«Constrained-optimal strategy-proof assignment: beyond the groves mechanisms»
| dc.contributor.author | Sprumont, Yves | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2012-02-02T15:04:17Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2012-02-02T15:04:17Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2011-12 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1866/6204 | |
| dc.publisher | Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques. | fr |
| dc.title | «Constrained-optimal strategy-proof assignment: beyond the groves mechanisms» | en |
| dc.type | Article | |
| dc.contributor.affiliation | Université de Montréal. Faculté des arts et des sciences. Département de sciences économiques | |
| dcterms.abstract | A single object must be allocated to at most one of n agents. Money transfers are possible and preferences are quasilinear. We offer an explicit description of the individually rational mechanisms which are Pareto-optimal in the class of feasible, strategy-proof, anonymous and envy-free mechanisms. These mechanisms form a one-parameter infinite family; the Vickrey mechanism is the only Groves mechanism in that family. | en |
| dcterms.isPartOf | urn:ISSN:0709-9231 | |
| UdeM.VersionRioxx | Version publiée / Version of Record | |
| oaire.citationTitle | Cahier de recherche | |
| oaire.citationIssue | 2011-09 |
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