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Election Forecasting under Opaque Conditions

dc.contributor.authorDassonneville, Ruth
dc.contributor.authorHooghe, Marc
dc.date.accessioned2016-07-28T20:34:32Z
dc.date.available2016-07-28T20:34:32Z
dc.date.issued2012
dc.identifier.citationDassonneville, Ruth et Marc Hooghe. 2012. "Election Forecasting under Opaque Conditions : A Model for Francophone Belgium, 1981-2010". International Journal of Forecasting 28 (no 4) : 777-88.fr
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1866/14068
dc.subjectVotefr
dc.subjectBelgiquefr
dc.subjectAdhésionfr
dc.titleElection Forecasting under Opaque Conditionsfr
dc.typeArticlefr
dc.contributor.affiliationUniversité de Montréal. Faculté des arts et des sciences. Département de science politiquefr
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.ijforecast.2012.04.008
dcterms.abstractElection forecasting models assume retrospective economic voting and clear mechanisms of accountability. Previous research indeed indicates that incumbent political parties are being held accountable for the state of the economy. In this article we develop a ‘hard case’ for the assumptions of election forecasting models. Belgium is a multiparty system with perennial coalition governments. Furthermore, Belgium has two completely segregated party systems (Dutch and French language). Since the prime minister during the period 1974-2011 has always been a Dutch language politician, French language voters could not even vote for the prime minister, so this cognitive shortcut to establish political accountability is not available. Results of an analysis for the French speaking parties (1981-2010) show that even in these conditions of opaque accountability, retrospective economic voting occurs as election results respond to indicators with regard to GDP and unemployment levels. Party membership figures can be used to model the popularity function in election forecasting.fr
dcterms.alternativeA Model for Francophone Belgium, 1981-2010fr
dcterms.bibliographicCitationInternational Journal of Forecasting ; vol. 28, no 4
dcterms.languageengfr
UdeM.VersionRioxxVersion acceptée / Accepted Manuscript


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