Show item record

dc.contributor.authorEhlers, Lars
dc.contributor.authorKlaus, Bettina
dc.date.accessioned2013-01-09T19:58:32Z
dc.date.available2013-01-09T19:58:32Z
dc.date.issued2012-09
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1866/8858
dc.publisherUniversité de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques.fr
dc.subjectDeferred-acceptance mechanismen
dc.subjectIndivisible objects allocationen
dc.subjectMultiple tie-breakingen
dc.subjectSchool choiceen
dc.subjectStrategy-proofnessen
dc.titleStrategy-proofness makes the difference: deferred-acceptance with responsive prioritiesen
dc.typeArticleen
dcterms.abstractIn college admissions and student placements at public schools, the admission decision can be thought of as assigning indivisible objects with capacity constraints to a set of students such that each student receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not allowed. In these important market design problems, the agent-proposing deferred-acceptance (DA-)mechanism with responsive strict priorities performs well and economists have successfully implemented DA-mechanisms or slight variants thereof. We show that almost all real-life mechanisms used in such environments - including the large classes of priority mechanisms and linear programming mechanisms - satisfy a set of simple and intuitive properties. Once we add strategy-proofness to these properties, DA-mechanisms are the only ones surviving. In market design problems that are based on weak priorities (like school choice), generally multiple tie-breaking (MTB)procedures are used and then a mechanism is implemented with the obtained strict priorities. By adding stability with respect to the weak priorities, we establish the first normative foundation for MTB-DA-mechanisms that are used in NYC.en
dcterms.bibliographicCitationCahier de recherche ; #2012-12
dcterms.isPartOfurn:ISSN:0709-9231
dcterms.languageengen
UdeM.VersionRioxxVersion publiée / Version of Record


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show item record