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dc.contributor.authorSprumont, Yves
dc.date.accessioned2017-12-14T16:24:49Z
dc.date.available2017-12-14T16:24:49Z
dc.date.issued2017-09
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1866/19683
dc.publisherUniversité de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques.fr
dc.subjectPreference aggregationfr
dc.subjectLotteriesfr
dc.subjectRelative utilitarianismfr
dc.subjectNash productfr
dc.titleRelative Nash welfarismfr
dc.typeArticlefr
dc.contributor.affiliationUniversité de Montréal. Faculté des arts et des sciences. Département de sciences économiques
dcterms.abstractRelative Nash welfarism is a solution to the problem of aggregating von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences over a set of lotteries. It ranks such lotteries according to the product of any collection of 0-normalized von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities they generate. We show that this criterion is characterized by the Weak Pareto Principle, Anonymity, and Independence of Harmless Expansions: the social ranking of two lotteries is unaffected by the addition of any alternative that every agent deems at least as good as the one she originally found worst. Relative Nash welfarism is more appealing than relative utilitarianism in contexts where the best relevant alternative for an agent is difficult to identify with confidence.fr
dcterms.isPartOfurn:ISSN:0709-9231
dcterms.languageengfr
UdeM.VersionRioxxVersion publiée / Version of Record
oaire.citationTitleCahier de recherche
oaire.citationIssue2017-03


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