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dc.contributor.authorAndersson, Tommy
dc.contributor.authorEhlers, Lars
dc.contributor.authorMartinello, Alessandro
dc.date.accessioned2018-12-05T18:59:17Z
dc.date.available2018-12-05T18:59:17Z
dc.date.issued2018-10
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1866/21097
dc.publisherUniversité de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques.fr
dc.subjectForced migrationfr
dc.subjectMarket designfr
dc.subjectRefugee matchingfr
dc.subjectDynamicsfr
dc.subjectEnvyfr
dc.subjectEfficiencyfr
dc.titleDynamic refugee matchingfr
dc.typeArticlefr
dcterms.abstractAsylum seekers are often assigned to localities upon arrival using uninformed matching systems, which lead to inefficient and unfair allocations. This paper proposes an informed dynamic mechanism as an intuitive and easy-to-implement alternative. Our mechanism can be adopted in any dynamic refugee matching problem given locality-specific quotas and that asylum seekers map into specific categories. Any matching selected by the proposed mechanism is Pareto efficient, and envy between localities is bounded by a single asylum seeker. Our simulations show that the proposed mechanism outperforms uninformed mechanisms even in presence of severe misclassification error in the estimation of asylum seeker categories.fr
dcterms.isPartOfurn:ISSN:0709-9231
dcterms.languageengfr
UdeM.VersionRioxxVersion publiée / Version of Recordfr


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