Now showing items 1-20 of 527

  • Bootstrapping factor models with cross sectional dependence 

    Gonçalves, Sílvia; Perron, Benoit (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2018-07)
    We consider bootstrap methods for factor-augmented regressions with cross sectional dependence among idiosyncratic errors. This is important to capture the bias of the OLS estimator derived recently by Gonçalves and Perron (2014). We first show that a ...
  • Asset pledgeability and endogenously leveraged bubbles 

    Bengui, Julien; Phan, Toan (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2018-06)
    We develop a simple model of defaultable debt and rational bubbles in the price of an asset, which can be pledged as collateral in a competitive credit pool. When the asset pledgeability is low, the down payment is high, and bubble investment is ...
  • Gale's fixed tax for exchanging houses 

    Andersson, Tommy; Ehlers, Lars; Svensson, Lars-Gunnar; Tierney, Ryan (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2018-06)
    We consider the taxation of exchanges among a set of agents where each agent owns one object. Agents may have different valuations for the objects and they need to pay taxes for exchanges. Using basic properties, we show that if pairwise (or some) ...
  • Monetary policy in sudden stop-prone economies 

    Coulibaly, Louphou (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2018-06)
    In a model featuring sudden stops and pecuniary externalities, I show that the ability to use capital controls has radical implications for the conduct of monetary policy. Absent capital controls, following an inflation targeting regime is nearly ...
  • Discrimination without taste : How discrimination can spillover and persist 

    Ramachandran, Rajesh; Rauh, Christopher (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2018-06)
    We introduce coordination failures driven by beliefs regarding the presence of taste discriminators as a channel of discrimination in productive activities requiring the input of multiple agents. We show that discrimination can persist under perfectly ...
  • Robust design in monotonic matching markets : a case for firm-proposing deferred-acceptance 

    Ehlers, Lars; Masso, Jordi (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2018-05)
    We study two-sided matching markets among workers and firms. Workers seek one position at a firm but firms may employ several workers. In many applications those markets are monotonic: leaving positions unfilled is costly as for instance, for hospitals ...
  • Positively responsive collection choice rules and majority rule: a generalization of May's theorem to many alternatives 

    Horan, Sean; Osborne, Martin J.; Sanver, M. Remzi (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2018-04)
    A collective choice rule selects a set of alternatives for each collective choice problem. Suppose that the alternative ’x’, is in the set selected by a collective choice rule for some collective choice problem. Now suppose that ‘x’ rises above another ...
  • Relative Nash welfarism 

    Sprumont, Yves (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2017-09)
    Relative Nash welfarism is a solution to the problem of aggregating von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences over a set of lotteries. It ranks such lotteries according to the product of any collection of 0-normalized von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities they ...
  • Externalities and the nucleolus 

    Alvarez-Mozos, Mikel; Ehlers, Lars (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2017-09)
    In most economic applications, externalities prevail: the worth of a coalition depends on how the other players are organized. We show that there is a unique natural way of extending the nucleolus from (coalitional) games without externalities to games ...
  • Strategyproof Choice of Acts : Beyond Dictatorship 

    Bahel, Éric; Sprumont, Yves (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2017-05)
    We model social choices as acts mapping states of nature to (public) outcomes. A social choice function (or SCF) assigns an act to every profile of subjective expected utility preferences over acts. A SCF is strategyproof if no agent ever has an incentive ...
  • (Il)legal Assignments in School Choice 

    Ehlers, Lars; Morrill, Thayer (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2017-05)
    In public school choice, students with strict preferences are assigned to schools. Schools are endowed with priorities over students. Incorporating different constraints from applications, priorities are often modeled as choice functions over sets ...
  • Assigning Refugees to Landlords in Sweden: Stable Maximum Matchings 

    Andersson, Tommy; Ehlers, Lars (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2016-12)
    The member states of the European Union received 1.2 million first time asylum applications in 2015 (a doubling compared to 2014). Even if asylum will be granted for many of the refugees that made the journey to Europe, several obstacles for successful ...
  • Pareto Dominance of Deferred Acceptance through Early Decision 

    Bonkoungou, Somouaoga (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2016-08)
    An early decision market is governed by rules that allow each student to apply to (at most) one college and require the student to attend this college if admitted. This market is ubiquitous in college admissions in the United States. We model this ...
  • Strategy-proof choice of acts : a preliminary study 

    Sprumont, Yves (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2016-06)
    We model social choices as acts mapping states of the world to (social) outcomes. A (social choice) rule assigns an act to every profile of subjective expected utility preferences over acts. A rule is strategy-proof if no agent ever has an incentive ...
  • Continuity and Incentive Compatibility in Cardinal Voting Mechanisms 

    Ehlers, Lars; Majumdar, Dipjyoti; Mishra, Debasis; Sen, Arunava (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2016-03)
    We show that every cardinal incentive compatible voting mechanism satisfying a continuity condition, must be ordinal. Our results apply to many standard models in mechanism design without transfers, including the standard voting models with any domain ...
  • Ordinally consistent tournament solutions 

    Sprumont, Yves (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2016-03)
    A set ranking method assigns to each tournament on a given set an ordering of the subsets of that set. Such a method is consistent if (i) the items in the set are ranked in the same order as the sets of items they beat and (ii) the ordering of the items ...
  • Ranking by rating 

    Sprumont, Yves (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2016-02)
    Each item in a given collection is characterized by a set of possible performances. A (ranking) method is a function that assigns an ordering of the items to every performance profile. Ranking by Rating consists in evaluating each item’s performance ...
  • Agendas in legislative decision-making 

    Horan, Sean (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2016-02)
    Despite the wide range of agendas used in legislative decision-making, the literature has focused almost exclusively on two stylized formats, the so-called Euro-Latin and Anglo-American agendas. As emphasized by Ordeshook and Schwartz [1987], this focus ...
  • Liquidity traps, capital flows 

    Acharya, Sushant; Bengui, Julien (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2015-12-17)
    Motivated by debates surrounding international capital flows during the Great Recession, we conduct a positive and normative analysis of capital flows when a region of the global economy experiences a liquidity trap. Capital flows reduce inefficient ...
  • A simple model of two-stage choice 

    Horan, Sean (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2015-12)
    I provide choice-theoretic foundations for a simple two-stage model, called transitive shortlist methods, where choices are made by sequentially by applying a pair of transitive preferences (or rationales) to eliminate inferior alternatives. Despite ...