against the military tribunals and their rulings. This included a series of sit-ins in front of the Interior Ministry to protest the trials. Young women activists raised anti-regime banners in support of those detained" (Abdel-Latif 2008, 19). In the protests against the government, the Muslim

Brotherhood sent a message to the public about where they stood on certain key issues such as the Israeli-Palestinian cause or its opposition to the United States' occupancy of Iraq.[68]

With about 25,000 Brotherhood protestors during these demonstrations and women accounting for close to half of those, their presence helped to fill the ranks of the organization, giving them a more important appearance in the streets. It sent a clear message to the population that the Brotherhood was an essential part of the opposition with a strong presence in society. With the population more aware of their presence, their success as well as their position, they would be more likely to join as sympathizers of the organization. It was an important tool to start rallying the population around their cause. It was a way to gain an audience, in the optics that the success of their goals would be maximized with an increasing popular base. Women's presence also helped the Brotherhood to send a message to the government. The membership in the organization was growing and it would become increasingly difficult for the government to be able to repress them.

During this period, female activists were often more active in the streets than men, according to Sameh Eid, a member of the Muslim Brotherhood. Wafaa Hefny, the granddaughter of Hassan al-Banna, echoed this thought by arguing, "women are especially suited for media and campaigning work because of their skill set, and were an important part of the Brotherhood electoral campaigns during the Mubarak era" (Gehad 2013). The advancement of the organization's goal was tied to rallying people to their cause and engaging with the public, as is discussed in the idea of the 'dual games'. It was important for the Brotherhood not to be too confrontational, in order to prevent government repression. Yet at the same time, the organization had to ensure that they were putting a continuous pressure on the government to push for

[68] This is especially important because the Muslim Brotherhood has always been notoriously vague about their policies, the type of political system they desire as well as their stands on certain key issues such as minority rights, women's rights.

changes. Using women to perform this task provided this type of shield because the security forces of the regime would not target them.[69] Female activists were therefore encouraged to participate in different protests because of their numbers, their effectiveness as well as to avoid being targeted by the government.

4.2.2. INCLUSION AS RECRUITERS FOR THE MOVEMENT

Female activists were also used as political recruiters for the Brotherhood because of the unprecedented access they had to the population. Sondos Asem, a Muslim sister, stated, "women do most of the work on the ground, especially in campaigns. They are larger in numbers, and in influence in campaigns, they can be more convincing" (Khalaf 2012). Therefore as soon as the Brothers started to take part in elections, female members became important recruiters for the organization. When the Brotherhood's goals shifted to being elected in office, women once again began being included. It was therefore crucial to increase the numbers of sympathizers and voters of the organization. Their abilities as recruiters were vastly superior to those of men and were therefore used for those tasks by the Brotherhood.

A high turnout of female members in polling station is one of the mechanisms that the Brotherhood used during this third period. Because many Muslim Sisters are, for the large part, veiled,[70] a large number of women "created a common knowledge about the popularity of Islamist candidates in a particular district, and the presence of female activists cut down on the likelihood and effectiveness of government repression" (Tadros 2008, 128).

[69] Starting in the first period, the Brotherhood had made a tacit agreement with the regime, which would help to prevent women from being targeted by the state. Between 1967 and 1970, the government had broken that agreement, as female activists were being too successful for the Brotherhood.

[70] The Muslim Sisters started adopting the veil in the 1950s, using a white veil to signify their piety. Then in the 1970s, with the increasing liberalization, it became a common practice for supporters of Islamist parties to wear them.

On top of displaying the popularity of the Brotherhood and recruiting this way, women in polling stations also protected Brothers from the repression of the state. This represented a new type of inclusion of women that came about following the popularity of the Brotherhood in elections. With the success of the Brothers, the regime would, as mentioned earlier, use certain mechanisms that would undermine the movement's survival. A female voter reported,

> "Female Muslim Brotherhood supporters used their bodies to surround the male Brotherhood voters who were being taken away by the police. In addition, these women would scream and shout at the security services, believing that it was their role to engage in direct confrontation with authorities" (Blaydes & el-Tarouty 2009, 375).

Female activists are used as a type of shield against the repression of the state, in order to ensure that people would be able to vote for the Brotherhood candidates.

This type of women's activism, as recruiters for the Muslim Brotherhood was helpful to the goals of the organization for two reasons. First, this helped Brotherhood candidates to be elected. And second, it also projected an image of the organization as a successful popular movement with large support.

