Recherche
Voici les éléments 1-10 de 11
Belief-weighted Nash aggregation of Savage preferences
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2018-09)
The 'belief-weighted Nash social welfare functions' are methods for aggregating Savage preferences defined over a set of acts. Each such method works as follows. Fix a 0-normalized subjective expected utility representation ...
Strategy-proof preference aggregation
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2012-08)
An aggregation rule maps each profile of individual strict preference orderings
over a set of alternatives into a social ordering over that set. We call such a rule strategyproof if misreporting one’s preference never ...
Strategyproof Choice of Acts : Beyond Dictatorship
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2017-05)
We model social choices as acts mapping states of nature to (public) outcomes. A social choice function (or SCF) assigns an act to every profile of subjective expected utility preferences over acts. A SCF is strategyproof ...
Relative Nash welfarism
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2017-09)
Relative Nash welfarism is a solution to the problem of aggregating von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences over a set of lotteries. It ranks such lotteries according to the product of any collection of 0-normalized von ...
Strategy-proof choice of acts : a preliminary study
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2016-06)
We model social choices as acts mapping states of the world to (social) outcomes. A (social choice) rule assigns an act to every profile of subjective expected utility preferences over acts. A rule is strategy-proof if no ...
Ordinally consistent tournament solutions
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2016-03)
A set ranking method assigns to each tournament on a given set an ordering of the subsets of that set. Such a method is consistent if (i) the items in the set are ranked in the same order as the sets of items they beat and ...
Welfare criteria from choice: the sequential solution
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2015-01)
We study the problem of deriving a complete welfare ordering from a choice function. Under the sequential solution, the best alternative is the alternative chosen from the universal set; the second best is the one chosen ...
Ranking by rating
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2016-02)
Each item in a given collection is characterized by a set of possible performances. A (ranking) method is a function that assigns an ordering of the items to every performance profile. Ranking by Rating consists in evaluating ...
«Constrained-optimal strategy-proof assignment: beyond the groves mechanisms»
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2011-12)
A single object must be allocated to at most one of n agents. Money transfers are possible and preferences are quasilinear. We offer an explicit description of the individually rational mechanisms which are Pareto-optimal ...
Size invariant measures of association: characterization and difficulties
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2014-08)
A measure of association is row-size invariant if it is unaffected by the multiplication of all entries in a row of a cross-classification table by a same positive number. It is class-size invariant if it is unaffected by ...