Recent Submissions

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    (Il)legal Assignments in School Choice 

    Ehlers, Lars; Morrill, Thayer (2017-05)
    In public school choice, students with strict preferences are assigned to schools. Schools are endowed with priorities over students. Incorporating different constraints from applications, priorities are often modeled as ...
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    Strategyproof Choice of Acts : Beyond Dictatorship 

    Bahel, Éric; Sprumont, Yves (2017-05)
    We model social choices as acts mapping states of nature to (public) outcomes. A social choice function (or SCF) assigns an act to every profile of subjective expected utility preferences over acts. A SCF is strategyproof ...
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    Assigning Refugees to Landlords in Sweden: Stable Maximum Matchings 

    Andersson, Tommy; Ehlers, Lars (2016-12)
    The member states of the European Union received 1.2 million first time asylum applications in 2015 (a doubling compared to 2014). Even if asylum will be granted for many of the refugees that made the journey to Europe, ...
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    Pareto Dominance of Deferred Acceptance through Early Decision 

    Bonkoungou, Somouaoga (2016-08)
    An early decision market is governed by rules that allow each student to apply to (at most) one college and require the student to attend this college if admitted. This market is ubiquitous in college admissions in the ...
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    Strategy-proof choice of acts : a preliminary study 

    Sprumont, Yves (2016-06)
    We model social choices as acts mapping states of the world to (social) outcomes. A (social choice) rule assigns an act to every profile of subjective expected utility preferences over acts. A rule is strategy-proof if no ...
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    Ordinally consistent tournament solutions 

    Sprumont, Yves (2016-03)
    A set ranking method assigns to each tournament on a given set an ordering of the subsets of that set. Such a method is consistent if (i) the items in the set are ranked in the same order as the sets of items they beat and ...
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    Continuity and Incentive Compatibility in Cardinal Voting Mechanisms 

    Ehlers, Lars; Majumdar, Dipjyoti; Mishra, Debasis; Sen, Arunava (2016-03)
    We show that every cardinal incentive compatible voting mechanism satisfying a continuity condition, must be ordinal. Our results apply to many standard models in mechanism design without transfers, including the standard ...
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    Ranking by rating 

    Sprumont, Yves (2016-02)
    Each item in a given collection is characterized by a set of possible performances. A (ranking) method is a function that assigns an ordering of the items to every performance profile. Ranking by Rating consists in evaluating ...

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