Women clearly played a role that the Brotherhood was unable to perform, which explains why they were used in such a way. Without voters, the organization's candidates cannot be elected, which put in jeopardy its goals. Ensuring that the electorates and the candidates are safe at the polls ensures that the Brotherhood can continue to make electoral gains and therefore maximize their survival. In an interview in 2000, Jihan al-Halafawi,[71] the only female candidate for the 2000 parliamentary elections, stated that "women are very active in the [Muslim Brothers], though perhaps not visible. Remember that women voters are responsible for the success of the seventeen Ikhwan members of Parliament" (El-Ghobashy 2005, 383).

[71] Jihan al-Halafawi became the new informal female leader within the Muslim Sisters, after al-Ghazali's death.

Though she did not elaborate on the exact quantification or characteristics for this estimate of the number of seats, it is clear that female activists play a key role in getting out the vote.

In the 2005 elections, women's activism increased even more in the campaigns, especially in the campaigns of other female candidates. Once again, in the optic of attaining their goals, increasing the support base and the electorate of the Brotherhood was important. The main claim to legitimacy that the Brotherhood was able to make at the time was that the Egyptian population was by large behind them. Furthermore, the movement faced some threats from the government, who felt that they were becoming too successful. In this optic, it was even more important to have the population's support in order to resist the government. Rallies were organized, for example, in Alexandria for Makarim al-Deeiry.

> "The sisters were entrusted with key tasks, including the distribution of voting cards among Brotherhood members and potential voters, and the supervision of electoral lists. This meant they had to go to police stations to collect lists of registered voters in each constituency. They also organized street activities, such as rallies and public speeches. Most importantly, they sought to win over potential voters. Young women activists went door-to-door soliciting votes in constituencies that Brotherhood candidates normally contested, such as Madinet Nasr, Sayyida Zayanab and al-Ramal" (Abdel-Latif 2008, 17).

The Brotherhood, therefore, took advantage of the fact that women, in political activities, were much more efficient than men. Female activists were capable of using their own social network to ask for votes and emphasize the honesty and integrity of the organization (Blaydes & el-Tarouty 2009, 374). Part of the reason why they were so successful is because of the intensive training and the organization that they received by other Brotherhood members. Each woman was given a list of families that target during their recruitments (Blaydes & el-Tarouty 2009, 375). The

efforts of female members were therefore very grassroots oriented. Shorouk al-Shawaf, a 25 year-old Sister stated; "we had a door-knocking campaign. We used to go to people's houses in areas where Muslim Brothers were running to explain the candidate's platform and the group's achievement in previous parliaments" (El-Hennawy 2011). There was therefore a clear desire of the Brotherhood to take advantage of these skills, include female members this time and organize their activities. Once again, the organization saw an opportunity to use female activists to their advantage.

4.2.3. INCLUSION AS CANDIDATES IN ELECTIONS

As a testament to the level of political inclusion women enjoyed during this period, female activists have been able to run in parliamentary elections starting in 2000. However that participation was fairly limited,[72] with at most three women presented as candidates in one election.

Prior to running for parliament, the Muslim Brotherhood also proposed Wafa' Ramadan, a female doctor, as a member of the medical association board in 1992 (El-Ghobashy 2005, 382). However she was not successful. This was a first attempt by the Brotherhood to include women as candidates in order to better represent their interests.

The decision to include female members in parliament was first made in 1994, when the Brotherhood announced, "that women are allowed to hold a variety of positions including that of members of parliament and *shura* and minister provided a number of conditions are met" (Tadros 2012, 149-150). This was a broader call to include women both in the organization and in government more generally. However

[72] Table 3 and 4 on page 85 and 86 provide a comparative view of the female participation for the Muslim Brotherhood and other political parties in the 2000 and 2005 parliamentary elections.

this was not materialized into actions until 2000.[73] The initial proposition was made because two leaders of the Alexandria branch of the Brotherhood, Ibrahim al-Zaafarani and Ali Abdel-Fattah,[74] felt that female representation was the weak point of the Brotherhood and that allowing women to take part in the electoral process would give the public a sense that the movement was progressing (Abdel-Latif 2008, 16). Different feminist groups in Egypt as well as the international community often criticized the organization for the treatment and the role that women had. Therefore including women was clearly a way to change the public opinion about the organization. This would in turn help the Brotherhood achieve their goals. They will be able to tap into a market that had not been their strong point in the past: women voters. The larger their support base is and the more numerous their members of parliaments are, the more legitimacy they have in the eyes of the public. It would be extremely difficult for the government to dismiss or disband the movement without a reaction from the population.

