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Now showing items 11-20 of 20
Candidate Stability and Nonbinary Social Choice
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2001)
A desirable property of a voting procedure is that it be immune to the strategic withdrawal of a candidate for election. Dutta, Jackson, and Le Breton (Econometrica, 2001) have established a number of theorems that demonstrate ...
On Fixed-Path Rationing Methods
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2001)
Moulin (1999) characterizes the fixed-path rationing methods by efficiency, strategy-proofness, consistency, and resource-monotonicity. In this note, we give a straightforward proof of his result.
Multiple Public Goods and Lexicographic Preferences Replacement Principle
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2001)
We study the problem of locating two public goods for a group of agents with single-peaked preferences over an interval. An alternative specifies a location for each public good. In Miyagawa (1998), each agent consumes ...
Probabilistic Assignments of Identical Indivisible Objects and Uniform Probabilistic Rules
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2001)
We consider a probabilistic approach to the problem of assigning k indivisible identical objects to a set of agents with single-peaked preferences. Using the ordinal extension of preferences, we characterize the class of ...
Arrow's Theorem in Spatial Environments
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2002)
In spatial environments, we consider social welfare functions satisfying Arrow's requirements. i.e., weak Pareto and independence of irrelevant alternatives. When the policy space os a one-dimensional continuum, such a ...
Top-Cycle Rationalizability
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2005)
We identify necessary and sufficient conditions for the choice set from every subset A of a (finite) universal set X to coincide with the top cycle in A of some fixed tournament on X.
Consistent House Allocation
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2005)
In practice we often face the problem of assigning indivisible objects (e.g., schools, housing, jobs, offices) to agents (e.g., students, homeless, workers, professors) when monetary compensations are not possible. We show ...
Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Sets in Matching Problems
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2005)
The following properties of the core of a one well-known: (i) the core is non-empty; (ii) the core is a lattice; and (iii) the set of unmatched agents is identical for any two matchings belonging to the core. The literature ...
Resource-Monotonicity for House Allocation Problems
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2003)
We study a simple model of assigning indivisible objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offices, etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We completely describe all rules ...
Efficient Priority Rules
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2003)
We study the assignment of indivisible objects with quotas (houses, jobs, or offices) to a set of agents (students, job applicants, or professors). Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not ...