Now showing items 1-20 of 41

  • An algorithm for identifying agent-k-linked allocations in economies with indivisibilities 

    Andersson, Tommy; Ehlers, Lars (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2013-11)
    We consider envy-free (and budget-balanced) rules that are least manipulable with respect to agents counting or with respect to utility gains. Recently it has been shown that for any profile of quasi-linear preferences, the outcome of any such least ...
  • Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance under Responsive Priorities 

    Ehlers, Lars; Klaus, Bettina (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2009-12)
    In many economic environments - such as college admissions, student placements at public schools, and university housing allocation - indivisible objects with capacity constraints are assigned to a set of agents when each agent receives at most one ...
  • Arrow's Theorem in Spatial Environments 

    Ehlers, Lars; Storcken, Ton (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2002)
    In spatial environments, we consider social welfare functions satisfying Arrow's requirements. i.e., weak Pareto and independence of irrelevant alternatives. When the policy space os a one-dimensional continuum, such a welfare function is determined ...
  • Assigning Refugees to Landlords in Sweden: Stable Maximum Matchings 

    Andersson, Tommy; Ehlers, Lars (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2016-12)
    The member states of the European Union received 1.2 million first time asylum applications in 2015 (a doubling compared to 2014). Even if asylum will be granted for many of the refugees that made the journey to Europe, several obstacles for successful ...
  • Budget-Balance, Fairness and Minimal Manipulability 

    Andersson, Tommy; Ehlers, Lars; Svensson, Lars-Gunnar (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2010-10-20)
    A common real-life problem is to fairly allocate a number of indivisible objects and a fixed amount of money among a group of agents. Fairness requires that each agent weakly prefers his consumption bundle to any other agent’s bundle. Under fairness, ...
  • Candidate Stability and Nonbinary Social Choice 

    Ehlers, Lars; Weymark, John A. (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2001)
    A desirable property of a voting procedure is that it be immune to the strategic withdrawal of a candidate for election. Dutta, Jackson, and Le Breton (Econometrica, 2001) have established a number of theorems that demonstrate that this condition is ...
  • Choosing Wisely: The Natural Multi-Bidding Mechanism 

    Ehlers, Lars (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2005)
    Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2002) propose a multi-bidding mechanism to determine a winner from a set of possible projects. The winning project is implemented and its surplus is shared among the agents. In the multi-bidding mechanism each agent ...
  • Consistent House Allocation 

    Ehlers, Lars; Klaus, Bettina (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2005)
    In practice we often face the problem of assigning indivisible objects (e.g., schools, housing, jobs, offices) to agents (e.g., students, homeless, workers, professors) when monetary compensations are not possible. We show that a rule that satisfies ...
  • Continuity and Incentive Compatibility in Cardinal Voting Mechanisms 

    Ehlers, Lars; Majumdar, Dipjyoti; Mishra, Debasis; Sen, Arunava (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2016-03)
    We show that every cardinal incentive compatible voting mechanism satisfying a continuity condition, must be ordinal. Our results apply to many standard models in mechanism design without transfers, including the standard voting models with any domain ...
  • Dynamic refugee matching 

    Andersson, Tommy; Ehlers, Lars; Martinello, Alessandro (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2018-10)
    Asylum seekers are often assigned to localities upon arrival using uninformed matching systems, which lead to inefficient and unfair allocations. This paper proposes an informed dynamic mechanism as an intuitive and easy-to-implement alternative. Our ...
  • Efficient Priority Rules 

    Ehlers, Lars; Klaus, Bettina (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2003)
    We study the assignment of indivisible objects with quotas (houses, jobs, or offices) to a set of agents (students, job applicants, or professors). Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We characterize ...
  • Externalities and the nucleolus 

    Alvarez-Mozos, Mikel; Ehlers, Lars (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2017-09)
    In most economic applications, externalities prevail: the worth of a coalition depends on how the other players are organized. We show that there is a unique natural way of extending the nucleolus from (coalitional) games without externalities to games ...
  • Externalities, Potential, Value and Consistency 

    Dutta, Bhaskar; Ehlers, Lars; KAR, Anirban (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2008-04)
    We provide new characterization results for the value of games in partition function form. In particular, we use the potential of a game to define the value. We also provide a characterization of the class of values which satisfies one form of reduced ...
  • Free Triples, Large Indifference Classes and the Majority Rule 

    Ehlers, Lars; Barberà, Salvador (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2007-03)
  • Gale's fixed tax for exchanging houses 

    Andersson, Tommy; Ehlers, Lars; Svensson, Lars-Gunnar; Tierney, Ryan (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2018-06)
    We consider the taxation of exchanges among a set of agents where each agent owns one object. Agents may have different valuations for the objects and they need to pay taxes for exchanges. Using basic properties, we show that if pairwise (or some) ...
  • House allocation via deferred-acceptance 

    Ehlers, Lars; Klaus, Bettina (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2013-07)
    We study the simple model of assigning indivisible and heterogenous objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offi ces, etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. For this model, known as the house allocation ...
  • (Il)legal Assignments in School Choice 

    Ehlers, Lars; Morrill, Thayer (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2017-05)
    In public school choice, students with strict preferences are assigned to schools. Schools are endowed with priorities over students. Incorporating different constraints from applications, priorities are often modeled as choice functions over sets ...
  • In Search of Advice for Physicians in Entry-Level Medical Markets 

    Ehlers, Lars (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2003)
    We consider entry-level medical markets for physicians in the United Kingdom. These markets experienced failures which led to the adoption of centralized market mechanisms in the 1960's. However, different regions introduced different centralized ...
  • Manipulation via Capacities Revisited 

    Ehlers, Lars (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2009-03)
    This paper revisits manipulation via capacities in centralized two-sided matching markets. Sönmez (1997) showed that no stable mechanism is nonmanipulable via capacities. We show that non-manipulability via capacities can be equivalently described by ...
  • Matching Markets under (In)complete Information 

    Ehlers, Lars; MASSÓ, Jordi (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2007-02-01)
    We are the first to introduce incomplete information to centralized many-to-one matching markets such as those to entry-level labor markets or college admissions. This is important because in real life markets (i) any agent is uncertain about the other ...