According to Abdel-Latif (2011), the Brotherhood came to terms with the fact that "in election-based political systems where women are allowed to vote, female candidates could help them win votes" (Abdel-Latif 2011, 178). In Egypt, women are estimated to account for 35-37% of the voting population (Abdel-Latif 2011, 174). To increase their voting base, they therefore had to propose female candidates.

Jihan al-Halafawi,[75] who ran in El Raml in Alexandria, was the first and only female Brotherhood candidate in the 2000 elections.[76] She had been amongst the

[73] The second part of the request, to include women in the organizational structure of the Brotherhood, has still not happen to this day. The implication that this has on political inclusion will be further discussed in the last section of this chapter.

[74] Both al-Zaafarani and Abdel-Fattah represented a younger type of ideas within the Brotherhood. Al-Zaafarani eventually became part of the Shura council but both him and Abdel-Fattah left the movement after the revolution, over disagreement on internal leadership. Al-Zaafrani's wife was Jihan al-Halafawi, the only female Brotherhood candidate in 2005.

[75] She is the wife of a prominent Brotherhood leader, Ibrahim el-Za'farany, who resigned from his position in April 2011 in order to form his own party (Tadros 2012, 128).

women in the movement vocal about asking for more official positions for women in the Brotherhood, such as increase representation in the leadership positions. Though she was not able to gain such leadership, she was allowed to run for office, which to her set an important precedent for women (Khalaf 2012). She faced considerable resistance from some of the more conservative factions in Egypt. Her husband and her campaign manager were arrested in the early days of the campaign (Abdel-Latif 2008, 17). However she pursued her candidacy and, according to the initial count, was close to winning when "her victory was simply overturned by an official decree that cancelled the elections in the El Raml constituency, which remained without representation in the assembly for two years" (Abdel-Latif 2008, 17).[77] Al-Halafawi, along with her legal team, battled in courts for two years in order to overturn the decision of the government. In June 2002, the election was re-held but on the day of the election, security forces were blocking roads and al-Halafawi, along with 101 of her supporters were arrested (El-Ghobashy 2005, 373).

Then in 2005, the Brotherhood initially placed between 14 and 21 women on the candidates list. However that list was trimmed down to a single candidate when the Brotherhood cited security concerns for its candidates. Makarem al-Deeri[78] was the only one who ran in Cairo. Her campaign focused mainly on issues relating to women such as children rights and education (Hazou 2005). This was done to attract more female voters, whether they were supporters of the Brotherhood or not. In her district, she received 6,000 votes, which qualified her for the second round (Tadros 2008, 128). Much like al-Halafawi in 2000, she was expected to win the second round

[76] Fielding single candidates at a time is not only typical of the Muslim Brotherhood. Even the most progressive leftist groups did not significantly change the number of candidates (Tadros 2011)

[77] Her dismissal as a candidate by the government was mostly due to the fact that she was a Brotherhood candidate rather than a woman.

[78] She was a 55 year-old professor of Arabic literature at Al-Azhar University. Much like al-Halafawi, her husband was also an important Muslim Brotherhood leader who had been imprisoned during the repression under Nasser.

when the government announced that Mustafa al-Salaab, running for the NDP, had won the seat (Abdel-Latif 2008, 18).

These two experiences show that there were attempts to include female activists in the electoral process. El-Ghobashy (2005) argues that the presentation of women as candidates "reflects the younger generation's signature amalgam of flexible ideology and vote seeking" (El-Ghobashy 2005, 383). The evolution of the movement and its ideology is an argument that has often been brought forward. However the fact that there were very restricted with a minimal number of candidates shows that this is not an ideology issue, especially if these numbers are compared to the rest of the political parties. The Muslim Brotherhood was during the 2000 parliamentary elections, for example, the party with the lowest percentage of female candidates.

