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Continuity and Incentive Compatibility in Cardinal Voting Mechanisms
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2016-03)
We show that every cardinal incentive compatible voting mechanism satisfying a continuity condition, must be ordinal. Our results apply to many standard models in mechanism design without transfers, including the standard ...
(Il)legal Assignments in School Choice
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2017-05)
In public school choice, students with strict preferences are assigned to schools.
Schools are endowed with priorities over students. Incorporating different constraints
from applications, priorities are often modeled ...
Strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores revisited
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2014-04)
We consider general allocation problems with indivisibilities where agents' preferences possibly exhibit externalities. In such contexts many different core notions were proposed. One is the gamma-core whereby blocking is ...
An algorithm for identifying agent-k-linked allocations in economies with indivisibilities
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2013-11)
We consider envy-free (and budget-balanced) rules that are least manipulable with respect to agents counting or with respect to utility gains. Recently it has been shown that for any profile of quasi-linear preferences, ...
Respecting improvement in markets with indivisible goods
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques, 2023-09-17)
We study markets with indivisible goods where monetary compensations are fixed (or are
not possible). Each individual is endowed with an object and a preference relation over all objects. Respect for improvement means ...
Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: strategy-proofness and comparative statics
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2014-12)
We study the problem of assigning indivisible and heterogenous objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offices, school or university admissions etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are ...
Strategy-proof tie-breaking
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2011)
We study a general class of priority-based allocation problems with weak priority orders
and identify conditions under which there exists a strategy-proof mechanism which always chooses an agent-optimal stable, or constrained ...
«School choice with controlled choice constraints: hard bounds versus soft bounds»
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2011-11)
Controlled choice over public schools attempts giving options to parents while maintaining diversity, often enforced by setting feasibility constraints with hard upper and lower bounds for each student type. We demonstrate ...
Externalities and the nucleolus
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2017-09)
In most economic applications, externalities prevail: the worth of a coalition depends on how the other players are organized. We show that there is a unique natural way of extending the nucleolus from (coalitional) games ...
Respecting Priorities when Assigning Students to Schools
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2006)
We consider the problem of assigning students to schools on the basis of priorities. Students are allowed to have equal priority at a school. We characterize the efficient rules which weakly/strongly respect students’ ...