Now showing items 1-20 of 541

  • The hard problem of prediction for conflict prevention 

    Mueller, Hannes; Rauh, Christopher (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2019-04)
    There is a rising interest in conflict prevention and this interest provides a strong motivation for better conflict forecasting. A key problem of conflict forecasting for prevention is that predicting the start of conflict in previously peaceful ...
  • Games with unobservable heterogeneity and multiple equilibria: an application to mobile telecommunications 

    Marcoux, Mathieu (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2019-02)
    To shed light on the limited success of competition enhancing policies in mobile telecommunications, I estimate a game of transceivers’ locations between national incumbents and a new entrant in Canada. I recover player-specific unobserved heterogeneity ...
  • Sharp test for equilibrium uniqueness in discrete games with a flexible information structure 

    Marcoux, Mathieu (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2018-12)
    I propose a test for an assumption commonly maintained when estimating static discrete games of incomplete information, i.e. the assumption of equilibrium uniqueness in the data generating process. The test is appealing for several reasons. It allows ...
  • Random consideration and choice: A case study of «default» options 

    Horan, Sean (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2018-11)
    A growing number of stochastic choice models include a “default” option for situations where the decision maker selects none of the feasible alternatives. While this is a welcome development, these models also present an empirical challenge - since the ...
  • Threshold Luce rules 

    Horan, Sean (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2018-11)
    In the late 1950’s, Luce proposed two different theories of imperfect utility discrimination that have had a lasting impact on economics. One model (1956) gave rise to the literature on just noticeable differences while the other (1959) laid the ...
  • Dynamic refugee matching 

    Andersson, Tommy; Ehlers, Lars; Martinello, Alessandro (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2018-10)
    Asylum seekers are often assigned to localities upon arrival using uninformed matching systems, which lead to inefficient and unfair allocations. This paper proposes an informed dynamic mechanism as an intuitive and easy-to-implement alternative. Our ...
  • Belief-weighted Nash aggregation of Savage preferences 

    Sprumont, Yves (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2018-09)
    The 'belief-weighted Nash social welfare functions' are methods for aggregating Savage preferences defined over a set of acts. Each such method works as follows. Fix a 0-normalized subjective expected utility representation of every possible preference ...
  • The impact of uncertainty in agriculture 

    Godefroy, Raphaël; Lewis, Joshua (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2018-08)
    Income uncertainty in the rural economy is widely considered an important impediment to growth in poor countries. This paper uses a rich dataset on productivity, land use, and output for 17 different crops across 500,000 plots of land in 87 countries ...
  • Strategic investment and learning with private information 

    Klein, Nicolas; Wagner, Peter (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2018-08)
    We study a two-player game of strategic experimentation in which agents choose the timing of investments which yield uncertain returns over time. Agents learn about future returns through privately observed signals, others’ investment decisions and ...
  • The birth of the congressional clinic 

    Godefroy, Raphaël (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2018-08)
    This paper studies the impact of mortality in the districts/states represented in key congressional groups (i.e. committees, subcommittees, and parties) on the National Institutes of Health (NIH) allocation of medical research funds across diseases, ...
  • Bandits in the Lab 

    Hoelzemann, Johannes; Klein, Nicolas (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2018-08)
    We test Keller, Rady, Cripps’ (2005) game of strategic experimentation with exponential bandits in the laboratory. We find strong support for the prediction of free-riding because of strategic concerns. We also find strong evidence for behavior that ...
  • Precision may harm: The comparative statics of imprecise judgement 

    Horan, Sean; Manzini, Paola (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2018-08)
    We consider an agent whose information about the objects of choice is imperfect in two respects: first, their values are perceived with ‘error’; and, second, the realised values cannot be discriminated with absolute ‘precision’. Reasons for imprecise ...
  • Innovation growth clusters : Lessons from the industrial revolution 

    Dudley, Leonard; Rauh, Christopher (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2018-08)
    Over three centuries ago, a new technology suddenly increased the amount and frequency of available information. Might such «Big Data» have disrupted the causal relationships linking economic growth and innovation? Previous research has affirmed that ...
  • Bootstrapping factor models with cross sectional dependence 

    Gonçalves, Sílvia; Perron, Benoit (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2018-07)
    We consider bootstrap methods for factor-augmented regressions with cross sectional dependence among idiosyncratic errors. This is important to capture the bias of the OLS estimator derived recently by Gonçalves and Perron (2014). We first show that a ...
  • Organizing time banks: Lessons from matching markets 

    Andersson, Tommy; Cseh, Agnes; Ehlers, Lars; Erlanson, Albin (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2018-07)
    A time bank is a group of people that set up a common platform to trade services among themselves. There are several well-known problems associated with this type of time banking, e.g., high overhead costs and difficulties to identify feasible trades. ...
  • Monetary policy in sudden stop-prone economies 

    Coulibaly, Louphou (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2018-06)
    In a model featuring sudden stops and pecuniary externalities, I show that the ability to use capital controls has radical implications for the conduct of monetary policy. Absent capital controls, following an inflation targeting regime is nearly ...
  • Discrimination without taste : How discrimination can spillover and persist 

    Ramachandran, Rajesh; Rauh, Christopher (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2018-06)
    We introduce coordination failures driven by beliefs regarding the presence of taste discriminators as a channel of discrimination in productive activities requiring the input of multiple agents. We show that discrimination can persist under perfectly ...
  • Gale's fixed tax for exchanging houses 

    Andersson, Tommy; Ehlers, Lars; Svensson, Lars-Gunnar; Tierney, Ryan (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2018-06)
    We consider the taxation of exchanges among a set of agents where each agent owns one object. Agents may have different valuations for the objects and they need to pay taxes for exchanges. Using basic properties, we show that if pairwise (or some) ...
  • Asset pledgeability and endogenously leveraged bubbles 

    Bengui, Julien; Phan, Toan (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2018-06)
    We develop a simple model of defaultable debt and rational bubbles in the price of an asset, which can be pledged as collateral in a competitive credit pool. When the asset pledgeability is low, the down payment is high, and bubble investment is ...
  • Robust design in monotonic matching markets : a case for firm-proposing deferred-acceptance 

    Ehlers, Lars; Masso, Jordi (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2018-05)
    We study two-sided matching markets among workers and firms. Workers seek one position at a firm but firms may employ several workers. In many applications those markets are monotonic: leaving positions unfilled is costly as for instance, for hospitals ...