Table 3: Female Candidates in the 2000 Parliamentary Elections

	# Of female candidates	# Of total candidates	% Of female candidates
NDP	17	443	3.84
NWP	8	272	2.94
Progressive National Unionist	4	58	6.90
Liberal Party	7	37	18.92
Muslim Brotherhood	1	90	1.11

Source: Thabet (2006)

The 2005 elections presented an overall more difficult situation for women of all parties, with participation lower than it had been in previous years. The Brotherhood still presented the lowest number of female candidates of all parties.

Table 4: Female Candidates in the 2005 Parliamentary Elections

	# of female candidates	# of total candidates	% of female candidates
NDP	6	444	1.35
All legal opposition	7	222	3.15
Muslim Brotherhood	1	150	0.67

Source: Democracy Reporting International (2007)

Without a larger presence of female candidates, especially when compared to the overall participation of women in elections, it cannot be argued that there were real changes in ideology because of generational changes. There was no attempt by the Brotherhood to move to similar numbers of female candidates to the rest of the political parties. This was even further reinforced when looking at the increase of male candidates that the Brotherhood put forward, from 90 to 150. The amount of female candidates, however, did not change. As many argue, allowing women to run does not reflect a genuine change in ideology but rather an election stunt in order to gain more supporters (Abdel-Latif 2008, 16). It sent a message to both the population and the international community that they were willing to compromise and were not as conservative as was believed. This inclusion was therefore more about appealing to the masses and increasing their base. The lack of broader inclusion attests to the fact that there were strategic interests in allowing women to run.

4.2.4. INCLUSION AS ADVOCATES IN CYBER DISSENT

This period also marked the involvement of female members through the Internet. Because of the anonymity, it became a popular means of opposing the state. It was therefore used as a way to expose the repressive conduct of the Mubarak regime (Abdel-Latif 2008, 19). With the Brotherhood being the most active in the opposition, female activists joined the efforts themselves. Most of these blogs focused on the subordinate role that women played within the Brotherhood, the repressive practices of the regimes as well as solidarity with imprisoned members of the organization. It remains difficult to show exactly what the impact of blogging had on the goals of the Brotherhood as well as to show how much the organization was involved in this form of activism. Was this a form of purposeful inclusion of

women by the organization? There is some evidence that shows the Brotherhood's intentions as sponsoring these blogs by female activists.

The first blog created by a Sister appeared in March 2006. Though anonymous, she proclaimed to be a member of the Muslim Brotherhood. The discussions on the blog focused on:

> "Their personal experiences, including their experiences as Muslim Sisters. Some discuss what it means to be a member of the Brotherhood today. Some write about their imprisoned fathers, posting videos of the trials and the pictures of family members" (Abdel-Latif 2008, 20).

Since then, other Muslim Sisters' blogs have appeared. On top of discussing the state's policies, female activists also share stories, post videos and pictures of the trials of some of their family members.

The most popular was *Ana Keda* (translating to 'That's How I am' or 'I am Enough'), which is written by Arwa al-Taweel, 19 year old. Six months following its creation, the blog, which focused on both political and social issues, had already received 50,000 hits (Al-Anani 2012, 102). Her blog eventually evolved to twitter and Facebook. Al-Taweel was even involved in training dozens of other Muslim Sisters to blog (Radsch 2012). By the beginning of the revolution,[79] there were about ten blogs officially authored by mostly young women of the Muslim Sisters (Al-Anani 2012, 102).[80]

The Brotherhood encouraged this type of mobilization and even trained women to be more effective. Abdel-Latif (2008) recounts that there were several meetings between the bloggers and the mid-level leadership of the Brotherhood. Though details of what transpired during these meetings are unknown, it does show

[79] During the revolution, cyber activism included social media, where, though women were underrepresented, they still had a large presence. For more on this, read Radsch (2012)

[80] It is highly possible that more blogs exist, though the authors might not claim themselves to be official members of the Muslim Sisters.

a level of involvement of the Brotherhood leadership in this type of activity. Courses on what the movement called 'the resistant popular media', were also often given (Abdel-Latif 2008, 20), which reinforces the instrumentalization of this inclusion to further the Brotherhood's agenda.

Starting in 2000, and then especially in 2005, the organization faced greater oppression from the government. Their political space was closing rapidly. They were no longer in an optic of survival maximization but simply in a survival of the organization. The Brotherhood's goal-maximization tactics had therefore to involve a sense of quiet revolution and remain relatively anonymous. Therefore these specific activities were especially pertinent for the Brotherhood because it is next to impossible for the government to retaliate. Cyber dissent provides a space without filters and controls (Abdel-Latif 2011, 191). Blogs by female members allowed the Brotherhood to quietly mobilize against the state, while participating in more formal institutions such as elections. The risks they were taking were largely minimized.

