Recent Submissions

  • Robust design in monotonic matching markets : a case for firm-proposing deferred-acceptance 

    Ehlers, Lars; Masso, Jordi (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2018-05)
    We study two-sided matching markets among workers and firms. Workers seek one position at a firm but firms may employ several workers. In many applications those markets are monotonic: leaving positions unfilled is costly as for instance, for hospitals ...
  • Positively responsive collection choice rules and majority rule: a generalization of May's theorem to many alternatives 

    Horan, Sean; Osborne, Martin J.; Sanver, M. Remzi (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2018-04)
    A collective choice rule selects a set of alternatives for each collective choice problem. Suppose that the alternative ’x’, is in the set selected by a collective choice rule for some collective choice problem. Now suppose that ‘x’ rises above another ...
  • Externalities and the nucleolus 

    Alvarez-Mozos, Mikel; Ehlers, Lars (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2017-09)
    In most economic applications, externalities prevail: the worth of a coalition depends on how the other players are organized. We show that there is a unique natural way of extending the nucleolus from (coalitional) games without externalities to games ...
  • Relative Nash welfarism 

    Sprumont, Yves (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2017-09)
    Relative Nash welfarism is a solution to the problem of aggregating von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences over a set of lotteries. It ranks such lotteries according to the product of any collection of 0-normalized von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities they ...
  • (Il)legal Assignments in School Choice 

    Ehlers, Lars; Morrill, Thayer (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2017-05)
    In public school choice, students with strict preferences are assigned to schools. Schools are endowed with priorities over students. Incorporating different constraints from applications, priorities are often modeled as choice functions over sets ...
  • Strategyproof Choice of Acts : Beyond Dictatorship 

    Bahel, Éric; Sprumont, Yves (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2017-05)
    We model social choices as acts mapping states of nature to (public) outcomes. A social choice function (or SCF) assigns an act to every profile of subjective expected utility preferences over acts. A SCF is strategyproof if no agent ever has an incentive ...
  • Assigning Refugees to Landlords in Sweden: Stable Maximum Matchings 

    Andersson, Tommy; Ehlers, Lars (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2016-12)
    The member states of the European Union received 1.2 million first time asylum applications in 2015 (a doubling compared to 2014). Even if asylum will be granted for many of the refugees that made the journey to Europe, several obstacles for successful ...
  • Pareto Dominance of Deferred Acceptance through Early Decision 

    Bonkoungou, Somouaoga (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2016-08)
    An early decision market is governed by rules that allow each student to apply to (at most) one college and require the student to attend this college if admitted. This market is ubiquitous in college admissions in the United States. We model this ...
  • Strategy-proof choice of acts : a preliminary study 

    Sprumont, Yves (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2016-06)
    We model social choices as acts mapping states of the world to (social) outcomes. A (social choice) rule assigns an act to every profile of subjective expected utility preferences over acts. A rule is strategy-proof if no agent ever has an incentive ...
  • Ordinally consistent tournament solutions 

    Sprumont, Yves (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2016-03)
    A set ranking method assigns to each tournament on a given set an ordering of the subsets of that set. Such a method is consistent if (i) the items in the set are ranked in the same order as the sets of items they beat and (ii) the ordering of the items ...

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