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dc.contributor.authorAl, Chunrong
dc.contributor.authorArcand, Jean-Louis
dc.contributor.authorEthier, François
dc.date.accessioned2008-01-24T14:28:16Z
dc.date.available2008-01-24T14:28:16Z
dc.date.issued1996
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1866/2086
dc.format.extent1492645 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.publisherUniversité de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques.fr
dc.subject[JEL:D80] Microeconomics - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - Generalen
dc.subject[JEL:Q10] Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - Agriculture - Generalen
dc.subject[JEL:D80] Microéconomie - Information et incertain - Généralitésfr
dc.subject[JEL:Q10] Agriculture et économie des ressources naturelles - Agriculture - Généralitésfr
dc.titleMoral Hazard and Marshallian Inefficiency: Evidence from Tunisia
dc.typeArticle
dc.contributor.affiliationUniversité de Montréal. Faculté des arts et des sciences. Département de sciences économiques
dcterms.abstractIn the presence of moral hazard, received agency theory predicts the Marshallian inefficiency of agricultural tenancy contracts, meaning that inputs per hectare on sharecropped land will differ from that on owned land. in this paper, we test for the presence of Marshallian inefficiency using a unique data set collected in the Tunisian village of El Oulja in 1993.
dcterms.isPartOfurn:ISSN:0709-9231
UdeM.VersionRioxxVersion publiée / Version of Record
oaire.citationTitleCahier de recherche
oaire.citationIssue9605


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