4.2.5. INCLUSION? YES BUT …

Though female activists have been included in a variety of different activities of the Muslim Brotherhood, there were still restrictions in what women were allowed to do within the organization. Positions of leadership for women seemed especially problematic for the organization because, as mentioned in chapter 2, the biological differences between men and women make it impossible for women to hold the same positions as men, according to the Brotherhood.[81] Ideologically speaking, the organization believes in the complementarity of men and women, rather than equality. There were, within the Brotherhood, members who differed from this general idea, especially as outlined by the demands made to propose female

[81] Women are not fit for leadership position because as women cannot wage wars or ensure that their emotions do not cloud their judgment (Talhami 2001, 65).

candidacy by Ibrahim al-Zaafarani and Ali Abdel-Fattah. These internal divisions had little impact on the Brotherhood's policies at the time though. The main leadership of the organization still maintained the differences between men and women.

Female activists are still kept outside of the decision-making structure of the Brotherhood. They could not be a part of the *Shura* council, the legislative body and the Guidance Bureau, the executive body of the Brotherhood (El-Hennawy 2011). Even the leadership of the Muslim Sisters is kept away from female members as it falls under the supervision of the Guidance Bureau according to article 56 of the internal statute of the Brotherhood, issued in 1951 (Abdel-Latif 2011, 183). In an interview with given to Abdel-Latif, a Muslim Sister stated:

> "We work now in different places and it is very awkward that I meet my male comrade [in the Muslim Brotherhood] in the hospital or at the university and we site and discuss issues, but we are not allowed to mingle during Brotherhood meetings because of the heritage of the past" (Abdel-Latif 2011, 183).

The role that Muslim Sisters played was mostly restricted to certain committees, especially focused on education and healthcare.

In a 2004 initiative, the Brotherhood stated that a woman could run for office but could not hold a position as a head of state (Antar 2006). Then in 2007, in the draft political platform, the Brotherhood reaffirmed what many suspected; women and non-Muslims cannot be president (Brown & Hamzawy 2008, 5). The General Guide stated, "experts in Islamic jurisprudence say that the Islamic state cannot have anyone at its head except a Muslim. It cannot have a woman at its head. This is a legal interpretation" (Brown & Hamzawy 2008, 17).

The restrictions on what women can do show that this inclusion could not be a product of an ideological change within the Brotherhood. If there was an ideological change towards a belief that women are equal to men, the roles that women were allowed to play would not be restricted based on biological differences.

The fact that this exclusion mostly referred to female activists in positions of power also reinforces the continuity of the organization's ideology.[82] Rather than a wide exclusion, during this period of overall inclusion, the lack of female representation only occurred in specific positions, mostly situations of leadership because they were believed to be unfit to rule. Therefore the inclusion of female activists was not about reform but rather, as Tadros argues, a reframing of the discourse in order to draw from popular arguments and issues at the time (Tadros 2011).

[82] The discussion on the Brotherhood's ideology can be seen in chapter 2, where the emphasis is placed on the separation but complementarity of women in their role both inside and outside of the home.

CONCLUSION

The main objective of this research was to develop a better understanding of the cause(s) of the shifts in the inclusion and exclusion of female activists in the Muslim Brotherhood and their reasons. Indeed contrary to much research that focuses on the policies of religious movements, my research focuses on the fact that positions of the organization are not static.[83] In order to do this, I have retraced three different periods in Egyptian history, which show different levels of inclusion of women within the Muslim Brotherhood. This historical overview of the evolution of the Muslim Sisters helped me outline different threats to the survival that the organization faced and changing goals, as well as the effect that this had on the role of female activists.

In chapter two, I have analyzed the role of women between 1952 and 1967 in Egypt. This period was punctuated by a sharp repression of the Muslim Brotherhood when the government placed many members in jail and destroyed their headquarters. With the majority of the organization's leadership in jail, women, led by Zainab el-Ghazali, were active in reaching out to members and organizing the movement in a way that best maximized the movement's interests at the time. The ideology of the organization was placed aside during this period in order to ensure that it could survive past the repression of the government. The rational concern of surviving overtook ideological concerns.

