Recent Submissions

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    Externalities and the nucleolus 

    Alvarez-Mozos, Mikel; Ehlers, Lars (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2017-09)
    In most economic applications, externalities prevail: the worth of a coalition depends on how the other players are organized. We show that there is a unique natural way of extending the nucleolus from ...
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    Relative Nash welfarism 

    Sprumont, Yves (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2017-09)
    Relative Nash welfarism is a solution to the problem of aggregating von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences over a set of lotteries. It ranks such lotteries according to the product of any collection of ...
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    (Il)legal Assignments in School Choice 

    Ehlers, Lars; Morrill, Thayer (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2017-05)
    In public school choice, students with strict preferences are assigned to schools. Schools are endowed with priorities over students. Incorporating different constraints from applications, priorities ...
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    Strategyproof Choice of Acts : Beyond Dictatorship 

    Bahel, Éric; Sprumont, Yves (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2017-05)
    We model social choices as acts mapping states of nature to (public) outcomes. A social choice function (or SCF) assigns an act to every profile of subjective expected utility preferences over acts. A ...
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    Assigning Refugees to Landlords in Sweden: Stable Maximum Matchings 

    Andersson, Tommy; Ehlers, Lars (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2016-12)
    The member states of the European Union received 1.2 million first time asylum applications in 2015 (a doubling compared to 2014). Even if asylum will be granted for many of the refugees that made the ...
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    Pareto Dominance of Deferred Acceptance through Early Decision 

    Bonkoungou, Somouaoga (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2016-08)
    An early decision market is governed by rules that allow each student to apply to (at most) one college and require the student to attend this college if admitted. This market is ubiquitous in college ...
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    Strategy-proof choice of acts : a preliminary study 

    Sprumont, Yves (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2016-06)
    We model social choices as acts mapping states of the world to (social) outcomes. A (social choice) rule assigns an act to every profile of subjective expected utility preferences over acts. A rule is ...
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    Ordinally consistent tournament solutions 

    Sprumont, Yves (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2016-03)
    A set ranking method assigns to each tournament on a given set an ordering of the subsets of that set. Such a method is consistent if (i) the items in the set are ranked in the same order as the sets ...

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