[83] This study has really attempted to focus on the changes and nuances within the treatment of the Muslim Sisters in order to show that it is not a static religious movement but rather answers to different changes in the system and the context.

Chapter three analyzes the period between 1970 and 1984, where, without a direct threat to survival, the Muslim Brotherhood returned to its original ideology. The assassination of Nasser and the liberalization of Egypt under Sadat put the organization in a logic of rebuilding and rebranding, rather than survival maximization. This optic left little space and created even less needs for female activists to get organized and be included. As dictated in their core ideology, the role of female members was therefore strictly focused on charity, education and other tasks they undertook prior to 1952.

The final empirical chapter, chapter four, focuses on the era during which the Brotherhood enjoyed a considerable larger freedom. This has in turn led to a shift in the strategy of the organization who was then more preoccupied with survival in an electoral context rather than organizationally. 1984 marked the first time the Brotherhood entered elections and with that comes a new set of challenges. Female activists were extremely active during this period to ensure that the electorate and support of the Brotherhood increased. This included participation in street protests, recruitment of new members and participation in election campaigns.

These different moments of inclusion for female members throughout the history of the Muslim Brotherhood has had very little impact on the long-term role of women. Indeed, the constant shift from inclusion to exclusion that has occurred shows that this is not part of a static ideology.

LIMITATIONS

The most important limitation of the study presented above is the lack of first hand data from members of the Muslim Brothers and Muslim Sisters in French or English. This was partly remedied through interviews conducted by other researchers that I have used and memoirs of members of the organization. However this could have any number of impacts on my research. Without access to members

of the organization, the perception of threat to the survival of the organization was difficult to assess. What was deemed, in this research, as a threat to the survival of the movement might not have been interpreted as such internally.

Secondly, the threats to the survival of the Muslim Brotherhood have also meant that the organization spent a large part of its history partly underground. Therefore the data on the practices, beliefs and memberships of the organization is limited. Indeed, there is to this day still no official data on how large the Brotherhood actually is.[84] This could have been an indicator to show the level of threat that the organization was facing at the time. There was also little information given on what women's roles were during the period of exclusion.

Finally I address in the presentation of my argument, the inclusion of women as a tactical survival mechanism by the Muslim Brotherhood. The choice of this specific mechanism does not mean that this was the only tactic that the organization used or that its success was strictly attributed to the work that female activists did during these periods of survival. It is important to note that this is only one of the different tactics that can be used by the organization in order to increase its chance of survival. [85] The organization had also, for example, put in place several organizational mechanisms that would ensure its survival.[86]

MOVING PAST 2011

The 2011 revolution was probably one of the most important tests to the survival of the Muslim Brotherhood. If the argument presented above holds, then female members should be included in the different facets of the fight against the

[84] The vagueness over the actual membership of the Muslim Brotherhood is further emphasized by their actual membership system. The organization has several levels of memberships from sympathizers to full members. This has further made it difficult to assess how many people are actually part of the organization. Estimates have ranged from 500,000 to 2 million members.
[85] I argued that this specific tactic was used because of its practicality and level of success.
[86] In chapter 2, I mentioned that the Brotherhood used a secret change in the chain of command in case one of the headquarters was to fall. This order is only known to the top leadership of each chapter in order to keep the movement alive.

government. The revolution brought real confrontation between the Muslim Brotherhood, along with many other factions, and the government forces.[87] A study by Farag (2012) outlines the different roles that women undertook during that time such as placing themselves at checkpoint entrances into Tahrir Square or carrying weapons under their long and conservative dresses.[88] Once again, the Muslims Sisters have not seen the same level of repression from the state. Fick (2013) states, "with their structure intact, they are able to play a more central role in mobilizing for the current protests" (Fick 2013). Without going in-depth in the role that women played, it is clear that they were important to the Brotherhood's resistance to government oppression during this period.[89]

The post-2011 period has opened brand new possibilities for both female activists and the Muslim Brotherhood. With the organization now no longer part of the opposition, but rather at the head of the government, its survival was not at risk. However, surprisingly, this has not meant that women were completely excluded from the activities of the organization. Then finally came the removal of Morsi[90] from office on July 3rd 2013 by the army. These actions were rejected by Morsi as well as many members of the Muslim Brotherhood, who felt that this was a 'complete military coup' (Kirkpatrick 2013). This once again created a situation where survival was compromised. Female members of the Muslim Sisters played a highly active role in the protests against what they called a coup.

However the coup d'état in July 2013, led by the Egyptian army chief General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, changed this possibility. Today the Muslim Brotherhood is

[87] The Brotherhood took advantage of the ongoing protest and the rise of the population against the regime to increase their legitimacy.
[88] For a deeper analysis of the role that women played during the revolution, see Farag (2012), Magdy (2011), Fick (2013)
[89] The resistance of the Brotherhood against the regime did not start as the protests started in Tahrir Square. The organization was actually slow in joining the movement, preferring to stand on the sidelines in order not to face too much repression.
[90] Morsi, a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, had been the first democratically elected president in the history of Egypt on June 24th 2012.

considered a terrorist organization in Egypt since December of 2013 and then its political wing was formally banned in August 2014 (BBC News, 9 August 2014). The summer months of 2013 were some of the most violent that Egypt has seen. Protests and sit-ins were organized on a weekly basis, which was always answered by a large police and army presence. Human Rights Watch estimates that over 1,150 Brotherhood members, both men and women, were killed in five separate incidents during this period. What is now known as the Rab'a massacre was the most violent of this incident, with between 800 and 1000 deaths (HRW report, August 2014). With arrests of Brotherhood members multiplying and the death toll rising, the organization faces today a more important repression and threat than they have seen in it history.

In this new context of repression, the Brotherhood's main goal and objective is to stay afloat, similarly to the first period analyzed. It must therefore choose appropriate strategies in order to maximize its survival. The first and third period studied outline the ways in which the Brotherhood felt that the inclusion of women was the most successful strategy for it at the time. We should therefore expect the organization to keep or perhaps increase the inclusion of women in order to counter the efforts of the government. However, similarly to the end of the first period, if the repression of the state targets women as well, the inclusion of women might not suffice to help the Brotherhood overcome this period. Both men and women could be forced underground. It will therefore not be rational to include female activists. In this case, new strategies, which are more effective, need to be developed by the Brotherhood in order to achieve their goals.

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ANNEXES

ANNEX 1:

27 MAY 1984 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

Political Group	Votes Obtained (%)	Number of Seats
National Democratic Group (NDP)	72.9	391
New *Wafd* Party (NWP)	15.1	58
Socialist Labor Party	7.1	4
National Progressive Unionist Party	4.2	-
Liberal Socialist Party	0.7	-
Copts	-	4

6 AND 13 APRIL 1987 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

Political Group	Votes Obtained (%)	Number of Seats
National Democratic Party (NDP)	69	359
Alliance *	17.5	57
New *Wafd* Party (NWP)	10	34
Independents	-	8

* Comprising the Socialist Labor Party, the Socialist Liberal Party and the Muslim Brotherhood

18 OCTOBER AND 8 NOVEMBER 2000 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

Political Group	Number of Seats
National Democratic Group (NDP)	353
New *Wafd* Party (NWP)	7
Coalition Party	6
Nasserite Party	3
Independents *	72
Others	1

* In the 37 independent candidates, members of the Muslim Brotherhood won 17.

9 NOVEMBER AND 7 DECEMBER 2005 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

Political Group	Number of Seats
National Democratic Group (NDP)	320
National Front for Change (NFC) *	96
Independents	26

* Within the NFC seats, 88 of them went to the Muslim Brotherhood, 6 went to the NWP and 2 went to the National Progressive Unionist Grouping

ANNEX 2:

10-POINT CONSENSUS

Proposed in 1991 by the Brotherhood along with all other opposition parties

1. Commitment to the human rights and public liberties mentioned in *shari'a* and international law;
2. An end to the state of emergency and martial law;
3. A lifting of restrictions on the formation of political parties;
4. The independent supervision of elections by the judiciary;
5. The adoption of the parliamentary system in which the executive power will be vested in the cabinet, which is selected from the party with the majority;
6. Guarantee of the right of the People's Assembly to amend the budget; granting the *Shura* Council [i.e. the Upper House] powers of oversight and legislation;
7. Choice of the president through direct election from a list of several candidates, with a limit of two terms;
8. The compatibility of all legislation passed with *shari'a*, with emphasis on the rights of non-Muslims to follow their own religious law in case of contradiction;
9. The independence of the judiciary;
10. Freedom of the press and media from government control and equal opportunities for all political parties in the official media